Why did Bank of England keep shtoom?
I am still away, sorting that family problem I have mentioned before, but I could not resist making a couple of points about the Bank of England's clandestine emergency loans to HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland.
The first and obvious question is why on earth the Bank, Treasury and FSA thought it was a good idea to keep the £61.6bn of lending secret.
It's not as though they hadn't publicly stated at precisely the time the loans were being given that both banks were effectively bust.
On 8 October and again on 13 October of last year, the Treasury publicly announced - with its unprecedented package of support measures worth around half a trillion pounds - that the entire British banking system was in dire straits.
As for RBS and HBOS, they were identified by the authorities as kaput as commercial operations - because we as taxpayers had to inject more than £30bn of capital into them.
Against that backdrop, it might actually have been reassuring to depositors, investors and taxpayers to have had confirmation that the Bank of England was providing loans to replace private-sector finance that was melting away from RBS and HBOS.
However, as often happens, the authorities - led on this occasion by Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England - were fighting an old war, not the one actually being waged.
They were so bruised by the run on Northern Rock, which began after I disclosed a year earlier that the Rock had asked for emergency loans from the Bank, that they felt that they had to take advantage of new legislative powers to keep such loans secret.
But there was a big difference between the Rock on the one hand and RBS and Lloyds on the other: the Rock and its depositors had received no pledges that the bank would not be permitted to collapse when the emergency loan was confirmed. The Chancellor, Governor and head of the FSA all refused to promise that the Rock's depositors would not lose a penny.
But a year later they all showed in word and deed that HBOS and RBS were too big and important to fail.
So keeping secret that additional Bank of England support will seem fatuous to many.
Has the cloak-and-dagger performance done any serious damage?
Well, some shareholders in Lloyds will have their fears reinforced that they weren't in full possession of the facts in approving their banks' takeover of HBOS - although it's unclear whether those Lloyds owners who want redress will have their claims strengthened in a legal sense.
Also I am not sure that this example of covert ops by the Bank of England will promote financial stability in a long-term sense.
There will be many in the market who will now wonder what other horrors the Bank of England feels it can't unveil "devant les enfants".
Update 09:35 GMT, 25 November: A number of your comments are giving me pause for thought about whether I am being either naive or too knowing in querying whether the Bank of England was being rational in cloaking those emergency loans to HBOS and RBS.
It is true that, last October, it was of little interest to me whether or not the Bank of England was providing short-term emergency funding to RBS and HBOS.
Well, as I have said, it's because we had official confirmation from the Treasury, Bank of England and FSA that they were more-or-less bust - but were being propped up by the state.
Let's just take one item of taxpayer support announced at the time, the Credit Guarantee Scheme.
This was - in effect - a promise made on 8 October by the Treasury to lend £250bn to the banks.
In that context, £60bn of very short-term emergency funding by the Bank of England - which was necessary until the banks could complete technical arrangements to issue funds under the CGS - doesn't seem that significant.
Also, the Bank of England increased to £200bn the exceptional facility it had created allowing the banks to swap mortgages they had already provided for Treasury bills, the equivalent of cash.
So I have to say that - at the time - I really didn't give a fig whether the Bank of England was providing emergency bridging loans, until the effect of these other taxpayer-backed schemes kicked in.
We as taxpayers were up to our necks in financial commitments to HBOS and RBS. In that sense, surely it was irrelevant that they were maxing out their credit cards with the Bank of England until they could take advantage of the new overdraft facility at the Treasury?
Well, the truth is - as some of you have implied - that perhaps I am making the silly mistake of assuming that markets would have taken this cool and rational view.
There was a mood of utter irrational hysteria among banks and investors at the time.
And I guess there's a risk that the formal disclosure that financial institutions were calling in their loans to HBOS and RBS on such a colossal scale - which would have been the unmissable implication of the Bank of England lending tens of billions to them - would have fomented even greater panic.
So perhaps the Bank of England was right to keep shtoom (or perhaps "schtum", as my Yiddish coach has pointed out) at the moment of highest anxiety.
But many would say that there was no sound reason to keep the secret for quite as long as it has done.