In the early 1960s, President Kennedy expressed his fear that up to 20 countries might have the nuclear bomb by the end of that decade. An effort to limit the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons helped to prevent that nightmare being realised. But the system of treaties, inspections and trade-offs that was established to control nuclear weapons now appears close to collapse. Gordon Corera reports


The sense of global insecurity since 9/11 has heightened concerns that the world may be on the verge of a new nuclear arms race. And the intense focus on terrorism, coupled with Iraq's non-existent WMD, has risked obscuring the extent to which the spread of nuclear weapons remains a key challenge. Terrorism can and will kill many people around the world, but it will only have the capacity to attain catastrophic dimensions and create the kind of upheaval that Al-Qaeda seeks if it is allied to weapons of mass destruction. There also remains the very real possibility of the more traditional form of nuclear exchange between two states - in 2002, South Asia came closer than many realise to witnessing the use of nuclear weapons as India and Pakistan veered towards war. The spread of nuclear weapons makes both of these dangers - traditional nuclear war and terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons - much more likely.

The last conference to review and update the NPT, in 2005, couldn't even agree on an agenda, let alone what to do

Out of the fears of the 1960s came a non-proliferation system, codified in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The non-nuclear states agreed not to seek weapons in return for being provided with civilian nuclear technology, while the existing club of nuclear states agreed to facilitate this and to negotiate 'in good faith' to disarm.


But India and Pakistan both remained outside the system and tested bombs in 1998 with limited consequences. The US is now offering India a nuclear deal, even though it remains outside the existing structure. Israel also remains outside, to the irritation of many Arab states. North Korea recently decided to withdraw from the system to pursue its weapons programme. Hence the deterrent factor for those considering embarking on their own nuclear quest is low.

The bargain underlying the system is breaking down. The relationship between the nuclear haves and have-nots has deteriorated. Non-nuclear states question how the existing nuclear states can tell others not to acquire weapons when they are so unwilling to give up their own. "The talk in the US of updating their nuclear weapons and Britain deciding apparently to renew Trident demonstrates an indefinite commitment to retaining nuclear weapons," argues Paul Ingram of the British-American Security Information Council, a think-tank. "It explicitly breaks their commitment under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their commitments made in the 2000 review conference."

Meanwhile, the US questions whether the current system isn't making it too easy for the non-nuclear states to move towards weapons. Key US officials believe that the NPT is already broken and that remaining wedded to it makes no sense. "The US, of all countries, deems the NPT to be, in effect, dead," argues Paul Ingram. "And the US is going about their non-proliferation objectives using the coalition-of-the-willing model rather than the global negotiated model of the NPT." The result is that few believe in the system. The last conference to review and update the NPT, in 2005, couldn't even agree on an agenda, let alone what to do.


Few countries are suspected of actively seeking nuclear weapons, but those that are accused of doing so are in the two most unstable parts of the world: the Middle East and East Asia. Declared possession of the bomb by either Iran or North Korea could set off a cascade of proliferation. A North Korean bomb might lead to countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan reassessing their position on nuclear weapons, and all have the technical capability to move forward relatively quickly because of existing civilian programmes and research. If Iran were to develop the bomb, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt might also look at their options.

"A nuclear reaction chain would immediately start in the Middle East and would potentially impact around the globe as other countries come to the conclusion that the restraint regime is over," argues Joe Cirincione, a US non-proliferation expert. "You could quickly see us go into a world with not eight or nine nuclear nations, which we have now, but ten, 20 or 25 - the nightmare world that John F Kennedy warned us about." The nightmare may be looming on the horizon but the problem remains trying to work out what to do about it. Fashioning a new consensus between the nuclear haves and have-nots looks far from easy.

Gordon Corera has been a Security Correspondent for BBC News since June 2004 - in that role he reports on all aspects of terrorism, proliferation and international security issues for BBC TV and Radio. Since joining the BBC in 1997, he has worked as US analyst and a foreign affairs reporter for the Today programme

Read Steven Eke's article on Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran