Can non-execs cure banks' madness and badness?
Sir David Walker, a former regulator and someone who in the past would have been described as a City grandee, will today publish his prescription for how the so-called governance of banks can be improved.
Governance is the sententious word for the structures and rules for institutions that are supposed to prevent them doing the wrong thing.
And since banks all over the world in the years before the credit crunch did the wrong thing on a scale that was without any precedent, there must surely have been a collective failure of governance.
Or to put it another way, the owners and non-executive directors of banks from UBS in Switzerland to Merrill Lynch and Lehman in the US to Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS in the UK were useless at preventing those banks borrowing and lending in a reckless and dangerous manner.
So presumably that means the owners and non-executives were either under-qualified nitwits, cowards or unhealthily close to greedy manic chief executives.
Which would mean - surely - that new codes of conduct for shareholders and initiatives to improve the quality of those who sit on bank boards would make a world of difference.
That may be so.
But it's worth reminding ourselves what actually happened at Royal Bank of Scotland, for example, before we conclude that accidents can always be prevented if only the right people are in the right jobs.
Because the non-executives at Royal Bank were an impressive bunch - on paper.
They included three former bankers, an erstwhile treasury official whose responsibilities included financial regulation, the one time boss of an insurance giant, and the titular head of Goldman Sachs in Europe.
At the time, these were not individuals who would have been described as either ignorant of finance, shrinking violets or nincompoops.
Some have alleged that the non executives were terrified of the steely chief executive of the time, Sir Fred Goodwin.
This, I have to say, is less than compelling. I know some of these non-execs. And I can tell you that they are materially tougher and less pliable than old boots.
Then there's the question of whether they knew as much as they should have done about what was going on.
That is is a moot point. Some non-execs say they didn't know all the relevant details about RBS's holdings of lower quality housing loans in the US.
But it wasn't non-executive ignorance of those risks - or perhaps of any risk - that led to its collapse into the arms of the state.
What really did for RBS was its record-breaking takeover of the rump of the Dutch bank ABN Amro in the autumn of 2007.
This was the wrong deal, at the wrong price and at the wrong time.
The non-executives were not ignorant of the risks RBS was running in buying ABN. However they thought these risks, which turned out to be suicidal, were worth taking.
All of which simply says that even smart, well-qualified people can be gripped by irrational exuberance - and that therefore we shouldn't get carried away with the idea that governance can be a perfect protection again catastrophe.