Milosevic on Trial: The Dilemmas of Political Justice

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• 1. Trying the vanquished
• 2. Judging the Nazis
• 3. From Nuremberg to the Hague
• 4. Policing the new world order
• 5. The dilemmas of political justice
• 6. Find out more
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From Nuremberg to the Hague

Even the most limited historical survey of war crimes trials demonstrates their political nature. Their creation, successes and failures always reflect the diplomatic concerns of the time and the struggle amongst political leaders to determine the future order. Thus Nuremberg's achievements emphasise the catastrophic flaws of Leipzig: the latter failing to satisfy the allies and fuelling German resentment at the terms of Versailles. The legacy of Nuremberg however, far exceeds the narrow concerns of those who created it. In addition to its utility in the peaceful reconstruction of Germany and the establishment of an American-led order in Europe, its role in revealing the extent of the Nazi Holocaust later led to the United Nation's recognition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Genocide Convention. The long, hesitant process of instituting judicial proceedings for the Yugoslav conflict and the Rwandan genocide reflects their more peripheral importance to those in power.

'Warring sides came to see civilian populations as strategic assets and liabilities to be defended, displaced and annihilated...'

Nuremberg's emphasis on the crime of aggressive war and by extension the sanctity of state borders makes it an ambiguous precedent for the Hague. Notwithstanding international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, the Yugoslav conflict was essentially one of secession and resistance with the Serb dominated state of Yugoslavia fighting to retain first political unity and then territorial possession. As in many civil wars before it, warring sides came to see civilian populations as strategic assets and liabilities to be defended, displaced and annihilated in accordance with their war aims. The brutal suppression of the Kosovars for which Slobodan Milosevic now stands trial was again an internal affair, with the Kosovo Liberation Army, frustrated at the lack of political progress towards civil rights, fighting for secession and a greater Albania.

Far more ambiguous under international law was the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, which lacked a UN mandate and breached Yugoslav sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, given its sponsorship by the NATO states, this has not been deemed a matter for the Hague, nor have many of those in the more co-operative states of the former Yugoslavia who might also be accused of war crimes been pursued. It is perhaps in recognition of these ambiguities that the charges against Milosevic have been widened to include crimes of genocide during the Bosnian war and crimes against humanity in Croatia. His prosecution remains far from certain and the future legacy of the Hague Tribunal can only be the subject of speculation informed by attention to the changing nature of the international order.

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Published: 2002-03-01