Creationist leader to visit Northern Ireland
"How do you do?" asks Richard Dawkins. "I do very well," replies John Mackay. That was the end of the pleasantries in the encounter, filmed for one of Dawkins's documentaries. I can't remember if this interview made the final edit, but the raw footage is available online. John Mackay will be visiting Northern Ireland next month (more details about that soon).
Needless to say, Dawkins and Mackay agree about hardly anything in their encounter (and there's a decidedly unpleasant end to it all). The interview is fascinating on a number of levels, not least because it has been 'read' so differently by creationist and evolutionist commentators. To an evolutionist, it displays the arrogance of a scientifically-uninformed perspective and a campaigner who could never be persuaded by any evidence they have to answer. To a creationist, it shows how a fast-talking creationist can take on an evolutionist armed with creationist counter-claims.
The first half of the interview doesn't go very far: Mackay maintains his line that evolutionary biology is a form of faith, and the claim that the world is very old is based on a false assumption, namely, that the present is a guide to the past. Dawkins resists: the 'uniformity of nature' is a defining conviction of modern science and a scientific hypothesis about the past is based evidence available to us in the present. Mackay is unconvinced by all the available dating methods pointing to an old earth (essentially, because they all assume the uniformity of nature) and he prefers to hold onto his belief in a 6000-year-old earth. Lots of over-talking, incredulous head-shaking from Dawkins and smiling confidence from Mackay -- and not much else.
In the second part of the interview, Dawkins asks Mackay where Darwin gets his inspiration from. Mackay cites a book by Darwin's "great-great grandson Richard" a number of times to support his claim that it was the death of Darwin's daughter Annie that triggered his drift into atheism. Dawkins points out that Darwin had sketched the Origin of Species by 1844; that Annie died in 1851.
It occurs to me that Mackay must mean Darwin's great-great grandson Randal Keynes, author of Annie's Box, who was on Sunday Sequence last week. In that interview, Keynes told me he had revised his book to remove the claim that Annie's death moved Darwin significantly closer to atheism; that in fact his journey to atheism (or agnosticism, depending on where you decide he finished) was well begun before Annie's illness. Keynes also told me he was concerned that an earlier version of his book which made the link between bereavement and loss of faith had helped to produce further myths about Darwin's attitude to religion. A case in point, then.
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Pffffrrt. After watching that windbag Mackay for 18-19 minutes I must say I admire Dawkins' patience and restraint. Anyone who wants to call him a naturalist fundie should realize what enormous patience it takes as a scientist not to start banging your head against the wall or the camera when you have to listen to that drivel being pumped out at you. And continue listening closely during it and try to have a serious discussion about the issues. My FSM.
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Mackay: If you can teach the kids how to think, you're miles ahead when teaching them what to think, because then they will be able to think...
Dawkins: We certainly ought to be teaching them to think.
Mackay: Good. Great. Excellent. We agree on one thing.
Dawkins: Well, I'm not sure we really do actually...
Whatever one may think of Mackay, I cannot see what is wrong with the above statement he made. If children are taught how to think, then they can assess for themselves the scientific evidence and the philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted. Now, of course, Mackay will inevitably try to teach them his particular theory of origins - but we know that Dawkins does exactly the same thing.
It seems that at least Dawkins agrees that we should be teaching children to think. But then he draws back from actually acknowledging that he and Mackay agree on one thing - namely, that we should teach children to think. I wonder why he drew back from that?
Teaching people to think for themselves is an entirely different issue to the content of what you may wish them to believe. Therefore both creationists and evolutionists should be able to agree on that point. But it seems that Dawkins does not even want to find that common ground with his intellectual opponents. Why?
I would like to suggest that Dawkins only wants children - and adults - to think according to a certain methodology, consistent with the philosophy of naturalism. It seems to me that even the process and discipline of thinking has been hijacked and taken captive by a particular philosophy, which a priori rules out any possibility that empirical evidence could be interpreted according to non-naturalistic explanations. Naturalism becomes a kind of "default position" and the burden of proof is placed on those who argue that certain natural phenomena (such as the complexity, delicacy and intricacy of life) cannot be explained by natural processes alone.
The real battle is not so much a scientific one, but a philosophical and epistemological one. It's a pity Dawkins does not seem to recognise this (or maybe he does, but he is being disingenuous...)
Many people may deride Mackay's views (and I am expecting the usual, predictable comments to follow on this thread), but at least he can see the influence of philosophical presuppositions - and "faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data. So he is certainly right about that.
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"philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted" Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.
"faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data " There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence. A group of us, members of [Unsuitable/Broken URL removed by Moderator]discussed this subject and although the majority agreed with the scientific evolutionary evidence some felt the need to hold onto a chosen faith, in my view because like me when at school we were certainly never taught to think of anything other than the religious knowledge belief system.
I envy my friends commitment to their belief system, offering a social bond and to some an inner strength even in the latter stages dying, to other faiths a willingness to be martyrs whilst butchering others. My own view is that I turned out to be that best swimmer in my class of millions and I am grateful for the experience.
Rather like the ambiguous car bumper sticker I bought in America “I don’t know who discovered water, but it certainly wasn’t a fish.” DarwinsChurch.com
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#3 - jonathonn -
"Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.... There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence."
Please show me the evidence that "life could ONLY have arisen by purely natural means" and do it without, in any way, appealing to any kind of philosophical presupposition. I am asking for "pure empirical evidence" that proves this without any shadow of doubt.
Empirical evidence simply shows us what IS. Not how it came to be, or why it came to be. That is a matter for interpretation.
In the much derided book by Michael Denton called "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" he makes a point which I (an evolutionary skeptic) don't agree with, but which illustrates the point I am trying to make:
"Evolution by natural selection would be established today beyond reasonable doubt, even without empirical evidence of intermediates, if it had been shown that all the great divisions of nature could at least theoretically have been crossed by inventing a really convincing series of hypothetical and fully functional transitional forms."
He then goes on to say that he believes this has never been achieved, but that is not the point I want to make. Even if such convincing hypothetical transitional forms had been described accurately, that still does not "prove" anything. He is saying that "evolution by natural selection" would be established "beyond reasonable doubt". But that statement is based on the assumption that if we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID.
But the statement: "If something could have happened, therefore it did" is a non sequitur. Many things "could" have happened in the past that clearly did not happen. It is an absurd assumption.
It is only possible to hold to that belief as an interpretation of the empirical evidence - in other words, it is a "faith" position. And interpretations are based on philosophical presuppositions - in this case, the presupposition of naturalism, and the rejection of any reality (particularly intelligent reality) outside nature.
In fact, as a Christian, I could use exactly the same logic as the naturalists: "If God could exist, therefore he does." If such a proposition is derided, then so should the naturalistic proposition be derided.
Those who claim to believe in reason and logic can't have it both ways!
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Received your mail and forwarded the correction do not mind which version you include.
"philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted" Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.
"faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data " There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence. A group of us, members of http://www.pensioners.co.uk/ privately discussed this subject and although the majority agreed with the scientific evolutionary evidence some felt the need to hold onto a chosen faith, in my view because like me when at school we were certainly never taught to think of anything other than the religious knowledge belief system.
I envy my friends commitment to their belief system, offering a social bond and to some an inner strength even in the latter stages dying, to other faiths a willingness to be martyrs whilst butchering others. My own view is that I turned out to be that best swimmer in my class of millions and I am grateful for the experience.
Rather like the ambiguous car bumper sticker I bought in America “I don’t know who discovered water, but it certainly wasn’t a fish.” [Unsuitable/Broken URL removed by Moderator]
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@LSV
Let me get this straight. A book questioning the validity of the modern theory of evolution has within it some assertion that the theory could be somehow "proved" by making stuff up. This assertion is then assumed to apply to "the naturalists" in order to show that they are wrong. Priceless.
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logica_sine_vanitate
Well I have to grudgingly admit that after great debate my friend Harvey agrees with you entirely, others might be sceptical but I know that you will believe that although Harvey takes the physical shape of a large rabbit and is always with me he truly does exist and is the font of all wisdom.
My DNA is of little consequence, Harvey can recast knowledge as justified true belief, some truths may be justified and true, yet fail to count as knowledge even probabilities are but responses to Gettier. "If God could exist, therefore he does" absurd assumption of course not.
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#6 - grokesx -
I can see that you obviously didn't make much effort to try to understand what I wrote.
I was making the point - and just happened to quote from that particular book - that constructing a hypothesis to justify evolution by natural selection (which is what is necessary, unless you know of a way of providing the empirical evidence for all the transitional forms between species - and prove that they are indeed transitional forms) does not prove that evolution by natural selection occurred.
My post was a response to the assertion that there is no place for interpretation in the discussion concerning the theory of evolution - that somehow this idea rests on "evidence" that stands above any kind of philosophical interpretation. As I have shown, this belief (that there is no interpretation involved) is complete and utter nonsense, but is a view continually perpetrated by naturalists, who seem to be confused as to the distinction between science and philosophy.
If you can prove my points wrong on the basis of logic (rather than emotion), then I would be most interested.
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"I can see that you obviously didn't make much effort to try to understand what I wrote."
True. But I know a big fat straw man when I see one. If you can point to any serious exposition of the "If we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID" argument (hint "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" doesn't count), I'd be ready, both emotionally and logically, to look into your rebuttal of it.
In the mean time, as an "evolutionary skeptic", you might want to lose the obsession with proving stuff and take some time to understand the theory (well, any scientific theory come to that). When you've done that and appraised the evidence (if you can't quite bring yourself to chuck Dawkins a few quid for his latest, Jerry Coyne's "Why Evolution is True" is a good place to start) and you still count yourself a skeptic, you could get qualiified and do some research, a Nobel prize surely awaits.
Or you could go fossil hunting for a precambrian rabbit.
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#9 - grokesx -
"If you can point to any serious exposition of the "If we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID" argument (hint "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" doesn't count), I'd be ready, both emotionally and logically, to look into your rebuttal of it."
I think you will find that any exposition of evolution has to proceed on this premise (if that were not the case, then evolutionists would not be so dogmatic about their theory). The very fact that this theory (which can only ever be a theory, since we cannot observe what occurred before the dawn of recorded human history) is promoted as "fact", proves my point. There is a process of thinking that goes from "this could have happened" to "therefore we now know that it did". The fact that you encourage me to read a book called "Why Evolution is True" rather supports my contention!
And I repeat... are you suggesting that if transitional forms are not reconstructed hypotheses, then they have all been discovered empirically? If every conceivable transitional form has not been discovered empirically (e.g. as fossils), then Michael Denton's point is perfectly valid (but, of course, since he is criticising your pet theory of evolution, you simply a priori dismiss his views - oh, what a brave new world of intellectual honesty and rigour we live in!!).
I am concerned about the way people think. I am not interested in fundamentalist dogma, whether promoted by the secular or religious inquisition (and the secular inquisition seems to be gaining the ascendancy at the moment - so much for "free thinking"!!).
My argument may be a "straw man" for you. But, hey, anyone can write the words "s-t-r-a-w m-a-n". Look, I've just done it! It's quite another matter to be able to show logically that someone's argument actually is a "straw man".
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"My argument may be a "straw man" for you. But, hey, anyone can write the words "s-t-r-a-w m-a-n". Look, I've just done it! It's quite another matter to be able to show logically that someone's argument actually is a 'straw man'."
Well, strictly speaking, you may be justified in protesting at the straw man characterization. Normally the accusation is made if the argument presented is a caricature or misrepresentation of an actual one. The one you are so keen to rebut comes completely from inside your own head. Still, it's an argument you can't lose, so I won't knock it.
Seriously, if you can't be bothered to learn anything about theories and evidence before wittering on, you will come across as supremely ignorant, no matter how many "empiricals", "methodologies" and
"epistemologicals" you litter your posts with.
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So we should we assume the uniformity of nature?
Anybody any idea?
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"why should we"
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#11 - grokesx -
a: A THEORY about origins: "we believe that this is what could have happened"
b: A FACT about origins: "we know that this did happen"
Do you dispute those statements? And if so, why?
And how do we get from "a" to "b" (without the help of any philosophical assumptions or "leap of faith")?
Explain please.
And after you have successfully silenced me with sound logic and evidence, then you have earned the right to be dismissive towards me, and not before...
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Bernards_Insight
Aristotelian teleology
logica_sine_vanitate
"successfully silenced me" I for one would not wish to. However most of what you say contradicts what would seem to be your belief system (faith)If you do not have one then "Great" I would then understand your comments and conversely, then I understand your angst & so does Harvey
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"And after you have successfully silenced me with sound logic and evidence, then you have earned the right to be dismissive towards me, and not before.."
Well, like John Mackay, it is unlikely you will be silenced this side of the grave, but that is by the by.
In science, you don't tend to go from your a) to b). You start with b, your facts, and then come up with your theory (by way of a number of connected hypotheses) that explains those facts. To be a proper theory, it needs not only to explain your facts, but be falsifiable (Cambrian rabbits for eg) and make predictions which can then be tested by experiment. If the predictions are correct, your theory is strengthened, if not, it needs to be modified to account for the the new information, or junked altogether and a revolution in the field begun. At the dawn of the 20th Century, classical physics encountered just such a revolution with Relativity and Quantum Theory. It's not over yet, of course.
If your theory stands, unfalsified, but refined with new evidence, predictions and experiments for - for the sake of argument - 150 years or so, it is pretty strong and unlikely to be replaced by something totally at odds with it. It will never be proved, because that is a meaningless concept outside of maths and the fond imaginings of philosophers, sorry, the formal sciences and philosophy.
With evolution, great confusion arises out of the notions of what is fact, what is theory and the sometimes deliberate mangling of the definition of the word theory as a synonym for "guess", which is one reason why I recommended reading up on the subject. Facts include the genetic similarities of all living things - from banana to bonobo - the fossil record and direct observation of descent with modification in bacteria, fruit flies, even guppies and lizards.
The theory part, the modern evolutionary synthesis, the modified and extended theory that began with Darwin, is the current best explanation of the facts and will change over time, not due to leaps of faith or philosophical wibbling, but due to observation, prediction, experiment and evidence.
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Regalwanda;
I'm not sure I understand. Why does Aristotelian teleology explain why we should assume that nature is uniform? It presupposes that fact, surely?
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A good general post in #3 on how science works, grokesx. Thanks.
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"it presupposes that fact, surely?" The very point.
That's it for me enjoyed the comments, learnt lot of new words but need some reality now so will look at some illicit images online whilst Harvey reads up on Navya-Nyaya fallibilism
grokesx
Edge Foundation is the best for the intellectual and social achievement of society :}
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#19 regalWanda
Thanks for the heads up.
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Hahaha, thanks very much folks.
It's been...enlightening.
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#16 - grokesx -
Thank you for your response.
My point (b) - "fact" - is describing a claim which is asserted to be factual concerning something that happened in the past, which, for obvious reasons, could not have been observed. It appears that your concept of "fact" concerns what can be empirically observed in nature today. There is still a problem in extrapolating from current observations to reconstructions of events from the distant past. What are the presuppositions which enable these reconstructions to be made?
For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true. All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific" (although the adjectives "anti-naturalist" and "unscientific" are not synonyms, although they may appear to be to some people). This interpretation is the result of a philosophical decision.
I am well aware that you may scorn that view, but it is perfectly logical.
As a matter of fact, even though I am an "evolutionary skeptic", I am not actually attacking the theory of evolution in this thread. All I have been saying is that philosophical assumptions are part of that theory, and have to be.
This goes back to the point Mackay was making. Whether one derides his creationist view or not, he is right is saying that there is a "faith" (or "philosophical assumption") issue involved in the construction of the theory of evolution.
You may not have much time for philosophy, but anyone who claims to be "rational" and champions logic, evidence and knowledge, has to respect the way we think. This is what philosophy - and more particularly, epistemology - is about.
I wish you well, and thanks for the discussion.
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I am surprised the Professor lasted as long as he did in this discussion, he doesn't usually debate creationist. There isn't much point, evidently. How a belief that there is no god can be religion is hard for me to fathom.
I would like to point out that there is a wide consensus and growing agreement among scientist that the term should be the "Law of Evolution" because of the overwhelming evidence for it.
Oh and were do I get myself one of those darwinschurch stickers?
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Not really wanting to get involved in this one, team, but LSV writes:
There is still a problem in extrapolating from current observations to reconstructions of events from the distant past.
Of course it is a problem; you face that problem every day; light that strikes your retina left its source some time ago; you extrapolate. You never really observe anything - you just perceive the effects, and fill in the blanks. What we CAN do is create (consciously or unconsciously) MODELS to explain the incoming data; whether those data are from millions of years ago or nanoseconds ago is actually immaterial.
Insofar as the word "fact" has any meaning, evolution is a fact.
For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true.
Good, because the creationist response does not explain these similarities. The similarities are only explicable by common descent; *convergent* evolution can produce similar adaptations, but does NOT produce the hierarchical clustering of genetic similarities that we observe. Similarly "common design" does not produce this clustering, unless the clustering itself is intentionally (and inexplicably) produced. So your objection in this instance actually *fails*. The fact is that you do not have an adequate counter-explanation. That is a fact too, incidentally.
All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific"
Quite incorrect. As I mentioned above, so-called "intelligent design" does not explain the nature of these similarities. It FAILS, regardless of our philosophical presuppositions. You could propose theistic evolution, I suppose, but that doesn't really help either - you have accepted common descent at any rate.
As a matter of fact, even though I am an "evolutionary skeptic", I am not actually attacking the theory of evolution in this thread. All I have been saying is that philosophical assumptions are part of that theory, and have to be.
It helps to minimise these and keep them sensible, though. Time for your shave, Mr Ockham?
anyone who claims to be "rational" and champions logic, evidence and knowledge, has to respect the way we think. This is what philosophy - and more particularly, epistemology - is about.
And anyone who makes a pretence at the philosophy of science, or indeed of epistemology, has to recognise that *some* of the ways philosophers think are deeply unsound when applied outside their terms of reference. They would do well to realise that what is sauce for the goose is frequently sauce for the gander, and by loftily making pronouncements on science, they often cut off the limb on which they are perched.
Need to up your game, LSV ;-)
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"It appears that your concept of "fact" concerns what can be empirically observed in nature..."
Not really, although the examples I gave were of that kind. A fact does not have to be the absolute certainty demanded by many philosophers. As Stephen J Gould had it, "In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' I suppose that apples might start to rise tomorrow, but the possibility does not merit equal time in physics classrooms.'"
"...today."
Mackay, for his own reasons, is particularly hung up on the time thing. But there are many things in science that he doesn't appear to dispute as fact that are also impossible to observe directly. Qualified in geology, he would probably be well aware that the chunks of rock he worked with were comprised mainly of empty space, but I think it is a fair bet that he didn't spend long nights arguing the toss about how his fellow students in the physics and chemistry departments could be so sure of this so called "fact".
"For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true."
They do argue such things and many more things besides, but they have got a lot of heavy lifting to do to justify the arguments. It is a small matter to do some hand waving and say the speed of light could have been different 6,000 years ago, that radioactive half lives were not necessarily the same then as they are now and that the idea of the uniformity of nature is wrong. As I my have mentioned before, there are Nobel prizes for the taking if any one of these things could be supported by evidence, but don't hold your breath.
"All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific" (although the adjectives "anti-naturalist" and "unscientific" are not synonyms, although they may appear to be to some people). This interpretation is the result of a philosophical decision.
There's a lot to go at here, but I'll briefly mention the point that you don't seem to appreciate the difference between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. Also, intelligent design theory is ruled to be unscientific because it has no evidence to support it and there is no way to falsify it, not because of philosophical objections. The sciency seeming part of it, the "irreducible complexity" of blood clotting, the eye and flagella have been shown to be perfectly reducible.
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@Heliopolitan
Nice post, but more importantly, you can use HTML tags here?Yay.
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"Also, intelligent design theory is ruled to be unscientific because it has no evidence to support it and there is no way to falsify it, not because of philosophical objections. The sciency seeming part of it, the "irreducible complexity" of blood clotting, the eye and flagella have been shown to be perfectly reducible."
And even if they weren't, it was shown that the scaffolding mechanism can account for what are termed irreducibly complex systems through evolution. That works not by 'building up' but by 'trimming down' a system through gradual steps.
The ID creationists had as usual done it breathtakingly wrong. They had come up with the analogy of a Roman arch spanning a chasm as an irreducibly complex system. After all, they reasoned, if you take one stone out of it, the whole thing collapses, so each piece only has a useful function if all the other pieces are there. Pretty much Behe's idea of irreducible complexity. But by holding up that analogy they had killed their own case.
Behe and his fellow cretinists should have realized of course that an arch is not popped into existence all at once. You can fill up the chasm stone by stone (i.e. gradually, in small steps) then place the arch stones in place one by one on top of those stones, then pull away the stones under the arch stones one by one. The arch would then have been completed through a series of small gradual steps, yet it would form what Behe et al gave as an example of an irreducibly complex system.
In biology the same can happen. A large system can build up through small steps, then lose parts through small steps, and only after this 'trimming down' does each part become vital. Showing that the examples of blood clotting, the immune system and the bacterial flagellum were not irreducibly complex was important for winning the Dover trial. But someone should also have thought of bringing up the scaffolding mechanism back then (and I think there are some more mechanisms available to achieve the same) as it is arguably a more powerful argument against irreducible comlexity. Showing that examples of irreducibly complex systems were not irreducibly complex is one way to remove an objection to evolution. But the scaffolding mechanism shows that even if a system was found that adheres to Behe's definition of irreducible complexity, it could still have arisen through evolution.
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Yes, yes, but why do we assume the uniformity of nature?
I'm still waiting on an advance on "aristotelian teleology", which didn't really cut it as a reply.
Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?
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Hello Bernard,
"Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?"
Beats me. For now. Maybe physicists and astronomers will find the answer one day. Although I would not necessarily estimate the chances of that any higher than the chances of scientists one day fully uncovering the secret of consciousness.
Finding the answer to your question is work in progress, with no guarantee that the answer will definitely be found.
Still, that is no reason to make up an answer that doesn't explain anything at all (like your favourite words combination for that, 'god' and 'transcendent') and merely kills off the curiosity to investigate further.
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Peter;
What you're forgetting is that, as in algebra, and, indeed, experimental science, knowing something of the question tells us something about what kind of answer would suffice.
To ask "why am i here?" is already to know that the answer cannot be "because I have blue eyes"
Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.
Thus, although it is reasonable to hold that we don't know the answer, it is also reasonable to hold that, whatever the answer is, it won't be reduced to the physical phenomena.
So, although you might think I'm "making up an answer", what I'm actually doing is taking what I know of the question to infer what little I can about the answer.
I'm certainly not killing of any curiosity...I am, however, directing it to where the question leads.
Hope that makes sense to you.
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Hello Bernard,
"Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about."
This reminds me of one of your posts on the god and science thread. You initially dismissed some of my arguments about how we are learning about consciousness since they would only ever tell us about what you called the 'affected', the consciousness that was already there. But later you did agree that it could not be ruled out that consciousness could arise purely from physical processes. It seems you're putting forward analogous reasoning here, with the origin of the universe taking the place of consciousness.
I would agree with you to the point that the answer wouldn't lie in common, everyday physical processes we see around us. But then if science ever were to uncover the origins of our universe, I wouldn't expect it to come from the stuff we see as we travel to/from work, the physical laws that determine the planets, stars etc.
greets,
Peter
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Yes, yes, but why do we assume the uniformity of nature?
Why not? You do it all the time. For instance, you assumed, whether you aknowledge it or not, that the electrons in the semiconductors in your computer (plus all the ones in all the servers involved in the process of you going onto the net and coming here, virtually speaking) were going to behave in the same weird - but understandable to those people familiar with quantum mechanics - way they behaved last time you were here.
Every time you get out of bed in the morning you assume that gravity will work the same way it did yesterday. I could go boringly on forever (I often do) but you get the picture. If we don't, in our everyday life, assume the uniformity of nature, we would be like a supercharged version of the Catherine Tate character who is constantly startled by normal things.
So it makes sense to assume it until we come across a good reason not to. For lots of us, that something would need to be something more compelling than counting up the begattings in a book written by a tribe of desert nomads 4000 years ago.
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Peter;
It is false and misleading to make an analogy between the universe and consciousness.
First, I don't think I ever ruled out that consciousness could "arise" from physical processes. What I always said was that, even if it did, that didn't mean it itself was a physical process.
Secondly, the argument I'm making now is in no way analogous to that which you think I made previously - although, as I have pointed out, I never actually made such an argument.
The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes.
Physics can't account for there being physics.
To get back to my initial question some posts back, "why is there something rather than nothing"?
You cannot say "there is a universe because a (as yet unknown) physical process determined that there be a universe" because physical processes, even when we don't yet know them, are part of what is included in "universe". they are an instance of the "something" rather than "nothing" that we asked about in the first place.
Unless this as yet unknown physical process were entirely self-sufficient, totally unreliant and independent of any other physical process, it cannot be the answer to the question "why is there something rather than nothing?".
On the other hand, if this as-yet-unknown physical process that isn't part of the universe but accounts for the universe is totally self-sufficient and unconnected to any other physical process, I'm not sure what grounds we might have for hypothetically saying that it was a physical process at all.
Seems to me that a "fundamental act or existence-through-which" would be a better use of language for such a, hypothetical, thing.
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Grokesky, I'm afraid you miss the point.
I suppose I phrased my question wrong, but I think it was just how it came up. When I asked "why do we assume the uniformity of nature" I didn't mean that we SHOULDN'T assume it.
It makes sense to assume it, as it seems to be the case, as everything works accordingly.
I meant "why do we assume that that's the case without asking why it's the case"?
Usually when things work in a patterned way we ask for a reason behind that pattern. Sometimes the reasoning lies behind a mind that creates the pattern, sometimes the pattern is actually created wholly by the mind that perceives it.
Why is nature uniform and regular, and why does it work according to laws?
Now, obviously you can't invoke a law, real or hypothetical, to answer that.
Are the laws and regularity of experience simply constructs of the mind or is there a regular nature outside of the mind?
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Hmmm?
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Laters.
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I meant "why do we assume that that's the case without asking why it's the case"?
If you have kids you may remember the endless flows of why. Usually children will carry on long after they can grasp the concepts in the answers and it is obvious that the whys are serving some purpose other than satisfying curious minds. Similarly, many people who come up with questions like yours, and I've talked to a few, aren't interested in the answers, but are simply directing conversations down well worn paths, usually with a god at the end.
Those few, of which you may be one, who are not doing this are unfortunately living in the wrong century. Before Francis Bacon's time (I know I'm wildly simplifying things here, but hey ho) all the brightest people could be found arguing the toss about the deepest questions of theology and philosophy, happily disappearing up their own intellectual fundaments and having a whale of a time. Since then, the best bit of philosophy, the generating of ideas through inductive reasoning, has been incorporated into the scientific method (I'm sure you don't need me to go through it all again) and the rest of it, the sitting down and thinking really hard about stuff and coming up with pointless wibblings often as not have been left to those who are that way inclined.
Have fun with that, if you like, but if your question(s) will ever be answered, I'd wager it will be by the slow, stepwise processes of science.
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McKay was in Northern Ireland on his last visit , and didn't he manage to gain entry to a school as well ?
Still, we seem to be inundated with these high profile YEC speakers now. Paul Taylor (head speaker with AiG) was here last month, Philip Bell (CEO of CMI Europe) is here at the moment. Did anyone manage to get along to the meeting at QUB today ? After avoiding the provonce for many years he now seems to be a seasoned regular. I wonder why ?
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Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?
Maybe it's all a dream Bernard, you know, like the matrix and all that dreamworld skepticism. I've met people who actually think like this
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Perhaps it is, Peter.
Grokesx, for example, seems content not only to simply forget about the questions, but to denigrate anyone who continues asking the really interesting questions about reality. He is content simply to assume and never doubt the really hard questions.
He then makes a wager with astronomical odds, given the inherent unsuitability of science to explain why there is a science. I'd wager, with much better odds, that, even though there may never be a full, all encompassing, rational answer, the questions allows us to discount an answer that the universe exists because it is bound by laws. Such an answer is inherently non-sensical, but some seem content to make the wager anyway.
Personally, I'm more interested in the big questions than the particular questions about one particular branch of empirical science. But some people are content to stay in their empirical bubble, happy enough to assert that there will never be answers, so why bother trying.
Thankfully, even in this day and age, we haven't all given up on rationality.
The universe around us displays far too much rationality for us to ever stop asking "why?", or to denigrate those who do
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Hello Bernard,
My post 31 was phrased hurriedly, briefly and badly. You're right to be quite critical of it. While I did see some analogy in 'the studied object is already there, only its present workings can be studied, not its origin' you are of course absolutely right that that alone doesn't quite cut it. And I didn't take the time to look up the god and science thread again, it was only what I remembered from the top of my head. Apologies if I misrepresented your position.
Let me take more than the two sentences in my previous post to say more clearly what I meant.
I follow your reasoning of saying physics can't account for the presence of physics. It seems to make good sense. From a point of view based on the intuitions we get from looking at the world around us. What I meant to say is that that isn't necessarily what answers the question of the origin of the universe. See e.g. what you said in your follow-up post:
"The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes."
Really? There are some theories (pretty vague ones so far, like the multiverse hypothesis that our universe is not unique at all) that our universe may not be all there is. All pretty weird and very counter-intuitive ideas. But that doesn't necessarily make them wrong. Some of the physics that deals with matter in our own universe is every bit as weird. Intuition and ideas that at first seem very reasonable must sometimes yield. You may have read some of the links I posted to Graham about very weird physics. Before you'd read about them, you would have dismissed these ideas as being clearly impossible. Yet they're not.
So I don't think that the reasoning you outlined in posts 30 and 33 is adequate to say that the origin of our universe can't be explained from physics. Some of what you said, reasonable though it sounds, is already at odds with some theories currently being explored. If you want to maintain your position, then I would ask you to present something more extensive than posts 30 and 33, something that outweighs the basis of theories you are contradicting with those ideas. But you're in luck that those theories are so far still overwhelmingly speculative.:)
greets,
Peter
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Peter;
thanks for a good reply. You'll not be surprised to hear that I still think you don't quite get it.
"The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes."
Really? There are some theories (pretty vague ones so far, like the multiverse hypothesis that our universe is not unique at all) that our universe may not be all there is"
Here I think you fail to grasp the extension of the question.
What do you mean by "universe"?
By "universe" I mean "all there is"
When you use the term "our universe" it's quite obvious that you don't quite mean this.
Now, I will leave aside all of the problems with a "multiverse". you admit that its entirely speculative, with no evidential base. I would go further and say that it is the most irrational type of answer to any question. "X is the case because EVERYTHING is the case sooner or later" seems to be to be the laziest type of speculation imaginable.
Still as you say, that doesn't mean it isn't true.
Now, say there were lots of "universes". Would they be governed by some form of physical processes?
If yes, then those other "universes" are also included in what I call "The Universe". They still contain physical laws which have to be explained, but can't explain themselves.
If no, then this other "universe" which does not work according to any physical, understandabale or potentially rational laws...in which case I think you're unwarranted to call it a universe.
Seems more like a "transcendent other" to me....you know, something beyond the laws of physics?
So, either way, and even if there are "multiverses" they still raise exactly the same questions.
So your hypothetical argument is no more than a matter of words.
By universe, I mean what you mean by multiverse, if true.
If there are lots of universes, either they're all in need of an outside explanation or ONE of them IS the outside explanation. In which case, it's not exactly a universe, but entirely transcendent and OTHER.
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And just one more thing, Columbo.
"Some of what you said, reasonable though it sounds, is already at odds with some theories currently being explored"
How are these theories being explored?
How is there a physical investigation into the possibility of an infinity of non-physical universes.
Universe, multiverse, omniverse....whatever you call it, it doesn't explain its own existence.
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Let me put it yet another way.
you say "the fact that there are physical laws may be explained by other physical laws".
I say that that's entirely irrational.
You say that "it may be irrational in this universe, but there may be an infinity of universes in which the fact that there are physical laws can be explained by other, unknown physical laws"
I say it still remains entirely irrational. Either these other universes are governed by physical laws, or they're not other universes.
In fact, if not governed by physical laws, what makes these other universes "universes"? How can there be "things" that are not governed by physical and - I'll add this - logical laws.
Seem to me that such a "universe" is beyond the realm of "things".
In fact, it seems to me all of a suddent that we're both actually thinking similarly.
I assert that the universe can't explain itself and revert to one thing outside the universe that can.
You agree that the universe can't explain itself, but assert that it may be explained by other universes, which, presumably, can explain themselves, and need not be part of the universe of physics and rationality that we know.
I say YES. But, given that they're outside the laws of physics and logic, I don't see how you're warranted in calling them universes.
The only thing you can say for sure is that they are not part of this universe, otherwise they couldn't explain it.
Which, in a neat twist of logic, brings us back to my point.
Whatever explains the universe must not itself be part of the universe.
Now, that is as far as I will go. you are making the leap of faith to posit other "universes". however, in doing so you're making claims beyond what you are entitled to make. you are extending your understanding of the universe to claim that whatever is beyond it is "something like it".
I am saying that whatever is beyond "this" universe - what you hypothesise to be a "multiverse" must neccessarily be totally Other.
The thing that is totally beyond the universe, and totally distinct from it, I call God.
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Grokesx, for example, seems content not only to simply forget about the questions, but to denigrate anyone who continues asking the really interesting questions about reality. He is content simply to assume and never doubt the really hard questions.
Not so much forget and assume, but defer. In an earlier post you mentioned that framing questions in science as well as philosophy helps point one to answers that may suffice. This is true enough, but you go on to say:
Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.
This is just thinking hard and making stuff up. Conceptually, with the state of our current knowledge, it is virtually impossible to get our heads around that question (without getting all godly and transcendent) and so one thing to do is aknowledge the fact and work towards improving our sum of knowledge in the hope that the question will become more amenable in the future. A happy by product of this is that on the way we learn to develop some really useful things - and a fair few horrible ones, too, it has to be said.
Going back to quantum physics gives us an example of what I am talking about. The discovery that small particles act in mindblowingly weird ways led to an explosion of philosophical interest in the new reality it exposed. Throughout the twentieth century philosophers and a fair few scientists tried their hardest to get their heads round the new reality. Many decades later, no two philosophers can agree what it all means and these days there is a morass of quantum woo-ology peddled by the likes of Deepak Chopra that is painful to behold.
In the mean time, those scientists who ignored the philosophy and concentrated on the "empirical" science created the electronics industry. Nowadays they are moving slowly towards the possible next big step in computing.
In a nice ironic twist, due to the efforts of those early pragmatists, there is more quantum woo-ology pinging around, thanks to the internet, than there ever would have been if they had stayed in lonely garrets and thunk a lot.
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Mathematics exists, irrespective of the universe. Our universe is arguably a purely mathematical entity; TIME is a component of that. I keep suggesting to Will that he interviews Max Tegmark on this; Max has formalised the "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis", and I have to say I find it very persuasive.
The problem with pixies/gods is that they *don't* answer the question "why is there anything at all", because you're still left casting around for a reason for the pixie. Whatever you do, you end up with maths - not physics.
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"Not so much forget and assume, but defer"
But you're ignoring what we already know about the question! that's not deferring, it's wilful ignorance!
""Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.
This is just thinking hard and making stuff up."
Let me put it another way to see if you can grasp the logic.
It makes no sense to say "physical processes exist because of X physical process" as X physical process is included in what we're trying to explain.
Unless you can somehow explain that X physical process is a unique instance of an entirely self-sufficnet physical process - which you can't - this is just sheer nonsense.
The remainder of your posts simply seems to outline the many other useful and pragmatic things we could be doing if we didn't bother to think about the big questions.
That's fine...you go and do those useful things. But don't proclaim that it's irrational to come up with answers when you admit that you don't bother thinking about the question.
As you say, there are lots of other, useful things you could be doing with all the knowledge you have. You don't even need to ask the big questions. You can leave those to other people.
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Helio;
What about if you ask for reasons for the maths?
You don't understand that positing God is not specifically positing a particular explanation for the universe. You are right to say that simply saying "God did it" doesn't explain anything.
Positing God is more akin to framing the question in such a way as to glimpse what might suffice as an answer.
We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.
If the universe IS maths, what accounts for the holding together of a mathematical system such as the universe?
A space pixie certainly wouldn't, you're right. Nor would an ontological "mathematical reality", as such a thing is bound up in immanent rationality, only known to us through the working of the mind.
Maybe it makes sense to conceive of a meta-mid to ground all of those mathematical equations then. :)
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"meta-mind" I mean
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Hi Bernie,
No - mathematics is not dependent on a "meta-mind". A mind does not have to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be "true". The universe is not ALL of mathematics (although arguably we may have access to the lot of it; after all, it's Turing-complete); it is a particular mathematical structure, like an instance of the Game of Life. Sure, mathematics is immanent, but you don't need a mind for that to be the case. God can't change Pi, remember? If there *is* a god, it is subject to maths; it doesn't make it - that would be perfectly illogical.
Anyone interested can look up Tegmark's paper - google Max Tegmark Mathematical Universe Hypothesis.
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Helio;
"A mind does not have to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be "true"."
How do you know?
anyway, I'm not quite arguing that a mind has to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be true. I'm saying that 2+2=4 is, by it's nature, an intelligible content....the fact that 2+2=4 is an intelligibility already there, whether we conceive it or not, simply stresses my point that the universe is inherently intelligible...even hypothetical multiverses.
I think this immanent intelligibility demands an explanation that goes beyond the immanence. Some people think this doesn't raise any questions at all.
I'm not suggesting that that intelligible content of the universe proves that it is created by "a mind". If you remember, I merely offered it as a suggestion to counter your "mathematics creates itself" argument.
I'm saying that the universe being one big vast intelligible content is something which raises a question...a question, the nature of which, cannot be answered within this entire intelligible/perceptual matrix. Again, some people think it doesn't raise any questions at all.
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But you're ignoring what we already know about the question! that's not deferring, it's wilful ignorance!
Robert M Pirsig said that the scientific method is good for testing the truth of what you think you know, and I think that applies here. There's nothing to stop anybody thinking about the really big questions, but unless they are pretty sure about what they think they know, their answers and the way they think about the questions are highly suspect.
You say, for eg;
We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.
What evidence do you have for making that statement? Beyond our universe there may be concepts we do not have words for because we don't even know how to think about them properly. There might not even be a beyond, but if you want to wrap it all up and call it god, that's your perogative, I suppose.
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"You say, for eg;
We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.
What evidence do you have for making that statement?"
It's almost a statement of logical identity. All I am saying is that "whatever is not the universe is something other than the universe".
Do try to keep up.
"Beyond our universe there may be concepts we do not have words for because we don't even know how to think about them properly"
Indeed. Now, that would make such things OTHER than our niverse, right?
So we're agreed?
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It's almost a statement of logical identity. All I am saying is that "whatever is not the universe is something other than the universe".
You are not speaking precisely. Your original statement assumes the fact that there is something beyond the universe and that it is the source of the universe. But you offer no evidence in support of the claim.
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Er, Bernie, intelligibility does not imply a source *intelligence*. Indeed, if the MUH is correct (as I feel it is), and if Turing was correct about computation (as I feel he was, but smarter people than me might be able to thrash that one out a bit more), then *non*intelligibility would be the startlingly inconsistent thing.
I think it was Haldane (maybe not) who said that the universe is not only queerer than we imagine; it is queerer than we CAN imagine. I don't think that is true. Just the first bit.
Keep thinking. Keep testing.
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Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence? Does it need a "creator"? Or does it objectively "exist" in some hard-to-define way?
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Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence?
Rabbits.
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You guys move fast despite pre-mod. Bernard, I have little time for anything more than a few drive-by posts today, and since what you wrote is the most promising opportunity for an interesting debate I've seen here for a while, it certainly deserves more than a drive-by. I will get back to it this weekend hopefully.
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Grokesx:
"Your original statement assumes the fact that there is something beyond the universe and that it is the source of the universe."
No, i'm afraid you're not reading my replies to Helio.
The fact that the universe displays intelligibility implies, I think, a source of intelligibility. If that source is indeed the source of the universe, it must be something totally other than the universe, which, I have attempted to show, rules out a "multiverse", a "physical law" accounting for physical laws and a sky pixie with a magic wand.
IF the intelligibility that constitutes the universe has a source, that source is none of those things.
Helio:
"Bernie, intelligibility does not imply a source *intelligence*."
Please name one instance of intelligibility that doesn't imply an intellect?
Without an intellect to constitute it as intelligible, the universe is just a random series of impressions.
"Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence?"
Let me rephrase;
Is there a Fibonacci sequence? Objectively? How do you know? From what is that sequence derived? What is a sequence without a concept of sequentialism?
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Hi Bernie,
2+2=4. That is intelligible TO an intelligence, but it does not DEPEND on an intelligence to make it so. QED.
For instance, LSV might maintain that 2+2=5; it doesn't matter if that is his/her *opinion* - it is objectively incorrect, and it doesn't matter how stridently the error is asserted, or how "intelligent" we think the proposer is. It's just wrong. It is not dependent on *physical* laws, but on a deeper mathematical relationship.
The Fibonacci sequence depends on numbers and the relationship between numbers - that is ALL. Someone once said "god invented the integers" - that is clearly silly, but an amusing joke nonetheless, because it illustrates as well as anything that a "god" cannot be the ultimate layer of reality.
But the deeper issue is that if the universe *can* be conceived as a mathematical structure, this immediately explains its intelligibility to critters like us who have evolved brains and developed mathematical tools to delve into such things (hence my reference to Turing completeness).
Intelligences are systems; systems are based on mathematics, not the other way round. Even if there is a "god", she can't change Pi or e or the Fibonacci sequence, because she is dependent on mathematical truth. Or she doesn't exist. And the latter is the more likely option, of course, and the one which more and more Christians are realising is the case.
-H
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Helio, i think your QED is a bit misplaced there. ;)
"For instance, LSV might maintain that 2+2=5; it doesn't matter if that is his/her *opinion* - it is objectively incorrect"
I agree.
As I've said before, I'm not some Bishop Berkely asserting that intelligibility doesn't exist unless there is an intelligence to understand it.
I'm rather asserting that the very notion of an intelligibility requires that there be an intellect capable of understanding it, whether it actually does or not.
Consider this. Suppose you claim that there is some intelligibility, some pattern, some sequence or law, but that, in principle, it could never be understood.
How is it intelligible.
So I'm pointing out that intelligibility is not really some totally free-standing thing. what constitutes intelligibility is "capacity to be understood".
Now, the obvious point is that "capacity to be understood" doesn't actually imply an "intellect which understands".
However, I think, at a universal level, when considering the absolute fundamental cause of there being ANY intelligibility, not just a particular instance, the only possible way of thinking beyond that is to posit some form of grounding intellect.
Again we're still wrapped up in the question about the origin of ANYTHING.
When asking, "why is there a universe" we imply with the question (if it is a valid question) something NOT the universe.
When considering that the universe that we're asking about is capable of being understood, we imply that that which is NOT the universe somehow the source of "capability of being understood"
What kind of thing, which is not actually a determinate thing of the universe, could be the source of all "capability of being understood"?
I don't know, but it might be something ANALOGOUS to a "mind", though without the mundane differentiations, divisions and limitations of the minds we know as part of the universe. But it's a useful analogy.
"The Fibonacci sequence depends on numbers and the relationship between numbers - that is ALL"
And I'm claiming that number and the relationship between them are, by nature, "capable of being understood". that's what "relationship" means.
I'm further suggesting that "why is there anything" is a valid question, and that the "capability of being understood" of that "anything" is.....suggestive.
I don't think it PROVES anything, let me make that clear.
"But the deeper issue is that if the universe *can* be conceived as a mathematical structure, this immediately explains its intelligibility to critters like us"
It does. But all you're saying there is that the universe is "intelligible to us" because it is intelligible (a mathematical structure).
I still say that that intelligibility raises a question.
I say that it is valid to ask "why is there anything?" and "why is the "anything" intelligible?"
I think the first question, if valid, implies something beyond the "anything" of the universe.
I think the second question, if valid, implies that whatever is beyond the universe is the source not only of the universe's existence but of its "capability of being understood".
Of course, you probably think that both are fake questions, that don't genuinely arise.
I fail to see how you can show this rationally.
I believe that it is possible, when faced with the universe, to say "It is just there, and that is all". That is a possible attitude to take. But I fail to see how it can be described as rational, or how it can ever possibly satisfy the curiosity of the intellect.
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Hi Bernie,
It's a pity we are having this discussion on this thread. The fact that it is about a "Creationist leader" (figure that one out) somehow pollutes our friendly and constructive chat...
Anyway...
I think the second question, if valid, implies that whatever is beyond the universe is the source not only of the universe's existence but of its "capability of being understood".
Of course, you probably think that both are fake questions, that don't genuinely arise.
Well, I think the second one is correct, and is a real and important question, and gives us the answer. You wouldn't necessarily say that because something is edible, there must therefore be an eater. If something is visible, there is a viewer; if something is audible, there is necessarily a hearer. I know you don't say that intelligibility PROVES a source intelligence, and that's OK. I am suggesting that there is absolutely no need to even go there, as mathematics does the job "out of the box". It goes back to the concept of Turing completeness and "computability". It turns out that once you achieve a sort of mathematical critical ability, then *anything* that is computable (and hence ?comprehensible) comes into range.
So if the universe IS mathematical, then it is necessarily comprehensible (in principle; might take us a while to get there), but it is fallacious to suggest that this means there is an external intelligence *required* (or even "supported") for that to be the case. The conclusion (of an intelligence) bears no relationship to the source data (i.e. "intelligibility").
I believe that it is possible, when faced with the universe, to say "It is just there, and that is all". That is a possible attitude to take. But I fail to see how it can be described as rational, or how it can ever possibly satisfy the curiosity of the intellect.
Again, I completely agree. But mathematics is bigger than the universe, just as it is bigger than any one instantiation of Conway's Game of Life (another Turing-complete system, and, I would argue, a perfectly valid universe).
What I'm suggesting is that the MUH actually answers the question of why is there anything at all. If there were no universe (or "god"), there would still be a Fibonacci sequence; 2+2 would still be 4; Pi would be 3.14159[etc].
-H
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"You wouldn't necessarily say that because something is edible, there must therefore be an eater"
Your forgetting universality though.
Ino order for something to be "edible" there MUST be an "eater" otherwise neither concept would have any meaning.
Whether that eater eats that particular edible thing isn't really the point.
In this case we're talking about the universe, and the very fact that "intelligible" and "intellect" can have any meaning at all.
"The conclusion (of an intelligence) bears no relationship to the source data (i.e. "intelligibility")."
I say it does....see above.
There could be no edible thing without there being "eaters". There can be no intelligibility without there being intellect.
"What I'm suggesting is that the MUH actually answers the question of why is there anything at all. If there were no universe (or "god"), there would still be a Fibonacci sequence; 2+2 would still be 4; Pi would be 3.14159[etc]."
Yes, but you haven't answered the question of why they're there.
If the universe is dependent on mathematics, I suggest that mathematics is dependent on intelligibility - I do not think that intelligibility is an instance of mathematics, but that mathematics is an instance of intelligibility. And I refer you back to the above on universal intelligibility.
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I'll try it another, briefer way.
You seem to be suggesting that mathematics is self-sufficient. I think this is a mistaken view of the nature of intelligibility, of which mathematics is an instance.
That there is intelligibility seems to me not to be a self-sufficient fact. It seems to warrant an explanation.
Not only that, the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.
Given the questions raised by intelligibility, questions which are themselves inherent in the intelligibility, and further given the nature of the existence of intelligibility as implying intellect, it seems reasonable to be open to the possibility of something like an intelligence that grasps and grounds intelligibility perse.
As I say, this is not a proof. I don't think there can be a proof of "the intelligible ground of all intelligibility". To attemnpt to PROVE something like that is inherently contradictory.
It is, howver, an attitiude to take, and a reasonable one.
And, lest I sound like Peter Rollins, it is not just an attitude. Many people find that it is an attitude that finds reciprocation, even if in a barely understood way.
Sorry, that wasn't so brief after all.
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Bernie,
the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.
Indeed, but that does not imply or support, in principle or otherwise, that an intellect needs to CREATE that process or ground it or drive it, which was the reason for my "edible" remark. Yes, of course, along we come, and we have evolved intellects, and we find that we can use those intellects in this arena; similarly, we can eat that edible thingy, but it is simply a fallacy to suggest that intelligibility requires *grounding* in an intellect.
I appreciate that you *feel* that this is the case, but my point remains that that is just your feeling - you can't make a case for it.
Not that that is a bad thing per se; as I mentioned before, gods can't change Pi - mathematics (and by virtue of that, "intelligibility", because I think we are in the same territory here) is Properly Fundamental; minds/intellects/systems/relationships always lie on top of that layer, not below.
See what I'm getting at?
I could expand with a little thought experiment, but better go and pick up my little godless kids first :-)
-H
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"the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.
Indeed, but that does not imply or support, in principle or otherwise, that an intellect needs to CREATE that process or ground it or drive it, which was the reason for my "edible" remark."
Look, the "edibility of a thing" NEEDS an eater. For the thing to exist as edible there must exist eaters. Granted that the edible thing itself doesn't need an eater to exist, to exist "as edible" it does need an eater. If there were no such things as eaters and eating, it would not be edible.
Now, I'm claiming that "to exist as intelligible" just means "to exist". I am claiming that to be intelligible is to exist.
So, if the existence of intelligibility implies an intellect, needs an intelect to exist "as intelligible" I am suggesting that that is the sufficient cause of it to exist at all. If there were no such thing as an intellect, the universe would not exist as intelligible. I am saying that to exist as intelligible is the same thing as "to exist".
What do we mean when we say that something "exists"? We mean that a certain, intelligible state of affairs is actually the case. Can we say of a complete unintelligibility that it exists? What can we say of it?
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Helio, you seem to be driving at some sort of universal pan-intelligibility within which everything else inheres.
You're getting quite Hegelian there, or Spinozist.
Still, you also seem to be agreeing with me that there is a "properly fundamental" intelligibility that underlies all minds/intellects/systems/relationships.
For some reason you call that "mathematics", even though it lies beyond all minds, systems and relationships. Seems more like some unique and transcendent Other to me.
I am reading you right, aren't I? Let me just quote;
"mathematics (and by virtue of that, "intelligibility", because I think we are in the same territory here) is Properly Fundamental; minds/intellects/systems/relationships always lie on top of that layer, not below"
See, if we're talking about what underlies minds/intellects/systems/relationships, I don't see how we can describe it as mathematics or intelligibility, which both consists of and inhere within relationships.
Seems to me like you shold really be talking about what is really fundamental to all of those relationships.
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No, i'm afraid you're not reading my replies to Helio.
Well, about as carefully as you are reading my posts, mainly because you are arguing theologically. You have an answer that you would love to be true and are steering a logical course to arrive there. You like to address the big questions, but it is the somewhat smaller ones that lead to the most meaningful answers. I'll make another attempt, since you don't seem to understand the phrase "happy by-product", at explaining what I mean by illustration.
In the three hundred years of hard thinking since Leibniz addressed the something rather than nothing conundrum (I'm not knocking him BTW, the man's a legend) the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy comes no closer to an answer than its first line, "Well, why not?" In the same period another sort of thinking (incorporating many things presaged in some of Leibniz's own work) has managed to work out a well supported model of the very beginnings of the universe (I'm using the more usually accepted definition here, not the one you made up for your arguments). We now know, from the accumulated, "empirical" knowledge of "particular branch(es) of empirical science" what went on up to a tiny fraction of a second before the Big Bang.
Now, of course, the next really interesting part will come when we can get to grips with that fraction of a second, but for that we need a to further our understanding by unifying quantum theory and general relativity. Chances are it will involve concepts that will challenge what we think we already know. Some of the concepts in the candidate theories certainly do. When it happens, we may, or may not, be better equipped to make a stab at the big questions. It's a slow process, but it is the only way we'll even glimpse the answers, and it's all thanks to lots of very clever people with abiding passions for "particular branch(es) of empirical science".
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Hi Bernie,
Seems to me like you shold really be talking about what is really fundamental to all of those relationships.
Yes - mathematics. Maths does not INHERE in the relationships; maths DESCRIBES the relationships.
Cheers,
-H
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Grokesx
Again the gist of your argument seems to be that, as empirical science has been so successful at answering questions about the content of the universe, it will sooner or later be successful at answering questions about the existence of the world.
I have attempted to show that this is impossible in principle. So even your knowledge of the milli-second after the Big Bang tells us nothing about the cause of the Big Bang, and never will.
Helio;
It seems to me that all you're doing is reducing intelligibility to mathematics. While I don't quite agree with you, it makes no impact on the argument I'm trying to make.
Mathematics, if buy that you mean the intelligible structures governing everything that exists, itself raises a fundamental question.
The rationality of mathematics does not seem to be to be self-sufficient.
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Bernie, of course it is self-sufficient. Yes, I am reducing intelligibility to mathematics, and I have pointed out that mathematical "truths" can be said to "exist" without the need for any underpinning. Maths is basal. Pi is Pi, whether there are gods or not.
Now, you're saying that it (the "rationality of mathematics" - that is just mathematics itself, really!) doesn't "seem to be self-sufficient" - I have no idea what you mean by that. Can you please clarify?
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Helio;
I've been attempting to throughout the whoel thread, but i think we've gone a bit tangential. That you call "mathematics" what I call "intelligibility" doesn't seem to make a difference to the argument I have been making
Let me return to your "edible" analogy. For something to be "edible" doesn't imply that it is actually eaten...but it does imply that there are things in the universe that eat, and that this thing can be eaten by one of those things.
Nothing is "self-sufficiently edible". If it existed on its own, with no such thing as an eater, it would not be edible. It needs the existence in principle of an eater in order to be edible.
Similarly, I am suggesting that nothing can be self-sufficiently "intelligible". If it existed on its own, with no such thing as an intellect, it would not be intelligibile, even in principle. The universe needs the existence of intellect in principle to be constitued as intelligible.
Sorry i must be so brief, but I hope this explains what i mean when I say intelligibility doesn't seem to be self-sufficient. The very nature of intelligibility suggests otherwise, just as the nature of "edible" does also.
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Hello Bernard,
Sorry I took longer to reply than I said I would.
I've just read through this entire thread from about post 29 onwards. I'm afraid this is not going to another lengthy 'god and science' thread.
First some rather unimportant nags. I think you apply a somewhat non-standard use of the word 'universe'. And in post 44 you attribute quite a few statements to me I didn't make. But you said tha earlier on I did something similar to you. Nowhere near as much has you did, but I'm fine with calling it even on that front.:)
Then on to more interesting things. I'm afraid this whole thread hasn't changed my mind very much. Let me start by repeating that your reasoning of 'a physical process can't explain the presence of there being physical processes in the first place' doesn't seem bad to me. But I will also repeat that your reasoning, reasonable as it seems, is an extremely flimsy basis for making a very far-reaching statement like 'physics will never explain the origins of the universe'. I think Helio once said something like
philosophy is fine and can lead to very interesting results, but without verification it is possible to take a wrong turn, reason very far in the wrong direction from there, and never realize it.
Indeed. I don't see any obvious big holes in that particular bit of reasoning that started this. It may prove right. But then it may not. I'll go along with what grokesx said in post 45, let's try to understand things better first. As long as our understanding of things is progressing I see little reason to declare we'll never understand it. Who knows, maybe we will come to the more certain conclusion that we can't understand the coming about of our universe. Or maybe we'll figure it out. In case we don't, and we can only say 'this is how it works, no idea how it got there', then I'll agree with you that that would not be intellectually satisfying. But then I don't think anything that you have called 'other', 'transcendent', etc in this entire thread helps us understand things much better.
greets,
Peter
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Again the gist of your argument seems to be that, as empirical science has been so successful at answering questions about the content of the universe, it will sooner or later be successful at answering questions about the existence of the world.
Nooo. But as Peter says, it offers the hope. Without it we are left with the transcendent other and gods of gaps.
I have attempted to show that this is impossible in principle. So even your knowledge of the milli-second after the Big Bang tells us nothing about the cause of the Big Bang, and never will.
Never say never, Bernie. Never say never.
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But neither of you have yet addressed the arguments I made suggesting that it is impossible in principle!
This is beginning to remind me of Anthony Flew and falsification. What would possibly convince you that physics CAN'T explain the origin of physics in principle?
"Let me start by repeating that your reasoning of 'a physical process can't explain the presence of there being physical processes in the first place' doesn't seem bad to me. But I will also repeat that your reasoning, reasonable as it seems, is an extremely flimsy basis for making a very far-reaching statement like 'physics will never explain the origins of the universe'."
Aren't they pretty much just claiming the same thing though?
If you agree that physical processes can't cause there being physical processes in general, surely the science that explains physical processes can't explain the existence in general of those processes. Surely that second claim is no more than a logical corrolary of the first!
"philosophy is fine and can lead to very interesting results, but without verification it is possible to take a wrong turn, reason very far in the wrong direction from there, and never realize it."
I can agree with that. But there is a difference between engaging in apparently reasonable, but purely speculative, inquiry and attempting to frame the nature of inquiry based on the nature of intelligibility itself.
This is not speculative - it is firmly grounded in the way in which humans understand.
Sure, I can't prove that physical processes will never provide the explanation of why there are physical processes. How does one prove a category mistake?
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Imagine I wanted to claim that one day we might be able to understand how humanity began to exist by counting the number of humans there are.
Now, do you think that's possible? How can a physical description of the number of humans that exist ever tell us how those humans began to exist?
Of course, it can't, but how is it possible to prove it can't to one who is determined to believe that it might? Surely there is something inherent in the nature of the nature "how many humans are there" which rules out the answer being able to tell us anything about origins.
Similarly, the questions asked in physics relating to how physical processes work, and what constitutes those processes, can never in principle tell us how those processes work. That is implict in the type of question being asked.
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Great, that's what I get for typing in haste.
The sixth line from the top should read "...something inherent in the nature of the question...", not "the nature of the nature"
The first word of the last line should read "came into existence" rather than "work".
Cheers
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But neither of you have yet addressed the arguments I made suggesting that it is impossible in principle!
In our different ways we both have. Peter nailed the crux of it in 41:
I follow your reasoning of saying physics can't account for the presence of physics. It seems to make good sense. From a point of view based on the intuitions we get from looking at the world around us.
That's why I say never say never. Science sees more of the universe around us every day and so our intuitions about it change. Simples.
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Hello Bernard,
Sorry, but I think posts 75 and 76 were poor ones. In 75 there are repeats of bits you said before. And then it seems you're saying 'My reasoning can't be wrong!' when you something like
"This is not speculative - it is firmly grounded in the way in which humans understand. "
or
"But there is a difference between engaging in apparently reasonable, but purely speculative, inquiry and attempting to frame the nature of inquiry based on the nature of intelligibility itself."
Ah, so you are 100% sure that your understanding (see that bit that grokesx quoted in bold) can't possibly be overlooking something. Sure Bernie, sure.
And post 76 is a really bad straw man analogy.
Try to get your head around it Bernie, what you say sounds reasonable, but it's nowhere near good enough to accept for sure a far-reaching statement like 'science will NEVER figure it out'. And including some exclamation marks in your post 75 will make it sound louder, but not more convincing.
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Grokesx:
I don't know what intuitions you're talking about, but I'm talking about logic.
It is a logical fact that counting the number of humans will never explain how humans came to exist. that is a logical fact, not based on intuition, but on the intelligible nature of the question asked.
Similarly, any physical science which describes and explains physical processes cannot explain the existence of physical processes in general. That is a logical fact based on the question asked. Physics presumes physical processes. It is dependant on them.
Perhaps you think that, at some point in the future physics will begin to lok beyond the phsical proceeses to try to glimpse their origins.
If it ever does, it will no longer be physics, but metaphysics. And, in the nature of looking beyond physical processes, whatever is "beyond" is obviously not open to physical verification. Otherwise it wouldn't be beyond.
Again, these are logical implications deriving from the nature of physics. If physics changes so that it speculates on "what is beyond physics", maybe it will no longer be physics. Certainly, if it no longer deals solely with description and systematisation of physical processes it won't be the physics that we know.
Or perhaps you're sugesting that the logical implications that I have outlined may change. Maybe logic iself is unreliable, and subject to change.
If that is the case, i can only asume that it makes no sense to talk of true or false, as the rules governing them could change arbitrarily. In which case, neither of us is right or wrong, and both of our scenarios both are and are not the case.
But I don't thnk this is true. I think logic stays the same, as does truth. It is both inherently logical and actually true that a scientific system that describes and systematises physical processes cannot explain there being physical processes. Unless you're willing to admit that logic is unreliable, and that therefore ALL of our thinking is suspect, this is an inescapable logical conclusion.
You say you "never say never", but of course, you do say "never" to some things. Science would not be science if it "never said never" to anything. Some things are thought to be sufficiently logically impossible to be totally discounted in any proposed scientific explanation or hypothesis. Science does, of course, accept the limits of the logically possible, otherwise no experiment could be expected to achieve any particular result at any given time. Anything could just randomly happen at any time.
Now, you could ignore logic altogether, truly "never say never", and forget the nature of the question you're asking. You could assert quite forcefully that counting the number of humans will one day tell us how humans came to exist. you can even really really hope that it will.
But it wont. And when you reach the end of your life and it still hasn't, mabe then you'll realise that it wont. Until then I'm not sure I can prove the applicability of logic, or the intelligibility of narrowing the answer to a question.
If your default position is "Well, anthing MIGHT happen, I'm not sure how to have an intelligent debate with you.
ANYTHING might happen. The world might turn upside down. Logic might stop working. Language might become meaningless. But we live, work, speak and debate in the assumption that logic does work, and that particular questions ask for particular answers.
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Post 80 is a response to Grokesx, but I think it adequately answers PeterK as well.
Logical relationships CAN be held to be indubitable. If you're sugesting that they may change, then neither of us is right or wrong, as anything could arbitrarily change.
It is a logical corrolary of the nature of physics that it can't move beyond the physical phenomena, and therefore can't account for there being physical phenomena, just as a study of the number of humans can't acount for there being humans.
Above you say that I say "Science will never figure it out". I'm not sure if this is a direct quote or not, but I have atempted to always speak of "physical sciences". Only "physical sciences" are affected by the ogical implication outlied above.
If I said that "science" can never figure it out, that was a slight mistake, as I think metaphysics is a science, and can ask the questions about what accounts for there being physics.
So apologies if I wasn't consistently speaking of "the physical sciences".
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Bernard, I did mean physical science not metaphysics, I'm not saying that logic itself will be overturned, etc. I don't think grokesx was saying anything like that either. What I am saying is the observations and insights you apply that logic to may be far from complete. I don't think the results of applying fine (even indubitable) reasoning to a possibly very incomplete picture are reliable enough to claim the absolute certainty you claim. For the moment I'd go along with your reasoning and say I can't see how science would explain the universe coming about. But I don't think you or anyone can say that will still be the situation 500 years from now.
Your latest two posts do read to me like yet another way of you outlining somewhat similar reasoning as in your earlier posts and then again saying 'That can't be wrong'. I think we're going around in circles, aren't we?
Apart from that I'll repeat my suggestion to drop the rather bad straw man analogy about counting people. I don't think it was very good the first time you posted it.
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Bernard
I was going to go off on one about logic and science and stuff, but this bloke here does it far better than I can.
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Peter;
A number of things occur to me.
I'm not sure we mean the same thing by "physical science". My idea of "physical science" is a science that systematises the relations and functions between what are defined as material objects (whatever "material" turns out to mean).
Now, I'm suggesting that a science that deals with the relations between already existing things cannot extend its method to deal with the cause of the existence of those things. That takes a new type of question.
You seem to agree with that, with the caveat that that may change 500 years from now.
I'm suggesting that, if it does change 500 years from now, and science begins to ask questions about how the universe came about, it has no grounds to restrict itself to "physics".
If you're suggesting that, 500 years from, now, we may be able to ask scientific-type questions about the origin of the universe, I agree.
I'm suggesting that, given this new paradigm of thinking, you have no grounds for insisting that it still deals only with physical matter and the relations and functions between it.
So, let's say we both agree that scientific thinking may well change and begin to ask the questions that it cannot ask presently. My point is that, given that change, you have no grounds for continuing to restrict this new science to physical matter.
It's the very restriction to the relations between physical matter that means science is currently unable to ask about the origin of the universe.
If "science-thinking" does become able to ask those questions, I see no grounds for assuming it will be what we now know as "physical science".
In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned.
Finally, I think we may have got bogged down in discussing the limits or otherwise of science. the real question is not "what kind of science can tell us about the origin of the universe" but "what is the source of the origin of the universe"
As I define the universe as all that physically an intelligibly exists, and as all the physically and intelligibly exists inherently raises a further question about its existence, I still assert that whatever is the source of that beginning to exist must lie outside of that which began to exist.
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Bernard
Firstly we should define some terms. Physical science is merely a term for those branches of natural science that deal with non living systems. Natural science is a catch all term for the naturalistic study of the universe and is nearer to your concept of physical science. Natural science uses the scientific method to study the natural world as distinct from the social sciences that use the scientific method to study people and the formal sciences that rely on maths and logic and which has only limited applicability to the real world. Metaphysics deals in areas beyond current knowledge that cannot be tested.
Gotta go now, but hopefully I will continue later.
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Back again.
So, the important thing in this discussion about science is the method and how it works rather than worrying about what it studies and what matter is etc. I gave a brief outline to the best of my ability in 16 and there is further discussion if you follow the link in 83.
The key is that science comes up with new knowledge by the interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning, testing and experiment, seasoned with maths and a dash of inspiration. Alone, each of the elements can't deliver, but together they enable scientists to come up with models of reality that serve us well until something better comes along.
It is necessarily a slow process, because unlike philosophers, scientists have to be careful not to extrapolate too far from what can be tested. Theories have to be well supported by evidence. When they are not, they run into trouble and founder, at least until ways of testing can be developed. String theory, by some accounts, falls into this category.
Hopefully, you can see the problem a scientifically minded person has with:
In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned.
The tendency in science is not towards speculation, but towards greater difficulty, complexity and towards more counter intuitive concepts, simply because the easy stuff has been done. To say that "empirical verification will be completely outdated" is to misunderstand what science is all about. Quantum theory is as difficult and counter intuitive as it gets, but it is also probably the most well supported scientific theory around. Whatever the new paradigms are, if they stray from evidence, testing and falsification, they won't be science.
Finally, I think we may have got bogged down in discussing the limits or otherwise of science. the real question is not "what kind of science can tell us about the origin of the universe" but "what is the source of the origin of the universe"
The question for me all along has been, "what is most likely to get us closer to knowledge of the origin of the universe." My money is still on science.
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Grokesx;
First, I disagree with this.
"Metaphysics deals in areas beyond current knowledge that cannot be tested."
Why can metaphysics not be tested? Surely, like any other branch of inquiry, it can come up with hypotheses, which can then be tested to fit, or not fit the evidence,
Take the proposition "the universe was caused by something not the universe."
As scientists are so keen to point out in other scenarios, the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence, and if there continues to be no falsification, we are as sure as we can be.
Given that we know of nothing in the world to be the cause of itself, it is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the universe as a whole is not the cause of itself. If we were to discover something that created itself ex nihilo, we'd have grounds for revising that hypothesis. Until then, we can treat it as true. Like evolution, for example.
"So, the important thing in this discussion about science is the method and how it works rather than worrying about what it studies and what matter is etc"
Ya see, I think those are important questions, and can reasonably be asked. And, using metaphysics, we can propose reasonable hypotheses that can then be tested. Perhaps another difference between "natural science" if you like, and metaphysics is that both consider different questions to be important. If you don't think these questions are important, that's fair enough. Don't ask them.
"The key is that science comes up with new knowledge by the interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning, testing and experiment, seasoned with maths and a dash of inspiration. Alone, each of the elements can't deliver, but together they enable scientists to come up with models of reality that serve us well until something better comes along."
OK.
All of your arguments about science's reliance on verification is all well and good, but you don't seem to apply that scientific thinking to this;
"The question for me all along has been, "what is most likely to get us closer to knowledge of the origin of the universe." My money is still on science."
It is counterintuitive to suggest that science, which relies on physical verification, will ever be able to find any evidence for what caused "physical things". It can't move beyond physical things because it demands physical verification, therefore it can't answer questions which do not presuppose the existence of physical things.
Metaphysics does not neccessarily rely on physical, empirical verification. Some of its hypotheses rely entirely on logical implication and deduction.
In this way, and if the question is "can metaphysics be as universally agreed as physical science?", then I agree with you that it can't. Logic and deduction are fickle, and there will always be arguments and misunderstandings about what counts as evidence.
So I agree that metaphysics can never achieve the universally agreed certainty of the physical sciences. Its subject matter, and the only method available for dealing with such subject matter, does not allow it.
But its conclusions are no less rational, reasonable and open to assent for that. Although we can never achieve the certainty that comes from empirical verification, the questions asked by metaphysics are still worth asking, and the proposed answers are still worth considering and weighing against your own intelligble experience of being. That is the evidence, although it can be interpreted in different ways.
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Hello Bernard, post 84,
You're suggesting that science may change and then become able to address the questions of where physical process we observe come from, rather than just explain how they work. That's a bit different from what I meant, I meant explaining origins working within the current methodology. But as I'm not sure what you mean by that 'different science' and it seems like a bit of a diversion, we may agree to leave that one?
You then go on to say
"In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned."
More speculative? Empirical verification becoming outdated? Things at the cutting edge of fundamental science may be becoming more and more counter-intuitive, but empirical verification isn't about to become obsolete. The very existence of for instance the dark matter you mention is hypothesized in part due to observations concerning light (how it sometimes bends in a different way than what is predicted if you account for all known factors that make it bend).
And what exactly do you mean by quantum functions and wave spectrums? Fancy terms, but I somehow suspect you're threading into areas where you don't know 100% what you're talking about. I could be wrong in thinking that of course. So perhaps you could elaborate please?
And then the last paragraph of what you wrote means we are going around in circles. You state your reasoning, but you do not bring any new insight into the discussion. That means I feel the same about the end of post 84 as I do about previous posts. Again, it's reasoning that seems ok to me, but it's reasoning based on the same limited knowledge as before. And therefore I again think it presents a far too limited basis for saying with full certainty that science will never figure it out (please note that I think that there is some chance you may be right! Just not the 100% certainty as you think.). And I strongly suspect that next posts would continue that pattern.
greets,
Peter
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Hello grokesx,
"Firstly we should define some terms. Physical science is merely a term for those branches of natural science that deal with non living systems. Natural science is a catch all term for the naturalistic study of the universe and is nearer to your concept of physical science."
Definition questions aren't the best ones, since it is just about that, definitions. But I always used the words physical science for what you refer to as natural science. For instance, computational modeling of protein folding, using electronic structure methods, would you say that that is an area of physical science? I would.
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I should have read post 86 before posting my reply in post 88, I see I was repeating much of what grokesx already said. But since post 87 is at present the latest post past moderation, I guess I can jump in on that one before grokesx.
Bernard, you go in off I think when you write
"Take the proposition "the universe was caused by something not the universe."
As scientists are so keen to point out in other scenarios, the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence, and if there continues to be no falsification, we are as sure as we can be.
Given that we know of nothing in the world to be the cause of itself, it is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the universe as a whole is not the cause of itself. If we were to discover something that created itself ex nihilo, we'd have grounds for revising that hypothesis. Until then, we can treat it as true. Like evolution, for example."
You mention a proposition and say there is no evidence against it. Fine, I fully agree. I disagree with the bit 'the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence'. What evidence? What is your positive evidence in favour of that proposition? If you read Bertrand Russels galactic tea pot analogy or the Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, you'll find that they are constructed in such a way that you can't easily say 'this or that is at odds with what they say'. But lack of counter evidence doesn't make them true. You put you proposition on the same level as evolution. Wrong, very wrong. Evolution has tons of positive evidence speaking in favour of it. You seem to want to present something in support of your proposition when you mention that we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere. But that is not positive evidence in favour of your proposition, it is merely the absence of counter-evidence.
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For instance, computational modeling of protein folding, using electronic structure methods, would you say that that is an area of physical science? I would.
I know you realise I was just trying to clarify things a bit for Bernard, and so I used the general academic distinctions. For eg Imperial College London's faculty of natural science includes chemistry, physics, the life sciences and, interestingly, maths.
As for computer modeling of protein folding, that's just Greek to me.
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Sorry folks - I've been busy, and have lost this thread a wee bit. Let's back up a tad. We don't need an external CAUSE for the universe, because if it's a cause, that necessarily implies time (or a time-like process), which implies change, which means it cannae be fundamental, so we're looking not for a CAUSE, but for an EXPLANATION. That explanation needs to be timeless (of course), fundamental (of course), and non-contingent (maybe I've just tautologised things). So a god can't do it, otherwise the universe as a structure would be coeval with its "causer"; there is no "change factor" that a god can apply.
So do we have another potential explanation? Yes - mathematics. Indeed, that's the only potential explanation, surely?
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Bernard,
What Peter said in 90.
Perhaps another difference between "natural science" if you like, and metaphysics is that both consider different questions to be important. If you don't think these questions are important, that's fair enough. Don't ask them.
No, no, a thousand times no. They think exactly the same questions are important, but go about answering them in different says. Most of my posts have been attempting - pretty badly, apparently - to suggest that if the fundamental questions are to be answered (which as Peter says is a mighty big if), science is a better candidate than logic, philosophy, metaphysics etc, not to mention the many elephants kicking around in this particular room: theology, scriptures, mysticism and all the other examples of magical thinking that human beings are prone to.
Without go over it all again, I shall just emphasise the key distinction - that of extrapolation. Science is careful not to over extrapolate, philosophy and metaphysics have no compunction in doing so. Science addresses the questions that can be answered, so that the in the future more questions can be asked with a reasonable expectation of obtaining an answer. Metaphysics speculates and logic shuffles the pack of what we already know. Science may get there in the end. If metaphysics does it will be by accident or by hanging on the coat tails of science.
If I were to use an analogy, it would be of attempting to reach the summit of Everest from the base camp. Metaphysics keeps jumping up to get a better view of the top. Science climbs, hitting many difficulties along the way. Sometimes it comes to a dead halt while it improves its equipment. Logic examines the climbed area, frequently going back to bottom to see if there's something of interest science has missed on the way.
It is counterintuitive to suggest that science, which relies on physical verification, will ever be able to find any evidence for what caused "physical things".
We've been here before. Counter-intuitiveness isn't an indicator of reality. The closer science gets to reality, the more counter-intuitive it is going to be become.
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Heliopolitan
I think I'll go with the reply that, with hindsight, I should probably have used with Bernard: It's too early to say.
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Helio
How on earth can an abstract truth cause anything?! By definition it cannot enter into causal relationships. That's why it's called abstract.
Even Plato needed a Demiurge.
I'm going to butt out again, lest the ad hominems flow. But apparently science doesn't need metaphysics. Just really bad pop-metaphysics.
Graham
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Graham, Graham, Graham,
Pfffrrr! pseudo-philosophical tosh, I love to see a bit inferiority complex shining through , you are the king of the already often-reiterated emptypostulate, so I'll just continue my laughing, FlyingSpaghettiMonsters,prrft!!!....
etc etc
There, I saved PK the bother.
You can go back to your discussion.
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Fellows, just a quick reply, as I'm a little short on time. Sorry if I don't reply to all points.
Peter;
"You mention a proposition (the universe is caused by something not the universe) and say there is no evidence against it. Fine, I fully agree. I disagree with the bit 'the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence'. What evidence"
The evidence is the fact that everything in the universe is caused by something else. Perhaps you're disputimng this?
"You seem to want to present something in support of your proposition when you mention that we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere. But that is not positive evidence in favour of your proposition, it is merely the absence of counter-evidence"
Perhaps that should be reversed. the evidence is not that "we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere" but that "everything we know of DOES NOT pop into existence out of nowhere". It is positive evidence based on everything we know about anything else.
Helio;
"We don't need an external CAUSE for the universe, because if it's a cause, that necessarily implies time (or a time-like process), which implies change, which means it cannae be fundamental, so we're looking not for a CAUSE, but for an EXPLANATION."
Fair enough. technically this is true, but the word "cause" can be used analogically to refer to different types of "explanation". So I think it is reasonable to say that the explanation of the universe is "something like a cause" - i.e., the reason for the being of a thing, but that it cannot be thought of as a physical or temporal cause. I still think the word has useful reference in this case, although analogically.
"So a god can't do it, otherwise the universe as a structure would be coeval with its "causer"; there is no "change factor" that a god can apply."
Here I'm not altogether sure what you mean. i think you may be suggesting that a fundamental, non-contingent God cannot be responsible for change. This is only true if "fundamental" and "neccessary" means "static". I think we have reasonable grounds to suggest that the opposite is the case - that what is fundamental and neccessary if infinite ACT, the participation in which is the source of ALL development, change and progression into fuller existence.
I've spoke about mathematics and intelligibility before.
Grokesx, all I can say is that you seem to have a mistaken view of metaphysics - or perhaps an understandable view of some systems of metaphysics, but not all. Many metaphysical systems - Kant's for example - push the resistance to extrapolation further than any method of physical science ever has, and doubts absolutely everything that can be doubted. Given that, though, there are still some fundamental bases on which logic and intellect can proceed.
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Ooooh, I wonder what Graham has said while I typed that....?
The suspense is killing me!
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Bernard
Will you be IPS Sat?
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Hmmm, I haven't had an invite...I've been a little out of touch for the last couple of years.
Where and when...and what? I would quite like to show my face.
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St Malachy's College Belfast, all day more or less. I've a friend speaking, so I'll be there. Dr Kerr is speaking at the end of the day on Aquinas, so I should be there all day.
GV
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Ah, seems you're being slightly modest there, Mr Veale. At least according to the programme!
I really must try my best to make it to this, as I haven't seen Gaven in quite a while - I'm not sure he's got his phd yet though, i think he's still working towards it.
Bernard Cullen is also a very good speaker.
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Grokesx, all I can say is that you seem to have a mistaken view of metaphysics - or perhaps an understandable view of some systems of metaphysics, but not all. Many metaphysical systems - Kant's for example - push the resistance to extrapolation further than any method of physical science ever has, and doubts absolutely everything that can be doubted.
Well yes, but in my simplistic analogy, they simply put limits on how high they allow themselves to jump in order to glimpse the top of the mountain.
Anyway, I don't know much about philosophy, but I know what I like:) Popper, basically.
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Hello Bernard,
You write two paragraphs claiming positive evidence for the proposition 'the universe is caused by something not the universe'. I do not think either constitutes a valid claim for there being any positive evidence. In the first paragraph you write
"The evidence is the fact that everything in the universe is caused by something else. Perhaps you're disputing this?"
Everything we see now came from something else, condensation of big gas clouds caused the appearance of stars, etc. Of course I wouldn't dispute that. And you can go back in time like that more than 13 billion years, but then at some point, just after what we presently think was the big bang, you can't continue like that. Hence my position of 'We don't know yet. We may learn, or we may never know.'. What you then do again is to reason an external source for our universe. That is just because you can't think of another explanation. Neither can I at the moment, but then what do we (and the rest of mankind) know? We might learn something that changes our thinking. Point is that your position is based on reasoning (which I may come to agree with once we learn more btw, it seems fine to me for now, but we already agreed that reasoning can at some point go in the wrong direction if there is no verification at hand), not evidence. It really is 'I can't imagine anything else. Therefore what I think must be true. Oh, and btw, I consider my own powers of reasoning to be infallible.'
The second paragraph goes in a somewhat similar direction. You write
"everything we know of DOES NOT pop into existence out of nowhere. It is positive evidence based on everything we know about anything else."
No, you are again mixing the evolution of the universe already present, where indeed we do see everything coming from something else, with its origin, which is something else and so far unexplained. So I don't see any positive evidence for your position here either, just reasoning again, mixing observations of something else and then just saying that the observations on something else are positive evidence for you proposition.
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It just occurs to me that we seem to have moved to almost opposite ends now, you arguing from observations of the present to explain the origins of the universe whereas initially you were saying that explanations of the present wouldn't explain how the universe came about. And me saying that rewinding the tape just over 13.5 billion years won't prove that someone outside the room must have brought that tape in.
I know that the analogies above aren't exactly the positions we took, not trying to start a separate debate on that or anything. But you may agree that we seem to be arguing from things that would almost have fit better with what the other person was saying earlier on in this thread?:)
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I'm not sure I'm expressing the explanation I'm proposing very well, let me try to clarify;
"you arguing from observations of the present to explain the origins of the universe whereas initially you were saying that explanations of the present wouldn't explain how the universe came about"
I'm still precisely saying that explanations of the present can't explain how the universe came about - But that fact thus tells us SOMETHING about what the explanation cannot be. The explanation for the universe cannot be the same kind of explanation as the explanations that operate WITHIN the universe. It must be something wholly other.
"Everything we see now came from something else, condensation of big gas clouds caused the appearance of stars, etc. Of course I wouldn't dispute that. And you can go back in time like that more than 13 billion years, but then at some point, just after what we presently think was the big bang, you can't continue like that"
I totally agree. But I'm suggesting that the fact that "you can't continue like that" actually tells us SOMETHING about what kind of explanation it would have to be. Although there is a certain point where we can't continue the explanations that operate WITHIN the universe, even if you are adamanat that we can't reach another kind of explanation, we can at least ascertain that there is another kind of explanation.
In brief, my "evidence" of explanation that we see IN the universe was not attempting to show what kind of explanation accounts for the universe, but to show what kind of explanation DOES NOT account for the universe.
I am becoming increasingly used to people attempting to present my views as more positive and firm than they actually are. I do not KNOW what kind of explanation could possibly account for there being a universe. But I do know that it is not the kind of explanation that accounts for things within the universe. It is, by nature, a transcendent explanation. It is almost contradictory to suggest that it is not - that the universe is caused by something in the universe.
Now, rewinding a tape doesn't prove that someone outside the room brought the tape into the room. But rewinding a tape proves that there is something that isn't a tape, if that makes sense.
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Hello Bernard,
If we're not careful we might end up agreeing.:) Sorry for my little barb of attributing 'Oh, and btw, I consider my own powers of reasoning to be infallible.' to you. I assume that that is what prompted the bit 'I am becoming increasingly used to people attempting to present my views as more positive and firm than they actually are.'? But after reading your post I think that our whole discussion is equivalent to the question of whether some of your reasoning is beyond any possible doubt. Again, much of what you're saying sounds ok to me. But, since we have so little information about the origins of our universe, I wouldn't be 100% certain of it.
Let me ask you a question.
Are you 100% certain, no possible doubt whatsoever, that what you think now about the direction in which to look for the origin of our universe will always remain correct, that no new insight could possibly ever make us think in a different direction?
After the discussion in this thread it won't surprise you that I would answer no. If you would also answer no then I think that all that is left is to go over our gut feelings as to what the chances would be. Not that I have a certain percentage in mind, but here my guesstimate would probably be considerably lower than yours.
If your answer would be yes, as I guess it would be after the certainties you expressed in previous posts, are you then not saying 'Oh, and btw, I consider my own powers of reasoning to be infallible.'?
Oh, and I wouldn't say that I am adamant that we can't reach another kind of explanation. Part of the holding back from being too sure about things also means not ruling stuff out 100%.
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Peter;
"Are you 100% certain, no possible doubt whatsoever, that what you think now about the direction in which to look for the origin of our universe will always remain correct, that no new insight could possibly ever make us think in a different direction?"
I am not 100% certain of ANYTHING. I don't know that the universe exists, or that words mean what I think they do. However, I live in the universe, and make judgments about it.
I do not consider these judgments to be 100% infallible...of course not, that would be ridiculous. But we all make judgments about everything based on logic and argument. I think our experience of causality in the world shows that no part of the universe causes itself, and that the causality operative WITHIN the universe cannot be extrapolated beyond the universe.
Now, yes, all of those things could be wrong. EVERYTHING in the universe may cause itself in some way that we don't yet know. Logic could be overturned at some fundamental level. But humans can't think like this. We do not 100% certainty about anything, but living as a human means making judgments and assenting to them. In this way, all life and knowledge is a kind of faith.
But doersn't it strike you that you're using something of an argument from ignorance - a "science of the gaps". Everything we know about scientific explanations suggest that we cannot justify extending those to the origin of the universe. You are suggesting that SOMETHING we don't yet know might change our minds, and somehow physical causal explanation might, in some mysterious way, using some unknown logical or intelligible process, explain the exhistence of physical causal explanations themselves.
Again, the argument seems to be boiling down to you saying "We don't know, it might".
Well, yes, we don't know. It might. On the other hand, it might be God.
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I should make clear that my last statement wasn't meant as a facile rejoinder to what I see as your argument from ignorance.
I am not just saying that, as we don't know, it could be God. I am everything that everything we think we do know, every view that we hold to be true about the universe, suggests that causal operations operate within the universe, and cannot be extrapolated to the existence of the universe itself. That this is not 100% infallible doesn't make it false or unreasonable.
Peter, is there ANYTHING that you are certain of? If not, how do you make affirmations about anything?
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Hmm, I think the moderator's forgotten about me.
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Has that comment slipped through the net or got lost somewhere? No one has complained about it have they?
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Ah, there we go. Comment 109 has only appeared now, at 2.51, although the later comments appeared first, in case you're all wondering what I'm talking about. But at least it's showed up. Must have taken more moderating than the others, eh?
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HI Bernard's Insight
RE post 109
'every view that we hold to be true about the universe, suggests that causal operations operate within the universe, and cannot be extrapolated to the existence of the universe itself'
I wonder whether that is correct. If we can accept metaphysics as a legitimate philosophical scidence (as Lonergan would), then metaphysics distinsguishes various metaphysical phenomena that require a causal explanation. One such phenomena is existence (as distinct from essence), and thus an explanation into the existence of existence can perhaps be instituted (as Owens and Gilson would argue), and such an explanation could take us beyond the universe (as Aquinas would argue). Thus, we can engage in Kantian transcendental argumentation, given the existence of something (e.g. the act of existence), what are the conditions for the possibility of its existence? Aquinas (and Lonergan) would answer existence itself. At least that is how I understand their procedure.
Best
Gav
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But humans can't think like this. We do not 100% certainty about anything, but living as a human means making judgments and assenting to them.
Well, that's a whole different ball game to addressing the origins of the universe. Humans make judgements based on a whole raft of mistaken notions too numerous to go into. The key one as far as we are concerned here is the notion that our ideas of the world and the universe are anything more than a rough approximation of reality. Humans perceive their world through the agency of their senses and attempt to understand it via thought patterns appropriate to them. We have evolved (according to the best theories available to us that fit the evidence) to flourish in a world where cause precedes effect and where we fall out of trees with an acceleration of about 32 feet per second per second, where time passes at a constant rate and where even the smallest things we can perceive have a solidity, if only that of a breath of wind on our faces.
The efforts of people following "particular questions about particular branches of empirical science" have shown that reality is a very different beast to that, and in the process have caused us to adjust the ways we think about the world and the universe. They have shown us, for instance, that the rate of time is not as immutable as we thought (and if you work with GPS systems, you need to to take that into account) that the smallest, fundamental particles have the qualities of both waves and particles and that... well you get the picture.
Everything we know about scientific explanations suggest that we cannot justify extending those to the origin of the universe.
Actually, everything we know about scientific explanations show that we are only ever one discovery away from having to fundamentally alter our view of reality.
I am not just saying that, as we don't know, it could be God. I am everything that everything we think we do know, every view that we hold to be true about the universe...
...will in the future be shown to be, at best, somewhere on the right lines towards a better explanation.
Your "Unknown logical or intelligible processes" are stone wall certainties, and maybe one of them will explain the origins of the universe.
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Hi Grotesx
'Well, that's a whole different ball game to addressing the origins of the universe. Humans make judgements based on a whole raft of mistaken notions too numerous to go into.'
I think that you are missing Bernard's point, to the effect that judgement, qua judgement, takes a particular act of understanding and evaluates it according to the evidence. If a judgement is made according to mistaken notions, then it is not properly speaking judgement.
'The key one as far as we are concerned here is the notion that our ideas of the world and the universe are anything more than a rough approximation of reality.'
Now that is a huge assumption to make. It assumes that what is known is not reality itself, but our ideas about reality. Thus, the knowledge that we have is not of external objects or states of affairs, but the ideas we have about them. If knowledge is of some ideas functioning as intermediaries between intellect and reality, then one will always be forced to say that knowledge only approximates to reality, this was Kant's central presupposition, nowhere defended by him (of course post-Kantians are free to do so). Why not abandon such a picture and opt instead for knowledge of reality by means of ideas? Thus what is directly known is external reality, and the ideas are simply the means by which it is known.
Best
Gav
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...judgement, qua judgement, takes a particular act of understanding and evaluates it according to the evidence.
Agreed, with the rider that for the judgement to be useful, we need to be careful not to extrapolate too far from what is supported by the available evidence.
Now that is a huge assumption to make. It assumes that what is known is not reality itself, but our ideas about reality.
No, it is a fact - and I am using that word as defined in 25. There are massive gaps in our knowledge about the nature of the universe. We do not understand how what we know about the very small can be unified with what we know about the very large. (This is very likely to be of particular importance to the subject under discussion here, which is why I have laboured it so much). Then there is the small matter of the 95% of the universe that we have labelled dark matter and dark energy that do not show up on our instruments and is not available to our senses.
...opt instead for knowledge of reality by means of ideas? Thus what is directly known is external reality, and the ideas are simply the means by which it is known.
No thanks. That way woo-ology lies.
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Hi Grotesx
'No, it is a fact - and I am using that word as defined in 25. There are massive gaps in our knowledge about the nature of the universe. We do not understand how what we know about the very small can be unified with what we know about the very large. (This is very likely to be of particular importance to the subject under discussion here, which is why I have laboured it so much). Then there is the small matter of the 95% of the universe that we have labelled dark matter and dark energy that do not show up on our instruments and is not available to our senses.'
I still fail to see how this obviates the assumption that reality is not what is known but ideas. So, you point out that some of our ideas are merely approximations of reality and do not wholly exhaust reality itself, and then you go on to list problems that natural scientists are still working with. But then to extrapolate from that that knowledge of the world by means of ideas is only approximate seems to me to be a large jump. For then what you are saying is that it is our ideas that are known, and insofar as our ideas do not map perfectly only reality (whatever the latter could be intelligibly defined to be on your account), such ideas can only be classed as approximations. But any assumption to the effect that it is our ideas that are known and not reality itself will always entail that there is some ethereal aspect of reality not captured by the ideas. Aristotle spotted this problem with Plato's account, and it is the lynchpin of Kant's division of the world into phenomena and noumena. Thus there is at least one philosophical assumption in your account, an assumption that requires a defence.
Best
Gav
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But any assumption to the effect that it is our ideas that are known and not reality itself will always entail that there is some ethereal aspect of reality not captured by the ideas.
That is not what I am arguing. I incline to the view that it may well pan out that way in practice, but at present we are in no position to say one way or the other (or a wholly conceptually different another, of course). My statement that our ideas about reality are approximations holds as of now. Perhaps approximations was the wrong word. Incomplete would be better.
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Oops, didn't mean to hit the post button yet.
Anyway, our incomplete ideas are useful for some things but not others and we have been using them and abusing them for millennia. Philosophers and theologians down the ages have stretched them beyond breaking point. With a bit of imagination we can speculate that this very human pastime began somewhere after around 100,000 years ago, when our ancestors apparently first began to bury their dead.
Science will continue to add to our incomplete ideas about reality (which is, of course, supremely indifferent to how we decide to intelligibly define it) and philosophers will continue to ponder those ideas. My point to Bernard, such as it is, is the same one Helio made miles back up the thread and is made more cogently than I can, with more besides thrown in, in the link I posted in 83.
The rest of my posts have just been wibbling, really.
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Hi Bernard,
I didn't mean to go in the area of 'is the universe real' etc when I asked if you were 100% sure of your reasoning. Let me give an example of the '100%ness' I had in mind.
Suppose you and a friend are walking past a pub, a drunk comes out and, swears at you and announces that he's going to punch you in the face. Before you can react he takes a swing at you and hits you on the nose. You feel bad pain and as you wipe your hand under your nose, there is a swipe of blood on it. The drunk yells 'bulls eye!' and walks back into the pub. Your friend hands you a tissue to wipe off the blood.
Now, you heard the drunk say he was going to hit you, you saw him swing his fist, you felt a great pain as he hit you, your friend saw you were hit and hands you the tissue in response to your bleeding nose, the drunk was satisfied that he had achieved what he wanted to achieve.
So you're fully sure that you had just been hit in the face. Are you that sure about your reasoning about there being a transcendent god behind the origin of the universe?
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#120 - PeterKlaver -
Sorry to butt into your conversation with Bernard, but I notice that you have appealed to an argument from experience.
So I will answer your question according to my own personal experience:
Yes, I am sure of the reality of God.
Now are you going to dispute the reality of my own personal experience?
Or perhaps you would explain away my experience by saying that it was purely "natural" and that I am deluded. In that case, you would have to provide reasons to justify that conclusion, by proving that a naturalistic explanation is the only logically permissible explanation.
But then you would first have to justify logic itself from a naturalistic / empirical perspective. How are you going to do that?
Empiricism, by the way, is based on experience - the experience of sense perception. And the philosophy of naturalism depends on the empirical method. Therefore naturalism is based on experience - in essence no different, therefore, from religious faith.
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LSV
Also apologies for butting in, but unless you provide a little more information, it is difficult to compare Peter's fictional scenario to your actual one. However, most personal experiences of gods I have heard of don't tend to involve witnesses, bloody noses, bloodstained tissues etc. That is to say, the evidence is weaker and alternative explanations simpler to find.
If someone were to come along and say Bernard's bloody nose was the result of Satan striking him because he is just too nice and Satan hates nice people, we wouldn't have to prove that the drunken hooly was the only logically permissable explanation to say that this is bunkum.
BTW, I see you've not got to grips with methodological and ontological naturalism yet.
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Hi Grokesx
Sorry for taking so long in getting back to you.
So, you argue that our ideas about reality are incomplete, and the natural sciences are continually extending the research programmes or enlarging the paradigms. In any case, the ideas that natural science uses to explain reality are at the minute incomplete and stand to be completed.
I have two points to make.
Firstly, I wonder what conclusion can be drawn from such a state of affairs with regard to knowledge of reality. On the one hand, it is admitted that it is reality that is known, and on the other hand, it is admitted that our ideas about reality are incomplete. But incompletness in our ideas about reality does not preclude a knowledge of reality. Thus, the direct object or state of affairs to which we have epistemic access is reality itself and not our ideas.
Secondly, irrespective of whether or not natural science has completed its ideas about reality, it is a dubious task to extrapolate from that any epistemology about the nature of knowledge and this for the following reason. To take natural science as the model of the nature of knowledge is to say something about natural science that the natural scientist does not say, i.e. one does not, as a natural scientist, take natural science as the model of the nature of knowledge, rather, such a position is a philosophical one. Thus, by even talking about epistemic contact with reality, one steps outside of natural science. But if one steps outside of natural science by taking natural science as the model epistemology, then one admits the validity of some form of knowledge that is not derived from the natural sciences, i.e. the very knowledge by which one justifies one's acceptance of the natural science as the model of knowledge.
So it appears to me to be the case that your position is an entirely philosophical one, one that seeks to ground the conditions for the possibility of knowledge within the natural sciences. But what justifies that philosophical position?
Best
Gav
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LSV, Mandy Rice-Davies was clearly wiser than you. "You would say that, wouldn't you?" Peter is asking a very good question, because your experience of god (identical to a Hindu's experience of Shiva, or a Muslim's of Allah - and therein are several problems right off) is in your head. Naturalistically(!) by observation we KNOW that people come up with crazy ideas all the time, so it is not up to us to disprove your spaced-out ramblings - the burden of proof is on YOU to show that your mental phenomenon actually represents a real feature of the universe that we should take account of. Otherwise it's just the unhinged ramblings of yet another nutter.
Naturalism has you covered.
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So, you argue that our ideas about reality are incomplete, and the natural sciences are continually extending the research programmes or enlarging the paradigms. In any case, the ideas that natural science uses to explain reality are at the minute incomplete and stand to be completed.
Firstly, I wonder what conclusion can be drawn from such a state of affairs with regard to knowledge of reality
As with all logic, the conclusion is right there in the premise. Essentially I am saying no more than that. Bernard thinks he can deduce logically from the current state of knowledge (and we can talk about what that word knowledge actually means for the next six months and still be none the wiser) to what the future state can and can't be regarding the origin of the universe. I think it is futile to do so because, among other things and at the risk of repetition beyond decency, logical arguments do no more than unpick what is in the premises, and premises are subject to change.
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Catching up after two days is convenient, as most has been said for me.
LSV, in the example of Bernard getting punched in the face it wouldn't just be his personal experience. Others would see it too. There would be physical evidence like blood stains, maybe even something like an x-ray picture showing a broken nose. But even it that wasn't the case, personal experience is not 100% without merit. Possibly good enough to take his word on it that he did get punched on the nose. If it weren't true then it would hardly matter. The existence of a supernatural all-seeing deity and claiming that she created the universe requires more than someone saying 'I feel it is so'.
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You guys realise that this is one of the most constructive discussions between atheistic scientists and theistic philosphers that W&T has seen in a long time.
I think that it's going so well (if very slowly) because you're clarifying terms and presuppositions.
On that note, I think that LSV and Bernard are talking about two different kinds of certainty.
Bernard's would be theoretical - if I were in his shoes I'd say my certainty would be on a par with, say, my certainty in a mind independent reality - or that we should trust our sense perceptions are generally reliable but are not infallible. (At least if his argument works, I think this is the sort of certainty you would have.)
LSVs seems more experiential. If I were in his shoes I'd say that my experience of God is on a par with moral experience. So I'd be as certain of God's existence as I would that "cruelty for it's own sake is wrong".
Now, yes, there are arguments against moral realism. They don't seem good enough to make me skeptical of my experience. And as for Helio's counterexamples, they just show that there is a cross cultural, common, core experience of a transcendent personal reality. That doesn't make LSV correct. But for the life of me, I can't see how it undermines or defeats LSV's experiential knowledge claim. It may be relevant to #121 & #126, but PK and LSV can work out the details there.
We need to be careful not to mix up Christian Theology with the claim that God exists.
Just my tuppence's worth. I'm off again for a couple of days. But this threads a very good read IMHO. I look forward to reading it again on Monday.
GV
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"To take natural science as the model of the nature of knowledge is to say something about natural science that the natural scientist does not say, i.e. one does not, as a natural scientist, take natural science as the model of the nature of knowledge, rather, such a position is a philosophical one. Thus, by even talking about epistemic contact with reality, one steps outside of natural science. But if one steps outside of natural science by taking natural science as the model epistemology, then one admits the validity of some form of knowledge that is not derived from the natural sciences, i.e. the very knowledge by which one justifies one's acceptance of the natural science as the model of knowledge."
Yes, that seems to be the case here. There have been epistemological and metaphysical arguments. What I'm finding very interesting is the philosophy of a type of atheism that is being teased out here.
Put this another way. What do we need to presuppose about our minds and the world to explain the truth-telling power of science? That doesn't seem to be a meaningless question.
Like Gavin says, an atheist can give an answer (he might even like grokes(on pain of circularity) try to draw all his premises from propositions in scientific theories), but he needs to step outside science to explain the success of science. That's an historical and philosphical question.
I'm also sure that philosophy and natural science are rarely in direct competition. Science started life as "natural philosphy". Then it branched off. So the same sorts of questions are not addressed in both subjects. There is dialogue(eg. Google "cognitive science"). And philosophy reflects on human experience among other things, so premises are drawn from science, and the arts and human testimony, and so forth.
GV
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Has Anyone Found a Self- Replicating RNA Molecule?
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What I'm finding very interesting is the philosophy of a type of atheism that is being teased out here.
I don't know whose philosophy it is you are teasing it out, but mine doesn't need much teasing. It's the simple, boring one that says extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence, and there are no more extraordinary claims than those made by the religious. I do not claim to know that god does not exist, merely that there is no evidence that she does. I do not adhere to ontological naturalism, so I feel no need to step out of science (not that I am a scientist) to ponder on its efficacy. It seems to work and if it doesn't dish out the certainties that many philosphers crave and that they imagine they can get out of logic and thinking really hard, well, I'm OK with that.
Trouble is, I can't resist a good argument. So one thing I will say is that it seems really strange that people are prepared to spend time and energy going over these unremarkable arguments with a fine philosophical tooth comb to point out the (undoubtledly valid) inconsistencies when their own ultimate argument comes down to magic man done it.
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Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear...you know you're committed to quite a bit more than that. (I'm assuming that you believe that science gets things right - that it gets at the truth.)
And analytic philosophy is just the clarification and the defence of ideas. It rarely trades in certainty. Every argument can, in principle, be challenged and overturned.
But I'm not a philosopher, so I'll butt out.
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Hi guys,
I'm on the hoof a bit this week, but I'll make a quick reply to PeterK's last reply to me.
"I didn't mean to go in the area of 'is the universe real' etc when I asked if you were 100% sure of your reasoning."
But I wish you would think in those terms, because that's precisely the kind of fundamental question we're asking when asking about the possibility of transcendence.
you offer a simple, empirical example as a paradigm for 100% certainty, yet you freely admit that you don't realy want to consider questions about reality. If I may say so, it seems you're setting up empirical verification as an ideal of knowing, yet refusing to ask the many questions that it begs about the reliability of the senses and the reality of an external universe.
Questions about transcendence are on a par with questions about reality. They do not provide the same kind of certainty as provided by empirical looking, but an underlying judgement about reality must be made for these empirical proofs to even have any foundation.
I cannot PROVE that reality exists outside of my mind. But everything about consciousness and awareness almost COMPELS me to assent. It would almost be a contradiction to say that the universe does not really exist, whatever really could mean in such a context.
So it is almost a contradiction to say that the universe causes itself, although no element within it can account for itself.
Sorry that's so hurried, I might get a chance to come back later.
Let me give an example of the '100%ness' I had in mind.
Suppose you and a friend are walking past a pub, a drunk comes out and, swears at you and announces that he's going to punch you in the face. Before you can react he takes a swing at you and hits you on the nose. You feel bad pain and as you wipe your hand under your nose, there is a swipe of blood on it. The drunk yells 'bulls eye!' and walks back into the pub. Your friend hands you a tissue to wipe off the blood.
Now, you heard the drunk say he was going to hit you, you saw him swing his fist, you felt a great pain as he hit you, your friend saw you were hit and hands you the tissue in response to your bleeding nose, the drunk was satisfied that he had achieved what he wanted to achieve.
So you're fully sure that you had just been hit in the face. Are you that sure about your reasoning about there being a transcendent god behind the origin of the universe?
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Bernard, once you have some time to rejoin and have caught up to post 120, there is something else I'd like to take your mind on. About where to draw the boundary of the universe.
Earlier on the multiverse hypothesis came up. You switched to a definition of the universe that would include any universes other than the one we inhabit. If interaction with other universes had anything to do with our universe coming about, then your next question would be 'Where did the multiverse come from'. But where exactly would you draw the line between what is and what is not part of the universe then? Whatever caused our universe or the multiverse to come about you call god. Why is god not part of what your definition of the universe is, the way you would include the other universes in the multiverse as part of 'the universe'?
The discussion about this subject is often one where non-believers say about the earliest origins 'We don't know. Yet.' and where theists pretend that 'goddunnit' somehow represents something of an answer. In our discussion I don't think you have presented any evidence for your goddunnit, just reasoning. And as I've said a couple of times, it may turn out to be correct. But suppose it did, then that would represent nothing more than just the next step in the chain, right? Am I correct in thinking that your position doesn't represent any answer better than 'goddunnit', only obscured and made to sound more acceptable by where you choose to place the boundary of the universe? What determines the boundary of what is inside or outside the universe, other then the desire to have something distinct outside it that you can call god?
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Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear...you know you're committed to quite a bit more than that. (I'm assuming that you believe that science gets things right - that it gets at the truth.)
You are, in fact, making an incorrect assumption. The only thing I am committed to is pragmatism. Science seems to get things right and has been more useful than the alternatives: mysticism, revelation, holy books, authority and philosophy. That is not to say philosophy is useless and cannot contribute to the well of ideas, it clearly has and does, but it can have the tendency to to get lost down tortuous by-ways, to mix the metaphors a tad.
So, no, I don't believe science gets at the truth. I just think it gives us a decent enough model of it to be going on with.
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Bernard, the timing of our posts is remarkably coincidental today. I just posted 133 and once I did I see you just got there ahead of me with post 132.:)
"But I wish you would think in those terms, because th".....etc
You may wish me to think in those terms but I didn't when I merely asked you a very simple question in post 120. Could you answer the question please? It seems to me you're stuck between having to let go of the certainty with which you proclaimed that god explains the universe (except that it doesn't explain anything I think, see post 133) or proclaim the infallibility of your own reasoning.
So let me try again. Are you as certain about your reasoning as you would be of someone having punched you a bleeding nose?
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Peter;
"Whatever caused our universe or the multiverse to come about you call god. Why is god not part of what your definition of the universe is, the way you would include the other universes in the multiverse as part of 'the universe'"
This is the old question, if there is a God, what brought IT into existence.
That question, I've always thought, is a classic case of atheists just not really grasping the kind of arguments that theists are making.
Let me put it like this. Everything that exists raises questions. We can ALWAYS ask "where did that come from?" Indeed, an ad hoc definition of "exist" could be "open to questions re origins". Anything about which we can ask "where did this come from?" is included in "the universe".
The theist point is not that there is another, divine, level above the universe, about which we can still ask "where did it come from?". The theist point is that there must be ONE thing about which it makes no sense to ask "Where did it come from?"
It is not a matter or drawing an arbitrary line between the universe of causality and a God who somehow is not affected by that causality. the entire theist project is rather about gleaning, from the nature of causality, the limit of that causality itself.
So perhaps your question about limits can be answered in relation to causes. The theist point is not that causality must be rejected in one particular, special instance....It is that the nature of causality itself points to something that is uncaused.
So the boundary of what is in or outside the universe is causality. the universe consists of caused things. IF there is an uncaused thing, that thing is what we call God. I think your best bet is to argue that there is no uncaused thing, rather than arguing that our hypothetical uncaused thing is actually hypothetically caused.
Essentially, in positing a God I'm claiming that there is ONE uncaused thing. In asking "what caused that?" you're just not listening to what I'm positing.
I think the intelligible nature of causality demands one uncaused thing, otherwise the whole process could never have got going. You can't argue against that by saying "but what is the cause of your uncaused thing?", or "but how do you know there's not something beyond that that causes it?" If there were, it wouldn't be the uncaused thing I'm talking about,. Perhaps that would be at the next level up, or more levels beyond that.
I don't know how many levels of multiverse we would have to traverse to reach the uncaused thing at the end. Maybe there's a big universe that causes this universe, and perhaps there's a big multiverse that causes all the others. But beyond what causes all those, I'm suggesting that there is an uncaused thing.
Think of my concept of God as a moving target. It refers to what lies beyond all of the caused existing things. If something else that is caused lies beyond that, then my concept of God refers to what lies beyond "that". I could never claim that "God is such and such" because God is precisely that which lies beyond all limits, even those we keep breaking.
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"Are you as certain about your reasoning as you would be of someone having punched you a bleeding nose?"
No. However, I feel you didn't really read my post. The reason I asked you not to reject out of hand any questions about "the reality of the universe, etc" was that those are the kind of questions I am asking, and the kind of questions you're questioning the certainty of.
But you can read my post again. For now, the simple answer to your simple question is this. "I am as certain that God exists as I am certain that the universe exists". As you admit to not really thinking about questions of that kind, perhaps you should. Are you certain that the universe exists? You know, sometimes I'm not. So I certainly wouldn't describe it as 100% certainty. But it remains a fundamental assumption on which all of my perception of reality is based. But there's another post for you to read in the meantime too. I must go do some work.
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Bernard
Getting away from the tortuous by-ways which from where I'm standing always end up in the exact spot from where we started, I'd like to pick you up on a couple of points.
If we accept for the moment, your version of the cosmological argument, how does it lead you to a specifically theistic interpretation? I can see it might lead you to deism, but a whole raft of other things come into play when you posit theism that go beyond what you have argued so far. Or are you using theism in its broadest sense of the belief in a single deity?
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Grokesx;
Your entirely right, of course. On this blog I have always tried to show only that it is rational to accept that it makes sense for there to be a single transcendent Other which accounts for the universe.
I have never attempted to rationally argue for the doctrine of the incarnation, or the trinity, or even for God's taking any interest in creration.
I think argument can show that it makes sense to view the universe as having a transcendent, intelligent creator. I think the inherent intelligibility of the universe makes that a rational position to take.
If that position is rational, it leaves open the rational possibility that such a creator does, in fact, take an interest in the universe. In fact, it becomes likely - why create something in which you had no interest. That further leaves open the rational possibility that God, having an interest in the universe, wished to communicate himself to it in the fullest way possible - by somehow becoming part of it.
I have not attempted to show these things by argument, even though they seem fairly sensible to me.
But I have tried to show that it makes sense to view the world as having a transcendent creator - that is, in fact, the "least unlikely" of all scenarios.
Given that, the additional views, such as the incarnation, revelation etc, which are not open to the same kind of rational inevitability, nonetheless become worthy of concern on their own merits, and, in fact, seem increasingly likely.
But I am not neccessarily concerned with rationally arguing for these. There is something of direct experience by which people who hold those views claim certainty. Given the rational likelihood that there is a transcendent creator, such personal experiences should not be discounted out of hand, even though they are, by nature, personal and not objective. But who knows, when second-hand accounts of personal experience becomes one's own personal experience, it does not become objective as such, but you will certainly be sure of it.
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But yes, for the purpose of argument i am using theism in the broadest sense of belief in a single deity. Given this belief, however, the whole raft of other things that come into play become increasingly less unbelievable, and more rationally acceptable
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Bernie,
sorry I've been engaged in other projects, but...
Given this belief, however, the whole raft of other things that come into play become increasingly less unbelievable, and more rationally acceptable
Which, I might suggest, is precisely the problem. Maybe the reason that a much higher percentage of scientists are atheists than in other lines of work lies in the fact that we aren't lazy belly-rubbers, falling back into a slack-jawed "god-did-it" burp every time we're hit with a strange phenomenon, but we actually *work* to try to figure out what lies behind the phenomenon in question. And guess what? We have been astoundingly successful. WE are ones who don't accept the belly-rubbers' handwaving about bogeymonsters under the bed - we go and LOOK. We pull out the boxes and the toys, we scour the underside of the bed, and we don't find bogeymonsters. But the reason we do it is not specifically to disprove the silly fairy tales - we want to know what is going on under the bed.
We are curious. We are inquisitive. We take delight in tackling the mountain of ignorance with the Pickaxe of Observation and the Shovel of Reason. You can stuff the Feather Duster of Faith. We don't *care* that some people want to wallow in their ignorance - that's fine - clear off and indulge your inane fantasies as you wish. We've got a mountain to dig. Yes, it may take a while, and yes, we may make some mistakes as we go, but we have the tools for the job, we're up for the challenge, and we have already made an exceptionally creditable start. By all means sit back and rationalise whatever you want with reference to your giant inflatable space pixie - sure, once you swallow that, you can explain *anything* - it's just a giant toybox of ever-more-contrived epicycles. Be my guest. But please take yourself off to a wee corner where you can play by yourself, and get out of my way.
Scientists coming through. We've got work to do. You kids run along and play elsewhere. And take your ludicrous pixie with you.
:-)
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Gee whizz, gosh, Helio!
:-)
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Very eloquent Helio, if not very substantial. We're back to "We scientists aren't silly, we think about things and present arguments, not like you ridiculous theists" aren't we? Without so much as a glance at the arguments made? Is this what we've come to? :)
"Maybe the reason that a much higher percentage of scientists are atheists than in other lines of work"
Really? Is this empirically verified?
"but we actually *work* to try to figure out what lies behind the phenomenon in question"
Except the phenomenon of "existence" of course - I think this thread shows that physical science hasn't quite faced up to the challenge of that phenomenon yet. In fact, it's been amply illustratwed that you haven't even begun to ask those questions.
As Peter K said; "I didn't mean to go in the area of 'is the universe real' etc".
If that's utlising the correct tools for the job, I can only assume the job is not what you thought it was when you started.
The rest of your post reads more like a $1,000-bucks-a-throw seminar by some hot-shot millionaire motivational speaker than an actual argument.
The rhyming ditty at the end is quite nice, although the meter and scanning leaves something to be desired. :)
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Come on, Helio, don't beat about the bush, tell us what you really think.
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I'm glad to see that our "space pixie" is now "inflatable" too. I mean, what kind of dis-inflatable thing could create baloons?
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Except the phenomenon of "existence" of course - I think this thread shows that physical science hasn't quite faced up to the challenge of that phenomenon yet. In fact, it's been amply illustratwed that you haven't even begun to ask those questions.
As against asking the questions and making up the answers.
Seriously, Bernard, it seems clear to me that the raft of other stuff impinges to a large extent into your rationalisations, whether you are aware of it or not. The cosmological argument in all its forms has been around for a long while. To think that you can get at something useful out of it means you have to accept that out of two equally untenable notions, infinite regress and the uncaused cause, we have to accept the latter on the basis of special pleading and the (usually unstated) fact that it is consonant with the religious view.
I'm sorry, it really is just thinking hard and making stuff up.
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"out of two equally untenable notions, infinite regress and the uncaused cause"
This is the hub of the issue. When you say that they are equally untenable, are you saying that there is a third option, or do you accept that those are the two options? If so, on what basis do you obviously accept the former and not the latter?
"we have to accept the latter on the basis of special pleading"
I don't think it's special pleading. I have tried to argue that the notion of an infinite regress cuts at the heart of the notion of causality as we experience it. If there is an infinite regress of things causing other things, there is absolutely no reason why any of the things should exist in the first place, and thus the entire edifice of universal causality amounts to very little.
The later view, that there is an uncaused cause, may sound strange and imcomprehensible, but it has the benefit of accounting for the causality of the universe rather than undermining it. Positing an infinte regress is the first step on the road to positing absolute unintelligibility. If there is an infinite regress of causes, still no one cause constitutes sufficient reason for the other, and we have to admit to a universe of unintelligibility in which nothing fully accounts for anything.
Positing an uncaused cause may seem strange, but if, as you say, they are equally untenable positions, and yet the truth must be one of those positions, the fact that an uncaused cause leaves causality intact while an infinite regress suggests that here is really no such things as a cause means that, rationally, we must assent to the later option.
Unless there is a third option, between an infinite regress and an unknown cause. I'd love to hear it.
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This is the hub of the issue. When you say that they are equally untenable, are you saying that there is a third option, or do you accept that those are the two options? If so, on what basis do you obviously accept the former and not the latter?
I am saying that I reject them both as untenable, so we need to back up and examine the premises again. If I were the mischievous sort, I would choose to challenge the Causal Principle, since it seems inordinately important to you. I might argue that your position, like mine, is merely a methodological one and that there is no ontological justification. That would make the option which says let's wait and see if our empirical endeavours can cast more light on the subject the more rational one.
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Oh God! This nutjob is Australian. How embarrassing.
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Hello Bernard, let me respond to your various posts. I did read the one you thought I hadn't read btw.
Thanks for answering the question, when in post 137 you wrote
"I am as certain that God exists as I am certain that the universe exists"
Ok, based on what we discussed in this thread that sounds like you are saying 'my reasoning can't be wrong'. Given that there is no evidence to support your idea, that seems clearly wrong to me. And from post 75 it would seem to me that it is wrong to you too. There you agree that with reasoning alone you can take a wrong turn and go very far in the wrong direction without noticing. It seems you can't hold to that and then still proclaim your ideas about there being a god with such certainty.
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Hello again Bernard,
Post 136 seemed to me like you are repeatedly rephrasing the idea 'God does not need an explanation'. Phrased like that, almost everyone would see how empty that is. You try to make that position sound credible, but I don't read any arguments for that in your post that actually make it any better. You say things like
"The theist point is that there must be ONE thing about which it makes no sense to ask "Where did it come from?"
No elaboration as to why that would be so, just stating it out of nowhere.
"The theist point is not that causality must be rejected in one particular, special instance....It is that the nature of causality itself points to something that is uncaused."
No elaboration that removes the obvious question 'how does that work?'. Without an answer, I don't think those lines help anything.
"Essentially, in positing a God I'm claiming that there is ONE uncaused thing."
There is one word in there where I think you're getting it: positing. Now please offer something why you would that.
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Hello Bernard,
You didn't like Helios post to you, but I think he was actually being charitable. Not only is he right in stating that your (entirely unsupported by any evidence) position of a transcendent creator doesn't make that whole raft of other things any more credible, you went in off earlier than that. In the first part of post 139 you nicked a free lunch when your hypothesized transcendent cause of our universe suddenly became an 'intelligent creator'. I was unconvinced by your causality argument (as you seem unconvinced by my rejection of your arguments), but at least you brought that up before. The rest you're sneaking in out of nowhere.
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And finally for tonight, about there being more atheists in science than in other jobs you asked
"Really? Is this empirically verified?"
Yes. See e.g. the link I've posted here several times before:
http://kspark.kaist.ac.kr/Jesus/Intelligence%20&%20religion.htm
The data is a decade old. Since then, the belief among the general US population has dropped from 90 to 85%. But 5% shifts don't change the very clear picture.
Of the overall population, 90% believes. Just getting a BSc is enough for the majority to see sense. Please note that that is mostly following classes, you don't do much real research as a student getting a BSc. For those who do go on to become researchers the believing percentage drops further, to 10% for top scientists. And that 90% of non-believers aren't mostly agnostics, no they are outright atheists. I can add one more data point: of hundreds of science Nobel laureates, there has been exactly one believer. So the picture is overwhelmingly clear:
overall belief: 90%
among those with BSc: 40%
eminent scientists: 10%
Nobel laureates: less than 1%
So the more accomplished the scientist, the less likely he or she is to be a believer. To the point where if people are so smart that they become top scientists, there are almost no believers left.
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I'll try to reply to all of these points in order. Sorry in advance if I miss anything.
Grokesx;
"I am saying that I reject them both as untenable (the options of infinite causality or an uncaused cause), so we need to back up and examine the premises again."
To me that sounds like we're back to the old "I might come up with an explanation that might be better than yours, therefore we can make no judgment on the matter until my hypothetical better explanation comes along."
I'm all for holding back on judgment, but sometimes there are only two logical options, and it is no good just hoping there might be another.
Let me put it another way; Either causality STOPS somewhere, or it doesn't. I put it like that just to try to emphasise that there are only two options.
Is there a third option between stopping and not stopping? Either it does or it doesn't. I put it to you that arguing that there might be some in-between state, where a thing is both in motion and not in motion simultaneously, or both caused and not caused at the same time, is to dip into complete unintelligibility.
If things can both be and not be something in the same respect at the same time, there is no sense in saying that something is or is not in a certain respsct, and there is absolutely no debate to be had. Perhaps that is your view.
"If I were the mischievous sort, I would choose to challenge the Causal Principle, since it seems inordinately important to you."
I challenge you to challenge it! By causal principle I mean that a thing seems intelligibly to be sufficient reason for the being of another thing.
"That would make the option which says let's wait and see if our empirical endeavours can cast more light on the subject the more rational one."
Empirical endeavours casting more light on the nature of empiricism? I suggest to you that you're back to misunderstanding the question. I am not asking about the object of empricial endeavours but about the FACT of empricial endeavouring.
PeterKlaver:
"in post 137 you wrote
"I am as certain that God exists as I am certain that the universe exists"
Ok, based on what we discussed in this thread that sounds like you are saying 'my reasoning can't be wrong'."
No. That actually suggests that you HAVEN'T read the thread! I have clearly stated that both my reasoning about God and about the universe could be wrong! When I say i am as certain about God as about the universe I am precisely saying that I could be wrong about both! The point is, however, that being human demands judgments on issues of existence. We cannot "prove" that anything exists. The reason we cannot is because everything we know about anything operates WITHIN the framework of existence. there is no way of getting out of the ASSUMPTION that things exist. This, in a way, is not exactly proof that the universe exists. It is more a case of DISPROVING the opposite.
Similarly, when I say that God exists, I cannot "prove" it. But I can disprove, to a certain extent, that the universe exists on its own merits. In fact, absolutely nothing in the universe has the capability of existing through its own sustainance.
This does not "prove" anything about God - only that the universe must have a source beyond itself. There are certain existential corroloraies that can be further surmised, such as that the transcendent source of the universe can not consist of the plurality that makes up the universe - for a plurality would not be transcendent but part of the universe.
The point is that you completely misread me if you think I'm stating my reasoning CAN'T be wrong. I could be wrong about both God and the existence of the universe. But my intelligible existence demands that I reject the opposites - i.e. that the universe DOESN'T exist, or the universe causes itself. I cannot prove that these are not the case, but it is simply a contradiction for me to accept them. I cannot rationally accept that the universe doesn't exist.
"Post 136 seemed to me like you are repeatedly rephrasing the idea 'God does not need an explanation'.
Phrased like that, almost everyone would see how empty that is."
Phrased like that, it's almost backwards
I am saying that there cannot be an infinte regress of explanation, and therefore that something doesn't need an explanation. That something is given the name God.
The way you phrase it, it seems like I have blind faith in God, then say that it doesn't need an explanation to excuse the deficiencies of the idea.
In actual fact, my starting point is the impossibility of an infinite regress of explanation, and the corrollary that therefore something must be the ultimate explanation.
You say things like
"The theist point is that there must be ONE thing about which it makes no sense to ask "Where did it come from?"
No elaboration as to why that would be so, just stating it out of nowhere."
I have elaborated, and donse so again above. There must be one thing about which it makes no sense to ask that because otherwise there would be an infinity of caused causes. I have tried to argue that an infinity of caused causes makes no sense as nothing can then be said to be the cause of anything else, and we cannot then rationally talk about the origins of ANYTHING.
""The theist point is not that causality must be rejected in one particular, special instance....It is that the nature of causality itself points to something that is uncaused."
No elaboration that removes the obvious question 'how does that work?'. Without an answer, I don't think those lines help anything."
Again, i think I have elabroated - you just haven't read it. It works because the nature of causality includes the assertion that something can the the sufficient reason of something else. This cannot go on to infinity, because in that case, nothing is the sufficient reason for anything else, because it doesn't have sufficient reason for itself.
So the whole system of causality depends on there being sufficient reason for the entire process to get started in the first place - A "cause" of causality. If universal causality does not have its own sufficient reason, the notion of anything being truly responsible for the existence of anything else makes no sense.
I hope that is elaboration enough. i have said all that before, though probably far more briefly.
""Essentially, in positing a God I'm claiming that there is ONE uncaused thing."
There is one word in there where I think you're getting it: positing. Now please offer something why you would that."
I JUST HAVE.
"you nicked a free lunch when your hypothesized transcendent cause of our universe suddenly became an 'intelligent creator'."
I use "intelligent" in a wide sense meaning "author or perceiver of intelligibility".
If a transcendent cause is responsible for the intelligibiltiy of the universe - and I have already argued that the universe is inherently intelligible, that the universe IS intelligibility - then it makes sense to use the word "intelligent" about that cause. It need not mean intelligent in a human sense - in fact, an "intelligience" that was responsible for the enitire intelligible matrix of the universe would need to be "intelligent" in a much wider sense.
But I use the term analogically. It's not quite a free lunch, as you suggest.
As for scientist atheists - oh really? How interesting.
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Take this as a light hearted look at some of the atheistic posts here.
“We don't need an external CAUSE for the universe, because if it's a cause, that necessarily implies time (or a time-like process), which implies change”
No, not really. Imagine a universe in which a metal ball is resting on a cushion. Nothing else has happened there. Nothing else ever will. There’s no change. (It’s happening somewhere in Tegmark’s level-4 multiverse). Yet the ball causes a concavity in the cushion.
Imagine parallel universes. There’s never been any change in any of these universes.
We never find B in these universes unless A is present.
We always find B when A is present.
Suppose we could remove A. B would disappear.
So it's reasonable to believe A causes B.
You’re also assuming that God is timelessly eternal. Not every Theist agrees with that. Not even Bill Craig.
“which implies change, which means it cannae be fundamental”
Why not? Assuming that it can choose to change of its own volition? Talk about begging questions.
“So a god can't do it, otherwise the universe as a structure would be coeval with its "causer"; there is no "change factor" that a god can apply.”
Of course causes can be coeval with their effects. So I’m not sure what you mean here. Perhaps you’re assuming that a cause must DETERMINE its effect. So you’re assuming without argument that causality requires determinism? Good luck on that one! Go back to our parallel universes. Suppose we never find B in these universes unless A is present.
We OFTEN find B when A is present.
Suppose we could remove A. B would disappear.
So A causes B.
In any case, if God can freely choose to create or not to create then he can apply a change factor.
No need to invoke analogies here. I’m using cause univocally.
“Science seems to get things right.. So, no, I don't believe science gets at the truth.”
Err …what?
Maybe it’s the ‘seems’ that’s doing all the work here. But then there’s a philosophical principle that Groke’s is committed to:
Only believe (B) is true on sufficient evidence (E), where sufficient evidence goes beyond practical utility of (B) and the fact that (B) seems to be true.
But why should I believe that principle? It doesn’t even seem to be true, and it’s hardly practically useful. It seems completely counterintuitive - I shouldn’t believe that my kids’ love me? That’s a useful belief, and it seems to be true. But I still shouldn’t believe that it’s true apparently.
“once you swallow that, you can explain *anything*”
Once again, no. The Problem of Evil? Dysteleology? If Dennett’s account of the origins of Religious Belief were true, Theism would have a hard time explaining that. Furthermore, as Elliott Sober has shown, Theism might predict order and complexity[and Sober would contest even that], but it cannot predict what forms these would take. So it can’t explain the *particular* form and structure Bacterial Flagella or the vertebrate eye.
Now two things to note about these objections to Theism while we’re banging on about the wonders of science over philosophy when discussing God’s existence.
(i) These are *ALL* PHILOSOPHICAL arguments.
(ii) They’re not great philosophical arguments. At least they don’t seem to be well informed.
Which is were philosophy (at least analytic philosophy)is helpful. Examining arguments to see if they hold water.
GV
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I have to say, though, PK is coming across as very sensible.
Which is killing me to say.
But his objections seem to rely on his common sense - not any deep analytic criticisms. If you just don't buy "God" as an explanation, fine. Bernard and he can chat about God, and see if there aren't any prinicpled objections worth exploring.
But it looks like it's going to be one of those agree to disagree things. I don't think people need to prove their beliefs to be rational. And Bernie and he both seem very rational here.
GV
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Bernie
You might want to spell out what you mean by analogical language.
Just in case there's a mix up on statements I've made about certainty -
(i)I wouldn't want to get certainty mixed up with my commitment to an idea or a belief.
(ii)I think that you can have levels and different types of certainty. I just take it as meaning "a very strong belief in (x)" BUT
(iii)I don't believe I've indubitable, incorrigible, apodictic knowledge about anything. (I'm pretty sure knowledge doesn't have to reach those standards.) If THAT is what folk mean by 'certainty', I don't have it.
GV
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"analogy - A systematic comparison between structures that uses properties of and relations between objects of a source structure to infer properties of and relations between objects of a target structure.
Analogy is an important kind of thinking, contributing to such cognitive tasks as explanation, planning, and decision making. Analogical arguments are sometimes used in philosophy, for example to argue that there exist other minds analogous to one's own"
Graham, i agree with you on certainty. The point I was making is that some people seem to find it perfectly reasonable to demand a level of certainty about God that they freely admit to not having about the existence of the universe.
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I'm all for holding back on judgment, but sometimes there are only two logical options, and it is no good just hoping there might be another.
Come on, Bernard, even you must know that the cosmological argument has taken a hammering by the likes of Plantinga, Gale, Martin, Mackie, Quentin Smith, Rundle and Oppy, all of them concluding there are no versions of it that are sound, so I'm hardly going out on a limb here. Even Swinbourne rejects the deductive version and opts for (mis)using Bayesian statistics to prop up his position.
Empirical endeavours casting more light on the nature of empiricism?
No, empirical endeavours casting light on the nature of the universe, which may lead us to a greater understanding of the nature of reality, which in turn may give us more information on how to conceptualise those aspects of reality that our logic, based on current understanding, does not allow, no matter how much we want it to.
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Grokesx;
I'm sorry, but in answer to my point about sometimes being to logical options - either something is the case or is not the case - you appear to have just given a list of names. I'm not sure how that helps.
"No, empirical endeavours casting light on the nature of the universe, which may lead us to a greater understanding of the nature of reality, which in turn may give us more information on how to conceptualise those aspects of reality that our logic, based on current understanding, does not allow, no matter how much we want it to"
Ah. Again that just sounds like "I might come up with an explanation that might be better than yours, therefore we can make no judgment on the matter until my hypothetical better explanation comes along.
As far as I'm concerned, our empirical endeavours already cast enough light on the universe to show that it does not account for itself. All you are doing is saying "oh but it might. really, it might".
A subtext of your point seems to be that, while your empirical endeavour might somehow come up with a better explanation, my empirical endeavour - after all, I glean my knowledge of the universe from the senses, just like you - isn't really empirical at all. I can assure you though, it's about as empirical as any explanation can be.
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"may give us more information on how to conceptualise those aspects of reality that our logic, based on current understanding, does not allow, no matter how much we want it to"
But I can conceptualise the aspects of reality that deal with causality and its inherently dependent nature. If I wasn't able to copnceptuialise it I wouldn't have been able to argue with you about it this last while.
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Some terrible spelling and grammar in my last two posts, by the way. sorry about that, just a little rushed
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"Plantinga, Gale, Martin, Mackie, Quentin Smith, Rundle and Oppy"
Been googling? Wikipedia? Infidels.org/ maybe? Take Gale and Plantinga of that list immediately. Gale is well known for resurrecting the Leibnizian argument with Alex Pruss. He thinks it's sound, but not convincing. The article's online, and I've just finished another article by him on the subject. You can hear him ticking off Quentin Smith on the topic online as well if you like.
Read Swinburne? He doesn't use Bayesian **statistics** - he's talking about drawing reasonable degrees of belief from epistemic probabilities. He avoids all talk of frequencies, etc.
GV
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John McKay's Norn' Iron Itinerary is now available:
Wednesday 4 Nov 7:30 PM South Belfast
Forestside Christian Centre 88 Belvoir Drive,
BT8 7FR
Contact: Sam McIlwrath
Phone: 02890-964759
Thursday 5 Nov 8:00 PM Banbridge
Banbridge Independent Methodist Huntly Road,
BT32 3BE
Contact: David Wright
Phone: 02840-626799
Friday 6 Nov 8:00 PM Enniskillen
Enniskillen Free Presbyterian Church Chanter Hill,
BT74 4BG
Contact: John Gray
Phone: 02866-324164
Saturday 7 Nov 3:00 & 8:30 PM Craigavon
Dunamis Afternoon: Conference
Evening: Young People’s Rally
Craigavon Civic Centre, Lakeview Road, BT64 1AL
Contact: David Magarry
Phone: 02892-682520
Any chance of a report or interview William ?
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GV
Well, I can see that Gale may have changed his mind since 1991 when he said that as the conclusion of all versions of the cosmological argument invoke an impossibility, none of them can provide examples of sound reasoning, to deciding that they are still not convincing. But Plantinga? His whole oeuvre revolves around the concept of Reformed epistemology, or the idea that god is a properly basic belief which somehow makes arguments for her existence unnecessary, so it would be curious if he embraced the cosmological argument. But I stand corrected if he does.
As for Swinburne, well yes, you are correct that he doesn't put anything that actually means anything into his arguments. He takes Bayes Theorem, a perfectly sound tool for assessing prior probabilities (and if you don't think that has anything to do with statistics you should do some googling), rips the guts out of it and plugs his own personal preferences in and pretends it has some significance. I don't know what the good Rev Bayes would have made of it, but it looks like wish fulfillment to me.
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Slight correction - technically 'sound' means valid with true premises. As an atheist, of course, Gale can't hold to that. "Valid and rational" would describe his take on the cosmological argument. His atheism seems to be based on the Problem of Evil.
Grokes
Of course I'm aware of Bayesian statistics. Swinburne wasn't using Bayesian statistics. I'm also aware that Bayes theorem is a perfectly valid inferential tool. And if you think that Swinburne is using it in a controversial manner you need to read his critics a little more thoroughly (start with Mackie).
In fact you can drop the Bayesian analysis from Swinburne and use an IBE or a likelihoodist approach instead. Swinburne is a Bayesian, so he uses Bayes theorem.
GV
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grokes
Stanford's an excellent source of information, but there are better places to start.
GV
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The moderation process on this blog is absolutely pedantic. Can you not do something about this William as I do not feel that what I said broke any "house" rules.
Re. post 164. Why it was removed I have absolutely no idea.
It contains the itinerary of John McKay's visit to Northern Ireland this week. Wednesday evening McKay is speeking at Forestside Christian Centre at 8.00 pm. Any chance of either an interview or report ? He'll be in the pronce all week and full details are on his website:
http://www.amen.org.uk/cr/where/
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Yes, yes, now can we stop arguing about how many names you can drop into the one sentence. For the purposes of this conversation, it doesn'#t really matter what any of those people think, does it?
:)
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I'll not be surprised if the above doesn't get through either. The mind boggles.
In the event that it doesn't, I'll post on Helio's blog and maybe he can pass the info. on to william. An interview with McKay would be interesting.
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I give up
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William: Details of John McKay's visit are now on his website, amen.org. Any chance of either an interview or report ? He's in the province all week and speaks at Forestside Christian Centre tomorrow eveninf at 8.00pm.
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GV
To my untutored eye, when someone puts a figure of .97 on the probability that Jesus was God incarnate who rose from the dead, he's either misusing whatever tool he's decided on or simply making stuff up.
Bernard
Yes, yes, now can we stop arguing about how many names you can drop into the one sentence. For the purposes of this conversation, it doesn'#t really matter what any of those people think, does it?
Only so far as that many philosophers, theists and non theists alike, have gone over the kind arguments you are making and most have rejected them. I suppose your lofty disdain extends to them as well.
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Grokesx;
First, I haven't read all of the authors that you name drop, but at least one other person thinks that you're wrong in your attributions to those authors.
Either way, even if you're not, you really aren't making an argument here. And accusing me of "lofty disdain" doesn't let you off the hook either.
Any chance you could engage with the argument, rather than say, "oh, but all of these people disagree with you".
Why do you reject my argument? Given that you haven't engaged with it, how are you so sure that so many philosophers, theists and non thesists alike, reject it.
I know of quite a number of philosophers who don't reject the type of arguments I'm making.
Lonergan, Aquinas, Gilson, Maritain, Marechal, Coreth, Kerr, Torrell, Chenu - while we're listing names.
Does this mean i've won the argument now? Or maybe I have to list more names than you, is that it?
:)
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Grokes
Well, to be fair he said that if you grant that the probability that God exists is .5 then you get a probability of .97 (given that you grant him a set of other probabilities about witness reports and such). It was meant to be illustrative, not an objective conclusion about posterior possibilities.
But he was leaving himself open to misunderstanding. And I do find some of his arguments odd - about the nature of faith, for example. Dawkins and Dennett have said some odd things, and made some poor arguments. But that doesn't mean that we should dismiss everything they say.
In fact, once you tidy Dawkins up, he's just restating Humean arguments. So philosophically he's in very good company. I'm drifting off topic, but my point is we can be too quick to dismiss everything a writer says.
GV
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It's interesting that two atheists - William Rowe and Richard Gale - have been central to making the cosmological argument respectable again.
Now *there* are examples of open minds.
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Graham, you're exactly right that Dawkins is literally just restating Humean arguments.
Funny thing is pretty much no philosopher today accepts Hume's methodology, not to mention his conclusions. In fact, it could even be argued that, to be a through-going humean, you can't actually #have# any conclusions.
Also funny, though, how his ideas keep popping up again every few years, only to be rejected once their recognised for what they are.
I'm thinking of logical positivism here, which is basically Humean. It was very popular at one time, but I'm pretty sure NO philosopher accepts it now - even those who invented it.
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Follow the link off
http://philpapers.org/rec/WIEDGH
for an atheistic philosopher's examination of Dawkins. Although Wielenberg is a a little eccentric in thinking that our universe may be necessary.
GV
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Does this mean i've won the argument now? Or maybe I have to list more names than you, is that it?
Well, there's only one big hitter I can see there, and he's been dead since 1274. You're standing on the shoulders of one dead giant and a few pygmies there, mate.
GV
I've taken a quick look at Gale and Pruss and you're right, they don't seem to convince themselves, let alone anyone else.
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"Well, there's only one big hitter I can see there, and he's been dead since 1274."
Ahhh, "big hitter"! As we're now just listing names, I was wondering when that would come out.
How do you define a "big hitter"? The number of worldwide research institutions dedicated to their work? The number of peer reviewed papers ABOUT their work by other academics? The number of university modules available all over the world on their works?
Or maybe you're not really a big hitter until Dawkins mentions you.
:)
I can assure you that all of those philosophers I mentioned are widely respected and studied authors. If you don't know that, you really don't know much about philosophy.....I've completed post-graduate university modules on at least three of them, and know first hand the vast amount of research on their work.
.......absolutely all of which is neither here nor there with regard to the debate we're having, which I notice you now seem to be avoiding quite conscientiously, in favour of some strange kind of "big hitter" contest in the world of philosophical studies...which, in a final irony, you actually seem to know very little about.
Is it because they weren't mentioned in "Sophie's World", is that it?
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To make it easier for you, you appear to have given up the debate at post 160, since when you've been listing names, telling me I'm wrong because such-and-such says so, and spouting some ridiculous nonsense about "big hitters" and the date of people's deaths, as if that has anything to do with the argument.
Care to go back to posts 160 and 161, or have you made some substantial point in between that I've missed?
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Grokes
Can you explain which article you're referring to, and where you think that their logic breaks down? I'm assuming that you've read Pruss's latest work. So what is his mistake exactly? I'm a bit lost here - or are you "stirring the pot" for a bit of fun? No harm in that - just want to make sure that I'm responding correctly.
GV
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GV
I'm referring to the paper entitled A New Cosmological Argument, which concludes:
But how much does our argument justify theistic belief? There is room here for widespread disagreement, especially because of the gap problem that could be closed only by appeal to a battery of teleological type arguments and theodicies. We believe, however, that it goes quite some way, maybe even making it more likely than not that God exists. Especially when combined with other arguments, like that from religious experience, the case may become quite compelling.
But yes, of course I'm stirring the pot, in my experience, many religiously inclined philosophers (to be fair most I come across are of the armchair variety) are particularly prone to entertaining bouts of indignation like Bernard here. I put it down to the strain of believing six impossible things before breakfst and then trying to rationalise them.
Bernard,
Keep your hair on. Laters.
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Hahaha, not to worry Grokesx, I'm certainly not indignant. I'm happy enough to learn that you're just stirring the pot, and that the quote you gave above says almost the opposite of what you were claiming earlier.
And I'm not too sure what kind of philosophers there are other than "the armchair variety". It's always entertaining to see people with very little knowledge of philosophy talk about "big hitters" and "armchair philosophers", when it is fairly clear that most of their knowledge of such philosophers is glened from something they've read in Dawkins or in one of those atheist websites I'm always hearing about.
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Grokes
Yeah, I'm prepared to guess that you didn't give a thorough read to a paper on modal logic and the principle of sufficient reason. (-:
Things moved on quite a bit from that paper, on Pruss's front mainly. If you were *really* interested -
http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/ENNFtalk.html
http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/LCA.html
are thorough, but as entertaining as watching paint dry. That said, at the end if you still disagree with cosmological arguments you'll know exactly where and why.
"Some recent progress on the cosmological argument" by Pruss is worth googling, and is a better place to start that the Stanford article.
I'm not sure what the opposite of an "armchair" philosopher is. It's not like fieldwork's an option. But in any case, whenever Atheistic Scientists write against Theism, they rely on philosophical arguments. So I don't think that it would hurt anyone to understand them a little more. Me included - I'm not a philosopher by any stretch of the imagination.
GV
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"..maybe even making it more likely than not that God exists. Especially when combined with other arguments, like that from religious experience, the case may become quite compelling..."
I think I see where the mistake lies in the misquote. For a long time many philosophers in the West wanted absolute certainty. So a 'Theistic Proof' was meant to be indubitable.
Well, you can't give an indubitable argument that only indubitable arguments are acceptable. So Theistic Arguments just aim to give good reasons for believing in God. Not a proof that cannot be doubted by anyone who understands it. Same goes for atheistic arguments.
GV
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Hello Bernard,
Despite your protest in post 154 that I am not reading your posts, I did read them. And to me, it sounds exactly like you are saying that your reasoning can't be wrong. That is of course a position that is so ridiculously immodest to take, that most wouldn't want to express it like that. So we get a reservation on your part in the form of 'I am as certain about my reasoning as I am about the existence of the universe'. About as certain as we can be, then. And that, based not on any evidence (you're still confused about that, given your statements like "I can prove to a certain extent" etc), just the reasoning of someone who can't envision any other explanation (neither can I at the moment btw). Yes, I can understand that you don't like how I read your posts. But it seems to me the correct way to read them. We have gone through a number of cycles on this thread now where you repeat your reasoning. It won't help to repeat it more often, as the reasoning seems ok, it's the unfounded certainty with which you hold to it that is the problem. After that reasoning, sometimes accompanied by statements why it should really be so, how otherwise you get into impossibilities, after you say that you are as sure about your reasoning as you are sure that the universe exists, then to say 'Oh no, I'm not saying my reasoning is absolutely right' really doesn't cut it.
Then on the issue of God needing or need needing an explanation, you repeated that you have explained, elaborated, etc., and you say it again in more detail. Trust me, I did read your post 136, I just read it again, and re-read the part of post 154 concerning that. What I read is you repeatedly dedicating text to it, but not stating anything that helps us understand anything better. Things like
"Again, i think I have elabroated - you just haven't read it. It works because the nature of causality includes the assertion that something can the the sufficient reason of something else. This cannot go on to infinity, because in that case, nothing is the sufficient reason for anything else, because it doesn't have sufficient reason for itself."
don't help us get any further. We agree that saying 'God does not need an explanation' is completely unsatisfying. Yet the bits I quoted from you earlier or quoted directly above do not make any advance on that. Saying that it is the inherent nature of causality or, in the case of the bit directly above, 'the nature of causality includes the assertion that.......' is just defining or asserting it away without helping us understand things anything better than if you just said 'god does not need an explanation'. These are not explanations, these are rolls of verbal wrapping paper that only obscure the 'God doesn't need an explanation' position for some.
Finally, on a separate note re Aquinas etc, I agree about the vacuousness of supporting ones argument by listing a bunch of names. Argument from authority is not a good argument, regardless of whether it's believers or none-believers who use it.
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Well, you can't give an indubitable argument that only indubitable arguments are acceptable. So Theistic Arguments just aim to give good reasons for believing in God. Not a proof that cannot be doubted by anyone who understands it. Same goes for atheistic arguments.
Well, there's a bit of shifting going on here. You talked scathingly earlier of my view that science seems to work, but when we get into philosophy suddenly uncertainties are good. Not that I disagree, but I think it is fair to say that I have been saying something similar all along.
Peter, Bernard, everyone.
Although some of my comments are mischevious, the point of the list was that Bernard's argument rests, at least in part, on points that have been debated for centuries, and that few of the better known philosophers accept them unequivocally. He has shown no inclination to respond to anyone else's view except to restate his position, so I thought bringing in the names of people he might respect more than us blog wallahs.
I didn't expect the Spanish Inquisistion.
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PK
I don't want to get in the way of your discussion with Bernard, but I don't want to see it end prematurely either.
"it sounds exactly like you are saying that your reasoning can't be wrong"
I didn't pick that up from Bernard at all. A person can have a lot of confidence in an argument, but still see why others can disagree with that argument in a rational and intelligent way.
I just took Bernard as saying that the Cosmological Argument was as good an argument as *arguments* against skepticism. I did not read him as referring to our deep seated intuition that skepticism is wrong. That intuition, or presupposition, or gut feeling, or whatever you want to call it, isn't based on arguments. We have that intuition before we even know what skepticism is!
Now I think it's a pretty good argument, but I wouldn't go as far as Bernie. In fact, I wouldn't use the version that he's using. But I didn't read him as suggesting that I'm just like a man who denies the existence of the external world because I can't agree with all of his reasoning.
As an onlooker I do think that 'God does not need an explanation' needs more discussion. So I think you're well within your rights to come back to that point. I'll be interested to see what follows.
But I just think Bernard's trying to make a reasonable case, not convince you beyond all rational doubt.
GV
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GV
I'd say an armchair philosopher, theistic, sciency or whatever, is someone who feels the need to spout his (it's usually male) views on blogs.
That's all of us, then.
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And isn't the world lucky to have us?
(;
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Hi Peter;
"to me, it sounds exactly like you are saying that your reasoning can't be wrong."
I really don't know how you have read that, as I've said the opposite more than once.
"we get a reservation on your part in the form of 'I am as certain about my reasoning as I am about the existence of the universe'."
But I'm not? Are you?
"About as certain as we can be, then."
No, not at all. I would say we are far more certain about things within the framework of the universe, like 2+2 = 4, or even that zebras are black and white than we are about whether any of its actually real. In fact, we're not even sure what we mean by real. I think we are sure of many thins within a framework of rational existence, but that we can't have certainty either that the universe is actually real or that its rational.
"just the reasoning of someone who can't envision any other explanation (neither can I at the moment btw)."
Sometimes we can't envisage another explanation because there isn't one? I mean, I'm all for keeping an open mind, but sometimes we just have no need to look for another explanation because the current one is adequate. Why are you so certain that there will be a better explanation, when I'm not convinced you have properly grasped this one?
"the reasoning seems ok, it's the unfounded certainty with which you hold to it that is the problem."
If I tell you again that I'm not certain, will that solve the problem.
I'M NOT CERTAIN. It just seems reasonable. As it does to you, it apparently. Are we agreed that it's reasonable?
So again, I'm not certain that there is a God. But it seems reasonable.
oops, I had meant to reply to all the posts, but I've now less time than i thought I had. If you will wait I'll finish this tomorrow.
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Thanks guys;
Where were we?
"as the reasoning seems ok, it's the unfounded certainty with which you hold to it that is the problem."
Again, just to re-emphasise, I don't have certainty. It seems reasonable.
"Then on the issue of God needing or need needing an explanation, you repeated that you have explained, elaborated, etc., and you say it again in more detail. Trust me, I did read your post 136, I just read it again, and re-read the part of post 154 concerning that. What I read is you repeatedly dedicating text to it, but not stating anything that helps us understand anything better."
I'll try again, step by step. Let's take "cause" for "explanation", as we usually say that something is explained when we know its cause.
Either everything has a cause or something(s) doesn't have a cause. Are we agreed that those are the two options? Or are you, like Grokesx, claiming there is some alternative between being caused and not being caused? Because if so, I'll repeat that that is just unintelligible.
If we are agreed, either everything has a cause or something(s) don't have a cause.
Now, I'm claiming that it makes no sense to claim that "everything" has a cause. Even if there were an infinite series of causes, there would still need to be a cuase of that series - and that cause would then be included as part of the infinite series of things, which would then need a further cause.
It boils down to the misleading use of a conception of infinity, as if there can actually be an infinite series of existing things. Using the concept of infinity in this way doesn't ultimately explain anything, but simply pushes the question of the cause of existence further back until it is hidden from view.
If we can ask "what caused that?" to infinity then all that means is that, ultimately, we don't know what caused it. So extending the question of causality to infinity merely postpones the answer indefinitely, but never actually reaches it. Thus I think that the notion of extending causality to infinity actually cuts at the ability of causation to ever reach an explanation - which is why we started talking about causes in the first place.
If there were an infinite series of causes, then every particular cause would merely postpone the question "what caused that" absolutely indefinitely. If the question "what caused that" is only ever answered intermediately, as it were - by some other caused thing about which the question can ALWAYS be asked again - then we only ever have an intermediate answer - an answer dependent on a series of other answers. If that is the case the implication is that there is no final answer to "what caused it", and therefore it makes less sense to speak of causes at all.
The notion of causality, I am suggesting, is incompatible with the notion of infinity.
I think it is nonsensical to speak of causes accounting for the existence of things if we continue those causes to infinity, so that we actually never reach the cause of the existence of the prior cause. If everything is always caused by something prior to it, I don't think we are justified in calling those "causes", as nothing ultimately explains the cause of the series. The series becomes nothing more than a Humean set of conjunctions, one set of events following another, with no ultimate cause for the set of events at all.
I'll go back to explanation. Either everything has an explanation, or at least one thing doesn't.
Again, if there were an infinite series of explanations, where each particular thing is only explained insofar as the previous thing is explained, then the process of explanation could never get off the ground.
So again, i think the notion of infinity is incompatible with the notion of explanation. an explanation that depends on an infinite series of other explanations actually amounts to no explanation at all.
So it seems to me that the very nature of explanation means that there cannot be an infinite series of explanations. There must be a final, or ultimate explanation, which cannot be explained by anything prior to it, but which has the causal capacity to explain everything following it.
This is notoriously dense, of course, and I can see why you might think it's just words...but the words really do have meanings. I can only suggest you read it slowly.
I'll leave it there and wait your reply; the points I'm making do need a substantial amount of detailed unpicking, so I hope your reply will bring some of that out.
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"Well, there's a bit of shifting going on here. You talked scathingly earlier of my view that science seems to work, but when we get into philosophy suddenly uncertainties are good. Not that I disagree, but I think it is fair to say that I have been saying something similar all along."
Not shifting, just misunderstanding. You said that you were a pragmatist who didn't claim to *know* that science told the truth about the physical world. I maybe took you a bit literally.
If you believe that Science can get at the truth about the physical world, and you've good reasons for believing that science can get at the truth about the physical world, and science *does* get at the truth about the physical world, then you KNOW that truth about science. You don't need to prove it to a skeptic. Would you agree with that?
Maybe we should clarify terms. Say "certitude" for the *feeling* we associate with certainty, but which comes in degrees.
Contrast that with 'logically deductive' certainty (LDC), that follows from syllogisms like
"A -> B" ;
"A" ;
"B".
You can't doubt that. But once you start exchanging A's and B's for propositions, usually each premise is open to some objection or other.
So in the absence of LDC, we should just look for good persuasive arguments, and accept that on the big issues they'll rarely convince everybody.
GV
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It's worth pointing out that "there could be another explanation" can undermine any conclusion or explanation. It's just a way of pointing out that we don't have deductive certainty.
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And by the way, is the blog playing up on everybody today or is it just me.
I keep getting a picture of the clown and the blackboard, although without the wee girl who used to hold the clown. I'm sure she's in her 50s by now.
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Hello Bernard,
I will take a good look at your post. That is not something to be done in between two chores at work, it may take a while before I respond. If you see drive-by posts from me appear on other threads in the meantime then that doesn't mean I've forgotten about yours.
And yes, BBC IT need to get themselves sorted out as far as this blog is concerned. I've seen the picture you refer to too. A page reload usually solves it. I also got an email from RJB asking if he was the only one who couldn't post. And I see Graham and some others are now posting under new identities. So you're not alone in experiencing the FSMs Unintelligent Design.:(
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No problems Peter. I've just read Graham's post and I can see where there might be some confusion with my claiming I am as certain of the universe as I am about God.
I am not claiming that both assumptions a "basic beliefs" or that "the universe exists" and "god exists" are both equally apparent.
I can certainly see why you might be more prepared to accept that the universe exists than that God exists.
the reason I make the comparison is that the two statements are assumptions which operate at a fundamental level and which provide a framework within which all of the particular existing things in the universe can be understood.
These fundamental assumption are not open to the type of certainty that the we can gain about the relations that hold between particular things. We can't be as certain that the universe is real as we are that 2+2 =4. We can, however, hold it to be entirely reasonable, given that 2+2=4, that there really exists an intelligible matrix of relations.
But sorry, I have gone backwards in the argument. I have just spotted where there might be some confusion, but by rights this post should probably have come before the previous two.
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They got rid of the wee girl who held up the clown??!!!
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Or are you, like Grokesx, claiming there is some alternative between being caused and not being caused? Because if so, I'll repeat that that is just unintelligible.
This is not the first time you have held up something I've said here, subjected it to your own tortured logic and then claimed it as my position. It is quite tiresome, especially from someone who claims other people don't read his posts closely enough.
My point was that when your argument brings you up against two untenable positions, it is helpful to examine your premises. In this case, causation itself merits attention and also, as I have been banging on about for a month or more, the notion that there is a possibility that, as Helio quoted, the universe is not only queerer than we imagine, but queerer than we can imagine with our present state of knowledge. There are precedents - for eg before we started to get to grips with quantum theory we were conceptually un-equipped to grapple with what the universe is like at the level of the very small. (We still are, but less so).
It's worth pointing out that "there could be another explanation" can undermine any conclusion or explanation. It's just a way of pointing out that we don't have deductive certainty.
Which is where the scientific method comes in.
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"My point was that when your argument brings you up against two untenable positions, it is helpful to examine your premises"
Which is untenable? That everything is caused, or that not everything is caused?
I think the view that everything is caused is untenable, and I've tried to outline the reasons above. So if you also think that's untenable, we're agreed on that.
I've no reason to think the view that something isn't caused is untenable. Why do you think it is untenable? That the entire process of causation has a neccessary starting point seems to be to be completely tenable. How else would it have got going?
"In this case, causation itself merits attention"
In what way does causation merit attention? I'm all for that, but what are you suggesting? Let's attend to causation then. It seems to me that one intelligible entity can be said to be intelligibly the sufficient reason for the existence of another intelligible entity. Let's examine that, and flag up any problems that you find. Don't just say that it's a problem. What is the problem?
"the notion that there is a possibility that, as Helio quoted, the universe is not only queerer than we imagine, but queerer than we can imagine with our present state of knowledge"
I'm all for that. In fact, I think it's obvious. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't try to understand what we can. That the ultimate explanation is absolutely beyond anything I can imagine is actually one of my fundamental assertions. What I can imagine and understand is that there probably IS such an ultimate explanation. I can understand things about causation, and about "bringing about" that enable me to conclude that there is an ultimate explanation that underlies all others. It seems perfectly reasonable that this is far queerer than I can possibly imagine, as, no doubt, are many of the intermediary explanations.
And Graham, yes, they have. It's now just a clown sitting upright as if it had a life of its own beside a blackboard
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Grokes
Er, no. As a simple matter of logic it's always possible that some other explanation, as yet unthought of, would make better predictions, or the same predictions, just as adequately.
Of course that's a weird reason to reject any argument, scientific or otherwise.
GV
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And frankly the whole clown thing just sounds evil.
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GSV
Backing up slightly
So in the absence of LDC, we should just look for good persuasive arguments, and accept that on the big issues they'll rarely convince everybody.
This doesn't actually disagree much with what I have been saying all along to Bernard in the face of his (now shifting down a few gears) certainties. My other point is that the scientific method gives us a clearer model (never certain, but hopefully increasingly accurate) view of reality, truth or whatever you want to call it.
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Lose the "view".
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Back to Bernard and those arguments that would rarely convince everybody or, to put it another way, anybody out of theological departments. (As an aside, it may be noted that earlier in the discussion Bernard was making larger deductive claims for metaphysical and philosophical arguments than he seems to be doing now.)
Anyway, Bernard, your argument rests on accepting that everything has a cause. Everything, that is, except for the Uncaused Cause. The only reason you put forward for us to accept this is that if we don't the universe is unintelligible, that nothing explains anything. Why the mere fact that a group of intelligent apes on some planet in some galaxy have come up with ways of looking at and describing their world should compel the universe to satisfy their apparent need for the thing they call intelligibility is not fully explained, despite the many words lavished on the subject.
One might note if one were of a cynical bent (and let it never be said that there any of that persuasion here) that the whole thrust of the argument seems almost tailor made to satisfy a particular view of the world held by a religious denomination of the intelligent apes. If we did not know better, we might believe that the argument was first formulated in a time when it was virtually unknown in many countries for anyone to doubt the veracity of that view. But we will let that pass, as it is not good form to make such observations, lest one is accused of a Logical Fallacy. But, since we are on the subject of fallacies, your argument has many of the hallmarks of an argument from ignorance, or as the High Priest Dawkins - who all atheists worship, obviously - more picturesquely has it, the Argument from Personal Incredulity.
Another objection, the one that says there is a clear case of special pleading in your argument, you haven't answered except for saying you don't think it applies, which fact, given your prolixity in other matters, has an eloquence all of its own.
Tomorrow, I shall look a little closer at that pesky notion of causality.
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"it may be noted that earlier in the discussion Bernard was making larger deductive claims for metaphysical and philosophical arguments than he seems to be doing now"
I'm not sure that's true. would you care to elaborate. As far as I am aware during my whole time contributing to this blog I've been interested in showing only that belief in God is not irrational, unreasonable, unquestioning or stupid. That has been my only concern, and hence certainty doesn't come into it. My view is that is is a "reasonable" stance to take. That it makes sense.
I further don't think it's the kind of thing that can be proven, at l;east not in the way we "prove" things and relations within the existing matrix of the universe. It is specifically the transcendent that we are talking about.
"Anyway, Bernard, your argument rests on accepting that everything has a cause. Everything, that is, except for the Uncaused Cause. The only reason you put forward for us to accept this is that if we don't the universe is unintelligible, that nothing explains anything."
Yes. that is pretty much the case. The reason this argument is compelling is that not to accept it implictly means not accepting ANY explanation. If that's the case, one answer is as good as another. If that's what you think, I can't understand how you can argue with anyone.
"Why the mere fact that a group of intelligent apes on some planet in some galaxy have come up with ways of looking at and describing their world should compel the universe to satisfy their apparent need for the thing they call intelligibility is not fully explained, despite the many words lavished on the subject"
What is "the universe"? You are implicitly assuming that there is an external thing called "the universe", that may or may not fit our conceptions. what is this thing "the universe", that may or may not be intelligible?
As far as I am aware, the only reason for have for positing any such thing as "the universe" is that it we intelligibly encounter things. If we never intelligibly encountered things the universe might just as well not exist at all.
To posit something completely unintelligible is impossible. What are you positing?
I am suggesting that "real" is co-extensive with "intelligible".
What are you suggesting that is both "real" and "unintelligible"? I am arguing, and indeed, was doing so away at the start of this thread (or was it anotherthread ) that "intelligible" (in the widest sense of the word meaning "impacting on the intellect") is what we mean by "real".
What else could it be? The only reason we have for positing ANYTHING is that they impact on the senses and thus the intellect.
So that's why "the universe" must be "intelligible". Because that's what, I'm suggesting, "real" means.
What do you think it means if not "intelligble"?
"One might note if one were of a cynical bent (and let it never be said that there any of that persuasion here) that the whole thrust of the argument seems almost tailor made to satisfy a particular view of the world held by a religious denomination of the intelligent apes."
Not at all. It's a particular view of the world held by everyone in virtue of their being intelligent. Everyone believes the universe to be intelligible. It is contradictory to argue that it's not. How can you argue about something that is absolutely and fundamentally unintelligible? If you really don't believe the universe to be intelligible, all of your words are in vain, to say the least.
That the universe is intelligible is borne out by the fact that, as intelligent apes, if you like, everything we can possibly encounter is intelligible. That is how we encounter it.
Think of this as an almost Kantian view, although I'm suggesting that we have no reason to posit anything beyond the phenomena. (I'm also a Kantian realist, and believe that the phenomenal IS the real, but that's another story)
The only reason we know of anything existing is because those things fit into our intelligible categories. We have no reason to posit anything that doesn't fit into those categories.
How could there be a "reason" for something "unintelligible"? It's an oxymoron. And if there is no "reason", what "reason" could you possibly have for believing that the "unintelligible" exists?
"your argument has many of the hallmarks of an argument from ignorance"
Not at all. I've been making likely judgments based on everything we (intelligibly) know about the universe. As we know nothing about the universe that is unintelligible, why assert that the unintelligible exists? That's just making stuff up.
Given that you're suggesting that the universe might be unintelligible, and thus we might not actually know ANYTHING, I fail to see how you can accuse me of making an argument from ignorance.
:)
"Another objection, the one that says there is a clear case of special pleading in your argument, you haven't answered except for saying you don't think it applies"
I'm not sure you've outlined that objection. In what way is it special pleading to assert that either everything is uncaused or one thing isn't?
In what way is it special pleading to argue that the nature of causality is incompatible with a notion of infinity?
I think you'll have to elaborate, please.
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It's also interesting that you claim, in post 204 that;
"the scientific method gives us a clearer model (never certain, but hopefully increasingly accurate) view of reality"
How does this square with the fact that seemingly your only argument against my position is that the universe might be unintelligible.
How, then, can science give us any model of reality, if reality is unintelligible?
And if it is not unintelligible, what is this scientific view of reality if not precisely that reality is intelligible?
And yet your only argument against my position seems to be that reality might be unintelligible.
Can you see the inconsistencies there?
It never ceases to amaze me, and happens all the time in these discussions, that those people who start off arguing that belief in God is irrational and unintelligible almost universally end up taking the position that the universe is irrational and unintelligible.
If that is really the case, surely we have nothing to argue about!
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Bernard
I have seen the clown.
It's just not natural. Evil. Pure evil.
What did it do with that little girl?
GV
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Bernard
I'm not sure that's true. would you care to elaborate.
You're right I was thinking of LSV's posts about logic. Apologies.
It never ceases to amaze me, and happens all the time in these discussions, that those people who start off arguing that belief in God is irrational and unintelligible ...
I don't recall making that argument - it doesn't actually have much to do with what I am saying.
almost universally end up taking the position that the universe is irrational and unintelligible.
Since you have your own special definition of the word universe (and much else besides), there is difficulty here, but again it is not actually relevant to our differences.
Anyway, this is all bound up with what I was going to say about causality, but it is going to have to wait.
Laters.
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Grokesx;
"those people who start off arguing that belief in God is irrational and unintelligible ...
I don't recall making that argument - it doesn't actually have much to do with what I am saying."
Ah, so you're not arguing that belief in God is irrational and unreasonable?
If that's the case, I've no debate with you :). It sometimes happens on this blog that an argument with one person leads into an argument with another person, and the two can sometimes become conflated. If you're not arguing that belief in God is irrational, what are you arguing? I'm genuinely not sure.
"Since you have your own special definition of the word universe (and much else besides), there is difficulty here, but again it is not actually relevant to our differences".
I do have a (second order) definition of the universe, and surely it's entirely relevant!
If, as I thought, we were discussing the possible origin of the universe, we're going to have to know what it is we're asking about. I'm not sure my definition is particularly "special" or unique, it seems to be implicit in most views of the universe.
Perhaps you have a better definition then? An alternative? Because if we're asking about the origins of the universe, we're gonna have to agree about what the universe is, otherwise we're asking about two different things.
I'm asking about the origin of the entire universal extent of intelligible being. What are you asking about the origin of? Do you know?
Or perhaps, as I've said, I've conflated your arguments with those of PeterK. Maybe you're talking about something completely different...
I have to say, your last lot of posts just seem like avoidance and obfuscation rather than sticking to the argument I thought we were having. What are you actually claiming?
Graham, I could be wrong, but the clown seems to have eaten the girl!
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Ah, so you're not arguing that belief in God is irrational and unreasonable?
No, I am arguing that whatever my beliefs on God are, your rationalisations on the origin of the universe do not merit the certainty you have in them (which is apparently of the same order that the universe exists).
I'm asking about the origin of the entire universal extent of intelligible being. What are you asking about the origin of? Do you know?
Well, actually there is the rub and brings us back to physics and metaphysics. You appear to think that metaphysics is a science and that you can draw equally valid conclusions about the things for which we have no evidence for yet and the things we do. You seem to consider absence of evidence against something as evidence for it. You appear to think nothing we have learned over the last few centuries can inform the way you look at the universe. Although you protest that, of course, the universe is queerer than we can imagine, you have no compunction in asserting what it can't be.
That raft of other stuff you hold informs your rationalisations to such an extent that, like Aquinas's arguments, they only make sense for those who share them.
Regarding Peter K, I agree with many things he says. He is politer than me, though.
I'm going to but out for a while. If you are still around in a few days, I may get round to the post I was going to write. Maybe not, though. No loss.
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Right. We don't need to explain the universe, and we should ignore conclusions of logical deductions. Because we might be wrong and we're not scientists. Even though scientistic atheists inevitably resort to philosphical arguments about the concept of God, and evil, and explanation, and causality etc.
So only really bad philosophy counts.
I feel thoroughly refuted.
GV
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Bernard
The clown does seem eerily peased with itself.
GV
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Yes, I was also thoroughly unsatisfied with that answer.
It seems that, because we can't have 10% certainty, we're not allowed to think about what reality might be, the extent of existence that we have reason to posit, or whatever it is that makes us encounter "things".
We can't ask any of those things because we're not certain, so apparently we should leave all those questions to scientists - who don't ask them either.
Like you, Graham, I do indeed feel thoroughly debunked.
:)
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That should say 100% certainty, by the way. We can probably manage 10 alright
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Bernard, as I have already spent some time today debunking your global warming nonsense on the other thread (go check it out grokesx, you'll see that my civility has clear limits, I have no patience for the foolish and the disingenuous), I may decide to wait a while before pointing out the bad bits in your posts in this thread.
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Hahaha, oh come on, Peter, why wait?
Quite a bit of "I really really could prove you wrong, but I'll do it later" going on here. :)
Ill check the other thread now. Interesting glimpse of your thinking already though, when you refer to "(my) global warming nonsense". I have no idea what causes global warming, so I'm certainly not making any nonsense arguments about it. My only point was that there is a debate. which you then admitted. So no doubt the effort you have put into debunking mynonsense was actually aimed at what you think I think.
But come on Peter! Buck up man! you can take this argument. you know you can! ;)
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Apparently you prefer the strawman argument you're making in the other thread, based on the silly premise that I don't think global warming exists.
It does. If you like, there is no debate. Now, what about this debate?
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Ok Bernard, I've just gone through this thread from just before post 30 to post 193, only briefly scanning what came after that. Having just reread much of this lengthy thread, the simple situation now seems that you agree that your previously expressed degree of certainty about a transcendent cause to the universe (expressed in some post earlier in this thread and on several other threads as well) is simply wrong or (if you didn't mean to express great certainty) formulated overconfidently, right?
I think the crucial bit around post 90. You thought you had evidence in support of your assertion about the transcendent cause of the universe, but that was simply mistaken. Without it, it is good to hear you say you are not certain. It's good that we agree that reasoning alone without evidence to correct it can go off in the wrong direction. However, I suspect the amount of uncertainty that you allow yourself might still be a bit less than it should be. For instance, while I can't come up with an explanation for the universe that is supported by any more evidence than your proposal, I can think of one that is supported by an equal amount, i.e none. That would e.g. be the idea that we (as parts of the universe) would discover an explanation for our own origin without an external cause. Don't ask me how, I have as little clue as to how that would work as you have about your transcendent cause. But with two equally unsupported ideas, the certainty that either one is true has already dropped to half. Then there is the possibility that the origin of our universe will simply remain inexplicable by either. And then we're both down to a third for our ideas. Maybe someone else could think up something that would make it a quarter or a fifth. So that is the magnitude of uncertainty we should keep in mind I think.
I can accept the idea that there is a good chance that science will never explain the origin of our universe. Do you accept that there is as much chance that your idea of what you call 'God' explaining the universe has no better chance?
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Then there was the matter of how much calling that other thing 'god' says about god. I assume post 154 means that you accept that the idea of a transcendent cause to the universe lends no credibility whatsoever to specific attributes of such a creating cause like 'resembles my image of the christian god'?
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Then there was post 193 and beyond about why causality would invalidate the question 'what causes the first cause'. I've read it twice now, first quickly, then more thoroughly. You were right in your expectation that it makes for hard reading. I will re-read it more until I understand it and am convinced by it, or until I can formulate a good rebuttal to it.
You made remarks on this thread and the other one about me avoiding debate. After I take care of the point above, is there anything else on my todo list of posts to you?
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A bit if time on my hands, so:
Peter,
Looked at the other thread. I was particularly impressed with Bernard's style - posting long comments and then bailing out claiming to be uninterested in the subject while berating you for ducking this argument. That takes chutzpah if nothing else.
GV
Right. We don't need to explain the universe
Did I say that? Here's me thinking I've been saying that the best way to understand the universe was by a stepwise process of studying and testing what we think we have learned about it, using inductive methods (thanks for that, philosophers) to posit theories, test them etc. Basically, the whole empirical bubble thing and those
particular questions about particular branches of empirical science.
Incidentally, Bernard, when you went on to say:
But some people are content to stay in their empirical bubble, happy enough to assert that there will never be answers, so why bother trying.,
this was an example of your tiresome habit of egregious misrepresentation others' views. Coming from someone happy to throw accusations of straw man argumentation around, that takes chutzpah, too.
and we should ignore conclusions of logical deductions...
I thought we had been through this during the entertaining diversion a while back. Bernard's arguments are not deductive in the sense of proceeding from true premises, at least that's what I thought you philosophy types were saying.
Anyway, I have never said we should ignore the conclusions of logical deductions. I have said we should be careful of over extrapolation.
Because we might be wrong
As above.
and we're not scientists
Never said that.
Even though scientistic atheists inevitably resort to philosphical arguments about the concept of God, and evil, and explanation, and causality etc.
Don't know about anyone else, but my position is simple: if someone wants to convince me of something they need to offer evidence. If they go beyond what the evidence can support, I will withhold provisional consent.
Bernard
As Peter has demonstrated above, you offer no evidence for why we should accept your explanations rather than any others we might come up with. There is certainly no good reason for us to accept your, trust me on this one, the uncaused cause might seem strange but it is more rational than anything else assertion. I repeat there is no evidence you can offer. You co-opt everything we think we know about the universe to bolster your position, ignoring the myriad certainties mankind has thought it held over the millenia that turned out to be nonsense. Also ignoring that the people who know the most about the universe quite cheerfully fess up to ignorance of real knowledge of 96% of it.
So this goes back to the raft of other stuff informing your arguments. In your case there seems to be a lot of it, from Christianity and all that entails through to the Kantian stuff. If I were to have this conversation with say, a Hindu or a Buddhist, I think it is not too fanciful to think they might come down on the infinite regress side of the argument (note, this does not mean I accept that, nor does it mean I accept that there are only two options, or three). In Eastern religions, the cause/effect/karma idea is so intrinsic to the view of reality that the idea of an infinite series of universes going through the endless cycle of birth/death rebirth is not unintelligible at all.
And while we are on the subject, what's the problem with infinity? It is part of the intelligibility of the universe, after all. In the ultimate logical discipline, maths, it as an integral concept.
You argue for a universal intelligibility, but even if we accept that, your subsequent arguments are not based on it, but on what is intelligible to you. This is why I say you are arguing from ignorance, either that or you have sole responsibility for stopping the universe from fading into nothingness with the power of your understanding. Given your shaky grasp of what is theoretical and speculation, what is evidence and what isn't, I wouldn't give us long if that were the case.
For all your huffing and puffing, this all comes down, as such discussions always do, to what might be. It is instructive that you pour scorn on others' might bes, while yours are the apparent inevitable products of solid rationality, but it is plain that none of us can claim anything like certainty, no matter how much we want to, no matter how intelligible we would like the universe to be, because we have no evidence to support us. A proposition that there is no god and that all we know comes from nothing fits the evidence. A proposition that a deistic god brought the universe into being and left it alone also fits the evidence. Theism, though. Now that's a different bag of spanners.
Sorry, ultra long post and causality still there for the taking.
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grokexs,
"Looked at the other thread. I was particularly impressed with Bernard's style - posting long comments and then bailing out claiming to be uninterested in the subject while berating you for ducking this argument. That takes chutzpah if nothing else."
It wasn't his impatience over the time I took to reply on this thread that made me adjust downward my impression of his integrity. Reasons for that were his quote mining, claiming that a list of papers support his view when he hasn't even read what that list is supposed to be about, and claiming a paper on that list supports his view when he has read no more of that paper than the title and first 4 sentences of it. Those are the dishonest debating techniques one would expect from a young earth creationist.
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"It wasn't his impatience over the time I took to reply on this thread that made me adjust downward my impression of his integrity."
Nobody minds a chat. Nobody minds a debate. Nobody minds a bit of good-natured rib-poking.
NOBODY cares about your assessment of their intelligence. NOBODY cares about your assessment of their integrity. So stop giving it. It's rude. It's an ad hominem. And it's so unbearably arrogant I should probably stop typing right now.
You assert the importance of peer review. Here's an idea. Put down your thoughts on the weakness of Theism, and then Google "Philo". It's a humanist journal. It's a "peer-reviewed philosophy journal has just been launched to do something unheard of - offer rigorous critiques of theistic and religious claims." Daniel Dennett and Adolf Grunbaum are on the editorial board. Then submit your thoughts on, say, the Cosmological Argument, or the nature of Consciousness, to Philo. They'd be very interested given recent publications in these areas.
See how the peer review goes.
GV
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Grokes
My last post to you was a bit flippant. Which you usually take in the right spirit. I hope it didn't come across as impatient.
The evidence that Bernard is using is what we can infer about causality, versions of the principle of sufficient reason and contingent existence. We all assume that the universe could have been other than it is, we all believe in causes, we all believe that nothing happens or exists without some explanation (although we may not be able to give it). And these assumptions are confirmed by our observations. To say that there's no evidence is obtuse. (You haven't made that mistake, mind. Nor have you used the Principle of Indifference in a way that could undermine any inference. ("Oooh, gee I dunno, I guess something vague might be the case" is not a definite outcome in any universe). So if we all get to hand out points, you're outscoring PK).
Now an infinite regress of explanations is no explanation at all. So there needs to be some stopping point, a terminus. And we're looking for an explanation for everything that we observe. So Bernard is pointing out that a natural stopping point would be some cause external to the universe.
But an alternative would be Tegmark's universe, that Helio has cited. So I should award Helio some points too. (Although I don't think that the Platonic interpretation of Tegmark helps atheism. There are alternativbs).I think that Tegmark's universe causes as many problems as it solves. But here's a physicist saying that we need some explanation for order and existence. And he offers one that you'd never reach by the Baconian method.
Now there's two explanations, that seem coherent on the face of it. So we can infer to the best explanation, which is a kind of induction. (Abductive reasoning to be exact.) Or you could put it in Bayesian terms. You need to make some judgments about prior probabilities. You need to consider simplicity and such to make those judgments.
But you don't need deductive arguments. But if you did have a deductive argument that had reasonable premises, and was valid, then the conclusion is reasonable to hold. So if Bernard is simply trying to show that he isn't stupid or uncomprehending then he's succeeded. He may not convince PK - but connvincing PK is hardly the benchmark of rationality. He may not convince you. But I suspect you and he could live with that.
As for lowsy philosophy. I was really thinking about the lowsy arguments that Dawkins relies on, without even acknowledging that he's doing philosophy. You and I just seem to be having a chat here. And in that context, we can overstate our case, or pull legs, or whatever. Like you, I find these arguments fun. So let's keep 'em that way.
GV
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PeterK;
I must say, given the time you've taken I expected a more thorough reply than a simple restatment of your misapprehensions.
You don't seem to be making any argument, but I'll try to construct what I can of it.
"the simple situation now seems that you agree that your previously expressed degree of certainty about a transcendent cause to the universe (expressed in some post earlier in this thread and on several other threads as well)"
I'd like to see evidence of this certainty, Peter, if you would. Given that my position is, in fact, that there is no real conclusive argument proving the existence of God, I think this is highly unlikely.
"I think the crucial bit around post 90."
I'm sorry, but post 90 was one of yours...can all of our problems be because you're mixing up my posts with your own?
"You thought you had evidence in support of your assertion about the transcendent cause of the universe, but that was simply mistaken."
What? The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself. This is the verifiable evidence borne out in the entirety of human experience.
Yet it seems your only answer is that all of that evidence might count for nothing, and something as yet unknown might be both caused and uncaused, or that "we (as parts of the universe) would discover an explanation for our own origin without an external cause?"
But we know that we are caused by something that is not ourselves. We know that about everything that we know of in the universe. There is nothing in the universe about which we can say "that is its own cause". All of that evidence, and the entire experience of humanity, may not PROVE with CERTAINTY that a part of the universe cannot be a cause of itself. But it certainly makes it an irrational, blind hope.
Which is unreasonable - my view, based on the evidence of the entire causal history of the universe, or your view, based on - well, apparently based on the possibility that we can't be certain, so ANYTHING might be the case?
"For instance, while I can't come up with an explanation for the universe that is supported by any more evidence than your proposal, I can think of one that is supported by an equal amount, i.e none."
But my proposal HAS evidence. Given that every known part of the universe is caused by something else, it is reasonable to believe that the universe as a whole is caused by something else. for the universe is just the sum of its parts - the entirety of existing things.
If every existing thing we have ever encountered is caused by something else - in fact, if being caused by something else seems inherent to the notion of being a part of the existing universe - then it is rational to believe that the universe itself is caused by something else.
"I can accept the idea that there is a good chance that science will never explain the origin of our universe. Do you accept that there is as much chance that your idea of what you call 'God' explaining the universe has no better chance?"
It depends what you mean by "explaining". My view is that it can be intellectually assented to that the universe has its source in something transcending itself. What this practically tells us about the universe isn't readily apparent. It can certainly open the possibility of the universe being for a higher purpose. But I don't think that possibility is an intellectual one. Intellectually, I think we can rationally accept that it is likely that the universe has a transcendent cause. That tells us very limited things about the cause, only those thing that are inherent in "transcendent". In other words, the entire intellectual focus is on what the transcendent cause IS NOT.
"Then there was the matter of how much calling that other thing 'god' says about god."
Intellectually, I think that "God" means no more than "other than the universe". I think this is the definition of the word. But of course, things are much more than their definitions. Your mother may, by definition, be the person in whom you gestated as a foetus. she is also more than that.
But intellectually, and thus in the context of this debate, calling it "God" simply expresses the one thing that is known - transcendence. Otherness. That in itself is a negative knowledge about what the transcendent cause is not...which is implicit in "transcendence".
"I assume post 154 means that you accept that the idea of a transcendent cause to the universe lends no credibility whatsoever to specific attributes of such a creating cause like 'resembles my image of the christian god'?"
Well, of course, transcendence is pretty much the defining feature of the Abrahamic, monotheistic God. So it certainly does resemble it in that respect.
As for the details of Christianity, I don't think they can be rationally proven, and haven't tried, but, given a transcendent creative God, self-revelation is certainly not beyond the realms of imagination or possibility.
"Then there was post 193 and beyond about why causality would invalidate the question 'what causes the first cause'. I've read it twice now, first quickly, then more thoroughly. You were right in your expectation that it makes for hard reading. I will re-read it more until I understand it and am convinced by it, or until I can formulate a good rebuttal to it."
It's pretty important. What bits are you having trouble with? I like the way you keep open the possibility of rebutting it without understanding it.
"After I take care of the point above, is there anything else on my todo list of posts to you?"
Well, the point above is fairly fundamental.
GrokesX;
"I've been saying that the best way to understand the universe was by a stepwise process of studying and testing what we think we have learned about it, using inductive methods (thanks for that, philosophers) to posit theories, test them etc. Basically, the whole empirical bubble thing and those particular questions about particular branches of empirical science."
How is that the best way to explain the origin of existence? Surely that's just all particular things that already exist?
"Bernard's arguments are not deductive in the sense of proceeding from true premises, at least that's what I thought you philosophy types were saying."
What's not a true premise? Causality? Oh, but of course, you were going to "deal with" causality...could we have that please?
"Don't know about anyone else, but my position is simple: if someone wants to convince me of something they need to offer evidence."
That's not quite as simple and trouble free as you would like it. why? What constitutes evidence? How do you decide?
"If they go beyond what the evidence can support, I will withhold provisional consent."
How does evidence support anything? what is evidence again? What would be evidence for there being a transcendent cause of the universe...or not, as the case may be?
"you offer no evidence for why we should accept your explanations rather than any others we might come up with."
The nature of causality. Remember, that argument I made up there that you said you were going to "deal with" but never did... I thought Peter might also "deal with it" but he doesn't understand it, apparently.
"I repeat there is no evidence you can offer."
And I repeat; you promised to "deal with" the evidence I offered (i.e. the nature of causality), but then...well, you didn't.
You now talk a lot of guff about eastern mysticism and hinduism which I really don't think warrants much comment. you get back to the point here;
"what's the problem with infinity? It is part of the intelligibility of the universe, after all. In the ultimate logical discipline, maths, it as an integral concept."
Infinity is an abstract construct expressing the partly intelligilbe notion of an endless series. But this is only ever intelligibile in the abstract and in set theory. It is a holding mechanism that cannot be expressed concretely - how could there be an infinite series of existing things? In mathematics the abstract ideas of number and sets are used all the time as a way of abstractly manipulatimng features of reality. But there is no such thing as a pure number, or a set of 0. They are abstract constructions used to intellectually manipulate aspects of reality - they do not express actual existing things.
"Given your shaky grasp of what is theoretical and speculation, what is evidence and what isn't,"
Hold on, all I've been doing is asking questions about what constitutes evidence - questions that you haven't been able to answer.
What does constitute evidence then? You tell me. What constitutes evidence for the existence of the universe? The senses? Tell us your theory. And then maybe you can start "dealing with" causality.
"you pour scorn on others' might bes,"
I haven't heard anyone else's "might bes". All I've heard is "can't bes" or "ANYTHING might bes". Yes, but what?
"A proposition that there is no god and that all we know comes from nothing fits the evidence."
How? Surely all we know PRECISELY DOESN'T come from nothing!!! Can you name one instance of a thing that we know that comes from nothing?
"A proposition that a deistic god brought the universe into being and left it alone also fits the evidence."
It certainly does.
"Theism, though. Now that's a different bag of spanners."
Or it could be a corrolary of the deism. Given two options, that God created the world and left it alone, or that God created the world and still sustains it, why choose the former over the latter? Any idea? Surely, had God created the world, then any continuing action or movement in the world is also the result of the creation and continued sustainance? No?
Graham;
"The evidence that Bernard is using is what we can infer about causality, versions of the principle of sufficient reason and contingent existence. We all assume that the universe could have been other than it is, we all believe in causes, we all believe that nothing happens or exists without some explanation (although we may not be able to give it). And these assumptions are confirmed by our observations. To say that there's no evidence is obtuse."
"Now an infinite regress of explanations is no explanation at all. So there needs to be some stopping point, a terminus. And we're looking for an explanation for everything that we observe. So Bernard is pointing out that a natural stopping point would be some cause external to the universe."
I agree with those statements. That is an accurate overview of my reasoning. I was beginning to think no one had understood it! But not to worry, Peter says he'll read it again.
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Grokes
To give you a rather lengthy (but still quite rough) Cosmological Argument:
1. Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either by the necessity of its own nature or by an explanation external to itself.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is external to the universe
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.
5. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is external to the universe.
We then need to identify something external to the universe with enough scope and power to explain it. God seems to be a good candidate.
(1) depends on two principles. The first I think you should agree to, a principle of sufficient explanation. That is - everything that can have an explanation does have an explanation. This principle has an intuitive appeal. Consider the case of an airplane crash. The investigation concludes that the crash occurred for no reason. We naturally assume that what they mean is that they found no explanation. For the idea that an airplane crashed for no reason is absurd.
The principle seems to be confirmed by our everyday experience, and all rational enquiry. As a matter of fact, rational enquiry presupposes this principle. If events can occur and facts exist without explanation then anything's possible. (So there's your evidence).
(1b)The second principle is a little more controversial. That is the idea that a being can explain itself (not cause itself). Better put, a being can be explained by its own nature. Necessary beings exist no matter what else is true about the universe. Even if nothing else was true, they would be true. (Some folk advance mathematical truths as examples of necessary truths.)
Now if God exists, he would exist necessarily. That is just true by definition. God is by defintion a maximally great being… the greatest being we can conceive. Such a being would exist of necessity as it would lack any external explanation or cause. It would be impossible for such a being not to exist.
The concepts seem clear and coherent – but we can't just define God into existence. We have to see if the evidence supports the proposition that a Necessary Being exists.
(2) Therefore is the crucial premise, as I see it. Does the universe explain itself?. The universe contains innumerable fundamental particles behaving in predictable ways, and these particles make up the various stars and galaxies. It is natural to ask why our universe exists. After all scientists are always asking “how come?” when they discover a new particle or force. They ask why these things should exist. Given that the universe that science is made up of parts, and that we ask for explanations for each part we encounter, it seems reasonable to ask why the universe as a whole exists.
David Hume held that when the parts are explained the whole is explained. I think this is waht Grokes means by his "piece by piece" approach to the universe. Is Hume correct that the explanation of the parts explains the whole? Many (including Richard Gale) doubt it.To illustrate why, consider a case where there are a thousand soldiers in a region of Afghanistan. Individual explanations of each soldier’s personal life story to that point would miss the point of explaining why there are a thousand present, or why soldiers should be present rather than a thousand engineers. A broader explanation is necessary. Or again, explaining all the parts of a car exist does not explain why there is a car. Why were the parts assembled in such a way?
You don’t explain why there is a brick wall outside my house by telling me how and why each individual brick was made. Why are they formed into the shape of wall? Why is it outside my house?
In any case, in terms of what are the parts of the universe explained? Presumably the parts are explained in terms of more parts, ad infinitum (the only alternative is a circular explanation).
But this seems unsatisfactory in terms of the universe. We would lack an explanation as to why there should be any parts *at all*. Why should there be any causes, each limited in space and time? Each cause in the series might be explained by the prior cause - but why should there be a series *at all*?
It doesn't matter if the chain of causes is infinite. To take another example from the life of a teacher, suppose I have a layabout student who is perpetually underachieving. Call him Jim. Now one day Jim presents a piece of examination work that is flawless. Not a single mistake has been made. Now maybe my skills as a teacher have brought Jim’s intellect to life.
But anyone who knows me will tell you that it is much more likely that Jim cheated. And when I check I find that he has copied his work from another student, John. So I’ve explained Jim’s answers…but then I find I’ve a bigger problem to explain. When I mark all the papers it transpires that every student who sat the test achieved a perfect score! Now this is practically impossible, so I’ll need to explain to my headmaster and the external examiner how this occurred.
When I investigate it transpires that John has copied of a brighter student, Jill. And it doesn’t stop there. Jill copied off Susan, Susan off Gillian, Gillian off Mike and so on. I can find out how and why each act of copying took place. In fact I can have an infinitely long list of students all copying off each other (if I taught in a large enough school). But even if I can explain how each act of copying took place I still have not explained why every student has achieved the perfect score. I won’t have that explanation until I work out who sat down and worked out the perfect answer in the first place (or who stole the mark scheme). Until I know that and how that perfect answer made its way to another student I have not explained why every student has a perfect score.
Now some atheists have reckoned that if the universe is one of an infinite number of universes that cause one another, then we’ve explained why our universe exists. But that’s missing the fundamental question – why should there be any universes at all? Why should this series of events exist? Why should there be any series of causes, each cause limited in space and time? We need an explanation up to the task. We need something with enough power to explain everything else. And God matches that description because God is explained by his own nature.
Why assume that the cause of the universe is personal. (And don't get "personal" mixed up with "anthropomorphic"). Any cause of the universe must also have had the power *not* to bring about the universe (because if it didn’t, that would make the observed universe a necessary effect of a necessary cause. This is to say things are the way they are because they have to be that way. But that seems counter-intuitive. Couldn’t things in our universe have worked out differently?)
Having causal power, and the ability not to use that power, seems to belong to the sort of entity that can make choices about when and how to use its power. We seem to be referring to an agent of some kind.
Perhaps the defender of the cosmological argument can also appeal to Swinburne's distinction between two types of explanation. *Natural* explanation is provided in terms of precedent events, causal laws, or necessary conditions that invoke natural existents. *Personal* explanation is given "in terms of the intentional action of a rational agent" Since the cause of the universe is outside nature that leaves personal explanation as "the only show in town".
At the very least, we should concur with William Rowe (atheist) that the Cosmological Argument renders beleif in God rational.
GV
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Bernard, I re-read your post 193 more slowly and thoroughly. I should have done so earlier, as is was actually very simple. There is nothing in there but a little error on your part as to what is required to understand anything. You're missing the distinction between comprehending everything right from the very first thing there is to understand and going from some point as a given and progressing a bit further from there. You seem to suggest that if you can't have the former, you don't have the latter. And hence your discomfort with an infinite series of causes.
A clear example of this is when you say
"Again, if there were an infinite series of explanations, where each particular thing is only explained insofar as the previous thing is explained, then the process of explanation could never get off the ground."
It may be the case that we would never understand the origins of the universe. But just because we couldn't understand that, doesn't mean there is some uncaused cause where the question 'what caused that' is invalid. It might simply mean that we simply can't understand right from the beginning.
And of course that doesn't prevent our understanding of almost everything else. Most things do not depend on causes many steps back in the chain of causes. Let's look at the example of life on our planet.
Living organisms are made out of atoms. These come from stars or some (some hydrogen in your body) may have been formed originally in the big bang. Stars eventually all also came from matter that appeared out of the big bang. So some of our body may be 'original', other atoms may have been part of condensing gas clouds and exploding stars several times. Does that matter for how abiogenesis and evolution work? No, not at all. The fine details of those earlier steps in a possibly infinite series of steps don't matter for how life came about from non-living matter or how it diversified. We can perfectly well find answers to important questions.
So where does that take us? To a situation where most questions can be answered perfectly well independent of whether there is an infinite series of causes or not, as most questions do not depend on causes many steps back in the series.
But what about those questions where there being or not being an infinite series of causes is important, like the origin of the universe? It may well turn out there is a series of causes much longer than we can ever disentangle. It might well be infinite and we may therefore never find an ultimate first explanation so that we no longer want to ask the question 'What explains that then?'. Contrary to what you, that does not prevent us from understanding parts of what might well be an infinite chain of causes. And contrary to what you say, it is no grounds for saying 'therefore there is one thing that doesn't need an explanation'. The option 'we will never truly know what started it all' has a real chance of being the correct answer.
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Off you go PK. Get that published.
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'we will never truly know what started it all'
Yes, but that doesn't mean that we don't know that *something* must have started it all.
And that this thing would have unique properties - being uncaused among them.
Bernard isn't claiming that he can tell you *every* property about this something. Just that there must be an uncaused cause.
And he's NOT claiming that without a cosmological argument you can't understand everything else. You're conflating two of his arguments.
GV
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Hello Graham, Bernard,
Short out-of-order post here, Bernard I know I have an earlier one from you waiting for me still.
"And he's NOT claiming that without a cosmological argument you can't understand everything else."
That is not how I read the bit I quoted from Bernard, but I suspect you may be right there Graham. What I wrote in response to that was not something that I would expect Bernard to disagree with, so maybe he didn't mean it as the all out impossibility of explaining anything that I read it to be. If that is the case then Bernard can simply ignore the example I gave.
While I may have misread that part of Bernards post 193, I think you missed another part when you wrote
"And that this thing would have unique properties - being uncaused among them."
Bernard already addressed that in post 193 when he wrote
"Now, I'm claiming that it makes no sense to claim that "everything" has a cause. Even if there were an infinite series of causes, there would still need to be a cuase of that series - and that cause would then be included as part of the infinite series of things, which would then need a further cause."
Well exactly. It would just be the next cause added the infinite chain and therefore not change anything. Infinity plus one just gets you infinity again.
The whole thing seems to boil down to saying that if there is an infinite loop that we would never know the first cause. Sounds reasonable enough, but then how do we know that it must somehow be possible to know it? That assumption is implicitly included in this causality discussion and Bernards position is crucially dependent on it. But I don't think he has shown anything as to why it would be a valid assumption. If he can't show something good for that, then it's all just plucked out of thin air.
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And regarding publishing: yawn.
You've been on this blog log enough to have read that philosophical matters aren't my greatest interest (the art of reasoning being an exception).
At the risk of incurring your wrath again, I don't think posts 230, 225 (or post 96 for that matter!) were particularly good.:D
Maybe you can repeat the angry shouting from post 225 here (be sure to use lots of capitols again) and then I can repeat my low assessment of your new post again. We could go on forever that way to explore the concept of infinity, see if we find God at the end?
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Peter;
"You're missing the distinction between comprehending everything right from the very first thing there is to understand and going from some point as a given and progressing a bit further from there."
I'm not missing that distinction at all. What you are missing is the "point as a given". What is this point as a given, in your view?
"You seem to suggest that if you can't have the former, you don't have the latter."
I'm not suggesting that at all. Actually I'm suggesting that you must have the latter in order to have the former. We must begin from a starting point as a given. In my view, the only adequate starting point is the intelligibility of the universe. I'm not sure what you think the starting point as a given is.
""Again, if there were an infinite series of explanations, where each particular thing is only explained insofar as the previous thing is explained, then the process of explanation could never get off the ground."
It may be the case that we would never understand the origins of the universe. But just because we couldn't understand that, doesn't mean there is some uncaused cause where the question 'what caused that' is invalid."
Right, so you're suggesting that we may never understand, but that it still makes sense to ask what caused it? How does the question make sense if there is no possibility of an answer?
"It might simply mean that we simply can't understand right from the beginning."
Or that "it makes no sense to ask". That, in fact, is just what I have eben saying. I see that Graham has made this point better than I can. I am precisely saying that we can never understand what lies at the origin of the universe. This very fact, however, places whatever it is outside of the universe. Transcendent.
As Graham says, that we will never know what started it all does not mean that we can't know that "something" started it all, and that that something is transcendent.
"And of course that doesn't prevent our understanding of almost everything else."
Of course not.
"Most things do not depend on causes many steps back in the chain of causes. Let's look at the example of life on our planet.
Living organisms are made out of atoms. These come from stars or some (some hydrogen in your body) may have been formed originally in the big bang. Stars eventually all also came from matter that appeared out of the big bang. So some of our body may be 'original', other atoms may have been part of condensing gas clouds and exploding stars several times. Does that matter for how abiogenesis and evolution work? No, not at all. The fine details of those earlier steps in a possibly infinite series of steps don't matter for how life came about from non-living matter or how it diversified. We can perfectly well find answers to important questions."
Of course we can find answers to important questions. But the answers to those important questions still DEPEND on the answers to the earlier questions. Even if the fine details of the earlier steps in the process don't matter to our understanding, they still matter to the later steps in the process.
So you're conflating what is actually known with what is intelligible. That we don't neccessarily need to understand the fine details of star formation to understand abiogenesis doesn't mean that abiogenesis doesn't DEPEND on those fine details of star formation in an intelligible way.
"a situation where most questions can be answered perfectly well independent of whether there is an infinite series of causes or not, as most questions do not depend on causes many steps back in the series."
Again, you're conflating what is actually known with what can be known. By "answers to questions" I don't mean the particular linguistic expressions by which we express intelligible connections. I mean the intelligible connections themselves that constitute the whole system of question and answer.
So, although most questions can be answered without a knowledge of the entire series of causes, still the questions would not have an intelligible answer were it not for the entire series of intelligible causes, whether WE are able to linguistically express those causes or not.
"It may well turn out there is a series of causes much longer than we can ever disentangle."
I can only repeat, this would be totally irrational and illogical as it would run contrary yo our entire notion of causality. That doesn't mean it's not the case, of course. But to simply say "it may be the case" is as irrational as saying "logic may stop working in this one case". Well, it might, but you can't intelligibly hold that it does.
"Contrary to what you, that does not prevent us from understanding parts of what might well be an infinite chain of causes."
No, but it prevents there being anything to understand, as everything depends intelligibly on something else.
Again, I think Graham has provided a very succinct rebuttal of your post - I've probably rambled into details at the risk of convolution, but you obviously have quite a bit of patience, so maybe you'll read it anyway.
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PK
You're missing the point. This isn't meant to be a competition.
Those posts made me chuckle. Which is why I wrote them. Not to see if anyone scored them higher than yours.
When you're just chatting you're a great, and very interesting fella. And very reasonable. IMHO. When you turn the blog into a debate...well, you're not all those things. IMHO.
GV
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On a more substantial note - if we're friends again - Bernard is not committing the "completist fallacy". That is that we must list all the causes of an effect to have an explanation. Of course, the proximate causes will do.
But if you're asking, "why are there any causes at all?" , citing an infinitely long, or circular chain of causes doesn't answer the question.
And of course, it is, strictly speaking, logically possible that there is no reason, no answer to the question. But that doesn't make Bernards answer unsound, invalid or unconvincing.
GV
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BTW
Sincerely meant that you are very interesting and reasonable in "Mr Hyde" mode.
I doubt you care, but there it is.
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"The whole thing seems to boil down to saying that if there is an infinite loop that we would never know the first cause."
No, not only would we never know it, there wouldn't be one.
"Sounds reasonable enough, but then how do we know that it must somehow be possible to know it?"
Again, the point is not whether its possible to know it, but whether there is one. So the point is not what WE can understand, but what intelligible relations - such as causality - hold between a chain of caused things.
If there are no intelligible, causal relation, then we are no longer talking about that chain of causation.
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Graham and Bernard
Bit busy this week - hope to lock horns again soon.
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Thanks for checking in Grokes. You should check out some of the other threads. Throw in a few hand grenades, see what happens.
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Bernard, post 227,
I see that the quality of what was so far an interesting discussion has gone down.
"I must say, given the time you've taken I expected a more thorough reply than a simple restatment of your misapprehensions.
You don't seem to be making any argument, but I'll try to construct what I can of it."
I can't help notice that the change in tone on this thread occurred after I voiced criticism about your YEC-like methodology on the other thread.
Regarding the certainty with which you expressed yourself previously you said
"I'd like to see evidence of this certainty, Peter, if you would. Given that my position is, in fact, that there is no real conclusive argument proving the existence of God, I think this is highly unlikely."
See e.g. your posts 33, 44, or the latter part of post 84. I haven't re-read all your posts in this thread or the other threads where you were on about transcendence. There's plenty more examples of where you state things sounding quite certain and without any reservation.
"I'm sorry, but post 90 was one of yours...can all of our problems be because you're mixing up my posts with your own?"
Duh. The key word in what you replied to ("I think the crucial bit around post 90.") is the word 'around'.
With the posting rubbish left out for the refuse collectors, let's return to the more fruitful discussion shall we? You repeatedly claim to have evidence for an external cause to the universe, e.g.
"What? The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself. This is the verifiable evidence borne out in the entirety of human experience."
That's empty. Saying 'it's human experience' is not valid as evidence. Some things in the physical world work absolutely counter-intuitively. There are things where our experience would make us draw conclusions that are just plain wrong. See e.g. the links I posted for Graham a few times about experiments with very bizarre outcomes that some people would hardly believe because they go against everything we experience with our senses.
Even if reasoning were accepted as a form of evidence, you're still not any further, as it is not difficult to interpret what we see around us in a way that goes against the thing you wish to reason into existence. You say "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself." I could add a few words and make it "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself in the universe". We don't see anything around us that didn't come from something else in the universe. You see, I could then go from there to claim that whatever caused the Big Bang will fall in that as well. I'll not explain anything what the 'thing prior to the Big Bang' thing is, just as your word 'transcendent' doesn't explain anything. And voila, my position, which points in the exact opposite of yours, has achieved equal credibility status (about none, though what I say may turn out to be correct), interpreting the same observations.
I hope that from the previous paragraph you understand that you don't have any evidence. It is reasoning that might well prove correct, or it might just prove incomplete and wrong. I accept that what I put up in the previous paragraph amounts to nothing. You should accept the same or your position. If you want to claim evidence, then give some examples. The very broad 'whole of human experience' point absolutely won't do. It is quite fallible and so broad and non-specific that it can be bent into just about any direction. If you want to claim evidence then provide some examples that are not subject to large steps of interpretation that can make it point in various different directions. It would of course be helpful in that regard if you don't point to things only concerned with some things in our universe transforming into other things, but something actually related to something outside our universe, as that could not so easily be held up in support of my counter-explanation.
Your post then made various repeats, mostly saying again that you do have evidence. See above in response to that. You then said
"Which is unreasonable - my view, based on the evidence of the entire causal history of the universe, or your view, based on - well, apparently based on the possibility that we can't be certain, so ANYTHING might be the case?"
Well, you get at least part right. You don't have any evidence but you're right that since I (and others) have as little evidence as you (none), there are multiple options that can't be ruled out.
Then near the end you said, regarding the characteristics of the 'other'
"Well, of course, transcendence is pretty much the defining feature of the Abrahamic, monotheistic God. So it certainly does resemble it in that respect. "
I'm not too familiar with the vedic scriptures, but would you care to explain why the Abrahamic god fits the bill better than the creator god Brahma? Or the FSM for that matter?
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Bernaqrd, post 234,
I already realized (prompted by Grahams posts) that you probably meant something different from how I understood the bit I quoted from you in post 229. I'll therefore skip some parts that are only related to my misunderstanding.
"Right, so you're suggesting that we may never understand, but that it still makes sense to ask what caused it? How does the question make sense if there is no possibility of an answer?"
You may have misunderstood what I said, see the next line line that you quoted from me. I'm saying that he prospect of never being able to explain the origin of the universe is no reason to postulate something out of thin that air that doesn't require an explanation, just to get rid of the unmanageable infinite series of causes.
"Or that "it makes no sense to ask". That, in fact, is just what I have eben saying."
Yes, but not explaining why it would not make sense to ask. One could follow grokesxs posts 206 and suspect that the eagerness to drive for that answer derives from the desire to wish some rational basis for belief in god into existence.
You then mention Grahams posts a few times. Feel free to copy-paste bits from his posts if you like. But please formulate your own responses. I'm not having another round as with Graham on the god and science thread where I'm told 'my position is as stated in [insert ref to someone elses text]'. Especially since the text referred to sometimes didn't contain the relevant bits is was claimed to have (if any at all). So if I'm having a discussion with you, then YOU please formulate what your own position is.
You then say a couple of things about (if I understand you correctly, I'm not sure I do) the series of causes being intelligible or not. I'm quite sure I don't follow you there actually.
Let's make an analogy to positive, integer numbers (that mathematically comprise N), so 1, 2, 3, 4, .....
And let's also consider all integer numbers (that comprise Z) .....,-3, -2, -1, 0 , 1, 2 ,3, ....
N has a starting point (1) where you can't give an answer to the question 'what precedes it in the series'. Z doesn't. But regardless of whether we are in N or Z, if we ask 'Where do get to if we move 4 places forward from 3' the answer is 7. Whether the preceding chain is infinite or has a starting point without a preceding number is irrelevant.
In the spirit of the example above, I don't get your point about understanding of most things requiring some conditions of the things preceding it. Perhaps you could rephrase or clarify that part.
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Okay, we seem to be heading back to constructive debate. Before the novelty kills us all...
1) "I could add a few words and make it "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself in the universe"."
That's a perfectly acceptable objection to my mind. I don't think that it is enough to overrule the principle that 'everything that can have an explanation does have an explanation'. And it seems a little ad hoc to stop asking for causes once we reach a conclusion we don't like.
Now if the objector to the Cosmological Argument could find some incoherence in a Transcendent cause, they could use that with "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself in the universe" as a defeater for the argument.
2) "the links I posted for Graham a few times about experiments with very bizarre outcomes that some people would hardly believe because they go against everything we experience with our senses."
I don't think that this challenges Bernard much. Galileo, John Philoponus, Roger Bacon and other mediaeval's established that the human rational intuitions need to be tested by experiment. That's a view that imples that human rationality is fallible, but not so fallible that it cannot correct itself. They also helped establish that inference and induction can lead to knowledge as valuable as the knowledge provided by deductive philosophy.
It's worth noting that a very subtle view of human rationality underpins these views. We take it for granted - but at the time it was far from the norm.
But none of this undercuts our common experience of causality, and it certainly doesn't undercut the presupposition of the Principle of Sufficient Explanation.
3) "I could then go from there to claim that whatever caused the Big Bang will fall in that as well."
I don't think that you're meeting Bernard's challenge there. I've explained why explaining all the part's isn't necessary or sufficient to explain the whole. So adding another part to the universe's history doesn't help.
4) You can fall back to "The universe exists without explanation", and use "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself in the universe" to support that conclusion.
But be clear on what you mean. You're not saying something like 'the plane crashed without explanation.' That assumes that there is an explanation, but we're not clever enough to discover it.
You're saying something like 'the plane crashed for no reason whatsoever. No cause or prior state can give make it any more explicable.'
Now you're saying this about the entire universe. The universe has no explanation. It's not that we lack the intellect to grasp it. There is no explanation to give. But if universes can be for no reason at all, why not other events or entities within those universes? If events can happen without any cause, and if entire universes can begin to exist without any cause, just about anything is possible.
5) "The very broad 'whole of human experience' point absolutely won't do. It is quite fallible and so broad and non-specific that it can be bent into just about any direction."
Human rationality and inquiry depends on concepts like - no event happens without a reason, nothing begins to exist without a cause, only necessary entities can exist without a cause (some philosophers have proposed numbers and others propositions as existing in every possible world, therefore necessary).
Abandon these intuitions and you abandon rational inquiry. Cast doubt on them and you cast doubt on human enquiry. I'm not sure that I'd want to pay that price for defeating the Cosmological Argument.
6) "would you care to explain why the Abrahamic god fits the bill better than the creator god Brahma? Or the FSM for that matter?"
The FSM has been slain many, many times on the blog. As for Brahma - if you're taking Ramanuja's or Madhva's interpretation of Hinduism, he'd fit the bill just as well. Sankhara's interpretation has already been dealt with on this thread. (Prizes for whoever can spot where).
GV
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Peter;
"You repeatedly claim to have evidence for an external cause to the universe"
Well, I've repeatedly asked about what would constitute evidence of such a thing. I'm pretty sure there can't be "scientific evidence" - but there is no "scientific evidence" that "scientific evidence" is reliable. The view that scientific evidence is reliable is itself a piece of reasoning which, while not being scientifically proven, is continually borne out in experience.
I'm not sure disputing what constitutes "evidence" in those cases is entirely fruitful.
Will it help if I say that "I have "reason to think" that the universe has a cause outside itself. I'm fairly sure that's all I've ever said anyway, that it is a supposition that makes sense. I think we may mean something different by evidence.
"Saying 'it's human experience' is not valid as evidence. Some things in the physical world work absolutely counter-intuitively."
How do you know?
"There are things where our experience would make us draw conclusions that are just plain wrong. See e.g. the links I posted for Graham a few times about experiments with very bizarre outcomes that some people would hardly believe because they go against everything we experience with our senses."
Well, yes, but surely the experiments and analysis of their results themselves are the object of rational experiences. So, in that case, it's one form of experience correcting another.
"You say "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself." I could add a few words and make it "The evidence was that every intelligible thing in the universe has a cause other than itself in the universe". We don't see anything around us that didn't come from something else in the universe."
"You see, I could then go from there to claim that whatever caused the Big Bang will fall in that as well."
Well, you could, but it would be absolutely irrational and nonsensical. Of course, that doesn't mean it isn't TRUE, but what reason have you for positing it, other than some emotional desire to disprove its opposite?
When the options are either "everything has a cause IN the universe, including whatever CAUSED the universe" or "Everything has a cause IN the universe, EXCEPT whatever caused the universe", I know which of those makes more sense.
Yet again, we're back to the root of our misunderstanding here. I am saying, "of two positions, one is more rational", and you are saying "this doesn't make it true".
I agree. the fact that my explanation seems to make more sense DOES NOT make it indubitably true. but, in the absence of any reason for positing the opposite - and you haven't given any, other than that you don't want to accept my explanation - surely it is reasonable to hold to the most reasonable explanation.
The truth MIGHT be counter-intuitive. But often what is intuitive turns out to be right. That's why it's called intuitive and not just blind gut feeling. So, in the absence of any reason for positing the counter-intuitive, it's entirely rational to accept the intuitive.
"It is reasoning that might well prove correct, or it might just prove incomplete and wrong."
True. But, until you can give any reason to show that it is incorrect and wrong, and given that it seems intuitive and rational, I'll go with it for now. If you can show the truth to be entirely irrational and counter-intuitive, then I'll certainly listen. All you are saying, indeed all you ever say, is "well, it might".
Yes, it might. But that's not a good enough reason to reject the intuitive in favour of the counter-intuitive, or the irrational in favour of the rational.
"If you want to claim evidence, then give some examples."
That word "evidence" again. and now "examples". Yes, "examples" of "the cause of the universe". Good one.
"The very broad 'whole of human experience' point absolutely won't do."
How about "the entire working of the rational intellect"?
"It would of course be helpful in that regard if you don't point to things only concerned with some things in our universe transforming into other things, but something actually related to something outside our universe, as that could not so easily be held up in support of my counter-explanation."
Well, obviously I can't give an example of "something outside the universe", as my point is precisely that whatever that is must be unique and transcendent.
As I've already shown, your counter-explanation is POSSIBLE, but entirely irrational. In the absence of infallibility, i have to accept that you MIGHT be right. But I've absolutely NO reason to think that you actually ARE.
"You don't have any evidence but you're right that since I (and others) have as little evidence as you (none), there are multiple options that can't be ruled out."
I have "reason to think" that whatever causes the universe is not part of the universe. The "evidence" is that our notion of causality rules out the opposite. That "evidence" is not conclusive. You may wish to call it something less than "evidence". But it is certainly "reason to think"...at least
And as there is absolutely no "reason to think" that your counter-explanation is right, and as it doesn't make sense, and as it contradicts the notion of causality that we apply to all of our experience, I have "reason to think" that it's not in fact right. But yes, sure Maybe it is.
"I'm not too familiar with the vedic scriptures, but would you care to explain why the Abrahamic god fits the bill better than the creator god Brahma?"
Some Brahmaic doctrines do hold that Brahma is entirely transcendent. On that score, I think those doctrines are right. I'm no expert, though, but I'm fairly sure the doctrine of transcendence isn't entirely clear in that faith, and there are many ambiguities suggesting that Brahma is in fact the progeny of some more primal force, which again is the result of some more primal forces. In fact, there is some notion of an infinite cycle of the universe, including the creation from primal matter of a structured order. this is not the same as entire transcendence and creation ex nihilo. To that extent, I disagree with the worship of Brahma. To the extent that the abrahamic religions have the most cogent doctrine of total transcendence , I agree with them.
"Or the FSM for that matter?"
To suggest that some made-up nonsense cartoon made of spaghetti transcends the universe is so ridiculous that surely even you can see it. How can "spaghetti" transcend the universe? Spaghetti is a part of the universe, surely. I can tell you how it's made.
"I'm saying that the prospect of never being able to explain the origin of the universe is no reason to postulate something out of thin that air that doesn't require an explanation, just to get rid of the unmanageable infinite series of causes."
The prospect of never being able to understand the origin of the universe is no reason to postulate that it didn't have an origin. And there are reasons to postulate certain features of that origin, even if we can't fully understand it. There are reasons to suppose that the origin of the universe must lie in something outside the universe, as I've explained above. That is the rational and intuitive view to take, based on the intelligibility of causality as operative in the universe. In the absence of reason to assume the counter-intuitive and irrational, I'll go with that.
"Yes, but not explaining why it would not make sense to ask."
Because whatever is transcendent is outside the scope of the rational universe.
"You then mention Grahams posts a few times. Feel free to copy-paste bits from his posts if you like. But please formulate your own responses."
I do try. Sometimes Graham expresses it better than I do. I'm not simply agreeing with him so that we can both gang up on you. I'm agreeing with him when he genuineley expresses something that I believe to be true, but have not expressed with quite so much clarity. We can all learn from each other, surely.
"I don't get your point about understanding of most things requiring some conditions of the things preceding it. Perhaps you could rephrase or clarify that part."
I said that the "intelligibility" of a thing requires the intelligible conditions of the thing preceding it, whether we actually understand it or not.
That mitochondria in cells convert proteins to energy (isn't that right?) DEPENDS on the intelligible properties of chemical elements, whether wea ctually understand chemistry or not.
You give a mathematical example, but of couse mathematics are just abstractions from the concrete. We're talking about the concreteness of existence.
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I can only express my disappointment with this comment...
"I'm not having another round as with Graham on the god and science thread where I'm told 'my position is as stated in [insert ref to someone elses text]'. Especially since the text referred to sometimes didn't contain the relevant bits is was claimed to have (if any at all)."
You just can't help yourself, can you? You have to make everything personal and competitive.
Well, if we're talking about integrity...(a) I never said that I agreed with everthing in those urls. (b) You didn't read or didn't understand them. (c) You didn't read all the way through my posts. I already anticipated and answered the objections that caused you to huff and walk away. (d) You may be getting mixed up with the 'Insulation' thread. Maybe.
GV
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Massive post alert. And maybe more to come. Sorry.
Peter has covered some of the same ground, but hey ho.
How is that the best way to explain the origin of existence? Surely that's just all particular things that already exist?
Coming from someone who has argued to Peter that the answers to important questions depend on the answers to earlier ones and who claims interest in the intelligible connections themselves that constitute the whole system of question and answer, I find that a strange thing for you to say.
How do we make sense of a (probably) intelligible universe if we don't study it? How do we establish those connections themselves without constant endeavour? And in case you missed the really important part of that quote, I'll repeat it:
testing what we think we have learned about it.
Knowledge builds upon itself, things we learn today affect and are affected by what we learned yesterday. The process of learning about the universe is not about broadening, going from one thing to another - the sum of its parts idea - but is one of deepening. Theories become more detailed, explain more, or else have to be jettisoned for better ones. It is a possibly never ending process, because, (and here I think that overburdened raft gets in the way for you) reality, however you define it, is not what it seems. I've tried to give some real examples of what I mean throughout this thread by this, but you don't seem keen to consider them, so I'll use Graham's example and hopefully address some of his points, too.
Lets do a thought experiment. A 2009 Ford Focus pops up, 2001 Space Odyssey monolith style at various points in human history. What would they make of it? I’m talking about the car itself and not the fact of it appearing out of nowhere. Wheel less societies probably wouldn't recognize the significance and might be less inclined to investigate farther than sitting on the seats, maybe concluding that the purpose of the strange artifact was for shelter and comfort. If it turned up in the 1940s, many people would be able to drive it and substantial numbers would know how to get under the bonnet but would come across things such as catalytic converters that would baffle them at first but which they could probably figure out, and in the process learn stuff about cars that they didn’t know already, and infer stuff about the people who made this one.
The thing is, wherever it dropped into existence, the extent to which people could get close to a true explanation of a Ford Focus depends firstly on their willingness to prod and poke at it, to forget for the moment (or at least leave to the philosophers) the big why questions and concentrate on the how questions instead, and secondly on the knowledge they had on cars or car like things and the extent to which they were able to use it and modify it in the light of what they were learning about the Ford Focus.
BTW, Graham:
explaining all the parts of a car exist does not explain why there is a car. Why were the parts assembled in such a way?
We don't explain all the parts of a car in isolation if we want to further our knowledge of a car. We look at everything about it, its form and function, its parts and how they interact with each other to make up the whole. That way we can work out why the parts were assembled in the way they were. So with the universe. All I have been saying here is that the universe is a bit of a larger project than a car, and we are at a stage where although it might be an interesting intellectual exercise to ponder the matter, we are no better equipped to deal with it confidently than the wheel-less societies would have been to deal with their Ford Focus. We have got a whole lot more poking and prodding to do.
What's not a true premise? Causality? Oh, but of course, you were going to "deal with" causality...could we have that please?
I think my words were "challenge the Principle of Causality" and something about re-visiting premises. But I wasn't actually thinking about that. My point was your argument goes beyond deduction when you plump for the uncaused cause over infinite regress. Strictly speaking they both violate the premise of causality, so we are in non deductive territory. I thought we had established that.
That's not quite as simple and trouble free as you would like it. why? What constitutes evidence? How do you decide?
Okay, when we are talking about the origin of this universe, primarily I would consider scientific evidence. There's plenty of it around, but as I have said before it only takes us so far. To about 1E-43 seconds before the big bang.
How does evidence support anything?
Come again?
What would be evidence for there being a transcendent cause of the universe...or not, as the case may be?
You make my point for me. There isn't any. But you are the one making a positive claim, so the onus is on you to provide the evidence. My position, in case you've missed it, and to be fair I've only made it about half a dozen times here, is one of waiting to see if further evidence turns up that makes positive claims in this area more meaningful than just making stuff up. I have the hope that one day my descendents may get closer to the truth than I have, but since my curiosity about the universe is in no way bound up with my morality, who I should or should not sleep with, my fear of dying or any of the other many and varied things the religious claim their god(s) can help them with, I can live with the not knowing. It does not impinge on my view of myself, my worth as a human being or lack of it, I have nothing spiritual invested in it.
Hold on, all I've been doing is asking questions about what constitutes evidence - questions that you haven't been able to answer.
No you haven't, you have been offering as evidence everything we already know about the universe to support your position. Yet time and time again everything we think we know about the universe has proved to be an unreliable indicator of what we might learn about it subsequently. Time is not separate from space for instance, electrons, light, everything in fact, display the properties of both waves and particles, we consist mostly of empty space, which isn't as empty as we thought anyway. The list goes on and on. What we know is a good base (the only one) for investigation, but that is as far as it goes. If we haven't got the evidence from that empirical bubble, we are simply speculating. Nothing wrong with that, but I'm not going to base my life around it, and more importantly, I'm not going to privilege the beliefs of others who base theirs around it either. I'll tolerate those beliefs, but I won't show them respect and when people try to use them to influence the laws of my country, intrude on my private life and tell me I have no morals because I don't share them, I will protest. This does mean that I have to base my view of the world, my morality etc on something else and that can bring difficulties because a withholding of provisional assent is pretty useless for telling me what I should think about stem cell research, birth control, adultery, homosexuality and the like. But they are honest difficulties and I’ll deal with them with the help of the Invisible Pink Unicorn reason, empathy, discourse and ideas of justice, freedom, tolerance and a whole lot besides.
I'll now turn my attention to causality - although I have neither the intellectual prowess nor the time to "deal with it", as you insist I have promised.
I have already alluded to a philosophical objection to the principle, which I am sure you are aware of from elsewhere as well, that is, we cannot expect the universe to respect our apparent need for intellectual intelligibility. I shan’t go over it again, the whole intelligibility thing is a giant red herring as far as I am concerned and your habit of invoking it as a seeming knock down argument against everything that does not conform to your view has nearly driven me off this thread a number of times.
Firstly, as far as we can tell, causality holds up in this universe, but it has faced some pretty stiff challenges from quantum theory and is hanging by the skin of its teeth. The notion of causality in modern physics is a very different animal to the commonsense one and the one held by philosophers prior to the twentieth century. The phenomenon of quantum entanglement, for instance, seems to demonstrate that a previously sacrosanct aspect of causality, namely locality in time and space is violated in certain circumstances. The delayed choice quantum eraser experiment throws up the intriguing possibilities of faster than light information gain or even gaining information from the future (retrocausality), both of which would violate causality as physicists understand it, and also how most of us understand it on the level of human experience.
More speculatively, retrocausality has been posited in extreme environments of spacetime , such as wormholes. Now, I know that this is nearly as speculative as your uncaused cause – I say nearly, because it comes from exact mathematical calculations of equations of General Relativity - but I mention it because there are no more extreme environments of spacetime than the beginning of the universe.
I think someone has already brought up the fact that as the Big Bang brought the dimensions into existence, time effectively began at that point and so causality as understood by the philosophers who brought us the Cosmological Argument is rendered useless. To ask what came before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole. I realize you went on to consider your arguments in the light of brane theory (you didn’t call it that) which itself come out of string theory. These are theoretical branches of physics without any evidence to support them, although they do proceed from evidentially supported theories, so in a sense they are at the interface of physics and metaphysics and that is where they will stay until some evidence from the empirical bubble come along.
Crucial to all of this, in the light of the shifting definitions of causality over the centuries and the departure in your arguments from evidence (other than an intuitive sense of what things should be based on what you understand them to be) is the extent to which we can reasonably expect the various notions of causality to hold up beyond the Big Bang, if there is in fact a beyond. We could do a Swinburne and attempt to assign it a prior probability – I suppose that is what I am sort of doing by bringing up the examples of the shifting nature of our understanding, but I won’t be so dumb as to pluck a number from out my rear end. I’m not going to base a world view on it, either.
Anyway, I hope to get round to some of your other points in #227 and look at Graham's in #228 this week. Other points will have to wait.
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Edit:
The phrase "Invisible Pink Unicorn" in the previous post should appear crossed out - the del tags worked in the preview but have not survived actual posting. Bad joke anyway.
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"We don't explain all the parts of a car in isolation if we want to further our knowledge of a car. We look at everything about it, its form and function, its parts and how they interact with each other to make up the whole. That way we can work out why the parts were assembled in the way they were."
kind of my point, really...
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Think of the brick wall, if that clarifies any. An explanation for each brick and the cement - their individual histories, explaining their existence - doesn't explain why there is a brick wall.
Or the students with the perfect essay answers. I can discover that they all copied Jane's work and Jane wrote a perfect answer. So there's an explanation for each answer, each part of the whole. But I haven't explained how each student got a perfect score until I know how Jane achieved a perfect answer (Did she study? Did she cheat?)
GV
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GV
We clearly don't disagree about cars, then. Only universes.
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Ditto brick walls and possible cheating students.
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I think we're having a violent agreement about the car. No-one would accept a history of the production of each individual part of the car as an explanation of the car.
They'd appeal to intentions of engineers etc.
GV
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not ignoring you Grokes, I'll try and make some time to digest your post here later.
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No probs Bernard. I rather like the leisurely pace here.
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Grokes;
"How do we make sense of a (probably) intelligible universe if we don't study it? How do we establish those connections themselves without constant endeavour? And in case you missed the really important part of that quote, I'll repeat it:
testing what we think we have learned about it."
I agree with all that. my point is that studying the mechanisms of things that already exist can tell you virtually nothing about their origin.
"reality, however you define it, is not what it seems."
What makes you say that? It MAY not be, true. But even so, how does that affect any speculations about its origins?
"Lets do a thought experiment. A 2009 Ford Focus pops up, 2001 Space Odyssey monolith style at various points in human history. What would they make of it? I’m talking about the car itself and not the fact of it appearing out of nowhere."
Well this is it you see. I'm talking about the fact of it appearing out of nowehere. The "just being there" of the universe...not the particularities of all the things that are "just there". it's the "just there" bit I'm interested in.
"The thing is, wherever it dropped into existence, the extent to which people could get close to a true explanation of a Ford Focus depends firstly on their willingness to prod and poke at it, to forget for the moment (or at least leave to the philosophers) the big why questions"
Well this is it, ya see. you're entirely right - finding out how things work does often neccessitate leaving aside the philosophical questions. i agree with you. But this has no relevance to the philosophical questions and how they should be answered. what do you make of those questions?
I'm all for finding out about wheels and engines, but aren't you just a wee bit curious about why a ford focus just appeared?
"We don't explain all the parts of a car in isolation if we want to further our knowledge of a car. We look at everything about it, its form and function, its parts and how they interact with each other to make up the whole. That way we can work out why the parts were assembled in the way they were."
Indeed - we've still no idea who or what assembled them though. And that's what I'm asking about.
"So with the universe."
Exactly.
"All I have been saying here is that the universe is a bit of a larger project than a car, and we are at a stage where although it might be an interesting intellectual exercise to ponder the matter, we are no better equipped to deal with it confidently than the wheel-less societies would have been to deal with their Ford Focus."
Yes, but again, we're asking different questions. Say the wheel-less society, or any other society, asked "what made the ford focus appear out of nowhere"? Now, you may, rightly, insist that they can have no idea. they can, however, rule things out. If it just fell from the sky onto their island, they could rationally assume that its source was something "outside their island". that's really all I'm saying in relation to the universe.
"My point was your argument goes beyond deduction when you plump for the uncaused cause over infinite regress. Strictly speaking they both violate the premise of causality, so we are in non deductive territory. I thought we had established that."
Actually, we haven't. I have tried to show that an infinte regress of causes violates the principle of causality. why does an uncaused cause? If we take the principle of causality to be "some things constitute sufficient reason for the existence of things", why can something not constitute the sufficient reason for itself?
Of course, this goes against our "experience of causality", but it doesn't violate the principle that one thing can cause another. An infinte regress does, as the entire series of things that DON'T constitute sufficient reason for their existence - the universe - is assumed not to have an ultimate cause.
"Okay, when we are talking about the origin of this universe, primarily I would consider scientific evidence."
But that doesn;t make sense...for reasons which you go on to briefly allude to.
"as I have said before it only takes us so far."
Yes. I.e., it doesn't take us to the origin of the universe, but only to a point where the universe already exists. Ergo, scientific evidence can't tell us about the origin of the universe as, by its nature, it could only take us back to a point where the universe already existed.
To about 1E-43 seconds before the big bang.
How does evidence support anything?
Come again?
""What would be evidence for there being a transcendent cause of the universe...or not, as the case may be?"
You make my point for me. There isn't any."
But there are "good reasons to think". There couldn't possibly be evidence of something outside the universe, because evidence adheres within the universe.
"But you are the one making a positive claim, so the onus is on you to provide the evidence."
Well, my claim is that there are two possibilities, and that one is irrational. That's all. The evidence for this is in rationality, not in the physical sciences.
"My position, in case you've missed it, and to be fair I've only made it about half a dozen times here, is one of waiting to see if further evidence turns up that makes positive claims in this area more meaningful than just making stuff up."
What evidence could there be of something outside the universe? I am suggesting that the evidence "within" the universe demonstrates that the universe is not self-sufficient. We can then make rational assumptions that, if it is not self-sufficient, there is probably sdomething which accounts for it. What that something is, I don't know. It's outside the universe, so there's no evidence. But the evidence "inside" the universe - that the universe isn't self-sufficient - points toward something external.
"What we know is a good base (the only one) for investigation, but that is as far as it goes."
Yep. And we know that the universe is not self-sufficient, which is a good basis for investigation.
"I have already alluded to a philosophical objection to the principle, which I am sure you are aware of from elsewhere as well, that is, we cannot expect the universe to respect our apparent need for intellectual intelligibility."
I am arguing that our intelligibility is the only reason we have for positing the universe. Saying that the universe may not be rational is the same as saying that it may not exist. How can you posit an unintelligible universe? What reason have you for positing it?
"I shan’t go over it again, the whole intelligibility thing is a giant red herring as far as I am concerned and your habit of invoking it as a seeming knock down argument against everything that does not conform to your view has nearly driven me off this thread a number of times."
But it's the heart of the matter. I'm coming at this from the position of a complete sceptic who first of all asks "what reason have we to posit the existence of ANYTHING".
The only way we can possibly posit the existence of anything is through intellgibility, and we therefore have no reason to posit anything else. I can name you all sorts of things in the universe that are, in principle, intelligible. Can you name anything that is, in principle, totally unintelligible? If not, why do you think such a thing might exist?
"I think someone has already brought up the fact that as the Big Bang brought the dimensions into existence, time effectively began at that point and so causality as understood by the philosophers who brought us the Cosmological Argument is rendered useless."
Nonsense. you've misunderstood the notion of causality, as it actually has nothing to do with temporality. A cause need not come "before" its effect temporally. A thing can be simultaenously caused. My desk is the cause of this book being three foot off the ground. That does not mean that the desk acted at time A to cause the book at time B to be in a particular position. It means that the desk, at any time or no time, is the cause of the book's suspension off the ground.
"To ask what came before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole."
But we CAN still ask what caused the Big Bang.
"Crucial to all of this, in the light of the shifting definitions of causality over the centuries"
I;m still not sure how these have shifted. a cause is, and remains, an intelligible entity that is intellgibly the sufficient reason for the being of another entity. quantum physics doesn't shift this definition.
"the extent to which we can reasonably expect the various notions of causality to hold up beyond the Big Bang, if there is in fact a beyond."
You see, causality isn't spatial either.
We would be better asking "what is the explanation or sufficient reason for the Big Bang" without bringing ANY temporal or spatial considerations into it.
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More to follow.
You now talk a lot of guff about eastern mysticism and hinduism which I really don't think warrants much comment. you get back to the point here
Of course it’s guff. You don’t know the meaning of guff until you’ve sat on the banks of the Ganges while a saddhu, spliff in one hand and trident in the other, expounds on the mysteries of the universe. But it gives one an ear for guff, and Christian Apologetic guff runs Hindu guff pretty close, and what’s more, it’s all done without the benefit of mind altering drugs, or so I assume.
But I brought it up as an illustration of how different traditions of guff can lead the so called rational mind down different tracks, and because the fault line was particularly apt.
Infinity is an abstract construct expressing the partly intelligilbe notion of an endless series. But this is only ever intelligibile in the abstract and in set theory. It is a holding mechanism that cannot be expressed concretely - how could there be an infinite series of existing things? In mathematics the abstract ideas of number and sets are used all the time as a way of abstractly manipulatimng features of reality. But there is no such thing as a pure number, or a set of 0. They are abstract constructions used to intellectually manipulate aspects of reality - they do not express actual existing things.
Well, there is one particular area of interest to this discussion where the idea of actual infinity is taken seriously, and that is cosmology. That’s the type of cosmology where people make stuff up and then try to work out ways to test if it’s true or not rather than the type that makes stuff up, calls it god and then lets it tell us if we should chop bits off our kids or not. It’s all to do with the topology of the universe. Suffice it to say there is a real possibility that we live in an infinite universe.
How? Surely all we know PRECISELY DOESN'T come from nothing!!! Can you name one instance of a thing that we know that comes from nothing?
As I have said before, what we know, or what we think we know is no indicator of what we could learn in the future. And anyway, quantum vacuums are nothing in the sense most would understand he term, but particles zip in and out existence in them all the time. In one (intelligible) theory of the universe, the sum total of the energy of it (and matter is only energy in a different form) is zero. So the universe could be just one big ball of nothing. As ever in science, the jury is out.
Or it could be a corrolary of the deism. Given two options, that God created the world and left it alone, or that God created the world and still sustains it, why choose the former over the latter? Any idea? Surely, had God created the world, then any continuing action or movement in the world is also the result of the creation and continued sustainance? No?
Er, because the creation of the universe and all its physical laws, its intelligibility if you must, would be enough to sustain it without the god hanging around for 13 billion years for an intelligent ape to turn up so he/she/it could pass on its wisdom – apparently consisting of platitudes, smiting and not liking homosexuality much.
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Grokes
You've listened to a Saddhu on the Ganges? Cool.
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Grokes;
"As I have said before, what we know, or what we think we know is no indicator of what we could learn in the future."
Yet again, this is just another case of "Maybe". AS Peter has said earlier, my reasoning is rational and intelligible, but maybe it's wrong. Maybe it is. it doesn't seem wrong. There's nothing irrational about it. it's a cohesive explanation.
"And anyway, quantum vacuums are nothing in the sense most would understand he term"
No they're not. they're quantum vacuums. Do you know what you mean when you say that something is "nothing". Remember that the real is the intelligible. quantum vacuums are intelligible entities. whether they exist or not is up to the quantum physicists. but to say "X is nothing" is contradictory. It's not nothing. It's X.
"but particles zip in and out existence in them all the time."
So, not from nothing then?
"In one (intelligible) theory of the universe, the sum total of the energy of it (and matter is only energy in a different form) is zero. So the universe could be just one big ball of nothing."
Although energy may well be mass, it is not "existence" or "intelligibility". Whether or not the sum energy in the universe is zero has no bearing on the existence of all of the things in the universe. Or are you actually now saying that the universe doesn't exist?
"As ever in science, the jury is out."
On whether the universe exists or not, I think the jury is very much in, otherwise there would be no science.
"because the creation of the universe and all its physical laws, its intelligibility if you must, would be enough to sustain it"
I'm not sure where you get this from. How does the universe sustain itself when every entity depends on a prior entity. Aren't you now just saying stuff?
The universe doesn't sustain itself. There is absolutely no reason to think that it does, given that nothing in it is self-sufficient. An series of contingent things does not equal necessity, no matter how far you stretch the series.
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Hello people,
I have absolutely no time to carefully read the lengthy posts that have appeared here since last weekend. Just one small bit, that I mentioned earlier on in the thread, maybe didn't always mention in every post since, but appears to be becoming an issue again in the last couple of posts.
"Yet again, this is just another case of "Maybe". AS Peter has said earlier, my reasoning is rational and intelligible, but maybe it's wrong. Maybe it is. it doesn't seem wrong. There's nothing irrational about it. it's a cohesive explanation."
What you say seems ok when looking at things from the point of view of our everyday experience. But that is not what things were like in the very early stages of the universe. For example, what we know now suggests that shortly after the Big Bang, the various interactions that we see now were all merged, so e.g. gravitation wasn't separate from the forces that keep solid objects and fluids together. How should we imagine that? I haven't got a clue, and I'm pretty sure no one participating in this thread has. Our reasoning is pretty good for what we see around us, but even then it can go wrong. Bernard mentioned correction from experiment, a very good thing. For the strange conditions near the birth of our universe that becomes hugely more important, as our reasoning becomes less and less reliable.
So fine to apply reasoning to apples falling from a tree, not so fine to attach great certainty to it in areas where it is of little use without verification from observations. I don't think I ever said that the latter was rational, more the contrary.
I'll try to find time this weekend to fully catch up again.
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Peter;
"What you say seems ok when looking at things from the point of view of our everyday experience. But that is not what things were like in the very early stages of the universe"
But again you're taking causality to be temporal. The temporal "beginning" of the universe does not seem as important as its "existence".
I am not trying to extrapolate our everyday experience to the beginning of the universe - I am extrapolating our everyday experience of existing things to form a notion of "existence and its conditions".
"So fine to apply reasoning to apples falling from a tree, not so fine to attach great certainty to it in areas where it is of little use without verification from observations"
But it is the "existence" of the apples falling from the tree, and the tree, and everything else, that I am inquiring into.
The temporal "beginning" of the universe may be important, but that only deals with the conditions under which the universe as we know it took shape. If asking about the "existence" of things, anything, it is reasonable to extrapolate from the existence of things now.
I am asking about "existence", not "temporal beginnings" - about how any tempiral beginnings, intermiediate stages or up-to-date complex entities can "exist" at all.
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I need time to read this thoroughly too. I think PK had a good objection on causality. And Grokes had an interesting one from QM. Those are worth a chat.
In the meantime, I'd like to hear about the ganja on the Ganges.
That's so cool to type! And the speaker had a trident... I mean that's got to be a great story!!
GV
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GV
You get used to them. I lived in Banaras - one of the most religious cities in the world - for a few months, and the place was teeming with them, mostly Shaivites, since Banaras is supposed to have been founded by Shiva, who carried a trident. I've not got a photo to hand, but they mostly look like this.
I got to know one pretty well, a lonely old guy in his last days. Luckily his English was far better than my Hindi, being an educated man in his pre-Saddhu life. His guff was some of the finest I've ever heard. Bernard runs him pretty close for unintelligible intelligibility.
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I take it the weed helped his lucidity?
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