Dr David Onnekink, Edinburgh University

A contemporary observer once jested that William was King of the Dutch Republic and Stadholder in England. He meant to say that his powers in the republic were more significant than those in his new kingdom. But this was not apparent when he was born just after the death of his father in 1650, who forfeited the right of his son to the stadholderate through his reckless policies.

When William was a boy, there was no immediate prospect of any political role until in 1668 the Orangists gained ground and in 1670 William took a seat in the Council of State. In 1672 he was appointed Captain-General and Stadholder, in which capacity he led the Dutch armed forces to glory in their battle against the invading French. William emerged as the eminent head of the republic with extensive powers on a national, provincial and local level, and as the undisputed hero of the common people.

But the power of the Prince was still limited. Despite his considerable influence, he was still formally a servant to the States General and had to act with circumspection to achieve his goals. Moreover, the Dutch political nation was increasingly polarised as a result of William's war policy, which resulted in frequent clashes between the Prince and the Dutch regents. In 1678 the war with France came to an end against the will of William. In 1684 he wanted to send help to Luxembourg, besieged by the French, but the regents dared not risk it. Even in 1688 the regents only reluctantly supported William's design to invade England. And when William died in 1702 they were happy not to appoint a successor.

The 'reign' of William brought to light several weaknesses inherent in the Dutch political system which were not to be solved until its collapse as a result of the French invasion of 1795.

The first problem was of a constitutional nature. Sovereignty lay with the provincial assemblies made up of delegations from the various city councils and even countryside units.

One could even agree with Jonathan Swift when he wrote that the Dutch Republic was 'crazily instituted'. But in practice, in times of crisis there were several centralising powers. The most remarkable was the concentration of power in the hands of the Stadholder; a semi-monarchical figure, chief commander of the armed forces and navy, with a right to sit in the Council of State and appoint people for office both at a provincial level as well as in city councils.

Everyone realised that a strong man was needed in times of crisis, but the proud, rich and independent regents and merchants loathed the stadholderly authority, especially after two decades of republican government between 1650 and 1672.

The second weakness was the Republic's vulnerability. The Republicans desired a foreign policy of aloofness and neutrality, so as to trade in peace and not to antagonise the French and the English. But William led them into a war that would last for 40 years and would exhaust the states' resources. Was the war necessary or was it just a prince's lust for military glory? Had not Pieter de la Court in his Interest written that Princes are like lions, who live for violence and preys?

William may have saved the Dutch at their darkest hour, but it remained an indisputable fact that when William was born the Dutch Republic was one of the richest and greatest powers of Europe, and when he died it had become an exhausted, second rank power heavily in debt.