In a troubled and unstable world, BBC Security Correspondent Gordon Corera identifies the likely tipping points

The era of impending global Armageddon brought about by a face-off between two superpowers may be long past but, in many ways, the modern security environment appears far less stable and more uncertain than it has done for many years. The end of the Cold War led to much talk of the United States as the sole remaining superpower. But while no other single power looks set in the short to medium term to come close to rivalling it, much of the friction in international security comes from the growing plethora of challenges to America's influence.


As well as changing strategic balances among states, wider trends are also at work, in particular the dispersal of power thanks to changes in the fields of communications and technology.
Together this has fuelled a sense of insecurity in both states and individuals as they look to the future. Managing changing power dynamics between states is certain to strain the international system. But the deeper social and technological trends may challenge whether the current system as a whole is able to provide security.

The political solution that was supposed to be facilitated by better security has not materialised

In terms of US power, the Middle East and particularly Iraq remains the dominant theatre for the testing of US hegemony and power. Supporters of the new US security plan or 'surge' in Iraq believe it is working and will have had a real impact if troops stay through most of 2008. But the problem remains that the political solution that was supposed to be facilitated by better security still has not materialised and there is a feeling that many groups are simply biding their time and waiting for the US to downscale its presence.

And even if the surge is showing some signs of success on the ground, public opinion in the US continues to turn against the war and a Democratic Congress continues to challenge the President over the issue. The growing
divisions within the US make American policy more unpredictable as the Bush presidency draws to a close.

For all the fears of the country becoming a base for Al Qaeda or of unrestrained civil war, the implications of US withdrawal in Iraq are ultimately unknown. In a worst-case scenario the country could resemble Lebanon in the 1980s with a weak state and neighbours fighting their own battles for influence through proxies.

Particularly dangerous would be a full-scale sectarian conflict, which could inflame Sunni-Shia tensions in neighbouring countries and further afield. In Afghanistan, the strength of the US and Nato is being tested as well by insurgents and their supporters. Strategic failure in both Iraq and Afghanistan would be a serious blow to Washington and its credibility.


Iran's strategic policy towards the US and Iraq remains unclear. Some argue that Iran is using its influence with militias to try and drive the US out of Iraq, others that it is in Iran's interests to keep the US in Iraq - caught in a bloody conflict that might reduce its willingness to challenge Iran and its nuclear programme. The real policy is hard to divine, most likely a result of divergent views within Iran's complex polity.

There is no doubt overall that Iran senses an opportunity and a moment of relative strength in which to further its ambitions to a position of regional strength, even dominance, a rise aided by Washington having removed two opponents on its borders: Saddam Hussein and the Taleban. One means of Iran achieving regional power status in the medium term, but also potentially one of its greatest vulnerabilities in the short term, is Tehran's nuclear ambitions, which Iran insists are peaceful but the US believes are centred on its becoming a nuclear weapons power.


If Iran does become a nuclear power, then it could have profoundly unsettling implications for the region and the entire non-proliferation order. Beyond the immediate question of how Israel would react, many experts believe that Saudi Arabia would not tolerate a nuclear Iran without reconsidering whether it too needed to go nuclear and others in the Gulf as well as Egypt may well follow.

Additionally, a nuclear Iran may deal a near-fatal blow to the already struggling Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is based on a deal in which nuclear weapons states agree to pass civilian nuclear technology to non-nuclear states and also agree slowly to disarm themselves. In return, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to seek the bomb. But trust on both sides has been eroding rapidly, with the US arguing that Iran has been exploiting its membership of the NPT to seek weapons technology under the cloak of a civilian programme, whilst Iran and some other non-weapons states argue that the US and others have failed to pass on technology and to make sufficient moves towards real disarmament.

But while the reality of a nuclear Iran may be deeply unsettling to the global security environment, a decision by the US to take military action to try and stop Iran could also have unpredictable consequences. Iranian retaliation could possibly further destabilise Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other parts of the region. There's also no guarantee that military action would significantly delay Iran's acquisition of the bomb, if indeed that is Iran's intention.


Growing demand for energy, not least from Asia and particularly China, has increased competition for resources and increased the power of supplier countries. More and more bilateral energy deals are being cut as suppliers use their resources as a bargaining chip with energy-hungry countries. The knock-on impact will be not only a shift in international power dynamics but a challenge to the global security environment - increased military intervention to secure supplies is more likely.

Western companies such as BP and Shell are finding the terms of deals made with Moscow in the past are now being altered

Russia under President Putin has not been afraid to flex its muscles on the issue of energy, using its position to reassert its role in the world - something neighbouring Ukraine can bruisingly testify to after its supply was cut in the new year during a row over prices. Western companies such as BP and Shell are also finding the terms of deals made with Moscow in the past are now being altered. At the moment it is hard to judge whether this strong, assertive Russia is a product of manoeuvring before President Putin's second term of office ends or if it's here to stay.

The rise of regional powers such as Iran, Russia and Brazil, as well as potentially global powers like China and India, are slowly edging us to something like a more multi-polar world, even if none of those countries individually yet comes close to US power. As each of these countries asserts itself and seeks a greater role, tension may well grow among neighbours unhappy with the change. The European Union's position is hard to predict; much may depend on how inward facing it becomes as it tries to resolve its own future and work out whether to decouple itself from US foreign policy or remain as closely tied to Washington as it was during the Cold War.


More fundamentally, the nature of power in the international arena is also changing. The influence of nation-states is declining and the divide between foreign and domestic affairs is breaking down.

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The influence of nation-states is declining and the divide between foreign and domestic affairs is breaking down

lobal communications and networking allows individuals, non-governmental organisations and transnational groupings to wield more influence than ever before, often bypassing state controls and working outside the remit of international institutions. Those transnational actors range from coalitions and groups working to combat global poverty or deal with climate change on one side to transnational criminal networks involved in people smuggling or even nuclear proliferation on the other.

What they have in common is an ability to exploit the changes wrought by globalisation in order to operate. The internet has also been a great enabler for those groups and networks seeking out like-minded individuals across national barriers whatever the common interest and identity may be (less likely, today, to be a national identity). Terrorists have also been highly adept at using new media and communications. Technological developments in areas such as biotechnology and encryption also hold dangers for global security; non-state actors can increasingly get their hands on technology that was once the sole possession of large states.

The role of the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network - which sold nuclear technology on the black market - is an important lesson as to the way in which technology and especially knowledge, previously classified, can quickly pass from state control into a murky, international trade. Ungoverned spaces include not only failed states but also sprawling urban centres beyond state control in the developing world as well as the internet. Together these form part of the dark underbelly of globalisation in which criminal networks, terrorists and others can operate.


Global security threats - whether current or upcoming and ranging from bird flu pandemics to climate change to global inequalities and competition for resources - all challenge traditional institutional boundaries and the capacity of existing multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations, to cope.

New or radically reformed institutions and arrangements may be required to cope with these challenges but where and how they'll emerge is unclear. The degree to which the changing relations of power between states affects the ability of those institutions to reform themselves is likely to be an important factor.

While pessimists believe all these changes mean a certain increase in global insecurity in coming years, the optimists counter that the array of changes presents opportunities to refashion international relations - particularly to refocus it away from state-to-state inter-action and more towards the needs of ordinary people. Judging whether this new era of insecurity lasts or resolves into a more stable pattern is almost impossible.

Gordon Corera has been a BBC Security Correspondent since
2004, reporting on terrorism, proliferation and international security issues.
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