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'Hope and History': the US and peace in Northern Ireland by John Dumbrell
"A Farewell to Arms? From "long war" to long peace in Northern Ireland" Edited by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen Published by Manchester University Press, 2000
Clinton's activism: explanations and context
Various explanations for Clinton's activism spring to mind. The President had a personal interest in the affairs of the province, stemming from student days at Oxford. The abandonment of non-interventionism also had a strong "bureaucratic politics" dimension. Clinton's Irish strategy involved a bureaucratic victory for the White House European foreign policy staff over the State Department. (Aside from State and the London Embassy, the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency were also opposed to the granting of a visa to Adams in 1993-94.) At one level, Clinton was responding to Congressional and Democratic Party pressure. Edward Kennedy was an important influence. Clinton was also responsive to the new alignment in elite Irish America represented by the Morrison-O'Dowd group. The policy evolved alongside a reinterpretation of the "special relationship" with London. Two clusters of explanatory context stand out: one involving the Presidential relationship with Irish America; the other relating to the development of American internationalism after the Cold War.
For The Nation columnist Eric Alterman, Clinton's Irish policy was "a stunning success" for ethnic lobbying.26 Michael Mates, who had been sent by prime minister John Major to Washington to protest Clinton's early interventions, wrote in 1996 of "Clinton's cynical playing to the green Irish vote".27
Presidents, especially first term ones, are interested in votes and popularity. Although criticised by Republicans for damaging US-UK relations, Clinton was hardly likely to suffer much domestic damage in advancing his new activism. Irish America - a vast constituency of around 40 million people, represented by some powerful congressional figures - would probably like it. At worst, a highly assimilated Irish America would be indifferent, though surely willing to applaud any settlement. Irish-Americans were also widely thought to be prominent in the ranks of "Reagan Democrats", who had defected to the Republicans in the 1980s, and needed to be reclaimed. The new policy was not entirely risk-free, even if we discount the impact on Anglo-American relations. Nancy Soderberg later recalled the problems of heightening expectations, about "the President pulling a rabbit out of the hat".28 The policy clearly offended specialists at the State Department. However, it is possible to concoct an argument to the effect that Clinton was primarily concerned to please various sections of Irish America.
The problem with this type of analysis is that it is frequently pushed much too far. Commentators understate the complexity and overstate the intensity of political Irish America. David Trimble acknowledged, as the peace process developed, that Irish America was "complex, politically".29 For one thing, though arguably more assimilated than their Catholic counterparts, Protestant Irish Americans represent a significant component in the ethnic mix. Congressman Joseph Kennedy estimated in 1994 that around one-quarter of Irish-Americans in his Massachusetts constituency were Protestant in origin.30 Prominent Irish-Americans also often disagree about what is best for Northern Ireland. In 1993-4, House of Representatives Speaker Tom Foley, a highly influential Irish-American politician whom the Clinton Administration had every reason to cultivate, opposed the granting of Adams' visa. There is no cohesive "shamrock vote" in the US. In 1992, Clinton actually won reasonably clearly in states with large Irish-American populations.31 Indulging in high-profile and time-consuming policy departures in Northern Ireland was hardly a rational way of electioneering. It is also worth recalling that Clinton (like Senator Kennedy) has clashed with Irish Catholic lobbies over issues such as abortion and the waning American enthusiasm for the McBride principles.32
Strong arguments can be mustered to link both the entire post-1992 peace
initiative, and Clinton's own part in it, to the global context - particularly
to the end of the Cold War. As Michael Cox has argued, "it was inevitable
that, as the tide of global radicalism began to retreat after 1989, this
would feed into republican thinking".33 With the Soviet threat removed,
it indeed did appear that London had neither selfish strategic nor economic
interest in Ulster. The Clinton-ANIA strategy was a coherent and successful
attempt to reinforce republican doubts about the rationale for the armed
struggle and to talk up the benefits of peace. |
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