The questions for the former bank bosses
Here's the good news for the former bosses of Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS who are being grilled this morning by the Treasury Select Committee.
There's so much really bad financial stuff happening in the world that perhaps their past mistakes won't be quite as humiliating for them as would otherwise be the case.
For example UBS, the former pride of Swiss banking, has just disclosed that its losses in 2008 were around £12bn - that's about 50% more than the eyewatering losses made by Royal Bank last year, during the last disastrous phase of Sir Fred Goodwin's reign.
And in Russia regional banks are talking to the government about how to reassure overseas banks that they can repay around $400bn of debts over the next few years.
To paraphrase Ed Balls, this financial mess is global and as bad as we've seen for 100 years (although to nitpick, the Governor of the Bank of England thinks it's the worst banking crisis since just before World War One, so not quite a century).
So what should the MPs ask the erstwhile heads of HBOS and Royal Bank about the extreme local difficulties they succeeded in engineering for themselves?
If I had one question for each bank, these would be them:
For Andy Hornby, former chief executive of HBOS, I would ask how on earth he allowed the bank to abandon tried and tested banking risk controls. What I mean by that is that he gave licence to his team to take stakes in big companies as well as lending to them.
That went against all traditional banking practice, because it meant that the banks' judgement about the credit-worthiness of companies wanting to borrow vast sums was clouded by the enticing prospect of making fat profits on shares held in those borrowers.
Or to put it another way, good banking judgement was overwhelmed by at least one of those seven deadly sins.
In the early 1990s, when I was banking editor of the Financial Times, it was regarded as almost a scandal when the so-called clearing banks held shares in corporate customers. Over the past few years, at HBOS and at other banks, this dangerous mixing of lending and investing became commonplace - with disastrous consequences.
So the question to Mr Hornby - who is not a banker by training and yet went on to run one of our biggest banks - is why he didn't spot this danger (among many other dangers - such as the bank's excessive reliance on unreliable sources of funding, inlcluding sales of mortgage-backed bonds).
As for Sir Fred Goodwin, who for years was the supremely confident CEO of Royal Bank, the big question is why, oh why, did he buy the bulk of the toxic giant Dutch bank ABN right at the top of the market.
This deal would have bankrupted RBS, were it not for the generosity of taxpayers. And he can't claim there were no serious voices arguing against this takeover. There were many asking the question whether this was a deal too far.
Doubtless he and Hornby and their respective chairmen will say sorry this morning. But they need to do more.
They need to give a convincing narrative of how they made their egregious errors, so that we can all learn from their mistakes - and make new mistakes next time, rather than repeating these particularly disastrous howlers.