Why Kabul may miss Holbrooke's gritty style
I had interviewed Richard Holbrooke on a few occasions. But the one that sticks out most was at the Democratic Convention in Denver 2008. A few months before the election, Holbrooke was being widely discussed as a possible US secretary of state if Barack Obama were to win.
The notion that the next president's most bitter rival on the campaign trail, Hillary Clinton, might one day be offered that job - and take it - was too far-fetched even for the most optimistic fence-menders.
We were interviewing Holbrooke in his hotel for a documentary on Barack Obama and what his foreign policy might look like. He was late, apologised and sat down. I asked my first question. I can't remember what it was. But I do remember the answer. The possible future secretary of state, one of America's most high-profile diplomats, former ambassador at the UN and in Germany looked at me intently and then cleared his throat with the decibels of a roaring lion.
"Sorry, Matt," he croaked. "Rough night, REALLY rough!" The word rough sounded like two pieces of sandpaper rubbed together. It was vintage Holbrooke. He was the embodiment of the undiplomatic diplomat and he knew how to flatter journalists with misbehaviour.
We know that "the bulldozer's" gritty style didn't go down well in the slippery sweetness of some capitals. He frequently came to verbal blows with Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai. He was said to be deeply frustrated by the obfuscations served up in Islamabad.
But his style famously worked with the Bosnian factions in the mid-1990s to end a brutal, bloody war. It was a brilliant idea to force them all into a US airforce base in Dayton, Ohio. Holbrooke created a diplomatic conclave - Latin for "with key". Like the original conclaves at the Vatican, he told the factions, all lodged in airforce barracks with questionable food: you're not leaving till you strike a deal.
Dayton was definitely not Paris, Geneva or Rome. It had become a one-star camp for misbehaving warlords and Holbrooke did what the UN, the EU and the US - so far - had failed to achieve. He turned compromise into a less unpleasant alternative. He also understood the psychology of the Serbs: they're not suicidal, he once said, but they are infatuated with the mythology of their victimhood.
They may not miss him in Kabul as much as they profess today but Holbrooke understood better than most in Washington that the only solution to the war in Afghanistan is political, not military. He endorsed conditional dialogue with the Taliban. He believed that the Taliban could be separated from al-Qaeda. Kabul may miss him yet.
~RS~q~RS~~RS~z~RS~38~RS~)
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"infatuated with the mythology of their victimhood" - what a striking phrase. This is true not only of the Serbs but also of many other people, both groups and individuals. Such infatuation provides a comforting identity for many, but there can be no progress till the infatuation is overcome.
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It is true of Québecois as well.
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"Infatuated with the mythology of their victimhood"
--- should not be construed to imply ´The mythology of oppression ´
Having lived for a period (60´s) in Quebec, I can sympathize with the Quebecois.
I am sure Mr. Holbrooke meant no such generalization of ´Victimhood´
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Matt,
You're mild today. Is it that you don't want to speak ill of the dead?
Holbrooke was seen as such a bulldozer in Kabul that he literally took the bull out of the ka (ancient Egyptian for other world spirit).
In Kabul, Ruchard Hoolbrooke was seen as out of touch (with the facts on the ground), too combative to seriously dialogue, or even desure to forge, a partnership with Afghan leaders, and extremely abrasive. I guess the Americans thought that this was the best envoy for the job, but I always thought Holbrooke was a bad choice (but better Kabil than the Middle East).
Richard C. Holbrooke is now being lauded as a giant of diplomacy, but in South Asia, his reviews are - to be mildly said - mixed.
Among the leaders in Kabul, it was known that the vitriol between bulldozing Holbrooke and President Hamid Karzai made diplomacy non-existent. Many in Kabul, admitting that it felt pointless to speak ill of Holbrooke, just held their silence.
Those who were willing to speak, criticized Holbrooke as a "bulldozer", said he didn't understand the Afghan temperament and/or dismissed him as a "front" for Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.
Even so, I believe that Holbrooke understood Pakistan's inner workings and how they affected Afghanistan, but understanding and being able to build diplomatic bridges are two very different things..
Without a doubt, his death will be setback to the already shakey US engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan, mainly because he died so suddenly. There was no time for debriefing.
On Holbrooke's visits to Pakistan, Holbrooke promoted the Obama Administration's desire to help Pakistan deal with its biggest priorities, including shortage of electricity, water supply crisis...
Taliban, Qari Yousef Ahmadi compared Holbrooke's death to those of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, who were among Moscow's ill-fated, decade-long combat in Afghanistan.
Apparently, as Holbrooke awaited surgery, he was urged to relax by the attending physician, Dr. Jehan El-Bayoumi. Holbrooke, in severe pain, answered jokingly that it was hard to relax because he had to worry about the difficult situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The physician said she would do the worrying for him, to which Holbrooke responded, “END THE WAR”.
State Department Spokesperson, P.J. Crowley, also described an exchange (the same exchange) as an attempt at lighthearted banter, with Holbrooke telling the medical team, “Yeah, see if you can take care of that, including ending the war.”
So in the end Richard Holbrooke had two things in mind:
1. the last words were his,
2. the processes in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bringing peace to the region.
Kabul may miss Holbrooke's gritty style, or the loss of his gritty style may provide a smoother run for turning a new corner.
Time will tell.
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That's two now deceased and particularly maverick American' who have played a major role in the theater of Afghanistan over the decades. Richard Holbrooke was treading the same soil as Charlie Wilson, who himself passed away a year or so ago. Wilson famously managed to turn the tide in Afghanistan America's way by 'unconventional' means and a tendency to be alarmingly direct. Once more polished and better behaved colleagues took over his lead they managed to turn the tide the other way again. I hope that doesn't happen this time. Nobody can take the Dayton stunt away from him though. RIP.
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re. #4. At 1:36pm on 15 Dec 2010, BluesBerry wrote:
Matt,
You're mild today. Is it that you don't want to speak ill of the dead?
Holbrooke was seen as such a bulldozer in Kabul that he literally took the bull out of the ka (ancient Egyptian for other world spirit).
In Kabul, Ruchard Hoolbrooke was seen as out of touch (with the facts on the ground), too combative to seriously dialogue, or even desure to forge, a partnership with Afghan leaders, and extremely abrasive. I guess the Americans thought that this was the best envoy for the job, but I always thought Holbrooke was a bad choice (but better Kabil than the Middle East).
Richard C. Holbrooke is now being lauded as a giant of diplomacy, but in South Asia, his reviews are - to be mildly said - mixed.
Among the leaders in Kabul, it was known that the vitriol between bulldozing Holbrooke and President Hamid Karzai made diplomacy non-existent. Many in Kabul, admitting that it felt pointless to speak ill of Holbrooke, just held their silence.
Those who were willing to speak, criticized Holbrooke as a "bulldozer", said he didn't understand the Afghan temperament and/or dismissed him as a "front" for Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.
Even so, I believe that Holbrooke understood Pakistan's inner workings and how they affected Afghanistan, but understanding and being able to build diplomatic bridges are two very different things..
Without a doubt, his death will be setback to the already shakey US engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan, mainly because he died so suddenly. There was no time for debriefing.
On Holbrooke's visits to Pakistan, Holbrooke promoted the Obama Administration's desire to help Pakistan deal with its biggest priorities, including shortage of electricity, water supply crisis...
Taliban, Qari Yousef Ahmadi compared Holbrooke's death to those of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, who were among Moscow's ill-fated, decade-long combat in Afghanistan.
Apparently, as Holbrooke awaited surgery, he was urged to relax by the attending physician, Dr. Jehan El-Bayoumi. Holbrooke, in severe pain, answered jokingly that it was hard to relax because he had to worry about the difficult situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The physician said she would do the worrying for him, to which Holbrooke responded, “END THE WAR”.
State Department Spokesperson, P.J. Crowley, also described an exchange (the same exchange) as an attempt at lighthearted banter, with Holbrooke telling the medical team, “Yeah, see if you can take care of that, including ending the war.”
So in the end Richard Holbrooke had two things in mind:
1. the last words were his,
2. the processes in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bringing peace to the region.
Kabul may miss Holbrooke's gritty style, or the loss of his gritty style may provide a smoother run for turning a new corner.
Time will tell.
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Actually we may never know if those last words were spoken out of concern to bring peace to the region or concern for the need to extricate the country he served from a war that wastes American lives and treasure on a quixotic quest doomed to futility in a region that has rarely known peace.
Perhaps a bit of both?
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