Let's get one thing crystal clear mosques are organisationally unlike any place of worship in the host community. The mosque is a place for prayer but also counselling, education and other key services associated with the life of the community. Having evolved in what many migrants saw as the hostile environment of a new country they also provided sanctuary from discrimination and isolation.
 | | Radical cleric Abu Hamza |
In Islam as opposed to organised Catholicism or the established Church of England (the latter deriving its power and authority from its association with the state), each mosque and each Imam (religious leader) are sovereign. The mosque belongs to the people who collectively raise the money to build it and the Imam depends on his power from the support of those who worship in front of him or more often the mosque committee that employs him. As I found in my investigation back in 2001-2002 this sometimes led mosque membership into conflict with the mosque committee and/or the Imam. It is not uncommon for a mosque committee to employ an Imam whom worshippers find intolerable. Reputation The late Sheikh Zaki Badawi, who founded the Muslim College in Ealing for training British born Imams, believed that recruiting English speaking Imams and training Imams indigenous to these islands (irrespective of parental origin) was the best way of helping a British form of Islam to evolve. It was his view that recruiting Imams from a remote village in the country of origin of the community could not help the younger generation appreciate the importance of being a part of Britain. For many years it was seen as almost too harmful to the reputation of Britain’s Muslims, to publicly question the conduct of a particular Imam or the role of the mosque. I found back in 2001 that there was a real fear of speaking out when things were seen to have gone wrong. To criticise the institution and its keepers appeared tantamount to an act of religious treachery. That all changed with 9/11. Suddenly the institution which was seen as crucial and central to the well being of the Muslim community was placed under the media spotlight. One mosque in particular, Finsbury Park, seemed to exemplify institutional paralysis and an inability of anyone (including the police) to challenge wayward behaviour. When I filmed in the mosque in 2001 it was obvious that some of the Jihadist propaganda material was being listened to and probably absorbed by young boys of 12 or 13. This was not behaviour condoned by the overwhelming majority of mosques. Infiltrate The real difficulty was that mosques were open places and no-one expected this hospitality to be abused. In 1999 in Birmingham the writing was already on the wall. When a group of young British Muslims were arrested in the Yemen, the Birmingham mosque leadership along with everyone else were taken by surprise. It was then that more serious consideration should have been given to why young British men were joining forces with Jihadist movements overseas. It confirmed what many London Muslims had been privately complaining about; radical preachers infiltrating mosques. They had tried to enlist the support of the police locally to settle disputes, but found the police believed it was not their place to intervene in places of worship. This is hardly surprising as the police had no experience of this anywhere else. At first Imam's who were calling for change, like Mufti Abdullah Barkatulla, a former committee member physically expelled by Hamza from Finsbury Park, found little support within the Muslim institutions that represented Muslim interests in government circles. Perhaps understandably the didn't want to tarnish all mosques and all British Muslims with the hate filled invective spewing out of the North London centre of radicalism. | "For many years it was seen as almost too harmful to the reputation of Britain’s Muslims, to publicly question the conduct of a particular Imam." | | Kurt Barling |
But it wasn't just radical imams that needed curtailing. We found good evidence of individual Imams abusing children. Others were accused of embezzlement. In a number of places political disputes over who should run the mosque would poison relationships and there were often no mechanisms for exploring an orderly changeover through elections for official positions. In short there was a lack of accountability and checks and balances. Sometimes too much trust was given to Imams. Strain One of the key issues was that historically mosques had been set up by committed individuals who shared a common ethnic background. Bangladeshis worshipped with Bangladeshis. Kashmiris worshipped with Kashmiris. Pakistanis worshipped with Pakistanis. As new migrants changed the character and composition of the membership, mosques are of religious necessity open to any Muslim worshippers; this put a strain on existing management committees. Ironically one of the reasons Abu Hamza found it so easy to take over Finsbury Park Mosque, is that he was invited to mediate between warring factions. As more of these incidents became public, a younger British educated generation began calling for a spiritual renewal across many mosques. The principal demand of this new generation has been that mosques need to have a more transparent way of conducting their business. Shift So it is in this context that finally four of the principal Muslim organisations nationally have issued a document which was little publicised last week but could augur a massive change in the organisation of British Islam. The rather innocuous title, "Good Practice Guide for Mosques and Imams in Britain", reflects a seismic shift in the relations within British Islam but also its openness to the outside world. The group responsible, the Mosques and Imam National Advisory Body (MINAB), launched last week as well, will monitor and expand these guidelines. Of course this is only a code of good conduct. It has no enforcement power and no outside body will have the power to intervene in the affairs of an individual mosque. Limits They recognise that to remain credible they will have to walk a bit of a tightrope between what the government wants and what Muslims expect from their religious authorities.
Already talking to leading Muslim advocates privately, the lack of real power has heightened scepticism. There are already whispers that this code has resulted from strong arm tactics by the government. They point to the Catholic church and Church of England's inability in the past to control the actions of a few rogues. Nevertheless, by challenging all mosques to effectively abide by a common set of principles in administering the central institution in the life of Muslim communities; it is recognising that there must be limits to the autonomy of individual mosques and their leaders. They must be socially responsible organisations with an emphasis on helping their members work harmoniously in the host community. It is recognition that if more 7/7s are to be avoided the battle for the hearts and minds of disaffected Muslims is the responsibility not just of government but of those institutions that help socialise young British Muslims in the customs and values of their faith. | 
