Meanwhile in the eurozone
Elections are exciting sometimes - time-consuming, always. We've spent so much of this week on the campaign and the manifestos, the danger is that other stories fall between the cracks.
A total shutdown of UK airspace was hard to miss, even though it had to play second fiddle yesterday to the prime ministerial debate. But a few other things have happened as well.
On Monday, you'll remember, we had more clarity on the support that might be offered to the Greeks - a third injection of clarity, you might say, adding some details to the statements that had been made in February and March.
As I suspected on Monday, the deal gave the Greeks some relief on the markets - but not much. Their debt auction on Tuesday was oversubscribed. But the price was shocking: more than 4.5% for six months' cash, 350 basis points over short-term policy rates.
With the usual clouds of official vagueness and uncertainty hanging over the deal - and some question marks about how, exactly, the eurozone loans would be approved - Greek bond yields ballooned out again, to higher than they were before the new and improved rescue package was announced.
So, the Greek prime minister was forced to go to the IMF for real yesterday. Well, he sort of went to the IMF. True to the tradition - in this saga - of informal half-moves, signals and suggestions, the Greeks have only asked for "consultations" over the possible terms of a loan.
The IMF's chief spokesperson, Caroline Atkinson, said in her briefing yesterday that the talks could "mutate" into something more formal. For now, they are talking about a deal. And the markets remain unimpressed: Greek debt has been punished again today.
The latest edition of the Economist, out today, has an excellent briefing on the Greek crisis. I recommend that anyone interested read it in full. But to give you the headlines, they have some useful guesstimates on the scale of the funding problem for Greece, and the vulnerability of European banks to a restructuring of Greek debt, let alone an outright default.
They reckon that Greece could need official help to cover 67bn euros in new debt by 2014 - more than twice the 30bn euros so far on offer. And that's on, if anything, optimistic assumptions.
Many leading institutions are staying well clear: they think today's yields don't provide enough compensation for the risk of default.
I still think a restructuring of Greek debt is more likely than not over the next few years. But the article shows just how painful that would be for other eurozone countries; more specifically, its banks.
Using the back of a fairly sophisticated envelope, the Economist reckons that eurozone banks hold nearly 60% of foreign holdings of Greek government bonds, worth maybe 70bn euros. French and German banks are especially exposed. They think UK banks hold less than 5% of it, an exposure of around 6-11bn euros,
So, in a sense, France, Germany and the rest are bailing out Greece, so they won't have to bail out their own banks at an even greater cost.
But this may not be what many economists would call a sustainable equilibrium. Especially when the ECB has just told eurozone banks they can continue to put up Greek and other low-rated sovereign debt as collateral on cheap loans. The maths on a 30bn euros loan looks much worse if it doesn't, in fact, prevent a restructuring down the road - and France and Germany end up having to bail out their banks as well.
Will the eurozone ministers meeting today (or the full Eco-Fin meeting this weekend) produce a more lasting solution? I seriously doubt it.
At bottom, the Germans have always wished they could let Greece solve its own debt problems, even if that meant some form of 'haircut' for investors, or outright default. That was what the "no bail-out" provision for the eurozone was supposed to mean.
The exposure of German banks makes this less thinkable, for now, especially with other parts of the eurozone so weak. But key German officials do not want to rule it out.
Why? Well of course they think that countries should pay for their mistakes. But the larger reason is that, once you say there is a fiscal safety net in the eurozone - you're walking yourself in the direction of fiscal union. At some level, every government of the eurozone would be on the hook for everyone else's debts.
Famously, that's where the French always wanted a single currency to lead. Equally famously, Germany did not. And we wonder why the Greek situation takes so long to resolve.
In the meantime, investors' thoughts turn, naturally, to the question of who will be next. For a while I've been talking up Portugal as the country most likely to come under serious pressure. That's partly because I know that the European Commission and the ECB think so as well.
This week Simon Johnson and Peter Boone - two seasoned watchers of financial crises - also pointed the finger at Portugal.
Watch the election, by all means, but keep your eye out for troubles in Lisbon as well.