Editorial Standards Findings: Appeals to the Trust and other editorial standards matters considered by the Editorial Standards Committee Remit of the Editorial Standards Committee The Editorial Standards Committee (ESC) is responsible for assisting the Trust in securing editorial standards. It has a number of responsibilities, set out in its Terms of Reference at bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/meetings_and_minutes/bbc_trust_committees.html. The Committee comprises five Trustees: Richard Tait (Chairman), Chitra Bharucha, Mehmuda Mian Pritchard, David Liddiment and Diane Coyle. It is advised and supported by the Trust Unit. In line with the ESC’s responsibility for monitoring the effectiveness of handling editorial complaints by BBC management, the Committee considers appeals against the decisions and actions of the BBC’s Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU) or of a BBC Director with responsibility for the BBC’s output (if the editorial complaint falls outside the remit of the ECU). The Committee will consider appeals concerning complaints which allege that: • the complainant has suffered unfair treatment either in a transmitted programme or item, or in the process of making the programme or item • the complainant’s privacy has been unjustifiably infringed, either in a transmitted programme or item, or in the process of making the programme or item • there has otherwise been a failure to observe required editorial standards The Committee will aim to reach a final decision on an appeal within 16 weeks of receiving the request. The findings for all appeals are reported in this bulletin, Editorial Complaints: Appeals to the Trust. In line with its duty to consider topics of editorial concern to the Committee, whether or not such concern arises from a formal complaint, and to commission information requests from the Trust Unit or Executive to support such consideration, the Committee also from time to time requests the Executive to report to the Committee regarding breaches which have been accepted by the Executive and are therefore not subject to appeal to the Committee. This bulletin also contains findings relating to such cases. This bulletin also includes a statement on any remedial action taken and is published at bbc.co.uk/bbctrust or is available from: The Secretary, Editorial Standards Committee BBC Trust Unit Room 211, 35 Marylebone High Street London W1U 4AA Contents Page Summary of findings (4 September 2007) 3 Findings (4 September 2007) The Money Programme: The Men Who Wiped Out Billions, BBC Two, 16 October 2002 11 Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares, BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint A 32 Complaint B 47 Complaint C 62 From Our Own Correspondent, Radio 4, 20 January 2007 and bbc.co.uk, BBC News 73 bbc.co.uk, BBC News, Clitheroe Mosque Application pages, 6 April 2005, 29 November 2006, 21 and 22 December 2006 85 Today, Radio 4, 24 January 2007 91 Other editorial standards matters Newsnight: Act of Disunion, BBC Two, 16 January 2007 and Newsnight, BBC Two, 26 June 2007 94 Live Earth, BBC One and BBC Two, 7/8 July 2007 98 Summary of findings (4 September 2007) The Money Programme: The Men Who Wiped Out Billions BBC Two, 16 October 2002 This complaint is in the most part a first-party complaint made by one of the three individuals named by the programme. The complainant had been one of the designers of the new version of Split Capital Trusts (new zeros) that had failed in the stock market, causing a significant number of smaller investors to lose substantial amounts of money on a product that had been sold to them as being low-risk. The complainant, in a wide-ranging complaint, believed the programme had implied that he and the other two individuals and two firms named had been responsible for the loss of billions of pounds when the Split Capital Trusts (SCTs) failed. In particular he considered that “implication and innuendo” played a big part in the presentation of the arguments by the programme and that, as a result, he had suffered grievous reputational damage. The Committee concluded: • The programme had been fair and accurate in its approach to the subject matter and the individuals and firms named. • The choice of contributors had been appropriate in that they had the relevant experience and knowledge to accurately convey the structure and complexity of the investment’s design. • The use of language had been fair and objective, avoiding unnecessary exaggeration. • The programme had made every effort to offer the individuals and firms named a right of reply and was satisfied that the lack of response from those contacted, while not ideal, should not have acted as a veto to the broadcasting of the investigation, which the Committee believed was editorially justified. • Since the programme’s transmission, concerns had been proven to be justified following the collapse of the SCTs with the loss of billions of pounds for thousands of investors and firms in the City. • While it noted the complainant’s suggestion of deliberate vilification, innuendo, conspiracy and improper collusion, no evidence had been provided to substantiate his complaint. • While the complaint had taken a very long time to reach the ESC, there were clear mitigating circumstances for the delay and as such no further action was required. The complaint was not upheld. For the finding in full see pages 11–31. Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint A This was the first of three appeals heard by the Committee regarding this particular Horizon programme. The complainant in this complaint believed the programme had been biased in favour of a theory that low levels of radiation exposure is probably harmless. (The programme also briefly touched on the argument that exposure to low levels of radiation may even be beneficial.1) The complainant was also concerned that the programme had used evidence that was either not statistically robust to support the promotion of this theory or contributors who were, in his view, not credible. In particular he questioned the contribution of one scientist who had withdrawn a paper on the contamination of animals in the Chernobyl area. The complainant also believed the programme had been manipulated by those who wished to promote nuclear energy. The Committee concluded: • It was not within its remit to determine which of the scientific theories outlined in the programme was correct. Its task was to determine whether the programme had been in breach of the guidelines on accuracy, impartiality, editorial integrity and independence. • It acknowledged that the programme was a powerful presentation of a theory (which to the audience would have been new) about how the effects on health at low-level exposure to radiation should be considered. • The programme had satisfactorily set out the historical background of the Linear No Threshold Theory (LNT) and how it was currently used to set safety standards for workers in the nuclear industry. • It was reasonable for the programme to investigate the variance between an established theory used to define safety levels for workers working in or around radioactive materials (LNT) against the observed outcomes recorded in a published internationally respected report (the Chernobyl Forum report). • Dr Chesser’s presentation of his report had accurately reflected the results of his revised, peer-reviewed report. • The programme had satisfactorily checked the credentials and suitability of the contributors to the programme. • The subject matter was controversial and therefore required careful consideration to ensure that there were appropriate checks and balances as to what was discussed. • The general audience would consider the suggestion that there are harmless, even beneficial, levels of radiation to be counter-intuitive and controversial. It was therefore important for the programme to ensure that it provided a fair representation of opposing views. • The programme had failed, when explaining the view of some scientists that there may be a threshold to the LNT curve, to make reference to the lively debate within the 1 Historically, scientists and governments have used the Linear No Threshold (LNT) model, which works on the premise that there is no lower threshold at which radiation exposure is harmless. scientific community, which disputed the evidence – arguments that supported the LNT hypothesis or arguments that there was no safe level of contamination. • There was no evidence that the programme had been politically or commercially motivated. • The programme was originally commissioned for broadcast in April 2006, to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. The published broadcast date was issued before the date of the Government’s statement2 that nuclear power would have a role in future energy provision was in the public domain. 2 HM Government: The Energy Challenge, www.berr.gov.uk/files/file31890.pdf The complaint was upheld in part with regard to due impartiality. For the finding in full see pages 32–46. Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint B The second complaint considered the programme to be “flat out pro-nuclear propaganda”. The complainant also felt the programme failed to include a strand of opinion on “alternative dose response curves” that reflected a supra-linear curve on the Linear No Threshold (LNT) graph – a view which suggested the possibility of serious health effects on people at low exposure to radiation. The complainant also believed that the programme’s assertion that the Chernobyl Forum report “can be fairly said to represent the scientific consensus on the actual effects of the accident so far” was not sustainable. The Committee concluded: • It was not within its remit to determine which of the scientific theories outlined in the programme was correct. Its task was to determine whether the programme had been in breach of the guidelines on accuracy, impartiality, editorial integrity and independence. • The programme’s focus was on the measurement of radiation, particularly at low levels of exposure, not nuclear power. • The programme was not required to explain all arguments on the issue of health risks at low levels of exposure. • The programme had satisfactorily set out the historical background to the Linear No Threshold theory (LNT) and how it was currently used to set safety standards for workers in the nuclear industry. • It was reasonable for the programme to investigate the variance between an established theory used to define safety levels for workers working in or around radioactive materials (LNT) against a published and an officially recognised and internationally respected report (the Chernobyl Forum report). 3 The Other Report On Chernobyl (TORCH), 2006, Ian Fairlie & David Sumner (http://cricket.biol.sc.edu/chernobyl/papers/TORCH.pdf), launched at Chernobyl Forum, Vienna, September 2005 • Arguments as to the measurement of leukaemia, thyroid cancer and solid cancers had been based on the most comprehensive collection of peer-reviewed studies, the Chernobyl Forum report. • The programme had satisfactorily checked the credentials and suitability of the contributors to the programme. • The subject matter was controversial and therefore required careful consideration to ensure that there were appropriate checks and balances as to what was discussed. • A general audience would consider the suggestion of harmless, even beneficial, levels of radiation to be counter-intuitive. It was therefore important for the programme to ensure that it did not misrepresent opposing views. • The programme had failed, when explaining the view of some scientists that there may be a threshold to the LNT curve, to make reference to the lively debate within the scientific community, which disputed the evidence – arguments that supported the LNT hypothesis or arguments that there was no safe level of contamination. • There was no evidence that the programme had been politically or commercially motivated. • The programme was originally commissioned for broadcast in April 2006, to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. The published broadcast date was issued before the date of the Government’s statement that nuclear power would have a role in future energy provision was in the public domain. The complaint was upheld in part with regard to due impartiality. For the finding in full see pages 47–61. Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint C This appeal was a reconsideration of an earlier finding by the Committee. Following the initial finding in April 2007 the Committee received a request that the finding be reconsidered for the following reasons: • It contained factual inaccuracies in that the Chernobyl Forum report was not peer-reviewed (the initial finding referred to it as being peer-reviewed). • The process of reaching the finding was procedurally unfair in that the finding referred to the TORCH (The Other Report on Chernobyl)3 report, which the programme team was not given an opportunity to comment upon. The Committee felt that, in order to be fair to all parties to the complaint, it was appropriate for it to look again at the complaint and to review its finding in light of the points raised. The complaint and reviewed finding are set out below. The programme set out to consider what was, to the public, new evidence that suggested that fears about radiation could be unfounded. Its investigation looked at the evidence of the effects on people and animals in the area around Chernobyl following the accident there in April 1986, as well as considering information on the possible positive effects of low-level radiation. The complaint questioned the evidence raised in the programme concerning the Chernobyl accident and whether the programme fairly reflected all the facts and concerns regarding the after-effects of the fallout in the region, particularly in Belarus. The Committee concluded: • It was satisfied that the programme had not misled the audience as to the extent of contamination within the region by use of the Chernobyl Forum report (commissioned by the International Atomic Energy Authority) on the accident. • It acknowledged that the findings were disputed in a report commissioned by the Green bloc in the European Parliament and produced by TORCH. However, it considered that the TORCH report had not substantially disproved the findings of the Forum’s report, which had been recognised as a significant and reputable report on the effects of radioactive contamination in the region. It was satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on accuracy regarding the Chernobyl accident. • Regarding due impartiality, it acknowledged that the BBC sought to provide a wide range of subject matter and in terms of science that included examining scientific thinking that was new and/or controversial in the eyes of the public and/or to the scientific community. • In this context an analysis of the report on the Chernobyl accident and the investigation into low-level radiation required a range and conflict of views to be represented within the programme. • It noted that these views had not been sufficiently represented on both matters and as such believed the programme had been in breach of programme standards regarding due impartiality. • As to the programme being unduly influenced by the nuclear industry to present a positive image, it noted that there was no evidence of this and rejected this element of the complaint. • The programme was originally commissioned for broadcast in April 2006, to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. The published broadcast date was issued before the date of the Government’s statement that nuclear power would have a role in future energy provision was in the public domain. The Committee upheld the complaint concerning due impartiality For the finding in full see pages 62–72. From Our Own Correspondent Radio 4, 20 January 2007 and bbc.co.uk, BBC News i) Profile of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran: ‘The enigma of Prabhakaran’ ii) ‘Bomb targets Tamil Tigers’ critic’, 1 December 2006 The complainant believed that a BBC website profile of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was too prominent and should not have been listed with present and past leaders of Sri Lanka. He also complained that the BBC website had not described him as a terrorist. The complainant was also concerned that another BBC website report on a suicide bomb attack against the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary and brother of the President of Sri Lanka, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, had referred to him as a hardliner who was against holding talks with the LTTE. The complainant also believed that the From Our Own Correspondent (FOOC) programme of 20 January 2007 had been biased in favour of the LTTE and had contained a number of factual inaccuracies, including the suggestion that kidnap was common and that only Tamil businessmen were being kidnapped. In general the complainant was of the opinion that the BBC was distorting the truth when it came to the reporting of the matters of relevance concerning Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). The Committee concluded: • The profile of Vellupillai Prabhajaran had not shown bias and had reflected the BBC’s editorial values on impartiality by being “objective and even handed”. • It had also fulfilled the requirement to provide “comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news ... throughout the world to support fair and informed debate”. • There was a good editorial reason for including the profile. • The positioning of the profile with that of the President of Sri Lanka was in line with the requirement that bias and an imbalance of views should be avoided. • The profile had followed the BBC’s guideline on the use of the word “terrorist” by accurately reporting the facts and leaving it to others to “characterise” those mentioned. • The description of Mr Gotabhaya Rajapaske as a “hardliner” had been well sourced and had been based on information from a BBC correspondent who had first-hand knowledge of Mr Gotabhaya’s views. • The article had also been fair and open-minded when examining the views of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. • The FOOC report by Chris Morris had not suggested that the kidnappings were exclusively of Tamil businessmen. • The source of the story on the kidnappings had been appropriately based in the first instance on first-hand knowledge and latterly supported by an International Crisis Group report. • The FOOC item had been an authored piece which had added to the public understanding of the conflict in Sri Lanka. • The reporter had conducted sufficient research from first-hand sources to support his comment that the kidnappings had involved the Sri Lankan security services. • In general the FOOC report had been fair and open-minded. • There was no evidence in either of the BBC website articles or the piece for FOOC to suggest that the BBC was biased in favour of the LTTE. • All the reports had been objective and open-minded in their approach. The complaint was not upheld. For the finding in full see pages 73–84. bbc.co.uk, BBC News, Clitheroe Mosque Application pages 6 April 2005, 29 November 2006, 21 and 22 December 2006 The Committee was asked by the complainant to consider whether the changes to the various web pages cited in the complaint, made as a result of the complainant contacting the BBC, had been sufficient to ensure that the planning committee’s decisions regarding applications for the approval of a mosque in Clitheroe had been described accurately. The Committee concluded: • It had been right for the ECU to endorse the amendments to the web pages. • The reference to the eight attempts by the Medina Islamic Education Centre (MIEC) to build a mosque in the town of Clitheroe was an accurate reference to the number of applications, not just planning applications, made to the Council by MIEC. • It was acceptable for the article to report that fact without further attribution. • The quote from Mr Arshad had been appropriate given the context of the report and that Mr Arshad was speaking for MIEC, which was at the centre of the story. • The quote did not mislead the reader as the article explained fully that the issue was not related to a planning application but to a purchase of land. • It would have been misleading to have removed the wording “Council Chamber at the Ribble Valley Council” from the article dated 6 April 2005 as it was an accurate statement about where the incident occurred. • No further action was required to add to the changes made previously by BBC Radio Lancashire and the web team in Manchester. • It was not necessary for the web pages to carry notice of when they had been amended as a summary of the complaint finding could be found on the BBC’s complaints pages. The complaint was not upheld. For the finding in full see pages 85–90. Today Radio 4, 24 January 2007 The Committee was asked by the complainant to consider whether the action following the ECU’s partial upholding of his complaint – that James Naughtie had inaccurately stated that the Catholic Church believed that homosexuality was a sin – had been sufficient or whether the programme should be required to make a public correction. The Committee concluded: • It had been right for ECU to uphold the complaint with regard to accuracy. • It considered that the error by the presenter appeared to be a case of a misinformed view rather than a “slip of the tongue”. • Further action, such as an on-air apology, was not required as this would have been disproportionate to what was an unfortunate error in light of the programme as a whole. • There was no evidence to suggest that this mistake was an example of systemic bias against the Catholic Church or the Christian faith as a whole. The Committee endorsed ECU’s finding and was satisfied that the action taken by BBC management was appropriate. As to the complaint of systemic bias against the Catholic and other Christian faiths, the Committee did not uphold the complaint. For the finding in full see pages 91–93. Findings (4 September 2007) The Money Programme: The Men Who Wiped Out Billions BBC Two, 16 October 2002 1 The programme The Money Programme is a well-established business current affairs programme that features film reports on issues concerning the world of business and finance. This particular programme investigated the collapse of SCTs, a form of investment taken out by small investors with moderate savings who wished to put their money into a tax-efficient, low-risk financial product. The introduction to the programme stated: “This is the story of a false promise which is wiping out the savings of tens of thousands of people in an investment they were told was safe. ... At least three billion pounds has already been lost in the split capital trust disaster. As losses go on mounting, angry investors demand redress. ... After a year of scandal on Wall Street, now it’s the City’s turn. As split capital trusts go on crashing, we’ve been investigating the men behind this scandal.” 2 Split Capital Trusts and Zeros – a brief explanation Split Capital Trusts (SCTs) A SCT allows different types of investor to participate, including those: a) wishing an income (buying income shares) b) looking for a steady growth (through what are called zeros) c) accepting more risk in exchange for higher returns on capital (buying capital growth shares) Put simply, it pools the contributions of all types of investors – and in theory allows a greater income for the first type and a greater sum for growth for the third. Zeros Those wishing a steady growth b) invested in zeros (Zero Dividend Preference Shares), a class of share in the split where there is no dividend but which, although not guaranteed, offers a predetermined sum at the end of the investment term. The construction of the original splits made the zeros an attractive proposition for those seeking a low-risk investment – and were marketed as such. In theory this class of investor got “first call” on the assets when the trust reached its term. This is what is referred to as the “classic zero” in the complaint. 4 A first-party complainant is someone who complains about unfair treatment or an infringement of privacy that has directly affected them. The complaint must concern content for which the BBC has editorial responsibility. (This definition is taken from BBC Trust Editorial Standards Committee: Procedures for Handling Complaints.) However, when the later zeros were released – referred to as “new zeros” in the complaint – the funds selling the zeros to investors began to add bank borrowing to boost the overall pot of money, which in turn changed the order of who had “first call” on the assets. Thus the banks in the “new zeros” became first in line through repayment of the loans. 3 The complaint This is a first-party4 complaint by David Thomas, who worked with Brewin Dolphin and Aberdeen Asset Managers, two companies at the centre of the SCT business. The programme described Mr Thomas as “Brewin Dolphin’s top investment trust technician” who “did the design” for Aberdeen’s Preferred (AbPref) Income Trust. The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies). The complainant’s complaints have been grouped under four headings: A Contributors (the experts interviewed by the programme) B Fairness C Pressure and conspiracy D Programme points E The state of the market (what really happened and what the programme should have revealed) A Contributors The complainant had grave doubts as to the choice and reliability of the experts chosen by the programme to support its investigation. His main doubt was their ability to understand the complexity of the subject. B Fairness ii) General comments concerning the programme’s approach The complainant suggested in various responses that the programme named only three people involved in the issue of SCTs, including the complainant, and implied that it was they who wiped out billions. He believed that “implication and innuendo” played a big part in the presentation and that he was “inextricably connected by this innuendo in the audience’s mind”. As a result he stated that he had suffered grievous reputational damage. iii) The type of language used The complainant also noted that the commentary contained “loaded phrases” such as “smart City moneymen”. He also pointed to the terminology “magic circle” as an example of innuendo alongside phrases such as “just greedy”. He also considered the comment in the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU)’s preliminary finding – “I think it is appropriate that the programme regarded the three individuals and two firms as being at the centre of the affair” – as another example of the use of innuendo to implicate him in some wrongdoing. He stated: “I did not wipe out billions, or even facilitate this wiping out. I was not responsible for their investment even if I had created them earlier on ... Being at the centre of an industry is not the same as being at the centre of the affair.” iv) Use of photographs He also complained about the use of pictures of him and Christopher Fishwick, and of the potential breach of privacy of showing pictures of Christopher Fishwick’s house. v) Why the complainant was unable to cooperate with the programme In the complainant’s response to ECU’s preliminary finding he stated: “There are two separate questions here: a) Brewin Dolphin’s (and not my) opinion and policy, and b) The interface between me, in isolation as Corporate Finance and Brewin’s private clients Brewin was professionally advised not to ‘co-operate’ with Mr Robinson [presenter of the programme] ... Brewin were not alone in deciding NOT to help the BBC at all ... I was paid by Brewin and they did not wish for me to talk to Mr Robinson.” As to his contact with investors he pointed out: “I [was] a person with valuable and market sensitive confidential information. I cannot discuss such things openly outside my office. I had no inkling what was going on with Sue Kennedy [a private investor featured on the programme].” C Pressure and conspiracy The complainant believed that the programme was part of an organised conspiracy co-ordinated to attack SCTs prior to a hearing by the Treasury Select Committee. He originally had information that suggested the programme had colluded with The Sunday Times in the production of an article which appeared soon after the programme was broadcast. He was now satisfied that there had been no undue pressure or collusion between the two and thus this had now been resolved. Nevertheless he maintained that there was an orchestrated media campaign to show how badly the split trust world was behaving. Further, he was still not convinced that there was not possible manipulation of the programme to this end. D Programme points i) Hill Osborne The complainant believed that the comments regarding Brewin’s Lincoln office, formerly stockbrokers Hill Osborne, were: “[a] thinly veiled accusation ... that I, at Brewin, used clients in Lincoln to take up vast numbers of newly minted zeros to make Brewin money ... The accusation is unsustainable ... I talked only to the institutional professionals in the business ... not to private clients.” In his response to ECU’s preliminary finding on this point he stated: “The programme saying what Brewin did or thought or imagined is one thing. This cannot be equated with what I did, or should have done, or even should not have done. I was completely different. I was behind increasingly irksome Chinese walls and was not allowed to communicate what I or any particular trust management or Board thought about an emerging situation. There is no way I could have discussed any early misgivings about AbPref such as the discussions on health checks in March 2001 with anyone in Brewin.” ii) Explanation of trusts, risks and borrowing • Geared zeros The complainant pointed out: “The programme appears not to question any statement of opinion ... because it accepts ... so called experts’ views that geared zeros were new and that they were different ... They were not ‘new’. The first split trust to use a loan above a tiered structure was Triplevest in 1968. A little later many others did so too. The programme uses the words ‘changed nature’ ... but it deliberately misdirects the viewer. In the 1980s and early 1990s interest rates on loans were very high, which indirectly encouraged the invention of zeros. As a result bank loans were not used much by any trusts ... When bank loan interest rates fell to levels ... lower than the (compound) ‘gobble’ rates of existing zeros, bank loans again became a tangible and valid alternative ... At inception, geared and ungeared zeros had almost identical risk signatures. These products were indistinguishable ... No bank loan to a trust had ever broken its covenants at the time ... the bankers were perfectly happy with the numbers used. The fact is that the market conditions subsequently changed more than anyone ever thought ... which allowed the differences between geared and ungeared zeros to appear very great by mid-2002.” • Design The complainant stated: “Deep down I was an analyst, a designer and a doer. The programme starts by saying ... that this industry made false promises about safety and about identifying risk. They claim that splits ‘started’ to invest in each others’ shares in the late 1990s and 2000. They blandly suggest that risks were not revealed to the public accurately ... none of these claims are true statements.” “...they failed to realise ... that AbPref ... was designed from the outset in the 1980s as a fund of funds; an investment trust which would invest in other investment trust shares ... As for stating that the risks were not described accurately ... I would draw your attention to the front page of AbPref’s ... first prospectus which says ... that under certain circumstances ‘all money invested in either its zeros or its ordinary shares could be lost completely’.” And: “The truth is that the drafting of pages devoted to Risk Factors was the subject of intense and careful discussion. Every professional ... be he lawyer, broker, accountant, or manager eventually contributed to a Prospectus which was fully approved (i.e. signed off) by the Listing Authority which is part of the FSA. 5 Cazenove & Co, a reputable stockbrokers, produced a critical paper in July 2001 about the dangers of ‘barbell’ trusts: namely, closed-end funds with bank debt representing at least 35% of total assets and having no more than 65% of assets at inception invested in a “growth” asset class. (‘The split capital investment trust crisis’, edited by Andrew Adams, published by Wiley). The programme left the viewer in little doubt that the designers of split trusts appeared not to know what they were doing. Call that innuendo ... it was a way of making a quite easily understood accusation which could actually NEVER stand up: because each design had already BEEN APPROVED.” • Magic circle The complainant made various complaints regarding the use of the term “magic circle”, including the allegation that this term was used without regard for the people it might involve. • Mis-selling The complainant alleged that the programme suggested that he was involved in mis-selling. He commented: “The Programme suggests that the promoters of zeros sometimes overstepped the mark ... No one can deny that zero prices in some thirty cases fell dramatically and unexpectedly thus destroying the theory that they were ‘safe’ investments ... It is a fact that history is being ... re-written, and the one tag that remains valid ... is that some promotional techniques were very close to mis-selling. I was never involved in advertising and promotion.” E The state of the market (what really happened and what the programme should have revealed) The complainant suggested that the programme failed to mention several factors that undercut the price of split capital trusts: • The sharp fall in the stock market as whole, notably after 9/11. • The “alarmist paper” published by Cazenove5 entitled ‘Barbells Unbalanced’ in July 2001. • A series of articles in the Financial Times between August 2001 and September 2002 which encouraged readers to “sell split trust shares, ords and zeros”, which the complainant suggested was the single biggest factor to affect price (111 articles saying the same thing in just over a year, 30 at least by journalist Kate Burgess). 4 BBC response At stage 1, the editor of The Money Programme stated: “The Statement released jointly by the FSA and yourself on 24 December 2004 said that the FSA has ‘confirmed that it has not made a finding of regulatory breach’ against you. That is very different from confirming that the FSA has positively found that there was no regulatory breach.” “...the BBC investigated the issues impartially and reported – fairly – what it found.” “We conducted our research carefully and put the issues to you on the telephone and in writing before the broadcast, and offered you the chance to comment on them in interview.” “I believe our programme was fair, responsible and very much in the public interest.” The complainant escalated his complaint to ECU in November 2005, at which point further clarification was requested as to why there was such a significant delay between when the programme was broadcast in 2002 and his request to ECU to consider his complaint three years later. (See Complaints handling, section 5.) Following a successful appeal to the Governors’ Programme Complaints Committee (now the Editorial Standards Committee) to have the complaint considered by ECU in January 2006, ratified in March 2006, ECU investigated the complaint, providing a preliminary finding in August 2006. ECU’s final decision, having allowed for the complainant to respond to its preliminary finding, was made in January 2007. ECU did not uphold the complaint, on the following grounds. Experts ECU was satisfied with the choice of experts and the explanations from the production team as to the reasons why they had been included in the programme. Fairness ECU felt that the programme had devoted considerable effort to obtaining interviews and comment from the people named in the programme as well as from Brewin Dolphin. It also noted that, while the programme should make every effort to put “its criticisms to the criticised”, a refusal to respond should not act as a veto. Pressure and conspiracy ECU reassured the complainant that, although it was not within its remit to investigate suggestions of conspiracy or “improper” pressure, the programme makers had not come under pressure and they had not passed a “file” to The Sunday Times. Explanation of trusts, risks and borrowing ECU was satisfied that, given the complexity of the subject and the need to provide sufficient simplification of the problem for a lay audience, the programme had exercised legitimate editorial judgement. It was also satisfied that the programme had not inaccurately characterised AbPref by arguing that it had reasonably suggested that AbPref’s problem arose from its shareholdings being unduly concentrated in income shares of other trusts. State of the market ECU was satisfied that it was not essential to point out specific reasons for the downturn in the market in 2001, i.e. 9/11 and the publication of ‘Barbells Unbalanced’ from Cazenove. It was also satisfied with the programme’s view that Kate Burgess’s articles in the Financial Times had not been a contributory factor in the collapse in investor value in the view of anyone other than the complainant. Chris Fishwick’s house It noted that the picture had been sourced from an external supplier and had been used previously in a newspaper and as such was already in the public domain. Three individuals and two firms ECU felt there was sufficient information to support the programme’s concentration on the two firms and three people named. It felt that there was sufficient material to suggest that those individuals and firms were leaders in the split capital investment world. It also noted that the programme had taken sufficient care to ensure that viewers in general were aware that there were more people and firms involved than just this small group and that the whole affair was not just the responsibility of those that were named. Hill Osborne, Brewin Dolphin and Lincoln ECU noted that the programme had accurately referred to Hill Osborne as a subsidiary of Brewin Dolphin when referring to the particular documentation referred to in the programme regarding Sue Kennedy. However, following the complainant’s comments on its preliminary finding, ECU accepted that it had misunderstood the role of the complainant regarding the sharing of information between AbPref and Brewin Dolphin, and recognised that to have done so would have broken the law on insider trading and rules of confidentiality. It did note, however, that the error was purely ECU’s and not the programme’s. The programme makers had been unaware at the time of broadcast of a paper written by the complainant in 2001 called ‘Health Checks’, in which he set out a systematic set of checks “aimed at highlighting early any causes for alarm”. Innuendo and language ECU was satisfied that the use of language such as the phrase “smart City moneymen” had a sense of irony related to the situation, where shares sold as relatively safe investments lost 80% of their value. It also felt that the use of the term “magic circle” had been consistent with how it had been used in an AbPref memo and in newspaper articles predating the programme. It concluded that the term had been used in exactly the same sense as that of other commentators and industry insiders, and that it had certainly not originated with the BBC. 5 Complaints handling The complainant, throughout the lengthy process of his complaint, consistently suggested that a decision could have been expedited by direct escalation to the Chairman of the Board of Governors or at least to the Chairman of the Governors’ Programme Complaints Committee (GPCC). He wrote on numerous occasions in the hope that the Chairman of the Board of Governors or GPCC would intervene to speed up the process. The complaint was not received by the BBC until May 2005 (the programme was originally broadcast in October 2002) and took until April 2007 to be considered by the BBC Trust and ESC, which have superseded the Board of Governors and its subcommittee, the GPCC. 6 Applicable programme standards The programme was broadcast in October 2002 and as such was considered against the appropriate guidelines operating at the time. BBC Producers’ Guidelines (active until July 2005) Part One: Impartiality 1 General Due impartiality lies at the heart of the BBC. It is a core value and no area of programming is exempt from it. All BBC programmes and services should show open-mindedness, fairness and a respect for truth. The BBC is committed to providing programmes of great diversity which reflect the full range of audiences’ interests, beliefs and perspectives. Representing the whole spectrum is a requirement on all programme genres from arts to news & current affairs, from sport to drama, from comedy to documentaries, from entertainment to education and religion. No significant strand of thought should go unreflected or under represented on the BBC. In order to achieve that range, the BBC is free to make programmes about any subject it chooses, and to make programmes which explore, or are presented from, a particular point of view. The BBC applies due impartiality to all its broadcasting and services, both to domestic and international audiences. In achieving due impartiality the term “due” is to be interpreted as meaning adequate or appropriate to the nature of the subject and the type of programme. There are generally more than two sides to any issue and impartiality in factual programmes may not be achieved simply by mathematical balance in which each view is complemented by an equal and opposing one. The Agreement accompanying the BBC’s Charter specifies that the Corporation should treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality both in news programmes and other programmes that deal with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It states that due impartiality does not require absolute neutrality on every issue or detachment from fundamental democratic principles. The BBC is explicitly forbidden from broadcasting its own opinions on current affairs or matters of public policy, except broadcasting issues. 2 Factual Programmes 2.1 Due impartiality within a programme A factual programme dealing with controversial public policy or matters of political or industrial controversy will meet its commitment to due impartiality if it is fair, accurate and maintains a proper respect for truth. A programme may choose to explore any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate, as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. It may choose to test or report one side of a particular argument. However, it must do so with fairness and integrity. It should ensure that opposing views are not misrepresented. 2.7 Right of reply Where a programme reveals evidence of iniquity or incompetence, or where a strong, damaging critique of an individual or institution is laid out, there is a presumption that those criticised be given a fair opportunity to respond. There may be occasions when this is inappropriate (usually for legal or overriding ethical reasons) in which case the Head of Department should be consulted. It may then be appropriate to consider whether an alternative opportunity should be offered for reply at a subsequent date. Part Two: Accuracy 1 General The BBC must be accurate. Research for all programmes must be thorough. We must be prepared to check, cross-check and seek advice, to ensure this. Wherever possible we should gather information first-hand by being there ourselves or, where that is not possible, by talking to those who were. 2 Achieving Accuracy Accuracy can be difficult to achieve. It is important to distinguish between first and second- hand sources. An error in one report is often recycled in another. Material already broadcast and newspaper cuttings can get out-of-date quickly or simply be wrong. Programmes should be reluctant to rely on a single source. Simple matters like dates and titles may well need to be checked and checked again. It is helpful if clear, contemporaneous notes are made of significant conversations and other details. Accuracy is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth of what is reported or described. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. If an item is legally contentious, its accuracy must be capable of withstanding scrutiny in a court of law. 4 Accurate Language It is not sufficient that we get our facts right. We must use language fairly. That means avoiding exaggeration. We must not use language inadvertently so as to suggest value judgements, commitment or lack of objectivity. Chapter 3 – Fairness and Straight Dealing 3 Research Research for all programmes must be thorough and accurate. Facts must be checked and crosschecked. Particularly when dealing with members of the public, contributors’ credentials may need to be checked and corroborated several times. Documentary evidence may be needed to validate both stories and contributors identities. It will usually be appropriate to seek corroboration from sources other than those suggested by the contributor. 5 Refusals to take part The refusal of an organisation or an individual to take part in a programme should not be allowed to act as a veto. Anyone has a right to refuse, but when the audience might otherwise wonder why a contributor or organisation is missing the reasons for their absence should be explained. This should be done in terms that are fair to the absentee. The programme editor should consider whether it is possible to give a good idea of the views of the missing contributor based on what is already known. It is rarely acceptable to exclude the missing view altogether. Chapter 4 – Privacy 1 Basic Principles The BBC should respect the privacy of individuals, recognising that any intrusions have to be justified by serving a greater good. The right to privacy is qualified by: • The Public Interest People are less entitled to privacy when protection of privacy means concealing matters which are against the public interest. • Behaviour People are less entitled to privacy where their behaviour is criminal or seriously anti social. • Location The right to privacy is clearly much greater in a place such as a private home than it is in public places Private behaviour, correspondence and conversation should not be brought into the public domain unless there is a clear public interest. It is essential that we operate within a framework which respects people’s right to privacy, treats them fairly, yet allows us to investigate and establish matters which it is in the public interest to know about. Chapter 24 – Commercial Relationships and Appropriate Programme Funding 1 General Audiences must be able to trust the integrity of BBC programmes. They should be confident that decisions are made only for good editorial reasons, not as a result of improper pressure, be it political, commercial or special interest. They should never have reason to suspect that the BBC’s integrity has been compromised by any financial pressure or commercial inducement from any outside organisation or interest group. 7 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant BBC values and standards set out in the Producers’ Guidelines, current at the time of broadcast. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint, who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. In coming to its decision the Committee considered the individual areas of the complaint, which are summarised in section 4 of the finding, before commenting on the programme as a whole. A Contributors The Committee acknowledged that programme makers have the right to include a wide variety of interviewees within programmes. That right is tempered by the need to ensure that what they say is capable of substantiation by the programme makers or, if not, that any concerns about the accuracy of the interviewees’ comments are appropriately signalled to the audience so that they are aware of what has sounded biased and what is open to interpretation. Further, if comments are made which amount to a critique of a person or organisation, that person or organisation should be given the opportunity to respond – which may be by way of an interview or by some other technique, for example the inclusion of their position in commentary. The Committee did not accept the complainant’s comments regarding the choice of contributors. It found that in the case of each of the three named individuals – Richard Moon, Robert Champney and David Hanratty – the complainant had failed to substantiate his claim that they lacked credibility and knowledge of the issues surrounding SCTs. Importantly, the Committee noted that the contributors’ comments had accurately described what had actually happened to SCTs in the market and that their views had shown understanding of the nature and reason for the failure of these forms of investment. With regard to Richard Moon, the Committee considered the complainant’s criticism of him to be unjustified. It was satisfied that Mr Moon’s credentials as an established independent fund manager were appropriate for him to provide a professional opinion on an issue that had affected his clients. In this regard the Committee noted a remark Mr Moon had made in February 2002, quoted in Andrew Adams’ book The Split Capital Investment Trust Crisis (a book supplied by the complainant), in which he provided a prescient quote on the eventual outcome of SCTs well ahead of their eventual failure and months before the programme was made. At a conference in 2002 he stated: “This is not just a little market hiccup. We are in the early stages of an unfolding crisis of major and dynamic proportions ... It’s going to affect thousands, probably tens of thousands of people and cost billions of pounds.” The Committee likewise dismissed the complainant’s objections to Robert Champney. It noted that the complainant had believed that Mr Champney was “not very knowledgeable”, but considered this description at odds with his background and experience at the time of the making of the programme. Mr Champney’s contribution to the programme had been based on the analysis he had done for stockbrokers Merrill Lynch of the risks attaching to the newer SCTs linked to bank debt, an analysis the complainant disputed he had the ability to carry out. The Committee noted Mr Champney’s comments in The Money Programme regarding the risk status of the SCTs: CHAMPNEY: The analysis was quite revealing. It showed that a lot of zeros are on the market that people perceived to be low-risk are actually far riskier than, than anybody could have imagined really. In our analysis the market had to rise between three, four, five, six, seven hundred per cent in certain cases for very specific zeros before the zero paid off. Mr Champney had written a report which challenged Brewin Dolphin’s advice to clients (the advice was described as a report in the programme) that the zeros they had designed were low-risk. The Committee noted Mr Champney’s remarks in the programme regarding the complainant’s reaction to Mr Champney’s report: CHAMPNEY: Well he phoned me up and wanted to put me right on, on the report, which I found quite, quite amusing at the, at the time because he, he, he basically said that, that I had made some errors and that he had seen, he had seen people try to, to do this kind of analysis before and they had always made a fundamental error and he was going to put me right. And he sent over some analysis that he had done and then we never heard from him again. CHAMPNEY: The report that I received and the analysis that it used was fundamentally flawed and the statistics and analysis that the industry had used as a whole was fundamentally flawed. ESC then compared these comments from the programme with the replies provided by the complainant to the Treasury Select Committee with regard to the risk and design of the SCTs and the implications when covering zeros with bank loans of the price at which the bank could call the money in. The Committee noted two responses by the complainant in the Treasury Select Committee session: THOMAS (complainant): ...I do not think the level of gearing was unsafe. What has happened is that people have pointed after the event, when the markets have fallen and when assets were no longer covering these things, to the fact that the zero which is geared by a bank loan is now is very dangerous thing. ANDREW TYRIE MP (TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE): Your last remark was that a zero covered by a bank loan is “now a very dangerous thing”. THOMAS: Any level of gearing like 90 % on a stub-equity is dangerous. And: TYRIE: So how did this gearing come about? Where did this borrowing come from? Did it seep in by accident? What happened, was it not, was that you realised you could borrow more cheaply from a bank than you could by traditional methods. Then you used to be able to borrow at 8 or 9% and now you found yourself able to borrow at 6 but you did not recognise the price that was attached to that change in method of borrowing, the price being that the banks could call the money in. Correct? THOMAS: I do not think it ever worried any board or any accountant. TYRIE: Was that a yes or no to the question? I am not saying did other people get it wrong: I am saying did you get it wrong? THOMAS: I am saying in common with everybody else round the table in each one of those design sessions, nobody noticed it. TYRIE: Including you? THOMAS: Including me. The Committee was satisfied therefore that the concern Mr Champney expressed in his report following his analysis of Brewin Dolphin’s advice was demonstrated to be justifiable by later events and that his contribution to the programme was of material importance for the viewer in understanding the way SCTs changed from a low-risk to a high-risk investment. As to David Hanratty, the Committee was again satisfied that he had sufficient understanding of the SCT sector as a whole to make appropriate and considered contributions to the issue of how SCTs were marketed to investors. It was satisfied that his views had been consistent with the facts of the case and were representative of the views of other independent financial advisers who had been providing advice on SCTs to investors. With regard to the choice of phrasing used by the contributors, the Committee was satisfied that the extracts used by The Money Programme had been appropriately phrased. It considered the extracts to have been fair and objective, avoiding unnecessary exaggeration. The Committee noted that on the occasion when the tone of the language did raise questions as to the management of the SCTs the language had been tempered. The contributors did not single out any individual or organisation as being to blame for the crisis in SCTs, but referred to general failures within the finance industry. For example: HANRATTY: Everybody in the financial community, whether it’s provider or adviser, to a greater or lesser extent appreciated the problem. It was in the trade press, it was receiving some comments but nobody tells the investor. The people whose money it is, the people who actually need to be told in order that they could make what would be some fairly life-changing decisions haven’t got full possession of all the facts and they continued in blind ignorance of what was going on behind the scenes with their money. The Committee noted in particular the inclusion of the word “probably” in Richard Moon’s comment when he suggested the possibility of a serious breach of the financial services regulations. In conclusion, the Committee was satisfied that the programme had included appropriate contributors to the programme who had provided contributions that had helped explain the design and modelling of the SCTs and raised pertinent questions as to their management and selling. The Committee was satisfied that there was no breach of guidelines on accuracy or fairness with regard to the use of contributors. B Fairness and Accuracy i) General comments concerning the programme and the extent to which the complainant would be understood to be involved The Committee considered the two specific mentions of the complainant in the programme: 6 Definition from the Cambridge Dictionary “Aberdeen’s Preferred Income Trusts was actually designed by Brewin Dolphin here at their London headquarters. The man who did the design is David Thomas – Brewin Dolphin’s top investment trust technician.” And: “David Thomas, Brewin Dolphin’s top investment trust technician, tried to defend himself.” The Committee also noted the programme’s opening remarks which referred to the individuals the programme would be looking at alongside the issue of SCTs: “As Split Capital Trusts go on crashing we’ve been investigating the men behind this scandal, among them the multi-millionaire king of Split Capital Trusts, Chris Fishwick.” The Committee also noted the guideline regarding accuracy of language which states: “It is not sufficient that we get our facts right. We must use language fairly. That means avoiding exaggeration. We must not use language inadvertently so as to suggest value judgements, commitment or lack of objectivity.” The Committee considered that the words “the men behind the scandal” could be taken to include the complainant who, later in the programme, was described as a top trust technician and a designer of a SCT. It considered that the references to the complainant had not implied, as he believed, that he was an “architect to a scam”. The Committee noted that the word “scam” was never used by the programme. The Committee believed that the choice of the word “scandal” had been carefully thought through by the programme team. It was satisfied that the use of a term defined as “public feeling of shock and strong moral disapproval”6 was an appropriate description of the general concern that had been expressed at the failure of this form of investment from bothinside and outside the City. The Committee thought the use of the term “scandal” wreasonably accurate description of the concern the failing investments were causing to investors who had become involved in the SCTs in the belief that the risk to their investment was low. The Committee was satisfied that the description of the complainant as a designer and technician was appropriate. The Committee noted that the complainant had accepted the description of “designer” and “technician” in his letter of 27 March 2006 to the Chairman of the then Governors’ Programmes Complaints Committee (now ESC) where he stated: “I was the stockbroker to a dozen or so of those investment companies because I had invented them and created them along the way...” “...referring to my ‘designing one such trust’, your informant is rather wide of the mark. Each one of the 33 deals shown started with a spark from me...” “...I might be a technician and mathematical by training but ‘top investment trust technician’ is not an accurate or adequate description.” The Committee believed this letter demonstrated that it was acceptable to describe the complainant as a designer and technician. As to the complainant’s dislike for the description “top investment trust technician”, the Committee was satisfied that the complainant’s own description of himself as a “technician” who had designed over 30 trusts was sufficient to enable the programme to suggest his role was as a “top” investment trust technician. The Committee also considered whether references to the complainant and two other individuals amounted to “an attempt to vilify” the complainant and were thus unfair to him. The complainant was named twice within the programme. Naming him within the same programme as the other individuals mentioned was not a breach of the Producers’ Guidelines. He was specifically and accurately linked to the design of AbPref Income Trusts. The Committee was satisfied that the programme, while looking at some of the main players in the SCT business, made it clear that the individuals named, although very involved in the modelling and design of the new bank debt related splits, were not the only ones in the market place. The narrative of the programme states at one point: “They were not alone. A dozen management groups and up to forty trusts got entwined in a complex maze of cross-investment known as the ‘magic circle’.” And contributor Richard Moon remarks: “Everybody was making a lot of money out of the system. The brokers and the intermediaries were making a lot of money out of selling them. The investors, the investment managers were making a lot of money out of managing them. The lawyers were making money. The accountants were making money. Everybody was making money.” The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had widened its focus to incorporate the involvement of other firms in the expansion of SCTs. It felt that the references to other firms involved in the selling of SCTs had been in context and was sufficient to ensure that the guidelines on impartiality which required a programme to be “fair, accurate and maintain a proper respect for the truth” had been complied with by appropriately referring to the extent of the selling of these investments beyond those that were named. It accepted, however, that the main focus on the named individuals and firms was due to their explicit involvement at the centre of the issue concerning SCTs and that in being fair to the subject matter the programme had considered those who had been most involved in the modelling, design and selling of this new form of splits. As to whether the programme team had met the requirements of the guidelines on refusals to take part, the Committee was satisfied the programme had made every effort to offer the individuals and firms named a right of reply and that these offers had been turned down by all parties. The Committee was satisfied that, had their views been given, they would have 7 Financial Times article dated 28 July 1997. Jean Eaglesham wrote “The concern centres on a small ‘magic circle’ of split cap managers who hold stakes in each other’s apparently rival funds. The biggest three split cap managers – Aberdeen, Exeter and BFS investments – are at the centre of the circle. The diagram [in the FT] shows the position for just two of these managers, but the web of cross-holdings stretches across the sector. Each member appears keen to help the others. Indeed for just under half the £40m raised recently by Exeter for its Enhanced Trust came from the other two groups.” 8 The Daily Telegraph, 2000. “The term ‘magic circle’ in this context is a colloquial usage which became common in the press and elsewhere towards the end of the 1990s and simply means split capital trust managers whose trusts holds shares in one another.” been included in the programme, but, as it was, their views, particularly those of the complainant, were unknown (the programme being unaware of the complainant’s ‘Health Checks’ report of March 2001 which aimed to highlight early causes for alarm of certain SCTs). It noted that because of the nature of the programme there was a clear editorial purpose for its broadcast and that the refusal of those named to take part was not sufficient to act as a veto on it. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had met its responsibilities regarding refusals to take part ii) Type of language used The Committee then considered the use of a number of other phrases which the complainant had considered inaccurate or unfair. During the programme the narrative related the case history of Mary, who explained that she was not told and did not understand how the risks had changed in relation to the money she had invested in a SCT. The narrative line said: “Mary did not know it but smart City moneymen had fundamentally changed the nature of her zeros.” With regard to the use of the phrase “smart City moneymen”, the Committee was satisfied that the phrase had not been used unfairly. It considered it a general description of the people in the City making the decision on the modelling of the SCTs. It noted that the term had a number of meanings, including sarcasm. There was no evidence to suggest that the term referred particularly to the complainant. However, even if the term had been taken to be both sarcastic and a particular reference to the complainant, the Committee noted first that he had been offered an interview and had declined (he had explained that his company would not allow him to be interviewed: “Brewin were professionally advised not to co- operate with Mr Robinson ... I was paid by Brewin and they did not wish me to talk to Mr Robinson”); and that the term would have been within the realms of fair comment given the eventual outcome and taking into account the complainant’s own evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, where he had accepted (despite his design role and experience in this area) that he had not realised how risky SCTs had become. With regard to the use of the term “magic circle” to describe the practice of split fund managers investing in the shares of other split funds, the Committee was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence that the term was being used prior to the programme being broadcast. It noted in particular references to it in the Financial Times7 as early as 1997 and in The Daily Telegraph8 in 2000. The Committee was therefore satisfied that it had been used 9 ‘Health Checks’, the report referred to on page 17 appropriately by the programme as nothing more than a term already in widespread use in the City. The Committee was satisfied that the phrase did not suggest or imply any wrongdoing by the complainant and was thus satisfied that its inclusion had not breached guidelines on fairness or accuracy. iii) The use of photographs As to the use of photographs of Mr Thomas and Mr Fishwick, the Committee was satisfied that they had been obtained from appropriate sources and that they were already in the public domain prior to their use in the programme. The Committee therefore did not believe their use had breached guidelines on privacy. Further, the complainant had been given no authority to bring a complaint of infringement of privacy on behalf of Mr Fishwick regarding the use of a picture of himself or his house. C Pressure and conspiracy The Committee found no evidence to suggest that there had been any form of involvement between the programme and any newspaper regarding the reporting of this issue. (Had there been it would not itself have necessarily meant that a guideline had been breached.) The Committee was satisfied that the high risk levels of the SCTs and concerns over their potential to fail had already been reported in City pages before the programme had begun to investigate the issue and that the programme had set out, by itself, to investigate and report this issue. There was no unfairness to the complainant in this regard. D Programme points i) Hill Osborne The Committee considered the relationship between the activities of Hill Osborne, in Lincoln, in selling SCTs to investors, and the complainant as designer of those investments, and whether the links as explained within the programme were inaccurate and amounted to unfairness to the complainant. It noted that the SCTs had been sold as investments at “minimal risk”. The timing of the purchase of these SCTs, in 2001, came after Hill Osborne had been bought up by Brewin Dolphin for whom the complainant worked. The Committee noted the phrasing of the contested narration from the programme: “Brewin Dolphin refused to say why they’d continued to tell investors zeros were low- risk when they clearly weren’t. But at Brewin Dolphin’s head office they really should have known.” The Committee acknowledged that the complainant was not in a position to interact with the individual investor or for that matter with the team in Lincoln, but even taking into account the issue of ‘Chinese walls’ and the constraints on people in the complainant’s position, the Committee was satisfied that there would have been sufficient opportunity for the complainant to have raised concerns about the performance of the SCTs to the board of Brewin Dolphin without breaching City regulations on the transfer of information. The Committee was also clear that the complainant was aware of problems at the time regarding the SCTs as he had written a paper on a recovery plan in the summer of 20019 (which the production team was unaware of at the time of putting the programme together) and as such there was justification for the programme to assert that the head office at Brewin Dolphin should have been aware of the looming problems with SCTs. Even so, the Committee was satisfied that the programme’s comment, by itself, did not suggest that it was the complainant’s responsibility to change Brewin Dolphin’s policy on the selling of SCTs, nor imply that he was personally to blame for Brewin Dolphin’s policy. It recognised that Brewin Dolphin had a responsibility to its investors to be open about the risks attached to their investments and that it was the firm’s discharge of this responsibility that was being questioned. The Committee noted that the programme had raised this issue with both the complainant and Brewin Dolphin to respond to. Unfortunately, neither the complainant nor Brewin Dolphin gave a response (though the Committee was satisfied that, had they done so, their responses would have been represented in the programme). In the circumstances, the fact that they did not respond was not a reason for removing the comment. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the comment had been fair and accurate. ii) Explanation of trusts, risks and borrowing Geared zeros and design of SCTs The Committee considered whether the programme had explained the issue of the modelling of the SCTs with appropriate accuracy and in a way that had not misrepresented the activities of the complainant. It noted their complexity, as stated by Robert Champney in the programme: “It’s by far the most sophisticated financial instrument I’ve ever seen or analysed. There were times when I just didn’t know whether I was coming or going because it was so complicated.” And by the complainant in reply to a question from the Treasury Select Committee: THOMAS: ...I deal only with institutional, professional people who can understand the rather difficult descriptions that I write. JOHN McFALL MP: Does that mean that none of us can understand them? THOMAS: One person around, not you, sir, wrote on Sunday that they could not understand David Thomas. The Committee recognised that the programme had to simplify the design into its core constituents to make it understandable to its audience without diluting or misrepresenting them. The Committee was satisfied the programme had achieved this, reflecting the complexity of the design of SCTs while at the same time providing adequate and informed information as to how they were funded and why they were failing. It noted Robert Champney’s explanation of the differences between the classic zero and the new modelling: “In a classic Split Capital Investment Trust the Zero shareholder would have first call on the assets left in the pot when the fund matures. When you introduce bank debt into the Split Cap, the bank then has first call on the assets in the pot and the Zero shareholder is relegated to second place. And the more bank debt you have the riskier the Zero share becomes in comparison to a classic Zero.” The programme also explained where the problems in the mathematics occurred: NARRATION: It took Bob Champney six months to crack the problem. The result was a revelation. Far from being safe and able to survive stock market falls, for cross- invested zeros to deliver what they promised markets had to go on rising. CHAMPNEY: The analysis was quite revealing. It showed that a lot of zeros are on the market that people perceived to be low-risk are actually far riskier than, than anybody could have imagined really. In our analysis the market had to rise between three, four, five, six, seven hundred per cent in certain cases for very specific zeros before the zero paid off. This explanation matched the view expressed by the complainant to the Treasury Select Committee when he stated in explaining the difference between the classic and new modelled zero: “I would say the cover for the bank borrowing was there in ample quantity. The cover for zeros was there in ample quantity. I do not think the level of gearing was unsafe. What has happened is that people have pointed after the event, when the markets have fallen and when assets were no longer covering these things, to the fact that the zero which is geared by a bank loan is now a very dangerous thing.” Magic circle The Committee further noted that, while the programme commented on the complexities of how the SCTs were funded: “A dozen management groups and up to forty trusts got entwined in a complex maze of cross-investment known as the ‘magic circle’.” And: “Buying one another’s shares made it easy for managers to launch new Trusts and collect new fees for running them. But as cross-investment increased the Trusts became liable to collapse like dominos.” The programme did not suggest that the activities of these firms had been illegal. The Committee also noted that, when making these comments, the programme had not referred to the complainant or implied that he was personally involved in this activity. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had been fair to the complainant and did not misrepresent his activities in its presentation of the design of the SCTs. Mis-selling The Committee noted the comments concerning the selling of the SCTs in the section on Hill Osborne. It was satisfied that the programme had not suggested that it was the complainant’s responsibility to change Brewin Dolphin’s policy on the selling of SCTs nor implied that he was personally to blame for Brewin Dolphin’s policy. It recognised that Brewin Dolphin had a responsibility to its investors to be open about the risks attached to their investments and that it was this responsibility that was being questioned. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not implied that the complainant was responsible for or involved in the mis-selling of the SCTs. 10 Published in Professional Investor by Adams and Angus: ‘For Whom The Barbell Tolls’ E The state of the market With regard to the lack of comment by the programme on the state of the market, particularly after the attacks of 9/11, the Committee was satisfied that it was not necessary for the programme to apportion blame to 9/11 or individuals, for example journalists, for the state of the market and the collapse in SCTs. The precarious nature of the SCTs which relied on a rising market for a return had by mid-2001 already given rise to a number of City reports warning of the dangers of “geared trusts investing in other geared trusts”10. These reports not only included Cazenove’s report on the danger of barbell trusts but also the complainant’s report on a rescue package for some of the SCTs he was involved with. The Committee, while it acknowledged that articles were appearing in financial sections of the newspapers from 2001onwards, did not consider that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that they had been influential in the wider context of the market as a whole. The Committee also noted that, while the 9/11 attacks had had a negative effect on the market, the single most important factor in the collapse of the SCTs was their high level of sensitivity to a falling market because of the level of borrowing they involved. As the programme stated: “Borrowing magnifies profits when times are good. But when times are bad, bank borrowing increases the risk especially for holders of zeros.” In the case of Ronnie Henderson, the programme noted the dramatic fall in stock of the SCTs with regard to other investments: “The stock market was down twenty per cent but Ronnie’s shares had fallen over eighty per cent.” The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had adequately highlighted that the demise of the SCTs was rooted in their design, i.e. the heavy use of gearing, and was not the result of press speculation or specific incidents such as 9/11, which a more robust investment such as the classic zero would have been able to survive. Conclusion – the programme as a whole In conclusion, the Committee was satisfied that the programme had been fair and accurate in its approach to the subject matter and the individuals and firms named in it. It considered its choice of contributors to be appropriate in that they had relevant experience and knowledge to accurately convey the structure and complexity of the investment’s design. It was also satisfied that the language used in the programme had been fair and objective, avoiding unnecessary exaggeration. The term “magic circle”, for instance, was already in common use in the City before the programme was aired. The Committee also recognised the effort the programme had made to obtain a right of reply from the parties named in the programme and was satisfied that the lack of response from those named, while not ideal, should not have acted as a veto on the broadcasting of the investigation which the Committee believed was editorially justified. As to including a positive view in favour of SCTs, the Committee noted that there was no support for the SCTs by the time of transmission. It considered that the programme had presented a valid and representative view of the issues arising from SCTs. The Committee noted that, since the programme’s transmission, its concerns had been proven following the collapse of SCTs with the loss of billions of pounds for thousands of investors and firms in the City. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the investigation was appropriate and very much in the public’s interest. Finally, the Committee noted that although the complainant had suggested deliberate vilification, innuendo, conspiracy and improper collusion, he had not provided any evidence to substantiate this aspect of his complaint. The Committee was satisfied that the programme had not breached any of the Producers’ Guidelines. Complaints handling The Committee recognised that the complaint had taken an extraordinarily long time to be considered by the ESC. It acknowledged that the delays had been a frustration for the complainant. However, the Committee also recognised that this complaint concerned a very complex issue which required those working on the investigation for ECU and the ESC time to understand the intricacies of the subject matter. The Committee was therefore satisfied that, while the delay was frustrating, it was inevitable that the complaint would take far longer to investigate than would normally be expected. The Committee also recognised that as a direct result of the complexity of the complaint a larger than usual volume of contact and correspondence between the BBC and the complainant had resulted and that this had had a further effect on the timeliness of the process. The Committee did not believe that anyone was at fault for this larger than normal volume of correspondence. It acknowledged that the exchange of letters was in part due to the complainant’s frustration with the pace of the process, but felt that the delays were unavoidable because of the complaint’s complexity. The Committee was also satisfied that, while the process had been lengthy, it would have been inappropriate for the complaint to have been put to the third stage of the process any earlier. The BBC’s complaints process provides for the Trust (formerly the Governors) to become involved only when BBC management has completed its investigation, and the Committee saw no grounds for setting aside the provision in this instance. The Committee was therefore satisfied that, while the complaint had taken a very long time to reach the ESC, there were clear mitigating circumstances for the delay and as such no further action was required. Finding: Not upheld. Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint A 1 The programme The programme considered whether the fear of radiation following the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the accidents at nuclear power stations such as Chernobyl was justified. It asked whether scientists had misunderstood the effects of radiation at low level and overestimated its risks. Horizon’s investigation also suggested that there might be a threshold below which some experts believe radiation is not only harmless but may be beneficial. 2 The complaint The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies). In general, the complainant considered the programme unbalanced in that it failed to represent scientifically accurate views that opposed those of the programme makers and participants. The complainant had specific concerns about the programme’s account of the Linear No Threshold (LNT) hypothesis: • The programme presented a minority view – that informed scientific opinion supports a threshold – without representing the much better supported consensus view that supports the LNT hypothesis. • “There is no serious professional support for a threshold and even less for hormesis [where low doses confer a protective effect] although of course it has its advocates, but like your programme their advocacy is based on selective use of the evidence.” • “Mainstream scientific opinion supports the LNT for radiological protection purposes, that is, at low doses and low dose rates. ... The validity of LNT has been widely discussed over the past several years by the professional scientific community.” • “I am also concerned that the BBC has been used by those who wish to advance nuclear energy to advance their interests on false premises.” He also raised objections to the credibility of some the contributors used on the programme: Dr Ron Chesser • “Dr Chesser published an article in the journal Nature ... claiming an effect in the mitochondrial DNA of voles living in the Chernobyl region related to their exposure to the radiation. 18 months later he retracted his article saying that reanalysis using automated techniques did not support the published results; there was still an elevated rate but the sample size was too small to be statistically significant.” 11 The programme used the maps from the US Geological Survey for measurements of radon and terrestrial gamma radioactivity (http://energy.cr.usgs.gov/radon/DDS-9.html) and set this against the National Cancer Institute (US) map of all cancers (white males 1950–1994) (http://cancercontrolplanet.cancer.gov/atlas/index.jsp?&c=ACC&rg=WM&o=f&t=7094&a=0&l=us_county&cc=0&nr=10&pct=&common=0&ss=AL&rt=0&dd=c). 12 The programme’s evidence was based on a number of reports including Professor Bagshaw’s presentation of analysis on the risk of cancer for BA aircrews (1950–1992). • “Chesser ... does not come over on your programme as a credible scientist, that is, one genuinely working to understand some natural phenomenon.” Dr Mike Repacholi • “Repacholi has worked for the WHO since the mid 1990s mainly on effects of non- ionising radiation ... Indeed, he has few if any peer reviewed publications to his name on effects of ionising radiation.” • “It is therefore not surprising that he made many errors of fact during your programme and left a totally misleading impression of the state of knowledge on effects of ionising radiation.” With regard to other elements of the programme the complainant commented: US cancer rates • The information in the programme concerning US county cancer rates was misleading. (The programme referred to a map which showed US cancer rates county by county and compared that against a map showing US background radiation.11) “Specific cancer incidence rates vary considerably from place to place and a two fold increase in natural background radiation levels would hardly be enough to counter fluctuations due to other causes, smoking for example. This was not pointed out.” Aircraft crew exposure • The example of aircraft crew exposure (this concerned data looking at the incidence of cancer among airline crew, particularly long-haul crews, who are exposed to higher levels of radiation due to working at high altitude)12 was misleading. “To achieve statistical significance for an exposure rate of 5 times natural background for 10 or 20 years would require a very substantial study population, likely more than there are eligible aircrew.” The Chernobyl Forum • “The Forum was set up in 2002 and at least on the part responsible for health effects met only a few times to evaluate the literature. They did not, as your programme implies, thoroughly evaluate the health of the exposed population.” BBC response The editor of Horizon responded at stage 1 of the complaints process: LNT • “We are well aware that the LNT model is universally adopted as the basis for radiological protection in the nuclear industry, hospitals etc and that its use continues to be endorsed by those bodies charged with protecting the public.” • “But there is a distinction between adopting the LNT model for purposes of protection, and using it to predict the actual health effects of a real event, such as Chernobyl. Since, as you say, at low doses the LNT model is an assumption not based on direct evidence, what is the validity of the sometimes very large predictions of Chernobyl related cancer mortality in Western Europe, where the individual doses are a fraction of natural background? This seems to me a perfectly proper scientific question, and one which is certainly far from closed.” • “I think that your characterisation of the debate about the LNT model is misleading. You seem to conflate two different issues: a) whether the correct model is linear and b) whether there is a threshold below which radiation is harmless. The growing reservations among many scientists about the linear extrapolation of cancer risks from high to low doses has resulted in an intense re-examination of the evidence.” Dr Ron Chesser • “You criticise Dr Chesser on the basis that he retracted a finding when further work failed to support it. To my mind, the willingness to adapt one’s ideas in the face of the evidence is the essence of science, and I would have thought that the fact that Dr Chesser was willing to retract unsupported findings lends credibility to him as a scientist rather than the reverse.” • “Dr Chesser’s interview reflects his revised results, which have not been challenged.” • “You discuss the shortcomings of the two papers published in Nature. I note that Dr Chesser was the ninth named of the nine authors of these papers, and that therefore it is far from clear what responsibility he has for any possible mistakes (which were as you say corrected in the second paper).” • “Our production team met Dr Chesser well in advance of filming and discussed his work with him on several occasions, and we concluded that he was a skilful, dedicated and honest scientist.” Dr Mike Repacholi • “Dr Repacholi was a senior WHO scientist involved in the drafting of the Chernobyl Forum report. In his interview he simply summarised what is in the report.” • “Where he went beyond the published text was in the discussion of a possible screening effect of the 4,000 thyroid cancers. We asked Dr Repacholi about this and he gave us his opinion. The fact that you may not agree with him does not make his statement a ‘gross exaggeration’.” US cancer rates • “You say that the use Professor Brookes makes of this data is ‘misleading’, but surely the conclusion he draws that ‘if radiation is playing a role at all it’s not a big hitter’ is exactly the point you make in your letter – that a doubling of the background radiation level is insignificant as a cause of cancer compared to other environmental variations.” Aircraft crew exposure • “The important point we are making is that aircrew are annually exposed to significantly more radiation than most people affected by fallout from Chernobyl. I agree that the studies of aircrew lack the statistical power to settle the issue of the shape of the dose effect curve at low exposures; nevertheless the results are as Dr Karam stated them.” The Chernobyl Forum • “The Forum is as you state a review body. I don’t see how we implied that it carried out its own studies of the population. The Forum represents the most comprehensive review of the published literature to date. Therefore we decided to rely on the Chernobyl Forum Report as the best available source for the effects of the accident.” Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU) at stage 2 did not uphold the complaint, stating the following: • “There is a great deal of misinformation and misunderstanding about both risk and radiation in the public domain, and there is no shortage of sensational and perhaps inaccurate coverage in the press. A science-based programme such as Horizon, aimed at the general public, it seems to me, is an appropriate channel for examining such issues.” • “Equally it seems appropriate to look at what is known about the damage to the health of individuals that can definitely be attributed to known quantities of radiation, and perhaps the surprising absence of damage to aircrews or people who are exposed to above average levels of background radiation because of where they live.” • “Your view that ‘there are uncertainties over the dose from and the consequences of the Chernobyl accident’. I find it unsurprising you have reservations about the Chernobyl Forum Report, which is perhaps more definite about the consequences than you feel is justified. However the producers could hardly ignore such a piece of work – to do so would clearly be against the spirit of the Accuracy guidelines.” • “It is quite clear from the tone of your correspondence that you disagree with the point of view he [Dr Repacholi] represents. Although I appreciate there are often honest and genuine differences of opinion between former scientific colleagues, I am not in a position to decide which of you is correct, but I would have difficulty taking any one scientist’s statements about another as definitive of their professional abilities.” • “As far as Dr Chesser is concerned, a Pub Med search found 11 papers he co-authored relating to the effect of Chernobyl fallout on animals. I do not, therefore, accept your criticisms of his work, including the allegation that he ‘lacks credibility as a scientist’.” • “The overall message of the programme as I understood it was that the correct curve in those cases where there is good information about doses may well be sub-linear, that is below the LNT straight line. However the programme did not plump for any particular curve.” • “The question therefore becomes whether the programme irresponsibly or inaccurately advanced the case that LNT, while the appropriate basis for calculation for radiological protection purposes, predicts more health damage than actually happens ... our own research has found a number of scientists who argue against LNT.” 3 Applicable programme standards Section 1 – BBC’s Editorial Values Truth and accuracy We strive to be accurate and establish the truth of what has happened. Accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. We will weigh all relevant facts and information to get at the truth. Our output will be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We will be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. Section 3 – Accuracy Introduction The BBC’s commitment to accuracy is a core editorial value and fundamental to our reputation. Our output must be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We should be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. For the BBC accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. We aim to achieve accuracy by: • the accurate gathering of material using first hand sources wherever possible. • checking and cross checking the facts. • validating the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material. • corroborating claims and allegations made by contributors wherever possible. Checking contributors We should make checks to establish the credentials of our contributors and to avoid being “hoaxed”. The precise nature of these checks should be appropriate to the nature and significance of their contribution and the genre. We should consider whether it is appropriate to make more in depth checks about people who are the main subject of, or who are to make a significant contribution to, the programme. This may include ensuring they are interviewed and if necessary checked by, more than one member of the production team using a combination of the following: • documentary evidence to validate their identity and story. • corroboration from people other than those suggested by the contributor. Misleading audiences We should not distort known facts, present invented material as fact, or knowingly do anything to mislead our audiences. We may need to label material to avoid doing so. Section 4 – Impartiality and Diversity of Opinion Impartiality lies at the heart of the BBC’s commitment to its audiences. It applies across all of our services and output, whatever the format, from radio news bulletins via our web sites to our commercial magazines and includes a commitment to reflecting a diversity of opinion. The Agreement accompanying the BBC’s Charter requires us to produce comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the UK and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate. It specifies that we should do all we can to treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality in our news services and other programmes dealing with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It also states that the BBC is forbidden from expressing an opinion on current affairs or matters of public policy other than broadcasting. Special considerations apply during the campaign periods for elections. In practice, our commitment to impartiality means: • we strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under represented. • we exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. • we can explore or report on a specific aspect of an issue or provide an opportunity for a single view to be expressed, but in doing so we do not misrepresent opposing views. They may also require a right of reply. • we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects. Achieving impartiality Impartiality must be adequate and appropriate to our output. Our approach to achieving it will therefore vary according to the nature of the subject, the type of output, the likely audience expectation and the extent to which the content and approach is signposted to our audiences. Impartiality is described in the Agreement as “due impartiality”. It requires us to be fair and open minded when examining the evidence and weighing all the material facts, as well as being objective and even handed in our approach to a subject. It does not require the representation of every argument or facet of every argument on every occasion or an equal division of time for each view. Section 13 – Editorial Integrity and Independence Introduction The BBC’s global reputation is based on its editorial integrity and independence. Our audiences need to be confident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by any personal interests. We must not undermine these values by any actions which could bring the BBC into disrepute. 13 Hormesis, an effect where a toxic substance acts like a stimulant in small doses, but is an inhibitor in large doses (WorldWeb Online) 14 Chernobyl Forum, Vienna, September 2005 Editorial integrity and independence editorial principles • We must be independent of both state and partisan interests. 4 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. The Committee recognised that it was not within its remit to determine which of the scientific theories outlined in the programme was correct. Its task was to determine whether the programme had been in breach of the editorial guidelines on accuracy, impartiality and editorial integrity and independence. The Committee therefore considered its finding in three parts: a) Accuracy b) Impartiality c) Editorial Integrity and Independence Accuracy In approaching this matter, the Committee first considered whether the programme had misrepresented the Linear No Threshold (LNT) model hypothesis by suggesting that there were doubts as to the model’s effectiveness when assessing health risks at very low levels of radiation exposure. In doing so, the Committee considered whether the programme misrepresented research into the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident and research on aircraft crews and people living in areas of naturally high background radiation to explain that some scientists now believed that at certain low levels of radiation exposure the effects were not as harmful as the LNT model would suggest. The Committee then went on to consider whether the arguments put forward by the programme as to the possibility of a threshold below which the impact of exposure to radiation may be beneficial (an effect called hormesis13) were based on sound evidence that would not mislead the audience. The programme had satisfactorily set out the historical background to the Linear No Threshold theory (LNT) and how it was currently used to set safety standards for workers in the nuclear industry. The Committee noted that the programme referred to evidence published by the Chernobyl Forum14, a report initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to “generate authoritative consensual statements on the health effects attributable to radiation exposure arising from the accident (Chernobyl)” and supported by the UN, WHO and governments of the countries immediately affected by the fallout from the disaster, to support the hypothesis that the actual health risk to people from low-level exposure significantly differed from the LNT theory of a linear graph. The Committee noted that the Chernobyl Forum’s report had established that the death rates of those exposed to low levels of radiation had not been as high as suggested by the LNT. The Committee, while accepting that there could be more than one explanation for this variance (including the possibility that the report had not fully captured the death rates), felt that it was reasonable for a science programme to investigate the variance between an established theory used to define safety levels for workers (the LNT) against the observed outcomes recorded in a published and internationally respected report (the Chernobyl Forum report). The Committee noted that there was a dispute between the complainant and the programme team as to the interpretation and relevance of some of the evidence used to support the case for a threshold below which exposure to radiation is not as harmful as the LNT model would suggest. The Committee therefore considered the disputed evidence used within the programme: • the health risks to plane crews flying at high altitudes • the effects on people living in areas of naturally high background radiation • the measurement of damage to the DNA of animals in the affected areas around Chernobyl It noted the specific objections raised by the complainant and the replies from the programme team. It was satisfied that in each case, taking into account the need to summarise the information for the programme, what was reported had been an accurate presentation of the various reports. The Committee was satisfied that the details of the report on the effects of radiation on air crews, having been checked by the programme, had been accurately précised by Dr Karam, one of the programme’s contributors. The Committee took a similar view on the presentation of the information on natural background radiation. With regard to the reports by Dr Chesser on animals in the Chernobyl area, the Committee noted the complainant’s concerns regarding the dispute and retraction of a report by Dr Chesser on the issue of animal physiology in contaminated areas, but was satisfied that Dr Chesser’s contribution contained an accurate summary of the issue and was based on the revised research that had been peer-reviewed by the scientific community. To summarise – in answer to the question of whether the programme had breached the accuracy requirements by misrepresenting the LNT model hypothesis by suggesting that there were doubts within the scientific community as to the model’s effectiveness when assessing health risks at very low levels of radiation exposure – the Committee considered that the programme makers had produced evidence to demonstrate that there was such a debate within the scientific community. It was appropriate for a science programme such as Horizon to consider the question of whether the LNT was still sustainable. In addressing this complaint, the Committee was aware that it was approaching a dispute at a conceptual level within the scientific community. The Committee believed that the accurate representation of a valid view from the scientific community would meet the requirement for content to be well sourced, based on sound evidence and thoroughly tested. The Committee considered, however, that the way evidence was adduced to propose an alternative to LNT including hormesis (and in particular whether relevant criticisms should have been either included or their existence used to temper the commentary) was a matter which would, in the context of this programme, be best considered when the Committee approached the question of whether the programme had complied with the guidelines regarding impartiality. As regards the issue of whether alternative opinions should have been sought, in respect of the above complaints, the Committee also dealt with this matter under the heading of impartiality. The next issue regarding accuracy that the Committee considered concerned the choice of two of the programme’s contributors, Dr Chesser and Dr Repacholi. The Committee recognised that any programme team had the right to consider a range of contributors, but in deciding which to settle with needed to ensure that they were credible on the subject upon which they were to speak. The Committee was satisfied that the programme team had followed the guidelines on checking contributors and their contributions, i.e. it had established their credentials and suitability for their involvement in the programme. In the case of Dr Repacholi, the Committee was satisfied that his contribution had relied on his understanding of the detail of the Chernobyl Forum, which he had gained as a scientist for WHO for which he had worked on the report. With regard to Dr Chesser, the Committee, while it recognised that he had been involved with a retracted report on the extent of DNA damage to animals in the contaminated area close to Chernobyl, was satisfied that the programme had carried out suitable checks to establish his credentials and ensure that the comments made by him in the programme were based on the revised and resubmitted peer-reviewed paper regarding the health of animals in the contaminated area. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on accuracy in the choice of these two scientists as contributors. Impartiality The Committee then considered the issue of due impartiality and the programme’s comments on the Chernobyl accident and its wider investigation into the effects on health of low-level radiation. It acknowledged that the BBC sought to provide a wide range of subject matter and in terms of science that included examining scientific thinking that was new and/or controversial in the eyes of the public and/or to the scientific community. It recognised that the programme had the editorial freedom to consider what was, to the public, a new and counter-intuitive view of the effects of exposure to radiation at low levels. The subject matter of this Horizon was controversial and related very directly to a matter of political controversy – the dangers or otherwise of a nuclear power programme. It noted that the programme commentary alluded to this in stating: “As the world faces up to a new threat from global warming, and the controversial alternative provided by nuclear power, a growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation.” It noted that the programme was broadcast two days after the Government had announced that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations – a decision that was contested by other political parties. In this context an analysis of the report on the Chernobyl accident and the investigation into low-level radiation required a range and conflict of views to be reflected within the programme. Even without the context of the Government announcement however (and even setting aside that it was in the public domain that a statement was expected in July and that the future of nuclear power was under review), the Committee recognised that the area of science being investigated by the programme was controversial. It would always be an area that required careful consideration to ensure that there were appropriate balances and checks as to what was being put forward. It was therefore, the Committee believed, important for the production team to ensure that within the programme its arguments did not misrepresent or fail to represent appropriate opposing views. The Committee noted how the LNT was initially described: VOICE OVER (V/O): In 1958, using data largely drawn from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first systematic attempt to quantify the relationship between radiation dose and cancer was published. It was called the LNT or linear no threshold model... DR REPACHOLI: The linear non threshold dose model is composed of the dose that people received and then the risk, the percentage increase risk of getting cancer from this dose ... We know that the increase in risk of getting cancer from an exposure of about 2,000 millisieverts is about 10% ... And for 1,000 it’s the order of 6% increase in the risk of cancer. For 500 it’s about 3, so that you can see that you can draw a straight line through those points... V/O: So with a simple graph scientists could see there was a direct link between radiation dose and the risk of cancer. And how the programme introduced the issue of measuring risk to health at low doses: V/O: The new LNT model offered a partial answer but one thing remained unknown. DR REPACHOLI: The linear model was based on high doses and we just didn’t know what was going on at lower doses of between one and two hundred millisieverts. V/O: So scientists made a calculated guess. DR REPACHOLI: As a conservative assumption and for radiation protection purposes ... we have an assumption that this linear non threshold dose actually keeps coming down through zero. So that all radiation is dangerous. ...This then allowed nuclear power stations or hospitals with radio therapy departments to calculate the amount of shielding that was required to protect workers... The Committee then noted how the programme equated the LNT calculation against the actual deaths of emergency workers and people immediately affected by the fallout following the Chernobyl disaster. It noted the disparity in the LNT calculation which projected 4,000 deaths, and the 56 deaths that had been reported by the Chernobyl Forum published 19 years after the disaster in 2005. The programme noted that this figure would increase through the incidence of leukaemias and solid cancers that occurred between 10 and 25 years after the initial accident, but was satisfied from the death toll already known that an “epidemic” was not expected. The Committee then noted how the programme introduced the evidence to raise a different view of what was happening at low levels of radiation exposure: V/O: These figures are hundreds of times lower than the predictions based on the LNT model. So could it be that scientists have misunderstood what’s going on? Could it be that at low doses, the sort associated with even a major nuclear power station accident, radiation is not as dangerous as we think? The Committee found that whilst the programme had considered the evidence on the effect of Chernobyl by reference to the Chernobyl Forum Report and had indicated that figures for death and illness vary widely, in relying solely on the Chernobyl Forum’s Report, it had failed to convey that there were conflicting views on the figures which offered an alternative explanation for the variance between the LNT model predicted death rates and those in the report. It noted that the programme first referred to the research of Dr Chesser, who studied the effects of radiation on wildlife in the exclusion zone around Chernobyl. V/O: Chesser set out a series of traps and collected animals. Dr CHESSER: I will never forget when we picked up the traps the next day and found that we have a great diversity of animal life living right there in this most contaminated spot... And: Dr CHESSER: The real winners in this radioactive contest are these little guys, the bank voles. Now these animals would have been much more radioactive in life than what they are here [the voles were in a cabinet]. This is only measuring the amount of radioactivity that is deposited in the skin. Still these are very, very active. We were finding that the radiation doses were between eight and fifteen millisieverts per day. V/O: Eight to fifteen millisieverts per day is the equivalent of at least 8,000 chest X-rays in one day. Dr CHESSER: This is a very significant amount of radiation and we were compelled to think that we will see damage here... V/O: Chesser analysed his samples for genetic damage. Dr CHESSER: We began the study on what’s called the micro nucleus formation which is really looking at remnants of broken chromosomes... V/O: Chesser and his team compared the proportion of genetic damage in 10,000 cells from each animal. Then they compared them with the control group. Dr CHESSER: There was no difference. No difference at all. The radioactivity, even though it was very high, according to all of our measures was not enough to result in any appreciable measure of DNA damage in animals that live their entire life spans in this area. The Committee, while it noted the complainant’s concerns as to the lack of comment by the programme that published research involving Dr Chesser as an author had been withdrawn, was satisfied that the evidence quoted was based on Dr Chesser’s revised and corrected research, and as such it was appropriate for the programme to refer to its findings without further reference to the earlier publication. The Committee then considered the other evidence put forward by the programme. It noted the reference to a series of maps showing cancer mortality rates in the US by county set against a map showing levels of naturally occurring background radiation. V/O: What they wanted to know was whether this variation in cancer could be linked to radiation exposure. Dr REPACHOLI: Radiation is everywhere, everything we drink, breathe, eat. Building materials, people have radioactive material in them, it’s just part of life. V/O: The average dose from background radiation is around 2.5 millisieverts per year. But in high-altitude areas like America’s mountain states of Utah and Idaho and Colorado the dose shown here in red is twice that. Yet when scientists compared these states with high background with cancer incidence, they had a surprise. Dr BROOKS: You can see that these states with the high radiation background dose are the states that have the lowest cancer incidence. States out here with the lowest background radiation are the ones that have the highest cancer incidence so you can see from this that if radiation is playing its role, it’s not a big hitter. And the evidence put forward about the radiation exposure of airline crews: V/O: At 35,000 feet, the typical altitude of an international flight, radiation levels reach the equivalent of nearly 36 millisieverts per year. That’s nearly twenty times normal background radiation... V/O: Translated into typical flying hours, this means the average airline crew is subject to about 11 millisieverts or eleven hundred chest X-rays every year of their working lives. Yet even at these higher doses there is no significant increase in cancer rates. Dr KARAM: They’ve studied military flight crew as well as civilian flight crews for various lengths of flights. What they’ve found is some studies that show a slight increase in cancers, other studies that showed a slight decrease in cancers. None of those studies show an increase in birth defects, and the net result of all of this is that we just have to conclude that there is just very little effect from this elevated radiation from flying. V/O: Findings like this have led a growing number of scientists to conclude that radiation doses below about a hundred millisieverts per year may not be as carcinogenic as we think. In fact some studies suggest the relationship is even more unexpected. The Committee then noted the programme’s reference to evidence of blood samples from people who were living in an area of Iran with extremely high natural background radiation levels. It noted how the programme delivered the findings that the blood having been exposed to radiation had shown significantly fewer chromosomal abnormalities than the blood cells of people living in areas of normal background radiation. The programme stated: V/O: It sounds totally improbable. But it appears that radiation may actually help the body resist genetic damage. The Committee also noted the programme’s further coverage of this possibility when it commented upon evidence from Dr Chesser’s research. V/O: Tissue samples taken from animals from the Chernobyl region however looked very different... V/O: It suggests that radiation appears to stimulate precisely those genes that protect the body against cancer. Low-level radiation may be beneficial. Dr CHESSER: One of the thoughts that comes out of this is that prior exposure to low levels of radiation actually may have a beneficial effect and this is a positive impact of low doses of radiation. The Committee noted the programme’s caveat to the mounting proposition: V/O: It’s a controversial idea [Committee’s emphasis] but it’s further suggested evidence that it’s time to rethink our understanding of the hazards of radiation. It then noted how the programme discussed how this evidence would affect the LNT curve. V/O: Today there is a growing suspicion that the current model of radiation risk is out of date. Dr KARAM: ...so if we calculate risk estimates based on LNT then we are certainly going to be safe but there’s a growing feeling among my colleagues that it oversimplifies things. V/O: Instead of the LNT graph finishing as a straight line, could something else be going on? Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation below about a hundred millisieverts is harmless then this curve really comes along this axis before going up to this point ... this is called a threshold model. You need at least a hundred millisieverts before any adverse consequence occurs. V/O: There is a second possibility. Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation is beneficial then this curve would really look like this. Called a J-shaped curve, and that would be the resultant curve. In this case this would be a benefit from the radiation exposure and this would be the detrimental side of this axis but I think most scientists believe that this is probably not a supportable hypothesis [Committee’s emphasis]. The Committee considered the scientific evidence referred to in the programme which suggested the possibility of a threshold to the LNT model. It found that, while the programme provided a powerful presentation of evidence on how health could be affected at low levels of exposure to radiation, it failed to incorporate within its narrative an appropriate reference to alternative opinions to those expressed, both to the individual items of research referred to by the programme and to the overall thesis. The issue – the effects of radiation – already acknowledged by the Committee as being controversial, had to be treated with due impartiality. The Committee recognised that the narrative had doubted whether the evidence of health benefits at low levels of exposure could be supported scientifically. However, the Committee noted that the programme had not, when setting forward arguments raising the possibility of a threshold to the LNT curve, made reference to the lively debate within the scientific community, which disputed this evidence – arguments that supported the LNT hypothesis or that there was no safe level of contamination. The Committee noted that this did not mean the programme had to give equal time to each side or to provide a representation of every argument. It did, however, require it to be fair and open-minded and make reference to the fact that there were other views on the subject to the ones expressed. The Committee therefore upheld this element of the complaint. In making this decision the Committee believed it was important to remind all programme areas that they had the same responsibility as news programmes to ensure impartiality – particularly when dealing with a controversial subject. It was, therefore, important for a programme to provide appropriate and proportionate opportunity to reflect those other views. Editorial Integrity and Independence The Committee was satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had been influenced by outside commercial or political interests in its making or scheduling. The Committee accepted that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had come about for any other reasons than as a result of the production team’s investigation into the scientific reporting of this subject. The Committee noted that the programme had been commissioned in October 2005 and had been originally pencilled in for transmission at the time of the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Its move to a later transmission date in July 2007 had meant that the broadcast coincided with the Government’s announcement that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations. This announcement date was not in the public domain at the time the programme schedule was published. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on editorial integrity and independence. Finding: The Committee upheld one element of the complaint concerning impartiality, but did not otherwise uphold the complaint on issues of accuracy or editorial integrity. Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint B 1 The programme The programme considered whether the fear of radiation following the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the accidents at nuclear power stations such as Chernobyl was justified. It asked whether scientists had misunderstood the effects of radiation and overestimated its risks. Horizon’s investigation also suggested that there is a threshold below which some experts believe radiation is not only harmless but may be beneficial. 2 The complaint The complaint was made on behalf of the Low Level Radiation Campaign (LLRC), which believes that we (the human race) are living through a “cancer epidemic” caused by fallout from the “orgy of nuclear bomb tests”. LLRC believes the Linear No Threshold model, the model used by the nuclear industry to measure health risks, fails to correctly measure the risk because its measurement is based on external irradiation. The LLRC is concerned with the absorption of radiation inside the body and the risk of cancer through what they refer to as the second event theory. The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies). The complainant • “Nuclear Nightmares was, as its preliminary media spin suggested it would be, flat out pro-nuclear propaganda.” • The programme’s topic fell within the guideline heading “political or industrial controversy or major matters relating to current policy”. • The topic was clearly “radiation risk and its relevance to nuclear power”. Nuclear power was set in the introduction to the programme as the context: “As the world faces up to a new threat from global warming, and the controversial alternative provided by nuclear power, a growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation.” • “There was not an iota of balance, not the ghost of any attempt to offer a countervailing scientific opinion, not the faintest suggestion that people exposed to Chernobyl fallout had actually been dying or sickening at a rate in excess of the absolutely undeniable.” With regard to bias by the programme failing to report a strand of opinion on the concept of radiation dose, the complainant stated: • “It is now generally conceded that ‘dose’ is a virtually meaningless term when considering many types of radiation exposure where the radioactive source is internal to the human body.” • The conventional way of dealing with radiation doses as a radiation protection issue is to treat the energy they emit as an average over considerable volumes of body tissue (e.g. the whole body). This is appropriate for some exposure regimes (e.g. atom bombs, X- rays etc) but is inappropriate for others. • “Authorities who have contributed to the topic recently are the UK’s CERRIE, the ECRR, the French body Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Since ... Horizon considered LLRC’s work, the researchers must have been aware of these developments but the programme entirely ignored them and consistently used ‘dose’ as if it were not in question.” As to bias by failing to include opinion on the alternative dose response curve, he stated: • The programme failed to mention a third possibility – a dose response curve, usually called supra-linear, rising above the LNT straight line. This shows disproportionately great effects in the low dose region. “This is discussed just as often as a sublinear one ... the programme’s failure even to mention this side of the scientific debate reveals culpable bias and is possibly the most important aspect of this complaint.” The complainant also suggested there was bias in failing to report published research showing negative health effects of radiation doses: • “Countervailing evidence was hinted at ... but there was no discussion of it and no sources were given ... [the producer’s] assertion that the Chernobyl Forum report ‘can be fairly said to represent the scientific consensus on the actual effects of the accident so far’ is not sustainable. There is a large body of evidence to the contrary and no consensus.” • “The Horizon programme revealed gross bias by relying solely on the Chernobyl Forum and by dismissing out of hand any suggestion that things are worse than the Forum says.” • As far as leukaemia in liquidators was concerned, “contrary to the statement made in the Horizon programme, official sources show that by 1996 this disease was more common in liquidators than the average. The same is true for thyroid cancer.” • The programme’s treatment of the incidence of solid cancers also “lacked balance”. The complainant also believed it was biased of the programme to give undue emphasis to unpublished research: • Research on genetic effects in the Chernobyl exclusion zone (by Ron Chesser) included in the programme covered two issues: a claimed deficit of indicators of DNA damage where the researchers expected to find some, suggesting that risk had been overestimated; and over-expression of some genes, which was explicitly proposed as an indicator of a protective or beneficial radiation effect. “We have not been able to find a published study.” He also believed that the programme was biased in style of presentation suggesting scientific rationality versus public hysteria: • “The programme showed four scientists (all men) unanimous in their view of radiation risk. No proponent of a contrary view was included in the film except for film of wailing babushkas and the mother and daughter ... [from Chernobyl] who were as emotional as was to be expected of people visiting a home abandoned in such circumstances.” • “Nuclear Nightmares took a one-sided standpoint about perceptions of risk and from beginning to end represented the polarities not as a scientific debate but as a matter of science versus hysteria.” In a response to the programme’s producer supplying details of the LLRC reports considered by the production team in preparation of the programme, he stated: • How did the programme consider the evidence and on what grounds did it draw its conclusions? For example the post-Chernobyl increase in childhood leukaemia was a major part of the three publications [LLRC reports considered by the programme] but was not included. In conclusion: • The complainant suggested the producer might like to make a further programme “to give the required balance”, stating “we have plenty of material for him to work with”. BBC response The producer of Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares responded at stage 1 of the complaints process, stating: • “The programme was not primarily about nuclear power, but about radiation and in particular low level radiation.” • “This distinction was made clear at the beginning of the programme when the commentary explained that ‘a growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation’.” • “At the end, the programme concluded that radiation is only one ‘among the myriad of issues’ in the bigger debate about nuclear power.” • “The programme laid out scientific evidence for the LNT (Linear No Threshold) model which implies that all radiation is dangerous, and then explained what the best, peer- reviewed and internationally recognised science had to say about the LNT, particularly at low levels of radiation.” • “The discussion of Chernobyl was based on the most authoritative source available, the Chernobyl Forum report, which can be fairly said to represent the scientific consensus on the actual effects of the accident so far.” • In response to the complaint that the programme had ignored that people exposed to Chernobyl’s fallout had been “dying or sickening at a rate in excess of the absolutely undeniable”, he replied: “...the programme did discuss at some length the health effects of Chernobyl including acute radiation sickness and thyroid cancer”. • “The UK LLRC has criticised the Chernobyl Forum report. But after looking at these criticisms in some detail, the programme team concluded that the overwhelming scientific evidence suggests they are unproven and it would therefore have been misleading to include them in the programme.” 15 Hormesis, an effect where a toxic substance acts like a stimulant in small doses, but is an inhibitor in large doses. (WorldWeb Online) The Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU), who responded at stage 2 of the process, did not uphold the complaint on the following grounds: Context • ECU believed “the programme demonstrated that this was an attempt to examine the relationship between the quantity of radiation that an individual is exposed to and the consequent damage to the health of that individual”. • “As a science programme, Horizon takes seriously work produced by properly qualified scientists, and published against peer review. The Accuracy principle (above) requires that information it presents is based on sound evidence and thoroughly tested – that is, reviewed by properly qualified individuals.” • On the contention that the programme dealt with a controversial subject: the programme was broadcast in the week the Government announced the findings of its Energy Review. What the Government did was to announce a consultation exercise and the future publication of a White Paper. As I noted above, the Guidelines’ definition of a controversial subject includes highly contentious new legislation on the eve of a crucial Commons vote, and it is clear we are a long way from that. The concept of ‘dose’ • ECU, in noting the comments by the executive producer for Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares on the LLRC’s view of the concept of dose and when reviewing papers published by the Chernobyl Forum, the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the American Nuclear Society, the American Council on Science and Health and the Royal Society – “[who] talk in terms of ‘dose’ when discussing the effects of internal emitters” – was satisfied that programmes directed at a general audience should use consistent, widely used and easily understood concepts, and that ‘dose’ was an appropriate term in these circumstances. The dose response curve • ECU again noted the comments of the executive producer on the complainant’s belief that the Linear No Threshold (LNT) curve could be supra-linear at low exposure levels, i.e. the curve at low-level exposure would be greater than the linear LNT curve. It believed: “The material we have seen does not demonstrate that the programme demonstrated bias by excluding discussion of supra-linear curves. We have seen no convincing evidence that undermines David Sington’s underlying contention that no data from properly conducted epidemiological studies supports supra-linearity.” • ECU also noted that: “The programme was appropriately tentative when it comes to hormesis.”15 Dr Chesser • “You seek to cast doubt on Ron Chesser’s work, suggesting it is unpublished. His own website lists numerous publications, and an examination of the Medline database shows that he has published 11 papers on Chernobyl related subjects in peer-reviewed journals.” Health effects following Chernobyl • “...it is clear that the programme took into account the reviews of [other scientific papers], so I can’t conclude that it ignored relevant material.” Complaints handling The complainant raised a number of criticisms with regard to the reply from stage 2 of the complaints process: • “[ECU’s] response is as biased as Nuclear Nightmares – if not more so.” • “It is personalised in a way that the programme wasn’t. [Their] scientific arguments are skewed, the extracts from reports are selective and the arguments associated with them fail to acknowledge the context.” • “The assertion that LLRC assiduously cultivates the general public’s fear of radiation is an untruth.” “The ‘extreme position on the dangers of radiation’ that [the executive producer] imputes to LLRC is a slur intended to suggest our position is irrational ... we would ask you to consider this language.” • “In the end [the response] took four months. One has to ask why it took so long to compose [ECU’s] letter.” • The complainant goes on to describe an email exchange with (ECU). “[ECU] and I have discussed [their] failure to consult us; [it] claims that I misunderstood the nature of the complaints process. I say that in that case [they] described it misleadingly.” 3 Applicable programme standards Section 1 – The BBC’s Editorial Values Editorial Integrity and Independence The BBC is independent of both state and partisan interests. Our audiences can be confident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by an personal interests. Section 3 – Accuracy The BBC’s commitment to accuracy is a core editorial value and fundamental to our reputation. Our output must be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We should be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. For the BBC accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. We aim to achieve accuracy by: • the accurate gathering of material using first hand sources wherever possible. • checking and cross checking the facts. • validating the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material. • corroborating claims and allegations made by contributors wherever possible. Misleading audiences We should not distort known facts, present invented material as fact, or knowingly do anything to mislead our audiences. Section 4 – Impartiality & Diversity of Opinion Impartiality lies at the heart of the BBC’s commitment to its audiences. It applies across all of our services and output. The Agreement accompanying the BBC’s Charter requires us to produce comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the UK and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate. It specifies that we should do all we can to treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality in our news services and other programmes dealing with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It also states that the BBC is forbidden from expressing an opinion on current affairs or matters of public policy other than broadcasting. In practice, our commitment to impartiality means: • we seek to provide a properly balanced service consisting of a wide range of subject matter and views broadcast over an appropriate time scale across all our output. We take particular care when dealing with political or industrial controversy or major matters relating to current public policy. • we strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under represented. • we exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. • we can explore or report on a specific aspect of an issue or provide an opportunity for a single view to be expressed, but in doing so we do not misrepresent opposing views. They may also require a right of reply. • we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects. Achieving impartiality Impartiality is described in the Agreement as “due impartiality”. It requires us to be fair and open minded when examining the evidence and weighing all the material facts, as well as being objective and even handed in our approach to a subject. It does not require the representation of every argument or facet of every argument on every occasion or an equal division of time for each view. Section 13 – Editorial Integrity and Independence The BBC’s global reputation is based on its editorial integrity and independence. Our audiences need to be confident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by any personal interests. We must not undermine these values by any actions which could bring the BBC into disrepute. 4 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal; this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. The Committee recognised that it was not within its remit to determine which of the scientific theories outlined in the programme is correct. Its task is to determine whether the programme had been in breach of the editorial guidelines on accuracy, impartiality and editorial integrity and independence. The Committee therefore considered its finding in three parts: a) Accuracy b) Impartiality c) Editorial Integrity and Independence The Committee also considered how the complaint was handled at the first two stages of the complaints process. Accuracy With regard to accuracy the Committee first established the programme’s purpose. It noted that the complainant had believed the programme’s topic to be “radiation risk and its relevance to nuclear power”. The Committee did not agree. It noted the programme’s opening remarks: VOICE OVER (V/O): For the last fifty years we’ve lived with the fear of radiation. V/O: Hiroshima and Nagasaki and accidents at nuclear power stations have all struck terror in our hearts. DR REPACHOLI: It’s the fear of huge doses of radiation like the atomic bomb that set in people’s minds hysterical behaviour when they hear the word radiation. DR CHESSER: If you talk to anybody and you say the word radiation, immediately you get a fear response. V/O: As the world faces up to a new threat from global warming and the controversial alternative provided by nuclear power, growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation. The Committee was satisfied that the programme’s opening had clearly stated that its purpose was to consider the science of the health effects of radiation. It recognised that the 16 Chernobyl Forum, Vienna, September 2005 programme, by the nature of the subject matter, would have to refer to nuclear power and the effects on health following accidents involving nuclear power stations, but was satisfied that when looking at the programme as a whole its focus was on the effect of radiation on health, particularly at low levels of exposure. The Committee then determined whether the programme had accurately presented arguments on the health risks at low-level exposure. However, before considering the issue of accuracy, the Committee noted that the programme, in putting forward such arguments and evidence, was not required to put forward every argument on the issue of health risks at low-level exposure to radiation. The Committee noted the relevant guideline on impartiality, which ensures that the choice of argument is left to the programme as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. This states: We exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate, as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. The programme had satisfactorily set out the historical background to the Linear No Threshold theory (LNT) and how it was currently used to set safety standards for workers in the nuclear industry. This background briefly summarised what the theory consisted of, how it had come about and how it was used. It had not been objected to by the complainant. As regards the issue of whether alternative opinions should have been sought, in respect of the above complaints, the Committee dealt with this matter under the heading of impartiality. It then went on to consider whether the arguments put forward by the programme as to whether there was a threshold at low-level exposure to radiation, where its effects are harmless or possibly beneficial, were sufficiently based on sound evidence that would not mislead the audience. The Committee noted that the programme had used evidence published by the Chernobyl Forum16, a report initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to “generate authoritative consensual statements on the health effects attributable to radiation exposure arising from the accident (Chernobyl)” and supported by the UN, WHO and governments of the countries immediately affected by the fallout from the disaster, to support the hypothesis that the actual health risk to people from low-level exposure significantly differed from the LNT theory of a linear graph. The Committee noted that the Chernobyl Forum’s report had established that the death rates of those exposed to low levels of radiation had not been as high as suggested by the LNT. The Committee, while accepting that there could be more than one explanation for this variance (including the possibility that the report had not fully captured the death rates), felt that it was reasonable for a science programme to investigate the variance between an established theory used to define safety levels for workers (the LNT) against the observed outcomes recorded in a published and internationally respected report (Chernobyl Forum report). The Committee noted the concerns raised by the complainant regarding the measurements of leukaemia, thyroid cancer and solid cancers, but was satisfied that it was appropriate for the programme to raise arguments accurately based on the most comprehensive collection of peer-reviewed studies on the effects of the Chernobyl disaster, the Chernobyl Forum report. It noted that the report had considered the issues of cancer rates in the surrounding area most affected by Chernobyl. The Committee noted in particular that, with reference to the increased detection of childhood thyroid cancers, the programme stated: V/O: In the Chernobyl region it’s apparently been responsible for 4,000 childhood thyroid cancers, well above the norm... However, the Committee also noted the report’s finding that this increased rate, which would not necessarily lead to 4,000 children suffering clinical thyroid cancer, could not be reliably linked to radiation, nor could the Forum find any other link between ill-health and radiation. The Committee was therefore satisfied that what had been reported by the programme was an accurate presentation based upon the Chernobyl Forum report and that it was entitled to refer to its findings. The accuracy guideline states: “All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered.” The complainant’s recurring complaint was that relevant opinions were not considered. In considering the variance between death rates as reflected within the Chernobyl Forum’s report and those predicted by the LNT model, it was possible for Horizon to query the way in which death rates had been collated for the report as one way of explaining the discrepancy. Whether this was sufficient to meet the need for relevant opinions was considered under impartiality. The next issue regarding accuracy that the Committee considered concerned the choice of Dr Chesser as a contributor to the programme. The Committee recognised that any programme team had the right to explore a range of contributors, but in deciding which to settle with needed to ensure that they were credible on the subject upon which they were to speak. The Committee was satisfied that the programme team had followed the guidelines on checking contributions, i.e. it had established their credentials and suitability for their involvement in the programme. With regard to Dr Chesser, the Committee, while it recognised that he had been involved with a retracted report on the extent of DNA damage to animals in the contaminated area close to Chernobyl, was satisfied that the programme had carried out suitable checks on him to establish his credentials and ensure that the comments made by him in the programme were based on the revised and resubmitted peer-reviewed paper regarding the health of animals in the contaminated area. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on accuracy in the choice of contributor. As to the use of dose as a measure of contamination, the Committee was satisfied that its use was appropriate within the context of the programme. The Committee agreed that the concept of dose was crucial to understanding the workings of the LNT which was central to understanding the programme. The Committee was also satisfied that the use of dosage within this context was in line with its use externally in peer-reviewed research and by internationally renowned radiological and scientific bodies. The Committee therefore considered that its use did not breach guidelines on accuracy. Impartiality The Committee then considered the issue of due impartiality and the programme’s comments on the Chernobyl accident and its wider investigation into the effects on health of low-level radiation. It acknowledged that the BBC sought to provide a wide range of subject matter and in terms of science that included examining scientific thinking that was new and/or controversial in the eyes of the public and/or to the scientific community. It recognised that the programme had the editorial freedom to consider what was, to the public, a new and counter-intuitive view of the effects of exposure to radiation at low levels. The subject matter of this Horizon was controversial and related very directly to a matter of political controversy – the dangers or otherwise of a nuclear power programme. It noted that the programme commentary alluded to this in stating: “As the world faces up to a new threat from global warming, and the controversial alternative provided by nuclear power, a growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation.” It noted that the programme was broadcast two days after the Government had announced that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations – a decision that was contested by other political parties. In this context an analysis of the report on the Chernobyl accident and the investigation into low-level radiation required a range and conflict of views to be reflected within the programme. Even without the context of the Government announcement however (and even setting aside that it was in the public domain that a statement was expected in July and that the future of nuclear power was under review), the Committee recognised that the area of science being investigated by the programme was controversial. It would always be an area that required careful consideration to ensure that there were appropriate balances and checks as to what was being put forward. It was therefore, the Committee believed, important for the production team to ensure that within the programme its arguments did not misrepresent or fail to represent appropriate opposing views. The Committee noted how the LNT was initially described: VOICE OVER (V/O): In 1958, using data largely drawn from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first systematic attempt to quantify the relationship between radiation dose and cancer was published. It was called the LNT or linear no threshold model... DR REPACHOLI: The linear non threshold dose model is composed of the dose that people received and then the risk, the percentage increase in risk of getting cancer from this dose ... We know that the increase in risk of getting cancer from an exposure of about 2,000 millisieverts is about 10% ... And for 1,000 it’s the order of 6% increase in the risk of cancer. For 500 it’s about 3, so that you can see that you can draw a straight line through those points... V/O: So with a simple graph scientists could see there was a direct link between radiation dose and the risk of cancer. And how the programme introduced the issue of measuring risk to health at low doses: V/O: The new LNT model offered a partial answer but one thing remained unknown. DR REPACHOLI: The linear model was based on high doses and we just didn’t know what was going on at lower doses of between one and two hundred millisieverts. V/O: So scientists made a calculated guess. DR REPACHOLI: As a conservative assumption and for radiation protection purposes ... we have an assumption that this linear non threshold dose actually keeps coming down through zero. So that all radiation is dangerous. ...This then allowed nuclear power stations or hospitals with radio therapy departments to calculate the amount of shielding that was required to protect workers... The Committee then noted how the programme equated the LNT calculation against the actual deaths of emergency workers and people immediately affected by the fallout following the Chernobyl disaster. It noted the disparity in the LNT calculation which projected 4,000 deaths, and the 56 deaths that had been reported by the Chernobyl Forum published 19 years after the disaster in 2005. The programme noted that this figure would increase through the incidence of leukaemia’s and solid cancers that occurred between 10 and 25 years after the initial accident, but was satisfied from the death toll already known that an “epidemic” was not expected. The Committee then noted how the programme introduced scientific evidence to suggest a different view of what was happening at low levels of radiation exposure: V/O: These figures are hundreds of times lower than the predictions based on the LNT model. So could it be that scientists have misunderstood what’s going on? Could it be that at low doses, the sort associated with even a major nuclear power station accident, radiation is not as dangerous as we think? The Committee found that whilst the programme had considered the evidence on the effect of Chernobyl by reference to the Chernobyl Forum Report and had indicated that figures for death and illness vary widely, in relying solely on the Chernobyl Forum’s Report, it had failed to convey that there were conflicting views on the figures which offered an alternative explanation for the variance between the LNT model predicted death rates and those in the report. It noted that the programme first referred to the research of Dr Chesser, who studied the effects of radiation on wildlife in the exclusion zone around Chernobyl. V/O: Chesser set out a series of traps and collected animals. Dr CHESSER: I will never forget when we picked up the traps the next day and found that we have a great diversity of animal life living right there in this most contaminated spot... And... Dr CHESSER: The real winners in this radioactive contest are these little guys, the bank voles. Now these animals would have been much more radioactive in life than what they are here [the voles were in a cabinet]. This is only measuring the amount of radioactivity that is deposited in the skin. Still these are very, very active. We were finding that the radiation doses were between eight and fifteen millisieverts per day. V/O: Eight to fifteen millisieverts per day is the equivalent of at least 8,000 chest X-rays in one day. Dr CHESSER: This is a very significant amount of radiation and we were compelled to think that we will see damage here... V/O: Chesser analysed his samples for genetic damage. Dr CHESSER: We began the study on what’s called the micro nucleus formation which is really looking at remnants of broken chromosomes... V/O: Chesser and his team compared the proportion of genetic damage in 10,000 cells from each animal. Then they compared them with the control group. Dr CHESSER: There was no difference. No difference at all. The radioactivity, even though it was very high, according to all of our measures was not enough to result in any appreciable measure of DNA damage in animals that live their entire life spans in this area. The Committee, while it noted a complainant’s concerns as to the lack of comment by the programme that published research involving Dr Chesser as author had been withdrawn, was satisfied that the evidence quoted was based on Dr Chesser’s revised and corrected research, and as such it was appropriate for the programme to refer to its findings without further reference to the earlier publication. The Committee then considered the other evidence put forward by the programme. It noted the reference to a series of maps showing cancer mortality rates in the US by county set against a map showing levels of naturally occurring background radiation. V/O: What they wanted to know was whether this variation in cancer could be linked to radiation exposure. DR REPACHOLI: Radiation is everywhere, everything we drink, breathe, eat. Building materials, people have radioactive material in them, it’s just part of life. V/O: The average dose from background radiation is around 2.5 millisieverts per year. But in high-altitude areas like America’s mountain states of Utah and Idaho and Colorado the dose shown here in red is twice that. Yet when scientists compared these states with high background with cancer incidence, they had a surprise. DR BROOKS: You can see that these states with the high radiation background dose are the states that have the lowest cancer incidence. States out here with the lowest background radiation are the ones that have the highest cancer incidence so you can see from this that if radiation is playing its role, it’s not a big hitter. And the evidence put forward about the radiation exposure of airline crews. V/O: At 35,000 feet, the typical altitude of an international flight, radiation levels reach the equivalent of nearly 36 millisieverts per year. That’s nearly twenty times normal background radiation... V/O: Translated into typical flying hours, this means the average airline crew is subject to about 11 millisieverts or eleven hundred chest X-rays every year of their working lives. Yet even at these higher doses there is no significant increase in cancer rates. Dr KARAM: They’ve studied military flight crew as well as civilian flight crews for various lengths of flights. What they’ve found is some studies that show a slight increase in cancers, other studies that showed a slight decrease in cancers. None of those studies show an increase in birth defects, and the net result of all of this is that we just have to conclude that there is just very little effect from this elevated radiation from flying. V/O: Findings like this have led a growing number of scientists to conclude that radiation doses below about a hundred millisieverts per year may not be as carcinogenic as we think. In fact some studies suggest the relationship is even more unexpected. The Committee then noted the programme’s reference to evidence of blood samples from people who were living in an area of Iran with extremely high natural background radiation levels. It noted how the programme delivered the findings that the blood having been exposed to radiation had shown significantly fewer chromosomal abnormalities than the blood cells of people living in areas of normal background radiation. The programme stated: V/O: It sounds totally improbable. But it appears that radiation may actually help the body resist genetic damage. The Committee also noted the programme’s further coverage of this possibility when it commented upon on evidence from Dr Chesser’s research. V/O: Tissue samples taken from animals from the Chernobyl region however looked very different... V/O: It suggests that radiation appears to stimulate precisely those genes that protect the body against cancer. Low-level radiation may be beneficial. Dr CHESSER: One of the thoughts that comes out of this is that prior exposure to low levels of radiation actually may have a beneficial effect and this is a positive impact of low doses of radiation. The Committee noted the programme’s caveat to the mounting proposition. V/O: It’s a controversial idea [Committee’s emphasis] but it’s further suggested evidence that it’s time to rethink our understanding of the hazards of radiation. It then noted how the programme discussed how this evidence would affect the LNT curve. V/O: Today there is a growing suspicion that the current model of radiation risk is out of date. Dr KARAM: ...so if we calculate risk estimates based on LNT then we are certainly going to be safe but there’s a growing feeling among my colleagues that it oversimplifies things. V/O: Instead of the LNT graph finishing as a straight line, could something else be going on? Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation below about a hundred millisieverts is harmless then this curve really comes along this axis before going up to this point ... this is called a threshold model. You need at least a hundred millisieverts before any adverse consequence occurs. V/O: There is a second possibility. Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation is beneficial then this curve would really look like this. Called a J-shaped curve, and that would be the resultant curve. In this case this would be a benefit from the radiation exposure and this would be the detrimental side of this axis but I think most scientists believe that this is probably not supportable hypothesis [Committee’s emphasis]. The Committee considered the scientific evidence referred to in the programme which suggested the possibility of a threshold to the LNT model. It found that, while the programme provided a powerful presentation of evidence on how health could be affected at low levels of exposure to radiation, it failed to incorporate within its narrative an appropriate reference to alternative opinions to those expressed, both to the individual items of research referred to by the programme and to the overall thesis. The issue – the effects of radiation – already acknowledged by the Committee as being controversial, had to be treated with due impartiality. The Committee recognised that the narrative had doubted whether the evidence of health benefits at low levels of exposure could be supported scientifically. However, the Committee noted that the programme had not, when setting forward arguments raising the possibility of a threshold to the LNT curve, made reference to the lively debate within the scientific community, which disputed this evidence – arguments that supported the LNT hypothesis or that there was no safe level of contamination. The Committee noted that this did not mean the programme had to give equal time to each side or to provide a representation of every argument. It did, however, require it to be fair and open-minded and make reference to the fact that there were other views on the subject to the ones expressed. The Committee therefore upheld this element of the complaint. In making this decision the Committee believed it was important to remind all programme areas that they had the same responsibility as news programmes to ensure impartiality, particularly when dealing with a controversial subject. It was, therefore, important for a programme to provide appropriate and proportionate opportunity to reflect those other views. Editorial Integrity and Independence The Committee was satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had been influenced by outside commercial or political interests in its making or scheduling. The Committee accepted that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had come about for any other reasons than as a result of the production team’s investigation into the scientific reporting of this subject. The Committee noted that the programme had been commissioned in October 2005 and had been originally pencilled in for transmission at the time of the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Its move to a later transmission date in July 2007 had meant that the broadcast coincided with the Government’s announcement that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations. This announcement date was not in the public domain at the time the programme schedule was published. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on editorial integrity and independence. Complaints handling Finally, with regard to the handling of the complaint, the Committee was satisfied that the tone of the responses as well as the detail of the replies was appropriate. It acknowledged that there was a delay to the reply from the ECU, but felt that the complexity of the subject matter and the effort that had been taken by ECU to reply to the complainant mitigated the length of time the complainant had had to wait for a decision to his complaint. The Committee was satisfied that no further action was required. Finding: The Committee upheld one element of the complaint concerning impartiality but did not otherwise uphold the complaint on issues of accuracy or editorial integrity. 17 The Other Report On Chernobyl (TORCH), 2006, Ian Fairlie & David Sumner (http://cricket.biol.sc.edu/chernobyl/papers/TORCH.pdf), launched at Chernobyl Forum, Vienna, September 2005 Horizon: Nuclear Nightmares BBC Two, 13 July 2006 Complaint C This appeal is a reconsideration of an earlier finding by the Committee. Following the initial finding in April 2007, the Committee received a request that the finding be reconsidered for the following reasons: • It contained factual inaccuracies in that the Chernobyl Forum’s report was not peer-reviewed (the initial finding referred to it as being peer-reviewed). • The process of reaching the finding was procedurally unfair in that the finding referred to the TORCH17 report which the programme team was not given an opportunity to comment upon. The Committee felt that, in order to be fair to all parties to the complaint, it was appropriate for it to look again at the complaint and review its finding in light of the points raised. The complaint and reviewed finding are set out below. Finding in full 1 The programme The programme considered whether the fear of radiation following the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the accidents at nuclear power stations such as Chernobyl was justified. It asked whether scientists had misunderstood the effects of radiation and overestimated its risks. Horizon’s investigation had also suggested that there is a threshold below which some experts believe radiation is not only harmless but may be beneficial. 2 The complaint The complaint is summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint): • The programme was “inaccurate and misleading to the general public”. • It was “nothing more than a propaganda piece for the nuclear industry”. • “It was dishonest as you based the programme on the Ukraine southwards, where only 20% of the radiation from Chernobyl settled. The bulk of radiation fell on Belarus, 70% to be exact.” • The programme “did not give the true facts of events in respect to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, by stating that only 50 people died”. • The contaminated material buried on Belarusian soil had contaminated the water supply and covered an area the size of England and was a “no-go” zone for humans. • “There was no mention of deformed children in Belarus or animals equally deformed.” • The programme “failed to talk to the doctors at the hospitals and visit the Cancer Hospital [all in Belarus]”. • The programme “failed to mention the Thyroid cancers”. • “The scientists on your programme indicated that a bit of radiation is good for you ... [which] failed to give the true picture of the situation following Chernobyl and has given the general public a false impression.” • The complainant stated that, having just returned from the region of Minsk, he was informed by consultants that all cancers were on the increase and that the situation had not yet peaked after 20 years. • He also pointed out that the authorities in Belarus had not been aware of the programme and had not given it their “clearance and approval”. BBC response The Head of the Editorial Complaints Unit (HECU) did not uphold the complaint. A summary of his finding is set out below: • HECU noted that the purpose of the programme was to “explore the scientific understanding surrounding the measurement and prediction of the effects of radiation on the human body”. • There was no reason why Horizon should not examine the science behind the correlation between exposure and health effects. • Horizon takes seriously its requirement to highlight work produced by properly qualified scientists, and published against peer review. • The programme was based in large part on the work of the Chernobyl Forum, and Belarus is one of the members of the Forum. Its findings were endorsed by all the members, so they have been approved by the Government of Belarus. • The Government of Belarus has approved a document that states that the illnesses witnessed by the complainant cannot be definitively linked to radiation from the Chernobyl explosion, and this document has been prepared by properly qualified and independent scientists drawn from a variety of organisations. • The Executive Producer explained why the programme did not refer to Caesium-137: - Have the measurements [the complainant] alludes to been published or submitted to peer review? - Under these circumstances it is difficult to see why anecdotal evidence should be included in a programme explicitly dealing with the scientific evidence of the hazards of radiation exposure. - Caesium-137 is ubiquitous in the environment following 600-odd atmospheric nuclear tests since 1945, every single person on the planet is “contaminated” with Caesium- 137. - The Chernobyl Forum did not believe that Caesium-137 was sufficiently high to pose a significant health threat. - The complainant asserts that 4,000 children tested “one summer” all had levels of radiocaesium contamination “over the permitted dose”, but he gives no figures. • As to the possibility of small amounts of radiation being beneficial, HECU highlighted the frequent use of X-rays in medicine to show that some level of radiation is effectively harmless. The ECU’s investigation found that there was some scientific support for the ideas that it might be beneficial. • HECU noted that the programme remained cautious of the information and for that reason included an interview clip expressing scepticism. • HECU felt it was not inappropriate that a programme exploring the science of the issue mentioned these scientific findings and it was a balanced approach. 3 Applicable editorial standards Section 1 – The BBC’s Editorial Values Editorial Integrity and Independence The BBC is independent of both state and partisan interests. Our audiences can be confident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by any personal interests. Section 3 – Accuracy The BBC’s commitment to accuracy is a core editorial value and fundamental to our reputation. Our output must be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We should be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. For the BBC accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. We aim to achieve accuracy by: • the accurate gathering of material using first hand sources wherever possible. • checking and cross checking the facts. • validating the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material. • corroborating claims and allegations made by contributors wherever possible. Misleading audiences We should not distort known facts, present invented material as fact, or knowingly do anything to mislead our audiences. Section 4 – Impartiality & Diversity of Opinion Impartiality lies at the heart of the BBC’s commitment to its audiences. It applies across all of our services and output. The Agreement accompanying the BBC’s Charter requires us to produce comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the UK and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate. It specifies that we should do all we can to treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality in our news services and other programmes dealing with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It also states that the BBC is forbidden from expressing an opinion on current affairs or matters of public policy other than broadcasting. In practice, our commitment to impartiality means: • we seek to provide a properly balanced service consisting of a wide range of subject matter and views broadcast over an appropriate time scale across all our output. We take particular care when dealing with political or industrial controversy or major matters relating to current public policy. • we strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under represented. • we exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. • we can explore or report on a specific aspect of an issue or provide an opportunity for a single view to be expressed, but in doing so we do not misrepresent opposing views. They may also require a right of reply. • we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects. Achieving impartiality Impartiality is described in the Agreement as “due impartiality”. It requires us to be fair and open minded when examining the evidence and weighing all the material facts, as well as being objective and even handed in our approach to a subject. It does not require the representation of every argument or facet of every argument on every occasion or an equal division of time for each view. Section 13- Editorial Integrity and Independence The BBC’s global reputation is based on its editorial integrity and independence. Our audiences need to be confident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by any personal interests. We must not undermine these values by any actions which could bring the BBC into disrepute. 4 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaints against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint, who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. The Committee accepted that there were different, competing and contradictory strands of scientific analysis regarding the after-effects of the Chernobyl fire as evidenced by the Chernobyl Forum report and TORCH. This was not exceptional. Scientific thought advances over time as a result of constant challenges by experts. It was not within the remit of the Committee to reach a determination as to which elements of the reports were scientifically 18 The Other Report On Chernobyl (TORCH), 2006, Ian Fairlie & David Sumner (http://cricket.biol.sc.edu/chernobyl/papers/TORCH.pdf), launched at Chernobyl Forum, Vienna, September 2005 valid. Its task was to determine whether the editorial guidelines had been complied with in terms of accuracy and impartiality. The Committee first considered the concerns about whether the programme had accurately considered the evidence regarding the fallout in Belarus and, as suggested by the complainant, the increased incidence of cancers in children and people living in the contaminated areas of that country. It noted that the programme had relied on the report from the Chernobyl Forum (initiated by the International Atomic Energy Authority) in which it was stated: “The contaminated areas in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine received relatively minor radiation doses which are comparable with the natural background levels; this level of exposure did not result in any observable radiation-induced health effects.” It also noted that the Forum had included representatives of the Belarusian Government who had agreed with the findings and signed off the final report. It also recognised that the programme’s evidence had been based on a report that had been published and was an examination of peer-reviewed reports. It was recognised as a significant and reputable review of the effects of radioactive contamination in the region. The Committee also noted the summary of conclusions of the TORCH report as supplied by the complainant. This was an evaluation of the health and environmental effects of the Chernobyl accident commissioned by the Green bloc in the European Parliament, which also provided an evaluation of the report produced by the Chernobyl Forum. It noted that the report disputed the claims of the Chernobyl Forum on the number of eventual deaths resulting from Chernobyl and the increased incidence of thyroid and solid cancers particularly in Belarus: Thyroid cancers: “Depending on the risk model used, estimates of future excess cases of thyroid cancer range between 18,000 and 66,000 in Belarus alone.” Solid cancers: “Most solid cancers have long periods between exposure and appearance of between 20 and 60 years. Now, 20 years after the accident, an average 40% increased incidence in solid cancers has already been observed in Belarus with the most pronounced increase in the contaminated regions.” However, the Committee also noted the TORCH18 report’s final summary of the Chernobyl Forum report: “We recognise that the reports contain comprehensive examinations of Chernobyl’s effects in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.” The Committee agreed that the programme had clearly set out that it was considering the report of the Chernobyl Forum and why. The commentary stated that: “For the last twenty years the health of the people of Chernobyl has been tracked in huge detail. Figures for death and illness have varied widely. But the most authoritative were published in 2005 by the Chernobyl Forum, an international organisation of scientific agencies including a number of UN bodies.” It also noted that the programme set out that: “...the Chernobyl Forum has been unable to link any other increase in ill-health of birth defects that can be attributed to radiation...” which left open the possibility that an increase may or may not be due to radiation but that the link was not clear. The Committee decided that there had been no breach of the obligation for due accuracy in that the programme identified the report upon which it was relying. The issue of whether contrary viewpoints should have been described more fully was to be considered in the context of its review of impartiality. Impartiality The Committee then considered the issue of due impartiality and the programme’s comments on the Chernobyl accident and its wider investigation into the effects on health of low-level radiation. It acknowledged that the BBC sought to provide a wide range of subject matter and in terms of science that included examining scientific thinking that was new and/or controversial in the eyes of the public and/or to the scientific community. It recognised that the programme had the editorial freedom to consider what was, to the public, a new and counter-intuitive view of the effects of exposure to radiation at low levels. The subject matter of this Horizon was controversial and related very directly to a matter of political controversy – the dangers or otherwise of a nuclear power programme. It noted that the programme commentary alluded to this in stating: “As the world faces up to a new threat from global warming, and the controversial alternative provided by nuclear power, a growing number of scientists are asking whether it’s time to think again about the dangers of radiation.” It noted that the programme was broadcast two days after the Government had announced that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations – a decision that was contested by other political parties. In this context an analysis of the report on the Chernobyl accident and the investigation into low-level radiation required a range and conflict of views to be reflected within the programme. Even without the context of the Government announcement however (and even setting aside that it was in the public domain that a statement was expected in July and that the future of nuclear power was under review), the Committee recognised that the area of science being investigated by the programme was controversial. It would always be an area that required careful consideration to ensure that there were appropriate balances and checks as to what was being put forward. It was therefore, the Committee believed, important for the production team to ensure that within the programme its arguments did not misrepresent or fail to represent appropriate opposing views. The Committee noted how the LNT was initially described: VOICE OVER (V/O): In 1958, using data largely drawn from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first systematic attempt to quantify the relationship between radiation dose and cancer was published. It was called the LNT or linear no threshold model... DR REPACHOLI: The linear non threshold dose model is composed of the dose that people received and then the risk, the percentage increase in risk of getting cancer from this dose ... We know that the increase in risk of getting cancer from an exposure of about 2,000 millisieverts is about 10% ... And for 1,000 it’s the order of 6% increase in the risk of cancer. For 500 it’s about 3, so that you can see that you can draw a straight line through those points... V/O: So with a simple graph scientists could see there was a direct link between radiation dose and the risk of cancer. And how the programme introduced the issue of measuring risk to health at low doses: V/O: The new LNT model offered a partial answer but one thing remained unknown. DR REPACHOLI: The linear model was based on high doses and we just didn’t know what was going on at lower doses of between one and two hundred millisieverts. V/O: So scientists made a calculated guess. DR REPACHOLI: As a conservative assumption and for radiation protection purposes ... we have an assumption that this linear non threshold dose actually keeps coming down through zero. So that all radiation is dangerous. ...This then allowed nuclear power stations or hospitals with radio therapy departments to calculate the amount of shielding that was required to protect workers... The Committee then noted how the programme equated the LNT calculation against the actual deaths of emergency workers and people immediately affected by the fallout following the Chernobyl disaster. It noted the disparity in the LNT calculation which projected 4,000 deaths, and the 56 deaths that had been reported by the Chernobyl Forum published 19 years after the disaster in 2005. The programme noted that this figure would increase through the incidence of leukaemia and solid cancers that occurred between 10 and 25 years after the initial accident, but was satisfied from the death toll already known that an “epidemic” was not expected. The Committee then noted how the programme introduced the evidence which suggested a different view of what was happening at low levels of radiation exposure: V/O: These figures are hundreds of times lower than the predictions based on the LNT model. So could it be that scientists have misunderstood what’s going on? Could it be that at low doses, the sort associated with even a major nuclear power station accident, radiation is not as dangerous as we think? The Committee found that whilst the programme had considered the evidence on the effect of Chernobyl by reference to the Chernobyl Forum Report and had indicated that figures for death and illness vary widely, in relying solely on the Chernobyl Forum’s Report, it had failed to convey that there were conflicting views on the figures which offered an alternative explanation for the variance between the LNT model predicted death rates and those in the report. It noted that the programme first referred to the research of Dr Chesser, who studied the effects of radiation on wild life in the exclusion zone around Chernobyl. V/O: Chesser set out a series of traps and collected animals. DR CHESSER: I will never forget when we picked up the traps the next day and found that we have a great diversity of animal life living right there in this most contaminated spot... And: DR CHESSER: The real winners in this radioactive contest are these little guys, the bank voles. Now these animals would have been much more radioactive in life than what they are here [the voles were in a cabinet]. This is only measuring the amount of radioactivity that is deposited in the skin. Still thesee are very, very active. We were finding that the radiation doses were between eight and fifteen millisieverts per day. V/O: Eight to fifteen millisieverts per day is the equivalent of at least 8,000 chest X-rays in one day. DR CHESSER: This is a very significant amount of radiation and we were compelled to think that we will see damage here... V/O: Chesser analysed his samples for genetic damage. DR CHESSER: We began the study on what’s called the micro nucleus formation which is really looking at remnants of broken chromosomes... V/O: Chesser and his team compared the proportion of genetic damage in 10,000 cells from each animal. Then they compared them with the control group. DR CHESSER: There was no difference. No difference at all. The radioactivity, even though it was very high, according to all of our measures was not enough to result in any appreciable measure of DNA damage in animals that live their entire life spans in this area. The Committee, while it noted a complainant’s concerns as to the lack of comment by the programme that published research involving Dr Chesser as author had been withdrawn, was satisfied that the evidence quoted was based on Dr Chesser’s revised and corrected research, and as such it was appropriate for the programme to refer to its findings without further reference to the earlier publication. The Committee then considered the other evidence put forward by the programme. It noted the reference to a series of maps showing cancer mortality rates in the US by county set against a map showing levels of naturally occurring background radiation. V/O: What they wanted to know was whether this variation in cancer could be linked to radiation exposure. DR REPACHOLI: Radiation is everywhere, everything we drink, breathe, eat. Building materials, people have radioactive material in them, it’s just part of life. V/O: The average dose from background radiation is around 2.5 millisieverts per year. But in high-altitude areas like America’s mountain states of Utah and Idaho and Colorado the dose shown here in red is twice that. Yet when scientists compared these states with high background with cancer incidence, they had a surprise. DR BROOKS: You can see that these states with the high radiation background dose are the states that have the lowest cancer incidence. States out here with the lowest background radiation are the ones that have the highest cancer incidence so you can see from this that if radiation is playing its role, it’s not a big hitter. And the evidence put forward about the radiation exposure of airline crews: V/O: At 35,000 feet, the typical altitude of an international flight, radiation levels reach the equivalent of nearly 36 millisieverts per year. That’s nearly twenty times normal background radiation... V/O: Translated into typical flying hours, this means the average airline crew is subject to about 11 millisieverts or elevn hundred chest X-rays every year of their working lives. Yet even at these higher doses there is no significant increase in cancer rates. DR KARAM: They’ve studied military flight crew as well as civilian flight crews for various lengths of flights. What they’ve found is some studies that show a slight increase in cancers, other studies that showed a slight decrease in cancers. None of those studies show an increase in birth defects, and the net result of all of this is that we just have to conclude that there is just very little effect from this elevated radiation from flying. V/O: Findings like this have led a growing number of scientists to conclude that radiation doses below about a hundred millisieverts per year may not be as carcinogenic as we think. In fact some studies suggest the relationship is even more unexpected. The Committee then noted the programme’s evidence of blood samples from people who were living in an area of Iran with extremely high natural background radiation levels. It noted how the programme delivered its findings that the blood having been exposed to radiation had shown significantly fewer chromosomal abnormalities than the blood cells of people living in areas of normal background radiation. The programme stated: V/O: It sounds totally improbable. But it appears that radiation may actually help the body resist genetic damage. The Committee also noted the programme’s further coverage of this possibility when it commented on evidence from Dr Chesser’s research: V/O: Tissue samples taken from animals from the Chernobyl region, however, looked very different... V/O: It suggests that radiation appears to stimulate precisely those genes that protect the body against cancer. Low-level radiation may be beneficial. DR CHESSER: One of the thoughts that comes out of this is that prior exposure to low levels of radiation actually may have a beneficial effect and this is a positive impact of low doses of radiation. The Committee noted the programme’s caveat to the mounting proposition: V/O: It’s a controversial idea [Committee’s emphasis] but it’s further suggested evidence that it’s time to rethink our understanding of the hazards of radiation. It then noted how the programme discussed how this evidence would affect the LNT curve. V/O: Today there is a growing suspicion that the current model of radiation risk is out of date. Dr KARAM: ...so if we calculate risk estimates based on LNT then we are certainly going to be safe but there’s a growing feeling among my colleagues that it oversimplifies things. V/O: Instead of the LNT graph finishing as a straight line, could something else be going on? Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation below about a hundred millisieverts is harmless then this curve really comes along this axis before going up to this point ... this is called a threshold model. You need at least a hundred millisieverts before any adverse consequence occurs. V/O: There is a second possibility. Dr REPACHOLI: If radiation is beneficial then this curve would really look like this. Called a J-shaped curve, and that would be the resultant curve. In this case this would be a benefit from the radiation exposure and this would be the detrimental side of this axis but I think most scientists believe that this is probably not supportable hypothesis [Committee’s emphasis]. The Committee considered the scientific evidence referred to in the programme which suggested the possibility of a threshold to the LNT model. It found that, while the programme provided a powerful presentation of evidence on how health could be affected at low levels of exposure to radiation, it failed to incorporate within its narrative an appropriate reference to alternative opinions to those expressed, both to the individual items of research referred to by the programme and to the overall thesis. The issue – the effects of radiation – already acknowledged by the Committee as being controversial, had to be treated with due impartiality. The Committee recognised that the narrative had doubted whether the evidence of health benefits at low levels of exposure could be supported scientifically. However, the Committee noted that the programme had not, when setting forward arguments raising the possibility of a threshold to the LNT curve, made reference to the lively debate within the scientific community, which disputed this evidence – arguments that supported the LNT hypothesis or that there was no safe level of contamination. The Committee noted that this did not mean the programme had to give equal time to each side or to provide a representation of every argument. It did, however, require it to be fair and open-minded and make reference to the fact that there were other views on the subject to the ones expressed. The Committee therefore upheld this element of the complaint. In making this decision the Committee believed it was important to remind all programme areas that they had the same responsibility as news programmes to ensure impartiality – particularly when dealing with a controversial subject. It was, therefore, important for a programme to provide appropriate and proportionate opportunity to reflect those other views. Editorial Integrity and Independence The Committee was satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had been influenced by outside commercial or political interests in its making or scheduling. The Committee accepted that there was no evidence to suggest that the programme had come about for any other reasons than as a result of the production team’s investigation into the scientific reporting of this subject. The Committee noted that the programme had been commissioned in October 2005 and had been originally pencilled in for transmission at the time of the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Its move to a later transmission date in July 2007 had meant that the broadcast coincided with the Government’s announcement that nuclear power had a role to play in the UK’s future generating mix and that it would consult on setting its policy framework for the building of new nuclear power stations. This announcement date was not in the public domain at the time the programme schedule was published. The Committee was therefore satisfied that the programme had not breached guidelines on editorial integrity and independence. Process The Committee also noted that, with regard to any investigation done on the Committee’s behalf, it was imperative that the presenter (if directly criticised) or producer of the programme be contacted by the Committee’s editorial adviser to ensure that they were aware of the complaint and could contribute to the investigation. If for any reason contact could not be made with these people it would be required that the BBC division responsible for the commissioning of the programme should provide in writing, to the Committee’s adviser, notice that the relevant people had been notified of the investigation and impending appeal. In this case the programme producer was aware of the appeal but had not had direct contact with the editorial adviser during the initial investigation. The Committee would require that the Trust’s Complaints Manager ensured that all editorial advisers were also made aware of this responsibility. Finding: The Committee upheld the complaint on the lack of impartiality, but did not otherwise uphold the complaints regarding accuracy or editorial independence. From Our Own Correspondent Radio 4, 20 January 2007 and bbc.co.uk, BBC News i) Profile of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran: ‘The enigma of Prabhakaran’ ii) ‘Bomb targets Tamil Tigers’ critic’, 1 December 2006 1 The complaint This complaint concerned the coverage of events in Sri Lanka on the BBC News website, and in a report by Chris Morris for From Our Own Correspondent (FOOC) on Radio 4 and published on the BBC News website on 20 January 2007. The complainant suggested that the BBC was biased towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and did not tell the truth in its reporting on this topic. The complainant raised a number of examples to support his view. The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies). 1.1 BBC News websites Article 1 Profile of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran: ‘The enigma of Prabhakaran’ The complainant stated: • By publishing the profile of the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the BBC was giving too much prominence to the Sri Lankan organisation. • His name was listed with present and recently past leaders of Sri Lanka. • The same amount of exposure was not given to al-Qaeda leaders or Osama bin Laden. • The website should have described Vellupillai Prabhakaran as a “terrorist leader”. • The BBC was biased toward the LTTE. BBC response BBC Information and the Director-General, in response to the complainant’s MP, responded at stage 1 of the process. BBC Information stated in its reply: • “...our News Website aims to provide readers of this service with a thorough and balanced understanding of the issues pertaining to Sri Lanka.” • “The word ‘terrorist’ itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to avoid the term, without attribution.” • “...in the wake of events of 11 September 2001, we have provided numerous programmes, reports and articles on al-Qaeda and bin Laden.” • “...we have to provide links to all sides to the conflict as well as report on the principal players – that includes Tamil Tiger leader Prabhakaran.” The Director-General, Mark Thompson, responded: • “In the case of civil wars, as in Sri Lanka, we typically profile the key personalities. At present two of the key personalities are clearly President Rajapakse and the Tamil Tiger leader Prabhakaran.” • “The BBC covers an incredibly wide range of individuals and groups in our news coverage. To offer accurate, impartial information on any individual or group does not imply support of them or their cause – rather it meets our obligation to provide our users with a full range of facts on the conflict.” At stage 2 of the complaints process the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU) did not uphold the complaint, putting forward similar arguments as had been previously stated, including: • “...the profile of Velupillia Prabhakaran gives a balanced assessment of his role. It says for example, ‘To his followers, he is a freedom fighter struggling for Tamil emancipation from Sinhala oppression. To his adversaries he is a megalomaniac with a brutal disregard for human life.’ It goes on to say that he is the prime suspect for a number of murders, including that of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian Prime Minister.” • “...there is a lengthy profile in the section for South Asia, which includes details of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.” Article 2 ‘Bomb targets Tamil Tigers’ critic’, dated 1 December 2006 The article had described the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary, Gothabaya Rajapaske, as a “vocal critic of the rebels” and “a hardliner who is against holding talks with them [LTTE]”, when referring to his escape from a suicide bomb attack in Colombo. The complainant stated: • The BBC had been spreading untruths and/or half-truths. • He was strongly of the opinion that the BBC had always been trying to project the LTTE terrorists as freedom fighters rather than terrorists. BBC response BBC Information replied at stage 1: • “...the reference to Gothabaya Rajapaske was intended to offer some context and explain the political stance he has taken in the past for which he is well known.” • “...the BBC has no bias towards any organisation in Sri Lanka, and our coverage of events in that country is not governed by any desire to satisfy the sympathies of any individual towards the LTTE.” ECU did not uphold the complaint at stage 2: • After carrying out its own research, ECU was satisfied that the descriptions accurately reflected the widely held view of people within Sri Lanka and around the world. • Comments by Gothabaya Rajapakse himself, as reported by other media, also supported this view. ECU concluded that there was “persuasive evidence to justify the description of Mr Rajapakse as a ‘known hardliner’”. 1.2 From Our Own Correspondent (FOOC) This complaint referred to the FOOC article on the BBC News website by Chris Morris entitled ‘Civil war haunts Sri Lanka again’, dated 20 January 2007. The piece reported the end of the ceasefire declared in Sri Lanka between the government and the Tamil Tiger rebel movement. The complainant felt that this article illustrated bias towards the Sri Lankan group LTTE and did not tell the truth. The complainant felt the piece contained a number of factual inaccuracies regarding: • The statement that kidnap was common and that Tamil businessmen were being kidnapped. Further, the complainant queried whether there was any proof for the assertion that “rogue elements of the security forces are probably involved”. • There is no place called Sinhala south in Sri Lanka. • Mr Morris implied that the president was elected by the Sinhalese majority. • The piece “failed to say there is an internal conflict by a group of outlaws who have turned terrorist and they kill anyone who oppose their view/s”. • Further, the complainant requested the names of Tamil businessmen who had been kidnapped and raised the issue of whether it was only Tamil businessmen who were kidnapped or also Muslims, Sinhalese and others. BBC response The producer of FOOC responded at stage 1 of the process: • “...the article concerned the mood in the capital city of Colombo and not in other parts of the island.” • “The BBC regularly reports on abuses carried out by this organisation (LTTE) ... it is inaccurate to claim that the BBC has paid no attention to the LTTE’s long record of attacks on both civilian and military targets.” • Regarding the reported kidnapping of Tamil businessmen: “Journalists working in Colombo know of several cases.” • “Mr Morris spoke to human rights workers, political analysts, businessmen and diplomats in Colombo before filing his piece. Many of them wanted to remain anonymous, but we have faith in their veracity as sources.” ECU responded at stage 2 and did not uphold the complaint for the following reasons: • “Chris Morris’ report that Tamil businessmen are being kidnapped for ransom has been widely reported in the media [such as Amnesty International, The Guardian and The New York Times] for many months.” • “This makes it clear that there has been a significant increase in the number of kidnappings and that the increase is largely due to the actions of the security forces and groups opposed to the Tamil campaign for a separate homeland.” • The ECU could not find any reference by Mr Morris to Sinhala south. • The report did not make any claim about the backgrounds of the people who voted for Mahinda Rajapakse in the national election. • “...Mr Morris was looking at the options facing the new president following the effective collapse of the ceasefire between the government and the LTTE. There was no need for him to give a detailed explanation of the previous civil war, or the track record of the LTTE ... Mr Morris made it clear that the violence had escalated on both sides.” 2 Applicable programme standards BBC Editorial Values Truth and accuracy We strive to be accurate and establish the truth of what has happened. Accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. We will weigh all relevant facts and information to get at the truth. Our output will be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We will be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. Impartiality & diversity of opinion We strive to be fair and open minded and reflect all significant strands of opinion by exploring the range and conflict of views. We will be objective and even handed in our approach to a subject. We will provide professional judgments where appropriate, but we will never promote a particular view on controversial matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy. Section 3 – Accuracy Introduction The BBC’s commitment to accuracy is a core editorial value and fundamental to our reputation. Our output must be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We should be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. For the BBC accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. We aim to achieve accuracy by: • the accurate gathering of material using first hand sources wherever possible. • checking and cross checking the facts. • validating the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material. • corroborating claims and allegations made by contributors wherever possible. Gathering material We should try to witness events and gather information first hand. Where this is not possible, we should talk to first hand sources and, where necessary, corroborate their evidence. We should be reluctant to rely on a single source. If we do rely on a single source, a named on the record source is always preferable. We should normally only rely on an agency report if it can be substantiated by a BBC correspondent or if it is attributed to a reputable national or international news agency. Fact checking We must check and verify information, facts and documents, particularly those researched on the internet. This may include confirming with an individual or organisation that they posted material and that it is accurate. Even the most convincing material on the web may not be what it seems. Misleading audiences We should not distort known facts, present invented material as fact, or knowingly do anything to mislead our audiences. Section 4 – Impartiality & Diversity of Opinion Impartiality lies at the heart of the BBC’s commitment to its audiences. It applies across all of our services and output, whatever the format, from radio news bulletins via our web sites to our commercial magazines and includes a commitment to reflecting a diversity of opinion. The Agreement accompanying the BBC’s Charter requires us to produce comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the UK and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate. It specifies that we should do all we can to treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality in our news services and other programmes dealing with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It also states that the BBC is forbidden from expressing an opinion on current affairs or matters of public policy other than broadcasting. Special considerations apply during the campaign periods for elections. In practice, our commitment to impartiality means: • we seek to provide a properly balanced service consisting of a wide range of subject matter and views broadcast over an appropriate time scale across all our output. We take particular care when dealing with political or industrial controversy or major matters relating to current public policy. • we strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under represented. • we exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. • we can explore or report on a specific aspect of an issue or provide an opportunity for a single view to be expressed, but in doing so we do not misrepresent opposing views. They may also require a right of reply. • we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects. • the approach to, and tone of, BBC stories must always reflect our editorial values. Presenters, reporters and correspondents are the public face and voice of the BBC, they can have a significant impact on the perceptions of our impartiality. • our journalists and presenters, including those in news and current affairs, may provide professional judgments but may not express personal opinions on matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy. Our audiences should not be able to tell from BBC programmes or other BBC output the personal views of our journalists and presenters on such matters. Section 11 – War, Terror and Emergencies Terror We must report acts of terror quickly, accurately, fully and responsibly. Our credibility is undermined by the careless use of words which carry emotional or value judgements. The word “terrorist” itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to avoid the term, without attribution. We should let other people characterise while we report the facts as we know them. We should not adopt other people’s language as our own. It is also usually inappropriate to use words like “liberate”, “court martial” or “execute” in the absence of a clear judicial process. We should convey to our audience the full consequences of the act by describing what happened. We should use words which specifically describe the perpetrator such as “bomber”, “attacker”, “gunman”, “kidnapper”, “insurgent, and “militant”. Our responsibility is to remain objective and report in ways that enable our audiences to make their own assessments about who is doing what to whom. Guidance to support BBC Editorial Guidelines Terrorism, Use of Language when Reporting Background Our policy is about achieving consistency and accuracy in our journalism. We recognise the existence and the reality of terrorism – at this point in the twenty first century we could hardly do otherwise. Moreover, we don’t change the word “terrorist” when quoting other people, but we try to avoid the word ourselves; not because we are morally neutral towards terrorism, nor because we have any sympathy for the perpetrators of the inhuman atrocities which all too often we have to report, but because terrorism is a difficult and emotive subject with significant political overtones. We also need to ensure that when we report acts of terror, we do so consistently in the stories we report across our services. We have learnt from the experience of covering such events in Northern Ireland as much as in Israel, Spain, Russia, Southern Africa or the many other places where violence divides communities, and where we seek to be seen as objective by all sides, that labels applied to groups can sometimes hinder rather than help. As the guideline makes clear, careful use of the word “terrorist” is essential if the BBC is to maintain its reputation for standards of accuracy and especially impartiality. This is especially true when we use the word to describe a person or a group as opposed to an action or event (“the terrorist group”, say, as opposed “an act of terror” or “terrorist tactics” or “terrorism”). That does not mean we should emasculate our reporting or otherwise avoid conveying the reality and horror of what has occurred; but we should consider the impact our use of language may have on our reputation for objective journalism amongst our many audiences. Moreover in a digital age, it is no longer possible to assume an easy split between domestic and overseas audiences. What we do is seen, heard or read everywhere. This further Guidance Note explains the issues that lie behind the Editorial Guidelines on reporting Terror and the use of language, and suggests some issues to bear in mind as you consider what you are going to say. Definitions Unfortunately, there is no agreed or universal consensus on what constitutes a terrorist, or a terrorist attack. Dictionaries may offer definitions but the United Nations has again just failed to reach agreement. The obvious reason is that terrorism is regarded through a political prism. Our approach The Editorial Guideline focuses on the use of the word “terrorist”: “Our credibility is undermined by the careless use of words which carry emotional or value judgements. The word “terrorist” itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to avoid the term without attribution”.[1] The Guidelines do not ban the use of the word. However, we do ask that careful thought is given to its use by a BBC voice. There are ways of conveying the full horror and human consequences of acts of terror without using the word “terrorist” to describe the perpetrators. And there are a number of important editorial factors that must be considered before its use to describe individuals or a given group can be justified: • Value judgements The value judgements frequently implicit in the use of the words “terrorist” or “terrorist group” can create inconsistency in their use or, to audiences, raise doubts about our impartiality. For example, the bombing of a bus in London was carried out by “terrorists”, but the bombing of a bus in Israel was perpetrated by a “suicide bomber”. Or again, “terrorists” in London bombed a tube train, but “insurgents” in Iraq have “assassinated” the Egyptian ambassador. The use of the words can imply judgement where there is no clear consensus about the legitimacy of militant political groups. Have we assessed the merits of the different perpetrators’ cause, the acts of the different Governments against the perpetrators, or even the value of civilian lives further from home? We must be careful not to give the impression that we have come to some kind of implicit - and unwarranted – value judgement. Some will argue that certain events are so evidently acts of terror (and, therefore, perpetrated by “terrorists”) that those descriptions are reasonable, and non-judgemental. However, the language we choose to use in reporting one incident cannot be considered in isolation from our reporting of other stories. So to use the word in incidents which we may consider obvious creates difficulties for less clear-cut incidents. As the then-Editor of World Service News wrote in 1988: “Accepting that there are some actions which most people would recognise as a terrorist act- the hand grenade thrown into a crèche, the airport queue machine-gunned – we should still avoid the word. In the first place, our audience is as perceptive as we are, and can make up their own minds without being provided with labels. In the second place, there are actions which are not quite so clearly terrorism, and we should not be forced into the position of having to make value judgements on each event”.[2] On a breaking news story, ask yourself, first of all, is the use of the word “terrorist” accurate? Do we know, or do we suspect? It may be better to talk about an apparent act of terror or terrorism than label individuals or a group. As the facts become clearer we will also wish to describe what has happened as accurately and as clearly as possible. Give as much information as possible. “Bomb attack” conveys more information more quickly than “terrorist attack”, similarly “suicide bomber”, “bomber”, “assassin”, “gun man” help fill in the picture. We also need to ask ourselves whether by using “terrorist” we are taking a political position, or certainly one that may be seen as such. • Consistency We can no longer isolate the BBC’s coverage of the UK from how it reports the rest of the world. With global access to our services, the concept of a “primary audience” is problematic: reports made for News 24 are often shared on BBC World; UK bulletins are streamed on the internet; and users of BBC Online can compare the words used on global and UK pages with just a few mouse clicks. Importantly even within the same bulletin on the same service, there can be issues of inconsistency in how we describe who is doing what to whom. “Militants in Gaza launch a rocket attack: terrorists plant bombs in London...” Don’t assume that what you write or say is confined to a small part of our audience. If you do want to use the word, reassure yourself that its use is going to aid rather than hinder understanding wherever it may be seen or heard. • Precise but effective language Words can be used with precision to make clear what has happened and still convey the awful consequences without needing to resort to labels. For example, Denis Murray, the Northern Ireland correspondent, reported the wake of the Omagh Bombing in 1998. His commentary shows how to get close both to the reality of what has happened and to the emotions and feelings of his audience without any labels or tags: “There should have been a carnival here, instead there was carnage. Saturday afternoon shoppers here because it was safe, crowded together away from a bomb scare. Instead the bomb was in their midst. It killed fourteen women and three young girls ... It killed five men and four young boys ... three of them came from County Donegal, another was a 12 year old boy from Madrid, they were all friends on an exchange scheme. It killed three generations of one family ... a 65 year old grandmother, her pregnant 30 year old daughter and her 18 month old daughter. A litany of the dead ... of the slaughtered innocents”.[3] It is worth asking yourself what the use of the word “terrorist” would have added to that simple but powerful statement of what had happened. This is an issue of judgement. If you do decide to use the word “terrorist” do so sparingly, having considered what is said above, and take advice from senior editors. References [1] Editorial Guidelines, Section 11: War, Terror and Emergencies (Terror) [2] ‘Newsroom Policy on Neutral Language and Terrorism’, David Spaull, (former) Editor, World Service News, 1988 [3] BBC One News, 16 August 1998 3 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. The Committee considered each of the two articles on the BBC News website in turn, before considering the report carried on the From Our Own Correspondent website. Article 1 Profile of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran: ‘The enigma of Prabhakaran’ The Committee first considered whether the inclusion of the article had shown bias in favour of the LTTE. It was satisfied that the inclusion of the article had not in itself shown bias and that it had reflected the BBC’s editorial value on impartiality, which is to: “...strive to be fair and open minded and reflect all significant strands of opinion by exploring a range and conflict of views. We will be objective and even handed in our approach to a subject.” It was also satisfied that the profile had fulfilled the requirement for BBC News to provide “comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs ... throughout the world to support fair and informed debate”, and had been included for good editorial reasons. The Committee noted that, while the inclusion of the profile might have upset those who were opposed to the LTTE, it was important for an impartial objective news organisation to ensure that bias or an imbalance of views was avoided. The guidelines require that a wide range of opinion should be reflected and that the BBC should explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under-represented. The Committee was satisfied that the placing of the profile of Vellupillai Prabhakaran had provided an appropriate balance to that of the profile of the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaske, and that the views of Vellupillai Prabhakaran as leader of the LTTE in the context of the conflict in Sri Lanka were significant. It also agreed that he was a significant figure in the conflict and editorially should be covered on the website. It therefore did not uphold the complaint regarding a breach of the guidelines on impartiality. The Committee then considered whether the profile of Vellupillai Prabhakaran should have referred to him as a “terrorist”. The Committee noted the BBC guideline on the use of this word: “The word “terrorist” itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to avoid the term, without attribution. We should let other people characterise while we report the facts as we know them.” The Committee also noted that the article had first referred to Vellupillai Prabhajaran’s reputation “as a fearless and ruthless guerrilla leader” and then, when describing the different views that people had of him, described him as follows: “To his followers, he is a freedom fighter struggling for Tamil emancipation from Sinhala oppression. To his adversaries he is a megalomaniac with a brutal disregard for human life”. The Committee was satisfied that this had achieved the necessary objectivity and was therefore satisfied that, in line with the guideline on the use of the word “terrorist”, it was appropriate for the article to accurately report the facts and then leave it to others to “characterise” those featured. The Committee did not uphold the complaint. Article 2 ‘Bomb targets Tamil Tigers’ critic’, dated 1 December 2006 The Committee considered whether the article had accurately characterised the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, as a hardliner. It noted the reference to it in the article: “The BBC’s Dumeetha Luthra in Colombo says Gotabhaya Rajapaske has been a vocal critic of the rebels, and is known as a hardliner who is against holding talks with them.” The Committee was satisfied that the term “hardliner” had been well sourced, in that it was based on information provided by Dumeetha Luthra, who had first-hand knowledge of the views of Mr Gotabhaya. The Committee was also satisfied that this opinion of Mr Gotabhaya had been supported by comments he had made since the bombing where he had stated to the Associated Press in April 2007: “There is no cease-fire agreement. There is no meaning in that ... That’s a very dangerous thing, to have relaxed periods, it’s not good for the military. We must not give them time to regroup. We have to continue this push in the north as well and identify the targets and destroy their targets more and more.” In describing Mr Gotabhaya as a “hardliner”, the BBC did not demonstrate support for the LTTE. The Committee did not uphold this element of the complaint. As to whether the article breached guidelines on impartiality, the Committee was satisfied that the article had been fair and open-minded when examining the views of the two sides in the conflict. The Committee believed the article had provided an appropriate opportunity for the views of the two protagonists, the President of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapakse and the LTTE’s Vellupillai Prabhakaran, to be expressed within the context of the bombing. The Committee did not uphold the complaint. Article 3 From Our Own Correspondent, 20 January 2007 The Committee considered whether the article had breached guidelines on due accuracy and due impartiality. It noted the complainant’s concerns that the article had only referred to Tamil businessmen being kidnapped, but was satisfied that the reference to the kidnapping of Tamils had been supported by the journalist’s own first-hand research where he had personal knowledge of several cases of kidnapping among the local community and was latterly acknowledged in the International Crisis Group report about Sri Lanka published in June 2007, which stated: “Since mid-2006, there has been a wave of abductions for ransom, generally targeting Tamil but lately also Muslim business owners.” The Committee was therefore satisfied that the guidelines on due accuracy regarding the gathering of material had been met. As to the issue of due impartiality, the Committee recognised that this was an authored piece from a correspondent with a great deal of experience and knowledge of Sri Lanka and the present conflict. It agreed that the views expressed would add to the public understanding of the conflict in Sri Lanka as well as providing a fresh and original perspective of the issues involved. With regard to the kidnappings of academics and businessmen, the Committee was satisfied that Christopher Morris had conducted sufficient research from first-hand sources among the community, including Sri Lankan officials, human rights workers and businessmen, to have supported his comment that the kidnappings had involved the Sri Lankan security services. The Committee was also satisfied that Mr Morris’s comments had been backed up by press reports, such as the Reuters report in March 2007 that suggested that up to 20 people serving in the police and army had been arrested for, among other things, aiding and abetting the Tamil Tigers, abductions and killings. The Reuters report also quoted a defence spokesman, Keheliya Rambukwella, as saying: “Out of the arrests of the defence personnel, some may be involved in abductions and killings and disappearances.” The Committee was therefore satisfied that the comment had been fairly and accurately reported and had met the guidelines on due accuracy and the gathering of material. With regard to the article as a whole, the Committee was satisfied that it had been fair and open-minded in its approach to the problems affecting Sri Lanka, in that it reflected on the increased violence in the country and the options available to its president to resolve the conflict. The Committee did not uphold the complaint. In conclusion the Committee was satisfied that neither the articles on the BBC News website nor the report on From Our Own Correspondent had breached guidelines on impartiality, accuracy or the use of the term “terrorist”. The Committee was satisfied that there was no evidence in any of the reports to suggest that the BBC showed a bias in favour of the LTTE. It considered that all the reports had been objective and open-minded in their approach and had assisted in supporting fair and informed debate about the conflict in Sri Lanka. Finding: Not upheld. bbc.co.uk, BBC News, Clitheroe Mosque Application pages 6 April 2005, 29 November 2006, 21 and 22 December 2006 1 The ESC’s responsibility regarding this appeal This complaint was a first-party complaint which was made by the Chairman of the Planning & Development Committee of the Ribble Valley Borough Council (RVBC) on behalf of the Council. The complaint concerned the BBC News website’s coverage of the proposal for a new mosque in Clitheroe. The complaint had already been considered and upheld by the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU). However, the complainant appealed to the Editorial Standards Committee (ESC) on the grounds that he felt that the changes that were made to the BBC News web pages in response to his complaint were “inadequate”. 2 The context and background A history of the event provided by the complainant explained that on 21 December 2006 Ribble Valley Borough Council (RVBC) considered a planning application submitted by the Medina Islamic Education Centre (MIEC) to convert “a factory into a place of worship and community centre”. In the lead-up to the application being considered there was intense local media interest in the forthcoming decision of the Council. (BBC Radio Lancashire, North West Tonight and the BBC website covered the story extensively with local radio reporting live from the 22 December planning meeting.) Interest concerned not only the number of applications that MIEC had made to the council over a period of 30 years, but also concerned an “unrelated” ruling (in planning terms) by the Local Government Ombudsman, who had requested that the RVBC pay the petitioners of the planning application, who were acting on behalf of MIEC, £250 in compensation for not following accepted good practice when the Policy & Finance Committee (RVBC) refused to sell them Council-owned land so that they could build a mosque, even though the Ombudsman noted that the Council “was entitled to make the decision”. The background to the complaint Following the Planning Committee’s decision on 22 December 2006, the complainant wrote to both the BBC and Ofcom in January 2007 raising objections about how the story was covered on Radio Lancashire, North West Tonight and the BBC’s website. Ofcom considered his complaints against Radio Lancashire and North West Tonight under section 7 (Fairness) of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code. ECU agreed to consider the issues relating to the BBC’s website as these fell outside Ofcom’s remit. Therefore the complaint, as far as the ESC was concerned, related only to the four reports on bbc.co.uk which covered this story. 3 The complaint The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies). The complainant made the following complaint to BBC Information, which the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU) investigated without a previous stage 1 response. The complainant’s letter of 4 January suggested that the BBC website’s reporting of the story regarding planning permission for a mosque in Clitheroe, Lancashire, breached the OFCOM Broadcasting Code regarding ‘Due Impartiality, Accuracy & Undue Prominence of Views’ (section 5). In his letter of complaint relating to the following web pages: ‘Force apology over racist remarks’, bbc.co.uk, 6 April 2005 ‘Council mosque decision “flawed”’, bbc.co.uk, 29 November 2006 ‘Council decides on town’s mosque’, bbc.co.uk, 21 December 2006 ‘Controversial mosque plan backed’, bbc.co.uk, 22 December 2006 he stated: • The web pages contained errors which “erroneously painted the Council in a bad light”. • In two of the items (6 April and 28 November) the views of the Council had not been sought, only those of representatives of MIEC. • As a result of the reports on the BBC website, other media organisations picked up on the items and repeated the incorrect statements. The complainant stated that, as a result of these reports and the reporting on BBC radio and television: • The “matter has been extremely stressful”. • “These misleading reports have led to abuse in letters to the members of the RVBC Planning Committee.” • It had also led to the Planning Committee’s integrity being questioned, and to the Planning Committee being accused of racism in the making of its decisions. The complainant requested that he receive a public apology and similar compensation to that given to the petitioners of the MIEC by the Local Government Ombudsman (£250), which he would donate to charity. ECU’s response to the initial complaint ECU considered the complaint against the BBC editorial guideline on accuracy and upheld the complaint in part, noting: • The four web pages highlighted by the complainant had contained several factual errors. • ECU provided a reason for the errors occurring and included that in its finding. • The web pages had been corrected and updated by amending or removing all the points highlighted by the complainant. • The editor responsible passed on his apologies and made assurances to ECU that, in future, complex stories of this nature would always be checked by the BBC Lancashire news editor before publication. ECU published its finding on the complaint on the BBC Complaints website. This stated: The reports were compiled by a team in Manchester on the basis of material broadcast by BBC North West and Radio Lancashire, for sub-editing and formatting by a separate team in Birmingham. During this process, details of the story should have been checked with the original reporters, but that did not happen in this case. As a result, the pages contained a number of errors about the history of the Council’s conduct in the matter and the extent to which it had been subject to criticism by the Local Government Ombudsman. The inaccuracies were removed or corrected in response to Cllr Sherras’ complaint, and the Unit considered the complaint to have been resolved on that basis. The complainant responded to ECU with the following concerns: • The complainant stated that the web pages still contained errors and suggested further amendments. • No reference was made on the website that the pages were corrected as a result of an upheld complaint. ECU responded: • The suggestions made by the complainant were “largely matters of emphasis rather than fact”. The ECU was satisfied that the reports on the website were now fair and accurate. • In response to the suggestion that a reference should be made on the website to note the changes on the web pages: “...a summary of my finding, making clear that there were factual errors in the previous version, will be posted on the complaints pages of bbc.co.uk. The contents of the summary would enable interested readers to search for the pages in question, so I don’t think it is necessary to include a link.” The complainant appealed to the ESC, as follows: i) He requested that the web pages dated 21 and 22 December should include a reference stating that independent planning inspectors had confirmed that the Council’s refusals of applications were correct: “In view of the strong emphasis given to ‘8 attempts to build a mosque’ & ‘number of applications ... but all have been refused” and the consequent strong probability that the layperson reader will infer that the decisions were taken because they were for a mosque & not for sound planning reasons it is vital that this extra information be given.” ii) “Extremely strong exception is taken to the retention of the special ‘box’ containing the comment by Sheraz Arshad of MIEC in the ‘Council mosque decision flawed’ web page. Those may have been his words but it is completely untrue & his opinion only...” (web page dated 29 November) iii) “The ‘Force apology over racist remarks’ web page ... unnecessarily contains the words ‘Council Chamber at Ribble Valley Council’. It gives a completely wrong ‘steer’ & the average reader will almost certainly infer that the Council was controlling the meeting ... It adds nothing else to the story.” (web page 6 April 2005) 4 Applicable programme standards Section 3 – Accuracy Introduction The BBC’s commitment to accuracy is a core editorial value and fundamental to our reputation. Our output must be well sourced, based on sound evidence, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, precise language. We should be honest and open about what we don’t know and avoid unfounded speculation. For the BBC accuracy is more important than speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. All the relevant facts and information should be weighed to get at the truth. If an issue is controversial, relevant opinions as well as facts may need to be considered. We aim to achieve accuracy by: • The accurate gathering of material using first hand sources wherever possible. • checking and cross checking the facts. • validating the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material. • corroborating claims and allegations made by contributors wherever possible. Misleading audiences We should not distort known facts, present invented material as fact, or knowingly do anything to mislead our audiences. We may need to label material to avoid doing so. 5 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. First, the Committee wished to endorse ECU’s approval of the action already taken by Radio Lancashire and the web team in Manchester with regard to amendments that had already been made to the web pages. As to the complainant’s request for further amendments, the Committee made the following comments. With regard to the requested amendment of the article ‘Controversial mosque plan backed’ dated 22 December 2006, the Committee noted what was said in the article: “It is the eighth attempt by the town’s Muslim community to build a mosque in the town, with previous plans being strongly opposed by some residents.” The Committee was satisfied that the reference to the eight attempts by the Muslim community (MIEC) in the town of Clitheroe to build a mosque or place for religious instruction and occasional prayer was a fair description of the number of applications, not solely planning applications, made to the Council by MIEC. It considered it appropriate and acceptable for the article to report that fact without further attribution. As to the suggestion that the quote by Sheraz Arshad be removed from the web page titled ‘Council mosque decision flawed’ dated 29 November 2006, the Committee noted the comment in which Mr Arshad stated: “All we are talking about here is a planning application for a place of worship and it should be looked at as nothing else.” The Committee recognised that this was not a planning application, but was satisfied that the quote had been appropriately included in the item given the context of the report and that the comment was from Mr Arshad, a spokesperson for MIEC, who was at the centre of the story. The Committee was also satisfied that the quote did not mislead the reader as to the content of the report as the article explained fully that the issue was not related to a planning application but to a purchase of land. Finally, in relation to the removal of the wording “Council Chamber at the Ribble Valley Council” from the web page entitled ‘Force apology over racist remarks’ dated 6 April 2005, the Committee was in agreement that it would have been misleading to have removed this wording as it was an accurate statement about where the incident occurred. The Committee noted that the report gave full details about the nature of the meeting in the Council Chamber and the fact that it was not a Council meeting. It was therefore satisfied that no further action needed to be taken. The Committee therefore concluded that there was no requirement to add to the changes already made to the various web pages by Radio Lancashire and the Manchester web team. The Committee also considered whether it was appropriate for the web pages to include comments that they had been amended following the initial complaint. The Committee noted the response made by ECU which suggested that: “...[as] it is not possible to access a previous version of a BBC News Online page because of the way they are created ... there is no possibility of someone being able to read the original, inaccurate page. That being the case, I think it’s sufficient in this instance that current web pages are accurate, and that a summary of my finding, making clear there were factual errors in the previous version, will be posted on the complaints pages of bbc.co.uk. The contents of the summary would enable interested readers to search for the pages in question.” The Committee was satisfied that this was the most appropriate approach to adopt in this circumstance and as such endorsed the actions of ECU. Finding: The Committee endorsed the previous amendments to the web pages carried out by Radio Lancashire and the web team in Manchester, but was satisfied that no further amendments were required. Today Radio 4, 24 January 2007 1 The ESC’s responsibility regarding this appeal This complaint concerning the Today programme was considered and partially upheld by the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU). The complainant appealed to the Editorial Standards Committee (ESC) on the grounds that he was unhappy with the action that resulted from this finding. The complainant felt that “the BBC ought to correct themselves in public forthwith” and asked the ESC to consider whether the resulting action from the ruling was sufficient. 2 The context This edition of the Today programme included an interview between James Naughtie and the Archbishop of York, Dr John Sentamu. The discussion focused on whether Catholic adoption agencies should be able to refuse to place children with gay couples. 3 The transcript JAMES NAUGHTIE: The Cardinal is leader of a church in this country that teaches that homosexuality is a sin, that is not a view you share, do you? DR JOHN SENTAMU: No, but it doesn’t mean that on this particular issue about the adoption agency he hasn’t got a case. I think he has made his case very carefully. JAMES NAUGHTIE: But you are not supporting him on the grounds that you share a view of that sexual orientation as being inherently sinful. DR JOHN SENTAMU: The Church of England is very clear that sexual orientation is not sinful. What the Church of England goes on to say is that homosexual acts fall short of the glory of God like adultery and fornication and they require repentance. But pure “being oriented” in a particular sexual way should not bar anybody from anything, I mean that is very clear. 4 The complaint The complaint can be briefly summarised as follows: • “[The interview was] a direct misrepresentation of the Catholic position by both parties, although led by Naughtie and the BBC, which should not go uncorrected as it contributes to very real prejudice and discrimination against Catholics.” The complaint and BBC responses are summarised below (quotes are extracts from the complaint and replies): • “...the teaching of the Catholic Church on this matter is exactly the same as that of the Church of England, i.e. that ALL sexual activity outside of the marriage (of a man and a woman) is sinful.” • “I suggest again that this misrepresentation is itself the consequence of prejudice and discrimination against the Catholic Church by Mr Naughtie and the BBC.” BBC information responded at stage 1 of the complaints process, stating: • “We have covered the views of Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor widely and attempted to explain them as fully as possible.” • “We accept this is a difficult and contentious issue and we have no wish to misrepresent either side. In the course of a live interview it is difficult to enter into a detailed explanation or discourse on what exactly amounts to ‘sinful’ or is seen as a ‘sin’ by the church.” • “The interviewer was attempting to find out if Mr Sentamu’s views were comparable to the church and the reference to homosexuality as a ‘sin’ was in this context but we regret if you feel the difference between the ‘act’ and the ‘sexual orientation’ was not made clear.” The complainant escalated his complaint to the Editorial Complaints Unit (ECU) at stage 2, commenting: • There was a fundamental misunderstanding of the complaint. • “If he [James Naughtie] raises it [the point about what exactly amounts to ‘sinful’ or is seen as a ‘sin’ by the church] he and the BBC should ensure it is dealt with impartially and accurately, in however much time and detail is possible.” • The difference between the “act” and the “sexual orientation” was made clear by Dr Sentamu, but it was mistakenly asserted and allowed to go uncorrected that this was a difference between the churches. • “I suggest that this was done deliberately ... [Mr] Naughtie and the editorial position of the Today programme and the BBC is prejudiced and biased against the Papacy, the Catholic Church and indeed all orthodox Christian belief, and that this episode breaches the editorial guidelines of impartiality and accuracy.” • “...I contend that you are in fact deliberately and consciously propagating a secularist doctrine.” ECU responded at stage 2 of the process: • ECU upheld the element of the complaint concerned with accuracy. It was satisfied that the complainant’s comment: “It is not homosexual orientation, but ‘homosexual acts’ which the Catholic Church regards as sinful, and the Anglican position doesn’t differ from this in any way which is material to the point you make.” was endorsed by the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992) and the relevant resolutions of the 1998 Lambeth Conference. • ECU did not uphold the element of the complaint that suggested the programme was biased against the “Papacy, the Catholic Church and indeed all orthodox Christian belief” as it was satisfied that it was a slip of the tongue and not a deliberate misrepresentation to advance a secular agenda for two reasons: i) “The position the Archbishop set out reflected what you have described as a ‘broad consensus among all orthodox Christians’, so, although it was wrongly contrasted with the Catholic position, it was not the orthodox consensus which was made to ‘appear extreme’.” ii) “If the idea of deliberation is accepted, it would imply collusion on the part of the Archbishop in refraining from correcting James Naughtie’s initial misstatement, and I don’t think it likely that the Archbishop would collude in the promotion of a secularist agenda...” ECU published its finding on the complaint on the BBC Complaints website. This stated: BBC Editorial Complaints Unit’s ruling: This was a slip on James Naughtie’s part. It is homosexual acts which are sinful according to Catholic teaching, not homosexual orientation, and Anglican teaching does not differ from this in any way material to the complaint. Further action The Deputy Editor of Today has discussed the points arising from the finding with James Naughtie. The topic will be discussed at the Radio News Editorial Strategy Meeting. The complainant appealed to the ESC stating: • “...it is difficult to prove active deliberation – it is in effect Naughtie’s and the BBC’s word against mine – his [ECU] reasons for rejecting my assertion are dismal.” • “To attempt to evade responsibility by saying that the Archbishop did not correct him is shameful, and a childish derogation of responsibility.” • “Naughtie and the BBC ought to correct themselves in public forthwith.” 5 The Committee’s decision The Committee considered the complaint against the relevant editorial standards, including the BBC’s values and other standards set out in the Editorial Guidelines. The Committee took into account all the material before it relating to the appeal: this included submissions from all the relevant parties to the complaint who were asked to comment on the material going before the Committee. The Committee endorsed ECU’s decision to uphold the complaint on the issue of accuracy. It was satisfied, however, that the error was due to a misinformed view, rather than a slip of the tongue, and believed that this view was supported by the fact that James Naughtie repeated this perceived difference between Catholic and Anglican views. The Committee did not consider that further action was required by the programme or BBC management in the shape of an on-air apology, as this would have been a disproportionate response to what was an unfortunate error in light of the programme as a whole. As to the suggestion that this was an example of a systemic bias against the Catholic and other orthodox Christian faiths in favour of secularism, the Committee was satisfied that there was no evidence to support such a claim either in the way the programme had handled this issue or in BBC output. The Committee did not uphold the complaint. Finding: The Committee endorsed ECU’s finding and was satisfied that the action taken by BBC management was appropriate. As to the complaint of systemic bias against the Catholic and other Christian faiths, the Committee did not uphold the complaint. Other editorial standards matters This section looks at findings by the Committee regarding breaches of guidelines declared by the Executive and about which the Executive has provided a report to the Committee. The breaches have not been brought to the ESC on appeal. The ESC has ensured that before requesting a report from the Executive the complaints process has come to an end. Newsnight: Act of Disunion BBC Two, 16 January 2007 and Newsnight BBC Two, 26 June 2007 The Committee welcomed Mark Byford (Deputy Director General, Chairman of the Complaints Management Board and Chairman of the Editorial Standards Board), and David Jordan (Controller Editorial Policy) who joined the meeting to discuss a report by BBC management requested by the ESC on two incidents involving the Newsnight programme. A summary of the two incidents and the ESC action is outlined below. A Newsnight: Act of Disunion, BBC Two, 16 January 2007 In a special edition of Newsnight pegged to the 300th anniversary of the Scottish Parliament voting for the Act of Union, the presenter of Newsnight, Jeremy Paxman, put an unscripted question to Alex Salmond which referred to a straw poll conducted by the programme of the 25 largest companies in Scotland and the 25 top FTSE companies to find out if they favoured Scottish independence. A majority answered that they did not have an opinion, or did not want to give an opinion; six said they were against independence; none said they were in favour. It was decided that the straw poll, which was conducted by a Newsnight researcher, did not merit a graphics sequence, but it was discussed during the pre-broadcast briefing. On air Jeremy Paxman made the following unscripted comments: JEREMY PAXMAN (JP): Alex Salmond, we spoke to the 25 largest companies in Britain and the 25 largest companies in Scotland and not one of them favoured independence. ALEX SALMOND (AS): Well, there’s plenty of prominent Scottish businessmen, most recently Sir Tom Farmer, but many others, who do favour Scottish independence, and... JP: Well I’m telling you we spoke to the 25 top companies in Britain and Scotland and none of them... AS: Well, well, Jeremy, I’m a former economist with the Royal Bank of Scotland. The Royal Bank of Scotland has no view on the constitutional situation. JP: It has no publicly expressed view for very obvious reasons. AS: It has no view at all and I can assure you that that is exactly the case. Now, many prominent Scottish business people are in favour of independence and I think there is a sea-change in the business community and, you know, a poll just this Sunday showed a majority of people thinking we would benefit from independence and I can see why because people look around, they see the success of our near independent neighbours: Ireland, Norway, both countries smaller than Scotland – both have gained their independence in the past century... The Editorial Complaints Unit investigated a viewer’s complaint at stage 2 of the complaints process that no details had been given of the poll which presumably gave rise to this statement, and that the statement was in any case misleading. It considered Jeremy Paxman’s comment “We spoke to the 25 largest companies in Britain and the 25 largest companies in Scotland and not one of them favoured independence” was unwarranted. The claim that none favoured it [independence], or that the biggest Scottish and British companies were ranged against it was in breach of impartiality in relation to a party political matter. The ECU therefore upheld the complaint in part. The ECU then discussed its finding with the editor of Newsnight and his senior management team, who were reminded of the importance of clarity and transparency when reporting and describing snapshots and straw polls of opinion on stories and subjects, as distinct from fully- fledged scientific polls or surveys. As result of this incident, BBC management reported to the ESC that it has proposed a number of actions: • Newsnight will in future, regarding the use of any polling or survey information, ensure that questions are scripted and the information is where possible accompanied by a graphic. • Following discussion at Complaints Management Board and within News, Ric Bailey, Chief Adviser Politics, as part of a new guidance note he is preparing on polls, surveys and votes to supplement the Editorial Guidelines, will include specific advice and definitions for all programme makers on straw polls and surveys of this kind. • In his guidance note, Ric Bailey, Chief Political Adviser, plans to make specific reference to straw polls and the ways in which they differ from surveys and opinion polls. The ESC endorsed the finding of the ECU with regard to the breach of political bias and accuracy, but was satisfied that the recommendations put forward by BBC management and the Newsnight programme were appropriate. Action: The Committee requested that the guidance being prepared on polls, surveys, votes and straw polls be shared with it prior to it being published on the Editorial Policy website. B Newsnight, BBC Two, 26 June 2007 A freelance film-maker came to Newsnight at the beginning of Gordon Brown’s leadership campaign and offered to make a film about the accessibility of Gordon Brown. Eighteen months previously, the film-maker had made a film for Newsnight in a similar style about David Cameron’s leadership campaign and his proposal was to ask the same basic question about the openness and accessibility of the new Labour Party leader as he followed him over five weeks. The film was intended to be unorthodox and light-hearted but had an editorial purpose, which was to test whether Gordon Brown was, as he portrayed himself, an open and listening Prime Minster. Newsnight did not immediately commission the film, but expressed interest in seeing what would be produced and agreed to have a “first look”. The film-maker was deliberately kept at arm’s length from the production as the experiment was to see how an outsider – not a Newsnight team – would fare. In the weeks that followed, on the basis of the material shown to the editor and deputy editor of Newsnight, the programme agreed to go ahead with the project. The day before transmission the editor approved a rough cut where he asked for some minor changes. Newsnight was unaware that any of the material of the film had been reordered until the day after transmission – on 27 June 2007 – when it received an email from a special adviser to Gordon Brown, pointing out that the footage involving a press officer had been edited together out of sequence. On questioning by Newsnight’s editor, the film-maker instantly acknowledged he had reordered the sequence. He felt that the reordering of the sequence involving the press officer gave her a clearer introduction to the audience and did not alter in any way the substance of the film. There followed an exchange of correspondence between the editor of Newsnight and the special adviser to Gordon Brown and also with the Head of News at the Treasury Press Office. The Treasury Press Office decided not to take the matter further. BBC management reported to the ESC that they had proposed a number of actions following the incident: • Since July, the BBC has introduced new documentation to support freelance contracts which makes the requirement to comply with the BBC’s editorial guidelines more explicit. • Any freelance found to be unwilling to adhere to the BBC Editorial Guidelines will not be used. • All independent and freelance contributors will in future be issued with editorial guidelines at the outset of their time with Newsnight. • Newsnight is working on purpose-made guide sheets for different types of films, for example investigations and secret filming. • A member of Newsnight’s production team, either a producer or correspondent, will seek to be involved in independent productions at an early stage. • Where that is not possible, the deputy editor in charge of film commissioning will be responsible for making sure the film is compliant. The Committee agreed with the conclusion of BBC management and the comment made by the Director of News, which was contained in a report from the Executive Board to the Trust on 18 July in which it was stated: “The Director of News felt that there may have been some unfairness to the press officer involved, and that viewers would have been given a (misleading) impression that the film followed a linear chronology.” The Committee concluded that this amounted to a breach of accuracy, but was satisfied that the programme and BBC management had taken appropriate action to prevent an incident like this being repeated. Action: The ESC was satisfied that appropriate action had been taken by BBC management regarding this issue. Live Earth BBC One and BBC Two, 7/8 July 2007 The Committee asked BBC management why it had decided not to include a time delay when showing the concert. The Committee was concerned that, following the broadcast of the Live 8 concert in 2006, Ofcom had noted that the BBC had offered to consider a delay in future as one of a number of solutions to prevent the viewing audience being offended by the broadcasting of the most offensive language pre-watershed, and yet the BBC had chosen not to use a time delay on the Live Earth concert. In the event the word “fuck” was broadcast at 13.58, 14.20 and 16.28 and “motherfuckers” at 17.37. The word “fucking” was broadcast at 19.40. BBC management argued that they were concerned that live events should be live. They also explained that there was some risk of the broadcast of the most offensive language in any live event, including sporting events, but it would not be proportionate to introduce a time delay in all such events. Additionally, BBC management suggested that: • Any delay would have to be significant to enable a decision on language. • A delay might encourage performers to use offensive language in the knowledge that the language would be dipped. • Dipping sound was a blunt weapon which ran the risk of a trigger-happy reaction that would severely affect the viewer and listener experience. • To dip sound following the identification of the most offensive language in material which had been subjected to a brief time delay in a live event such as a concert with a great deal of ambient noise could be very unsatisfactory in that the language might not in fact be obscured. BBC management also explained what had been done to safeguard against the use of bad language. The event producers had: • Met with the Live Earth organisers to ensure that they were aware of BBC policy and UK broadcasting regulation. • Obtained written assurances from the organisers of the event that problems seen at previous events would not occur and that all required steps would be taken in relation to artists and management. • Contacted artists who were felt to be at risk of breaching guidelines regarding language, either directly or via their management. The production team had requested that artists perform “clean” versions of any numbers with bad language in the lyrics. • Provided the BBC teams working on the event with copies of the BBC’s Live Output Guidance and specially drawn-up Live Earth editorial guidelines. • Briefed network presenters working on Radio 1 and Radio 2 on the editorial issues relating to the event. • Made the presenters and production team fully aware of the need for appropriate apologies in the event of lapses. • Ensured that two separate individuals monitored the output for potential offence: one was located at the event in a monitoring area set aside for this purpose; the other was at home viewing as a member of the audience with direct communication to the production team. Unfortunately, the BBC’s efforts had not been sufficient to prevent the broadcast of the most offensive language, despite the foreseeable risks of a live event with pop stars. The Committee therefore considered this a serious breach of the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines. The Committee acknowledged the difficulty that management had in providing an exciting and entertaining programme without losing the edge of it being live. It also recognised the particular problems of broadcasting pre-watershed when a significant number of children would be attracted to an event. However, the Committee felt that these issues were not insurmountable and in future BBC management would be expected to avoid a recurrence of these problems. As to BBC management’s initial apology and explanation about the circumstances for not having a time delay, the Committee noted the comment it had published on the BBC Complaints website: We recognise that some viewers were concerned about the language during Live Earth. We had made it extremely clear to the management of the Live Earth event and artists beforehand that they should not swear during this live broadcast. We repeated this during the event and very much regret that some of them chose to ignore this. Presenters Jonathan Ross and Graham Norton apologised promptly and fulsomely for the small number of incidents which occurred before 10 o’clock and we regret that some viewers felt this was inadequate. The BBC has always broadcast major events such as Live Earth and the Concert for Diana live so that viewers can enjoy the true atmosphere of the concerts. This was a complex international transmission and we could not technically introduce a short time delay. We would only use a delay on a live broadcast in exceptional circumstances. It considered the explanation was at odds with the more detailed argument for not using the time delay which suggested that: • A time delay would in effect undermine the billing of an event as being live and as the event was accessible as live on other UK platforms it would have been inappropriate to broadcast it with a delay. • Ahort time delays can be a blunt instrument, relying on a censor to fade the sound when offensive language is heard and to fade it up again when the language stops. The system would be vulnerable to the risk of failing to obscure language effectively. • At a live rock event, monitoring takes place amid high sound levels and it may not always be apparent that lyrics have included offensive language. The Committee therefore considered that it was unacceptable for management to provide a response to the audience that was inaccurate in its detail and would remind BBC management of the requirement for it to be open in admitting mistakes. Action: The Committee decided that any further breaches of guidelines regarding the use of the most offensive language pre-watershed when broadcasting concerts such as Live Earth should be avoided and that any repetition would be unacceptable. The Committee would request that the online response be changed to reflect accurately the reasons for not using a time delay.