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| John Major |
No Conservative prime minister has been so reviled by the so-called "Tory Press" and Major has been subjected to constant sniping from within his own party, most notably by right wing Euro-sceptics. The combination several times seemed likely to bring about his imminent downfall.
When he won the leadership in 1990, some fashionable commentators predicted he would be no more than an "interlude" in British politics. And yet he goes into this election having spent longer as Prime Minister than anyone this century except Herbert Asquith, Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher.
Few Prime Ministers have made the job less glamorous. The man who opened his first Cabinet after he won the contest to succeed Lady Thatcher with the exclamation "Well, who would have thought it" has delighted in the ordinariness of his Brixton background and his Middle England tastes for warm beer, village cricket and "Happy Eater" fry-ups.
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| John Major |
Critics insist that he has lacked too what his American ally George Bush called "the vision thing". Indeed, he made a Tory conference speech celebrating his lack of it. His essentially pragmatic approach has offered no "Big Idea", no definable "Majorism" to follow "Thatcherism".
But he has, after a fashion, kept together a party which has been riven from the moment he took over on the greatest political issue of the day, Europe. He made significant progress on the most intractable political issue of our times, Northern Ireland. He has won many of the battles he has taken on, if only on points. And he has presided eventually over an economic recovery which offers the winner of the next election the prospect of a significant period of sustainable export-led growth accompanied by the low inflation which has been John Major's political Holy Grail.
If there is one quality which explains this, say his friends and colleagues, it is sheer political doggedness.
The Thatcher Factor
Since he succeeded Margaret Thatcher in the autumn of 1990, Major's premiership has been haunted by her legacy. When she gave him her backing as the candidate most likely to beat Michael Heseltine, many Thatcherites assumed they would get a "Thatcher Mark II" by voting for him.
When he emerged in his own light as a more middle of the road Conservative determined to keep Britain, as he soon put it "at the heart of Europe", they and their vociferous supporters in Fleet Street made no secret of their disappointment. His predecessor herself, first in private gatherings, then in her published memoirs,and finally in interviews and speeches, became steadily more critical of his conduct, especially on Europe, taxation and housing, eventually accusing him of failing the middle classes.
When Major emerged victorious from the 1992 election, which many Tories believed they could not have won under Lady Thatcher, it was with a majority of only 21, compared to the majorities she had enjoyed of 44, 144 and 101.
A party which had become steadily more ideological under her vigorous leadership then proved hard to handle. The old Tory pragmatism, concerned chiefly with the getting and holding of power, had given way to a more issue-based "conviction" politics which had diminished the coherence of the party, especially on the dominant issue of Europe.
The rebellions over Maastricht bred new group loyalties and demonstrated the power of determined minorities, but Major seemed uncertain of the best tactics for handling this phenomenon. He acknowledged there would be a need to tack and weave and compromise to keep the party and its programme intact, a course which offered little chance of appearing heroic.
But sometimes he chose to indulge in bouts of macho leadership too. One example was when he gambled on a Maastricht "paving " debate in November 1992 and survived by only 3 votes. Another was when he withdrew the party whip from eight rebels who failed to support the Government in what he had made a confidence vote on European Union finances in November 1994, a move which served only to advertise the party's divisions and which ended in ignominy: they were readmitted to the party some months later without any assurances as to their future conduct.
He talked tough about challenging Europe on qualified majority voting changes in 1995, only to be forced to retreat. And he was similarly forced to climb down and concede a debate on the single currency last December after vowing it would not happen.
On Europe it can certainly be argued that Major, a pragmatic rather than a romantic European, has steadily been forced to adopt more "sceptical" views as his majority has declined and as the Tory party's centre of gravity has shifted in that direction. On the single European currency he was forced to stick with a "wait and see" policy for fear of provoking his Chancellor's resignation.
Major's adoption of a policy of non co-operation with Europe over the ban on British beef in the BSE crisis signalled both his own deep frustration with the way in which he believed European partners were 'playing politics' with the issue. But his growing readiness as the election approached to play the Euro-sceptic card in the hope of wrong-footing Labour misfired as polls showed the public blaming the Government rather than Europe for mishandling of the issue.
But it has not been all retreat. Major can claim in some areas to have proved a better Thatcherite than his predecessor, tackling privatisations like British Rail and the nuclear industry which she had ducked and proving more consistent than her to market principles by allowing his Chancellors to cut back on mortgage tax relief. His Government too has done more to trim Welfare State spending. But in general the man who talked on becoming premier of creating a "nation at ease with itself" has acted more in the "One Nation" tradition of Conservatism.
His tensions both within the Cabinet and within the party have been more with the Right, notably with the Cabinet Euro-sceptics whom he described famously in an off-camera leak as "bastards". His style of running what initially became known as a "Cabinet of chums" has been less autocratic than hers. There has been more discussion and debate at the top, although Cabinet colleagues say that Major, who had no lengthy Cabinet experience before becoming prime minister, has "learned on the job" and become more dominant.
It was this style which enabled his former Chancellor Norman Lamont to say woundingly in his resignation speech to the Commons that the Government gave the appearance of being "in office but not in power". Major's strengths also contrast with those of his predecessor. He has proved a highly effective conciliator and negotiator. For all his party's later traumas over Europe, the Maastricht negotiations were seen at the time as a triumph for the prime minister.
He won concessions like the Social Chapter opt-out which others had simply not believed possible thanks to his readiness to master complicated briefs better than some of his fellow European heads of Government and to what colleagues call his "ability to say no without giving offence". The same qualities enabled him to overcome one setback after another in the slow and painful search for a peaceful political settlement in Northern Ireland, although the price of a lasting peace has eluded him.
Leader or Manager?
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| John Major |
His boldest and most significant gamble of all came when he resigned his party leadership in a challenge to the party snipers in June 1995. Though his Cabinet colleague John Redwood unexpectedly entered the contest Major emerged victorious by 218 votes to his challenger's 89. Characteristically it was a sufficient victory rather than a glorious one and friends as well as critics have accused him of failing to exploit it effectively.
Management of a splintering party and coping with crisis have so dominated Major's time in government that he has sometimes seemed to make less than effective use of such patches of clear water as he has enjoyed. Typical of such crisis management have been the Nolan Committee inquiry into standards in public life and the Scott Inquiry into whether the Government had connived at the evasion of its own guidelines on arms sales to Iraq.
Opposition critics say that both were classic examples of time-buying by a hard-pressed Government reeling under the ever-mounting accusations of "sleaze". The Prime Minister insists vehemently that he embarked upon both in a simple desire to get at the truth and to ensure that proper standards were maintained.
Major is accused of lacking ruthlessness. His attempts to maintain David Mellor and others in office after Fleet Street had wounded them beyond saving and his public remarks about Chris Patten after the Governor of Hong Kong intimated that he might be willing to return next year to British politics were typical of a man who remains truer than most to his personal friends. But he paid a political price each time for his lack of detachment.
Major has survived partly because he has read the changing mood of his party, partly because he has genuine admirers of his integrity and straight-dealing style, and partly because he has always been what one of his ministers called "the least worst option" as leader.
Any of the alternatives at any time his leadership has been under threat - Michael Heseltine, Michael Portillo, Kenneth Clarke, John Redwood - have been perceived by many MPs as people who would inevitably split the party further. But the penalty that he has paid for being a reconciler and bridge-builder, a "split the difference" lowest common denominator man, is to be dismissed as a politician without a vision or a grand strategy.
The Citizens Charter, instead of being seen as a reaffirmation of quality public services, has had him mocked as a "traffic cones" prime minister. His "Back to Basics" programme was designed as a return to higher school standards, better law and order measures and commonsense economics. Seized upon by the Right as a way of hooking the party into moral majoritarianism, it became instead a hunting licence for Fleet Street to probe the lives of Tory politicians.
Major has proved an effective performer at Question Time, the twice-weekly ordeal for Britain's political leaders. He has shown political skills in extricating his party from the nightmare of the poll tax, in winning the last election against the odds, in the Northern Ireland peace process and as a practised and effective summiteer at European Councils, G7s and the like.
Less hog-tied by his party he would probably prove a very effective Continental-style politician, scratching backs, winning concessions and cutting deals in a way his predecessor's absolutist approach did not permit.
But as he has watched a small majority chipped away to a minority he has been a prisoner of events and a prey to determined minorities within his own ranks. Tony Blair's stinging assertion one Parliamentary Question time that "I lead my party, he follows his" is not demonstrable on all subjects. But political realities have ensured that it was near enough the mark to hurt.
Ironically, it is Major himself, despite the way his own party has treated him, who may yet prove to be the Tories most significant asset in this election. His lack of artifice helped him to remain comparatively untainted by the "Sleaze factor" haze which has clung around his government. He has consistently polled ahead of his party. And while he may have been criticised for his mistakes he has never engendered the degree of personal hostility which accompanied his predecessor's more glamorous style. Few actively dislike John Major.
In its more forgiving moments the tabloid Press has called him "the Comeback Kid". He now faces the task of making the biggest political comeback of them all.
By BBC Political Editor Robin Oakley, taken from
"The BBC News General Election Guide", published by Harper Collins, price £5.99