The Greek gamble: New bailout means new EU risks

Homeless man on an Athens street, 19 Feb 12 Visitors to Athens see signs of increased poverty

It would be worth asking Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of the eurozone finance ministers, when he last walked the streets of Athens.

The same question should also be put to the EU's Economics Commissioner Olli Rehn. It could also be usefully asked of the eurozone finance ministers gathering in Brussels.

They are there to decide whether Greece should get a second bailout package and so avoid bankruptcy. They are also there to decide the fate of a country. Their knowledge of the real Greece matters because they are about to take an unprecedented gamble.

In the last quarter of 2011, the Greek economy shrank by 7%. The country is in the fifth year of economic decline. Unemployment is at 21% and rising fast. An estimated 150,000 businesses have closed. Emigration is at its highest level in 50 years.

A walk through the centre of Athens would reveal that thousands are sleeping rough on the streets each night. Thousands, too, line up for lunch at feeding centres. Many of them once held good jobs.

This is the view of Ilia Latrou, a resident: "The conditions are appalling, because we have living costs equivalent to Paris and London and we're beginning to have wages equivalent to Bulgaria's, so the people cannot cope, they simply cannot cope. When you have a quarter of the population unemployed... people are starving. We have food lines in Athens. We haven't seen things like that since the forties, since the time of the [German] occupation."

Does austerity mean ruin?

Here is the gamble: ignoring the reality of a country in decline, more austerity is demanded by EU officials and finance ministers. Greece has to fire 150,000 public sector workers by 2015. The minimum wage will be cut by 22%. Pensions of more than 1,300 euros (£1,079; $1,709) a month will be cut by 12%.

It is hard to recall when such spending cuts were demanded of a country in economic freefall. The challenge for the EU is immense. It will define their reputation for years to come. Will they end up rescuing a country or breaking it?

When questioned over the strategy Greek ministers reply by asking, "What is the alternative?" Greek ministers and European officials vividly describe the catastrophe if Greece defaults. "If there is a default," said the German centre-right MEP Elmar Brok, "then there would be no pensions, no salaries at all.

"That would be a total downfall of the whole economy and the state. It would become a failed state."

No one pretends that default would be an easy option. There would be a run on the banks and, at the most elemental level, there would be the question of how soon a new drachma could be printed and distributed.

But those who oppose the new bailout package argue that Greece is not being saved from the fate of a failed state, but being pushed into one - and for years to come.

Rotten practices

Certainly Greece and its politicians carry a heavy responsibility for the dilemma they find themselves in.

Athens and EU flag What went wrong in Greece?

What went wrong in Greece?

An old drachma note and a euro note
Greece's economic reforms, which led to it abandoning the drachma as its currency in favour of the euro in 2002, made it easier for the country to borrow money.

What went wrong in Greece?

The opening ceremony at the Athens Olympics
Greece went on a big, debt-funded spending spree, including paying for high-profile projects such as the 2004 Athens Olympics, which went well over its budget.

What went wrong in Greece?

A defunct restaurant for sale in central Athens
The country was hit by the downturn, which meant it had to spend more on benefits and received less in taxes. There were also doubts about the accuracy of its economic statistics.

What went wrong in Greece?

A man with a bag of coins walks past the headquarters of the Bank of Greece
Greece's economic problems meant lenders started charging higher interest rates to lend it money. Widespread tax evasion also hit the government's coffers.

What went wrong in Greece?

Workers in a rally led by the PAME union in Athens on 22 April 2010
There have been demonstrations against the government's austerity measures to deal with its debt, such as cuts to public sector pay and pensions, reduced benefits and increased taxes.

What went wrong in Greece?

Greece's problems have made investors nervous, which has made it more expensive for other European countries such as Portugal to borrow money.
Eurozone leaders are worried that if Greece were to default, and even leave the euro, it would cause a major financial crisis that could spread to much bigger economies such as Italy and Spain.

What went wrong in Greece?

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou at an EU summit in Brussels on 26 March 2010
In 2010, the EU, IMF and ECB agreed a bailout worth 110bn euros (£92bn; $145bn) for Greece. Prime Minister George Papandreou quit the following year while negotiating its follow-up.

What went wrong in Greece?

Lucas Papademos
Lucas Papademos, who succeeded Mr Papandreou, has negotiated a second bailout of 130bn euros, plus a debt writedown of 107bn euros. The price: increased austerity and eurozone monitoring.

What went wrong in Greece?

In May 2012 elections a majority of voters backed parties opposed to austerity, but no group won an overall majority resulting in political deadlock. Fresh elections have been called in June.
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Its political system was based on cronyism, where public sector jobs were doled out to reward supporters. Promised reforms never happened. It is estimated there are 60bn euros in uncollected taxes. Privatisation has stalled.

Many of the undertakings given at the time of the first bailout were not honoured. State agencies were not pruned. Costs in the health service - particularly the buying of drugs - were not cut back.

So after months of wrangling, the eurozone finance ministers must decide. There are still issues to be settled. Who precisely will oversee the implementation of this package?

Certainly last week some German politicians were losing faith in the ability of Greece to live up to its promises. The German finance minister feared they were pouring money into a bottomless pit.

Some of the ideas to ensure Greece stuck to the deal only reinforced the country's humiliation. The idea - probably now dropped - of imposing a budget commissioner from outside stung ordinary Greeks. Athens still might have to set up a separately managed account to service its debt. It would be an escrow account, giving legal priority to debt and interest payments over other expenditure.

Two of the party leaders have had to give written guarantees that they will implement the spending cuts after elections, so binding the hands of the politicians, whatever the will of the people as expressed at election time.

Some in the eurozone would even prefer Greece to postpone its elections.

The big question is whether even if Greece carries out all these measures, it can succeed in meeting the target of reducing its debt to 120% of GDP by 2020. It could well be that further funds will have to be raised - perhaps from eurozone governments. And the amount the IMF will put in is not settled.

Only when the broad package has been agreed will the private investors begin the process of taking 70% cuts on their investments, so reducing the Greek debt mountain by 100bn euros.

In all of this, there are voices who say that a new emphasis has to be placed on growth, that there is a need to free up money from the EU's regional fund and invest it in Greece. It will be interesting to see whether such ideas gather pace.

But the suspicion remains that this is a deal less about Greece and more about defending the political project of the single currency and buying time for the eurozone: to ensure that if down the road Greece defaults, the impact will be less on the banks and on other weak eurozone countries.

If there is an agreement today or early Tuesday, the markets will celebrate and EU officials will breathe a huge sigh of relief, but they will have gambled on Greece's future.

Gavin Hewitt Article written by Gavin Hewitt Gavin Hewitt Europe editor

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  • rate this

    Comment number 229.

    @ 228. smroet

    I told you about "well behaving" German civilians under occupation.

    Rotterdam resisted in the frontline and normally the civilians would have had evacuated or at least sheltered before the front occured.

    Airforces hit civilians very brutal indeed during the whole war. The German Luftwaffe had a major share of the guild killing civilians.

    Look at Guernica 1937. Not to excuse.

  • rate this

    Comment number 228.

    #226 & 227 Dietrich

    Rotterdam was bombed on May 14, 1940, and the victims were civilians. The attackers were your "well behaved" Germans military forces.

  • rate this

    Comment number 227.

    @ 225. smroet

    What I defend is the view of classical warfare that civilians must not be part of the military action. Neither as victims nor as fighters. Germans always regarded those irregulars as criminals murdering regular combat forces. The defending of a country is the matter of it's army only. Germans themselves behaved accordingly in every case they were occupied by foreign forces.

  • rate this

    Comment number 226.

    @ 225. smroet

    Germany was allied to Italy and Britain had declared war on Germany.
    When it came clear that Britain was militarily engaged in formerly neutral Greece, Greece became a threat to the Germans automatically (emerging southern frontier). If Britain would have stood apart of the Italian-Greece conflict, it seems Germany very probably would not have engaged there with own troops as well.

  • rate this

    Comment number 225.

    #224 Dietrich

    Your German troops had no business being in Greece, and the actions of the Cretans are fully understandable: it was their country, after all, which was invaded. Your indignation about the 'Cretan irregulars' was fully shared by the highest German 'authority' at the time. However, the EEC/EU was founded to have never again this kind of behaviour. So why should you defend this now?.


Comments 5 of 229



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