Will banks be an election issue?
I was recently asked by the Future of Banking Commission whether there was a risk that debate on financial reform would descend into party-political knockabout.
I said that I rather hoped it would, because it would be evidence of politicians believing that voters care about the arguments over how to prevent a repeat of the worst banking crisis for many decades - and that voter engagement extends beyond fury or despair over multi-million pound bonuses.
We all know that how banks behave matters more to us than how most other kinds of business behave: protecting our deposits and providing credit to businesses and households that need it, well it's hard to think of any other industry more vital to economic stability and our prosperity.
In theory, banks ought to be respected pillars of society. But time and again they find it difficult to live up to that expectation: today's damning indictment by the Office of Fair Trading, the competition watchdog, of the collusive behaviour of Royal Bank of Scotland will be seen by many as (sad to say) par for the course.
RBS has agreed to pay a fine of just under £29m for stitching up a cosy deal with Barclays on the pricing of loans to large professional services firms (such as solicitors and estate agents), where the duo dominate the market. Barclays escapes punishment because it blew the whistle.
Anyway, I'm sure that the new chief executive of RBS, Stephen Hester, would want you to know that he wasn't at the helm when the collusion took place.
Even so, I had thought that the slogan "collusion is us" no longer applied to British banks: perhaps I was getting ahead of myself.
That said, and on a related issue, I took a bit of comfort when last night's debate between the actual and wannabe chancellors (Darling, Osborne and Cable) strayed into the territory of whether the banks should be broken up.
Cable wants them dismantled. Darling said this would be fatuous, because what he described as smaller, simpler banks - like Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley - also had to be rescued by the taxpayer in 2007 and 2008, along with the huge complex likes of Royal Bank of Scotland.
Which is, of course, absolutely true.
But it is to ignore the argument that the proportionate cost to taxpayers and to the global economy was significantly greater because of the woes of the interconnected giant institutions, from Lehman, to AIG, to UBS, to RBS, to HBOS, to Citigroup.
Also, if there had been a cap on banks' size and a ban on leveraged-based speculation by integrated universal banks - such as RBS and UBS - the impact of the closures of wholesale funding markets in the summer of 2007 and beyond would have been less severe.
There's an additional pertinent argument that the bigger the bank, the more confident it can be of being rescued by taxpayers: the directors know that if their ship goes down, the whole economy goes down, and that therefore they'll be bailed out.
Which is arguably why they feel able to take reckless risks to generate profits - and they're not prevented from doing so by creditors, who also see taxpayers as the comforting backstop. Hey presto: taxpayers (you and me) pick up the bill when the market refuses to recapitalise Royal Bank of Scotland after it suffers life-threatening losses.
Anyway, the Channel 4 audience for the chancellors' debate seemed to stay awake during the interchange on whether banks' size matters. And you've read this far into this post, so maybe the future of banking will be an issue in the general election.
The risk, of course, is that the further away we move from the moment of acutest financial and economy crisis, the less urgency attaches to the reform of the structures that contributed to that stonker of a mess.
That's why five of the world's most powerful government heads - the presidents of the US, France and South Korea, and the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada - have this morning put their names to a letter that can be paraphrased as "pull your fingers out boys (and Angela Merkel); we can't afford any diminution of our collective efforts to strengthen banks and correct the fault-lines in the global economy".
The quintet are the past, current and future presidents of that new grouping of the world's economic powers, the G20. And they fear that a combination of national self-interest and post-crisis complacency may mean that the flaws in the global economy and financial system aren't properly corrected.
Lest we forget, as yet the imbalances between debtor and creditor nations have not been eliminated; and there has not been structural reform of banking. A once-in-a-generation opportunity to fix financial globalisation may yet be missed.