The remarkable story of Abdul Haq, warrior, peacemaker, visionary and martyr, whose fight to bring Afghanistan freedom and peace brought about his death.
DIRECTOR INTERVIEW: MALCOLM BRINKWORTH
BBC Four: For people who've never heard of Abdul Haq, why
was he an important figure?
Malcolm Brinkworth: First, he was probably one of the most
successful and respected commanders during the Soviet-Afghanistan
War. Secondly, he was a man of principal. He espoused all the kinds
of banners we think we stand for in the West, like truth, honesty
and integrity. All the people who worked with him during that war
said he had no anger or division over ethnicity, over which tribe
or part of Afghanistan you came from. Thirdly, he was also the man
who got things done. He was a highly effective commander and organiser.
Everywhere we went in our research, most people agreed that Abdul
Haq was one of the most important figures in Afghanistan. That's
why the Pakistan officials and the ISI didn't really like him. Haq
wouldn't tow the line. When I was looking at the whole history of
the last 25 years it became clear that you can see the whole conflict
through Haq's eyes. You can understand what happened in the Soviet-Afghan
War, you can understand the way the Pakistan Government and the
CIA played things out, and you can also understand what then led
to the kind of climate that made Afghanistan turn itself into a
terrorist state.
BBC Four: There's a lot in the film about American and Pakistani
involvement in Afghanistan. Did you set out to reveal a kind of
shadow history?
MB: Originally we didn't have the full story and part of
the process was trying to demystify and also uncover the truth about
what had gone on because it really didn't seem to make sense as
an outsider. Here we have a huge Cold War battle between East and
West fought out in the hills and cities of Afghanistan. A war that
went on between 1979 and 1989 into which the CIA and the Saudis
pumped millions of dollars. By the last two years of the war they
were pumping in $500m each, with Arabs coming in from all over the
world to be trained in the camps that would be subsequently be taken
over by al-Qaeda. Many seasoned experts told us that the CIA had
effectively lost control - with everything being run by Pakistan's
military intelligence organisation - the ISI. Despite the huge sums
being spent, there were no CIA people allowed into Afghanistan by
Pakistan's ISI. It seemed extraordinary.
| As we went on, it
became clear that if we were to understand the situation in
Afghanistan pre 9/11 under the Taleban, we also had to find
out what Haq had been doing during that period. It was then
that we uncovered all the efforts he had made to build a broad-based coalition to oppose the Taleban. |
 |
Shawalli Nasari, one of Haq's loyal
commanders
|
There were also numerous attempts
by various people to try to get him support in the US State Department,
the White House, the Department of Defense but all of them referred
Haq and his supporters to the CIA. It's at that point you realise
the CIA knew everything that was going on from 1996 to 2001. It
knew that al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were becoming more embedded
with the Taleban, it knew the Taleban were being financed, armed
and supported by Pakistani soldiers on the ground. Yet until the
Nairobi attacks the CIA and the American administration were thinking
of doing a joint pipeline across Afghanistan. Nothing was done to
help men like Haq, not even after Americans had died.
BBC Four: What were the reactions of the Americans you interviewed
on looking back on the 1980s and 90s?
MB: Some of them regret the actions that have not taken place
since the end of Soviet-Afghan War. They think further action should
have been taken. The Clinton administration withdrew and effectively
put on a blindfold between 1991 and 1998. As Robert McFarlane says
in the film: "To ignore South Asia was a historic error. Not
to leave enough people around from the CIA or the State Department
to keep us informed about what was going on during the Clinton years
was an appalling failure... It's clearly evident that by end of
1996 and early 1997 that al-Qaeda was putting down roots there that
this would represent to us and to others a real threat."
Abdul Haq is the one man who said, "I won't be your puppet
but you actually need to join with us to make this work, otherwise
the US policy is going to backfire in the longer term". Many
former officials tried to persuade people to act before the horrific
events of 9/11 - but the CIA made it clear that it had no intention
of doing so. There was no interest. But to make matters worse, after
9/11 they played a double game. The Americans actually went on record
saying that Abdul Haq was one of the chosen people they were going
to back in their efforts to topple the Taleban.
| However,
the reality is that Haq got nothing. The CIA refused to back
him, despite clear evidence that senior members of the Taleban
were in discussions about switching sides under his leadership.
While they dished out hundreds of thousands of dollars to others,
the only help Haq received was the offer of two satellite telephones,
which had to be a calculated insult. |
|
Abdul Haq's grave |
BBC Four: How do you think Afghanistan would look know if
Abdul Haq had been able to put his vision into practice?
MB: Abdul Haq did not want to become the president of Afghanistan.
He had no overall yearning for political power. He confessed to
his brother, "Do you know what my dream is? I'd love to have
become mayor of Kabul so I could rebuild the capital city so it's
a place fit for all Afghans." I think in Afghanistan at the
moment you have a lot of tension, you have a lot of people upset
not only by what the Taleban did but also by the imbalance of power
among the different ethnic groupings. There's also a great deal
of resentment over the lack of visible progress in reconstructing
the country. I feel that if they are going to build a modern, unified
Afghanistan for all Afghans Haq would have enabled the people to
say, "We trust you, we're behind you, you're going to try and
heal the wounds in conjunction with Hamid Karzai, with the Northern
Alliance and everybody else." Haq was the one man they could
all count on. As one of the senior Afghan politicians said to me,
"Losing him was like losing the best leader Afghanistan never
had."
